‘India needs to carry out more N-tests to get it right’

The government should set up an independent panel to review the data of India’s 1998 hydrogen bomb test to end the debate over its efficacy, says K Santhanam, ex-deputy director of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

India will need to “carry out two to three tests” to ensure its hydrogen bomb is working and “not rush to sign” the comprehensive test ban treaty, he says.

The panel should include retired “stalwarts in the field”, he suggests. The full report will have to be classified but “a sanitised version of one or two pages” could be made public.

Santhanam triggered the debate in August by saying the hydrogen bomb test’s explosive yield had been only 25 kilotonnes, and not the official 40-50 kilotonnes.

The debate has since split the nuclear establishment. It has been argued that the DRDO, and thus Santhanam, had no access to the test data. However, sources say because of the close relations between the scientists involved, Santhanam was known to have been “made aware of the primary data”.

Critics also say the sceptical assessment was based on partial information. DRDO handled only some of the instruments used to measure the explosion — ground motion and fibre-optic sensors and shockwave accelerometers.

The Department of Atomic Energy, which claims the test was a success, used radiochemical analysis. “My arguments are still solid, ” says Santhanam.

There is no reason to be embarrassed about hydrogen bomb test failure, he says. “No country in the world succeeded in the first try.”

But he believes that India’s nuclear deterrent is not credible with warheads limited to 15 kilotonnes — the yield of a successful fusion bomb test.

Brajesh Mishra, national security adviser during the tests, contests Santhanam’s claim that the issue of the yield was decided by a “voice vote” in a 1998 meeting. “There was no voice vote.” S K Sikka of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre did most of the explaining and he doubted, as Santhanam has claimed, there were any military officers present.

“There are people in the world who still believe the world is flat. What more can I say?” 😀

http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-needs-to-carry-out-more-N-tests-to-get-it-right/H1-Article1-455523.aspx

Some one is lying big time as usual the public is s*****d

Responsibilities on Indian Navy increased after 26/11: Verma

Naval Chief Admiral Nirmal Kumar Verma today said that responsibilities of the Indian Navy has increased post 26/11 terror attacks and suggested to bring all coastal vigilance agencies “under a single security magnet”.

Addressing a ceremonial parade at the Indian Navy’s helicopter base INS Shikra, Verma said, “After last year’s 26/11 incident, lots of developments took place and at the same time the responsibilities in terms of coastal security have increased. We should bring all agencies involved in the coastal vigilance like Marine Police and Customs under one security magnet and ensure effective co-ordination.”

On his first visit to Mumbai after assuming office as the Navy Chief, Verma said, “Western Naval Command always had greater resposibilies ever since Navy’s inception and it met all responsibilties.”

“An exercise for Navy personnel was conducted in Western Naval Command recently and we have learnt several lessons in the exercise. More exercises should be conducted to enable us to keep pace with security challenges,” he said.

He expressed optimism that if big responsibilties are given, the Navy will surely meet them.

“To strenghthen the Navy, more aircraft will be procured. With more equipment, we will find ourselves confident in facing most difficult of situation we may face at sea route,” he said.*

http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/responsibilitiesindian-navy-increased-after-2611-verma/73811/on

* = E2D Hawkeye ? :diablo:

Admiral Arun Prakash: The Arihant In Perspective

The following column, providing a robust and authentic account of India’s ATV SSBN programme, the first by a former Navy Chief after the launch of the submarine in July, appears in FORCE Magazine

Following close in the wake of India’s nuclear submarine launch, former Navy Chief Sureesh Mehta’s observations about the yawning gap between the militaries of China and India created a minor flutter in the media. But his candid admission revealed no secrets. In fact his remarks should serve to focus attention on the contrasting approaches of the two nations. We seem to have pinned all our hopes on high GDP growth triggering a Biblical “loaves and fish” miracle in India. The Chinese, on the other hand, adopting a multi-track approach, have ensured balanced growth of their nation by pursuing all constituents of Comprehensive National Power; economic, technological, diplomatic, social, cultural, and of course, military. It is in situations of asymmetry such as this, as Pakistan has repeatedly demonstrated to us, that a nuclear deterrent comes in handy if brandished noisily. Since that is not our style, let us at least dust off the cobwebs, mental and actual, and take stock of where our own nuclear deterrent stands after the launch of the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) on 26th July 2009.

Obsessive Secrecy?

The ATV project has been probably one of India’s worst kept secrets. A Google search for “ATV Submarine“ would, on any day, would throw up between 100, 000 to 200, 000 results ranging from news snippets, blog discussions and Wikipedia articles to learned analyses on the Federation of American Scientists website. Every aspect of the project has been discussed threadbare in cyber-space by self-appointed experts, amateur security analysts and plain nuts; sprinkled with inputs from retired scientists and an occasional press release by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Naval HQ have been content to maintain stoic silence about the ATV in the face of this tell-tale evidence and using, as a last resort, the “neither confirm nor deny” line to fend off the inquisitive media. Perhaps there was a method in all this secrecy and we did manage to befuddle everyone who tried to garner the truth from the heap of disinformation and half-truths available in the public domain on the ATV.

But the trouble with excessive secrecy is that while it may or may not deceive the enemy, it can certainly obfuscate the truth and lead you to the wrong conclusions; often with deleterious consequences. Now that the submarine is out of the closet, we need to discuss some aspects of this project which has a vital bearing on national security.

Project Management Paradigm

India must be unique amongst nations that undertake major expenditure on defence R&D in that; both timelines and cost ceilings are infinitely flexible and neither accountability nor responsibility for delays, or even failure, are ever affixed. Subjective in-house “peer reviews” can never be a substitute for hardnosed audits and progress-checks by independent experts, as well as end-users. The dismal story of projects like the Kaveri turbo-jet engine, the Light Combat Aircraft, the Arjun battle tank and the Trishul surface-to-air missile could have been very different, had they not been wrapped in furtive secrecy and been subjected, instead, to periodic scrutiny and oversight.

Of all the DRDO projects, to date, perhaps it is only the ATV which has forged ahead steadily, and, even after allowing for time and cost overruns as well as other shortcoming, can be called an outstanding success story. While we will dwell on some of the issues later, it can be stated up-front that this major achievement is mainly attributable to three factors, which should provide salutary lessons for the other two Services. The high level of synergy and co-ordination attained by the IN, DRDO and Department of Atomic Energy (DAE).

The tremendous good sense displayed by DRDO in placing the Navy in the driving seat, resulting in the intimate participation of the end-user in the project. The sustained and non-invasive support provided by successive Secretaries of DRDO to the project.

Genesis and Growth

The IN had begun to examine the viability of indigenous design and construction of a nuclear submarine as far back as 1967, and the initiative gathered momentum soon after the 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion”. By 1978 a small IN-DAE team had been located at BARC to undertake serious design and feasibility studies. This study obviously brought home the magnitude of the colossal challenge posed by this undertaking, and it was decided to approach the USSR for assistance.

A decade after signing the 1971 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the Soviet Deputy Defence Minister Marshal Ogarkov made an unprecedented offer, to lease a nuclear powered submarine to India along with a training and maintenance package. In 1988 a Charlie I Class (Project 670) Soviet nuclear attack submarine (SSN) arrived in Indian waters on a 3-year lease. Renamed INS Chakra, this SSN carried neither the weapons nor the systems for a strategic role, and therefore served a limited purpose; that of providing experience to IN personnel in the operation, maintenance and deployment of a nuclear-propelled submarine.

Tagged on to the lease offer had been an option for acquiring Soviet “assistance for design and construction of a nuclear-powered submarine” at a later date. Sometimes in the mid-1980s, in a far-sighted initiative, the IN and the DRDO joined forces, to constitute the Advanced Technology Vessel Project as an R&D venture. Funded by DRDO, the project was headed by a three-star Director General and manned largely by naval personnel.

On completion of preliminary concept studies, realization began to dawn on the ATV group, of the immense complexity of most disciplines involved in this ambitious project. The heart of this 6000 ton nuclear-powered vessel would be miniature low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuelled pressurized light-water reactor (PWR) delivering about 90 megawatts (120,000 horsepower) of power to drive it at 25 knots.

Unlike civilian power reactors which operate at a steady state, a naval reactor has to respond instantly to repeated variations in power for ship maneuvering. Nuclear safety, radiation, shock, quieting, and operating performance requirements in addition to operation in close proximity to the crew dictate exceptionally high standards for design, manufacturing and quality assurance. Once on patrol, a submarine’s reactor remains inaccessible for inspection or replacement throughout its core life — unlike a typical commercial nuclear reactor which can be shut down for refueling or repairs as required.

For scientists used to designing shore-based natural uranium/heavy water reactors spread over a couple of football fields, miniaturizing reactor components to fit inside a 20×20 foot compartment, with the whole assembly weighing no more than 300-400 tons, posed an insurmountable obstacle. No less daunting were the challenges of submarine design, hull fabrication and underwater missile launch, to name just a few.

ATV Spin-offs

The promised Russian assistance, both material and intellectual did come; albeit in fits and starts which accounted for most of the programme delays, and at prices which escalated at a breathtaking rate. However, Indians being quick learners, our scientists, engineers and designers too, rapidly gained proficiency in many of the complex technologies involved in nuclear submarine construction. In this process, DAE scientists also succeeded in building and fuelling a small shore-based reactor in Kalpakkam, which now serves as a useful training aid for submarine crews. In addition, there are many areas in which the tremendously beneficial fall-out of the ATV project has gone un-noticed by the public. Firstly, a large number of private sector companies have not just participated but contributed most significantly to the project by mastering esoteric techniques and technologies, to design and fabricate major systems for the vessel. Secondly, the ATV HQ has spawned a huge indigenization process in which small and medium ancillary industries all over the country have participated to contribute sub-systems and components manufactured to high precision and reliability specifications. Lastly, DRDO and other defence laboratories have come up trumps in developing some excellent products like combat-management systems, sonars, and electronic warfare systems for the ATV. The launch of the first ATV, whose correct current designation is S-2 (she will become INS Arihant only on commissioning in due course) is no doubt a most significant milestone in every respect and marks a major step in India’s quest for a ballistic missile armed submarine, known in US parlance as SSBN. However, in order to tread the thin line between skepticism and euphoria, and retain a balanced perspective, it is necessary to note the fact the S-2 is only the first step in a long journey, and it may be a year or more away from becoming an operational sea-going submarine.

More importantly, she may remain a “technology demonstrator” for a long time before attaining the status of a ballistic missile nuclear submarine or SSBN due to three major factors.

Stealth

The reasons why nations place a significant part of their nuclear arsenals on board SSBNs is because of their supposed undetectability. Once at its patrol depth of a few hundred meters in the murky ocean deep, the SSBN is considered safe from prying satellites and risk of attack, and poses a continuous, threat to the adversary with her battery of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

The only way to detect an SSBN, or any submarine for that matter, is through acoustics. The noise generated by a submarine’s hull, reactor, machinery, propeller and even her crew, across the full spectrum of frequencies can be picked up by the adversary’s listening devices mounted on ships, helicopters or submarines. Known as low-frequency recording and analysis or LOFAR devices, these sensors can detect submarine noise at tens of miles and pinpoint an SSBN within minutes. The Hollywood movie “Hunt for Red October” typified the deadly serious Cold War cat-and-mouse game played out between US and Soviet navies to locate and mark each other’s SSBNs, using LOFAR as well as sonar; with the Soviets usually at a disadvantage because of their traditionally noisier submarine designs. In our case, the first crucial test of the Arihant’s design will be the careful calibration of her underwater noise signature, which will determine her degree of invulnerability and suitability as a SLBM carrying platform. This may call for extensive trials involving minor adjustments or major design modifications – if not for S-2, certainly for her successors.

Reactor Design

For the submarine leg of the nuclear triad to have significance, there must be one or more fully armed SSBNs on continuous patrol, which could last for months. Before one SSBN returns home she must be relieved on patrol by another one. This obviously requires, not just, that there should be a certain minimum number of SSBNs available in one’s inventory, but also that at least 2-3 of them should be operationally available at any given time.

The most crucial factor in SSBN availability is her refueling cycle. Refueling, or replacing the enriched uranium fuel rods, of a submarine reactor is a complex dockyard operation which may take a submarine out of circulation for anything from 18-24 months.

The life of a reactor core is decided, apart from enrichment level of uranium fuel rods, by its operating regime. Since a SSBN has to travel long distances to its patrol area at high speeds, the power demand is invariably high and rapidly consumes reactor life. Reactor technology has been steadily advancing since the USS Nautilus first went to sea in 1954. Today the US Navy has 25 different types of reactors running into the 9th generation of development, many of such sophistication that, they do not require refueling throughout their lifetimes. The nuclear reactor installed on the S-2, according to open source information, is understood to be based on first or second generation Soviet era technology with a short re-fuelling cycle. The implications are that either her patrol areas will have to remain close to base, or that her endurance on patrol would be limited, and of course that there would be long gaps between patrols when refueling is under way. The shortcomings of this reactor design, demand larger submarine numbers at huge expense.

Missile Range

It is more than likely that Jin class SSBNs of the PLA Navy are, today, targeting both New Delhi and San Francisco with their 8000 km Ju-Long missiles from patrol areas in the home waters of the South China Sea. The effectiveness of the SSBN as an instrument of deterrence is obviously related to the range as well as number of SLBMs carried by her. While the SSBN does have the asset of mobility, her patrol areas must be chosen with great care to ensure that a valuable strategic asset of this nature is not placed in harm’s way. In this context, the shorter the range of her SLBM, the closer she must position herself to a hostile shore. In India’s case, the basic requirement is to deter China from threatening us with her considerable nuclear arsenal. This can only be achieved with SLBMs of inter-continental (5000-8000 km) range which have the warhead yield to threaten China’s cities and nuclear forces located deep inland. Such a missile would enable the SSBN to take up operational patrols in safe areas in the Bay of Bengal or even Arabian Sea. Missile range would also compensate, to an extent, for shortcomings in reactor design. The weapon slated for fitment on the S-2 is understood to be a SLBM whose range is currently limited to 700-1000 km. The successful underwater launch and flight trials of this missile (variously named by the media as Dhanush or K-15) is certainly a big feather in the DRDO’s cap, but its limited range constitutes a handicap for S-2. Moreover, this achievement needs to be assessed against the background that the DRDO’s 25 year old guided missile programme has yet to deliver an inter-continental ballistic missile.

At the same time ISRO, having obviously mastered the propellant technologies, routinely launches rockets which can achieve linear ranges of up to 10, 000 km. And yet the invisible firewall between the two organizations seems to prevent transfer of technology, even in national interest. While work on more advanced SLBMs is no doubt in progress, it has to be borne in mind that longer range missiles will have to be powered by propellant motors of larger length and diameter, and the resultant weapon is unlikely to fit within the hull of an Arihant class SSBN, in sufficient numbers (16-24).

After Arihant; What?

The launch of the S-2 is, no doubt, a most significant and encouraging demonstration of India’s technological skills and managerial expertise. But much more than that, this vessel will provide a trials platform which will enable us to learn from our own experience, what no one is going to teach us; the arcane disciplines of SSBN operations and maintenance. The main beneficiaries of this experience will be two submarines which follow S-2. The S-3 and S-4 are planned to be built on the same baseline design as S-2, in order to consolidate shipbuilding expertise and industrial capabilities. They will therefore incorporate only those capability enhancements which can be accommodated within the same hull-form and supported by the same nuclear power-plant. Therefore it is the fourth submarine in this series the S-5, still a few years ahead, which should be an object of sharp focus for not just the IN but even more so, the DAE and DRDO. In a 50-60 year perspective, India should be looking at a standing force of 4-6 SSBNs; accompanied, if possible by a smaller force of nuclear attack submarines or SSNs. While we are well on the way to achieving mastery over many of the technologies involved, there are three key areas which would need special focus: The acquisition of propellant technology for producing underwater launched ballistic missiles of inter-continental range. The length and diameter of the missile will decide the dimensions of the SSBN. These SLBM’s should preferably be capable of carrying 4-6 multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV).

The indigenous design of a SSBN hull which will be able to accommodate a battery of 16-24 such SLBMs. The indigenous design of a nuclear propulsion plants of about 200 megawatt capacity, with a 6-8 years refueling cycle, to drive a SSBN of 10,000-12,000 tons at about 30 knots.

Having committed ourselves to fielding a credible deterrent in the form of a nuclear triad, we no longer have a choice but to go down this route at the earliest. This is one area where dependence on foreign sources, especially for hardware, must be minimised and autarchy aimed for. Once we acquire indigenous capability for design and production of naval reactors and LEU cores, as well as long range SLBMs, we would have achieved such autarchy.

Future Project Management

The PLA Navy sent its first (Han class) nuclear submarine to sea in 1974, and today the Chinese nuclear flotilla consists of 3-4 Xia and Jin class SSBNs as well as 5-6 Han and Shang class SSNs. Given that we are already 30 years behind China in this field, there is not a day to be lost in committing the necessary capital as well as human resources from the Navy, DAE and DRDO to commence design and development work.

This is going to be a complex, laborious and time consuming endeavour, and a period of even 10-15 years for attaining the capabilities listed above may be optimistic. So far, Russia has remained the main source of technology for us, but in the changing circumstances, we must not shy away from seeking advanced reactor technology from the US or France for our strategic programmes. There is no doubt that the DRDO-Navy synergy worked well during the developmental phase of the ATV. With the launch of S-2, this project now needs to transition rapidly and seamlessly from R&D mode to serial production mode. The time has therefore come to create a new management structure in which all the national capabilities created for the ATV (in the public as well as private sectors) can be brought under an umbrella corporation for serial production of nuclear submarines for the IN. Lifting the pall of secrecy will promote a better dialogue with operators and lead to design improvements.

Command & Control

The protracted trials period of S-2 should be used by the Navy to prepare itself to enter a new and uncharted era of SSBN operations, maintenance, and above all, nuclear safety. In this context, two important issues come instantly to mind.

From the time she sails out for a deterrent patrol, till her return to harbor, a SSBN will form part of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and remain under its direct operational control. However, for all other purposes, the submarine would be like any other naval unit. This duality of control, and the specific modalities of change of operational control (CHOP), would need to be meticulously worked out, ensuring failsafe communication between the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), Chairman COSC, Commander SFC and Captain of the SSBN.

Nuclear weapon preparation/assembly on land has, so far, involved participation of SFC, DAE and DRDO personnel. SSBN operations will involve a new paradigm for India because the SLBMs carried on patrol would be fully assembled, and possibly containerized, nuclear weapons, ready for launch when required. The launch order, to be executed jointly by the Captain of the SSBN and his second-in-command, will need to be duly authorized through secure and authenticated means by the National Command Authority. In order to ensure instant launch when ordered, and to prevent unauthorized launch, a system of software permissive action links (PALs) will have to be devised, along with triple-redundant underwater communications. These are complex issues which require time and resources to resolve.

(Admiral Prakash was India’s Chief of the Naval Staff from 31 July 2004-31 Oct 2006. He currently divides his time between Dehradun and Delhi. This column is Copyright of FORCE Magazine, at which the Admiral is Maritime & Strategic Affairs Editor. He contributes columns to journals, magazines, newspapers and, occasionally, to LiveFist)

http://livefist.blogspot.com/2009/09/admiral-arun-prakash-arihant-in.html

Damaging fallout: ‘Dud’ Pokhran II blows up 11 years later

MUMBAI: Eleven years after India tested nuclear bombs in the deserts of Pokhran, embarrassing details about the test fizzling out have
exploded into a full blown controversy with top nuclear scientists on Thursday demanding that the government institute an inquiry to determine whether the test failed. Former nuclear czars said they were ashamed that information had been hidden.

Three former nuclear leaders — M R Srinivasan, P K Iyengar and A N Prasad — said in the wake of revelations by K Santhanam, project leader for Pokhran II, the government must order a peer review into the yield of the thermonuclear test of May 1998.

Santhanam went public first on August 26, saying that the yield from the test was far lower than what prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s government claimed. On Thursday, in a newspaper article he disclosed embarrassing details saying the test was a failure because the yield was only 25 kilotons, nearly half of what the scientists had then claimed. He said that a meeting of scientists discussed the failure soon after the test and decided to hide it. He also pointed out that the failure meant that India now did not possess a credible nuclear deterrent, indicating that warheads on India’s long-range missile could have far less punch than expected.

R Chidambaram, former chairman of Atomic Energy Commission and the architect of the nuke tests; Anil Kakodkar, then director of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, and APJ Abdul Kalam who led the team from Defence Research and Development Organisation, have insisted the device operated according to its design specifications and the yield was 45 kilotons.

At a meeting on September 5, the AEC dismissed the first statements made by Santhanam, saying through different types of analysis it was established that the yield of the thermonuclear test was 45 KT. Now, even scientists in Barc, the nation’s top nuclear weapon establishment, doubt the claim.

While saying he was surprised by Santhanam’s article, M R Srinivasan, former AEC chairman, told TOI it was time for both Chidambaram and Kakodkar to clarify the situation. “In such circumstances I think a peer review is certainly warranted,” he said.

At the same time he said he still stood by the official position and would support Chidambaram and Kakodkar regarding the yield of the thermonuclear test. “A lot of information has been published and is on record. So I have really no reason to disbelieve at this stage either Chidambaram or Kakodkar on this issue. However, because of the current controversy, I think the best recourse would be for both of them to clarify the position through a peer review,” he added.

Former Barc director, A N Prasad, who has all along maintained that the thermonuclear test was anything but a success, said, “The painful fallout of this episode is that the credibility of the nuclear scientific community and the respectable name of Barc is being damaged by a few at the top.”

In a direct attack on Kalam and Chidambaram, Prasad said: “If all that Santhanam has written is true, then people occupying high places have misled the country. If all the data about the thermonuclear test has been held by one man (Chidambaram), then how can it be scientifically contested or debated? He has kept it under wraps.”

Stressing that there should be a probe by a committee constituted by the government, Prasad said that the team should comprise those having serious doubts about the yield of the test as well as experts who can include former nuclear scientists who have been raising their voices. “It should not consist of only yes men. It should consist of those who are knowledgeable, who have the capacity to investigate such a serious matter,” he said.

“If this committee concludes that the thermonuclear test had completely failed then the government has played a major fraud on the people of this country,” he said. Asked if the AEC itself can investigate, he replied: “It has credibility, but no expertise.”

Another former AEC chief, P K Iyengar said, “The government should undertake an active investigation immediately following the statements made by Santhanam in the article. I am feeling really ashamed.”

Regarding a revelation in Santhanam’s article that the thermonuclear device had not yet been weaponised like the fission devices, he said: “How will they do it if they are doubtful about the yield? This itself is a clear indication that the test was not a complete success.”

Both Iyengar and Prasad said the disclosures by Santhanam, that there was no disturbance to the shafts at ground zero, was also proof that the test was unsuccessful.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/india/Damaging-fallout-Dud-Pokhran-II-blows-up-11-years-later/articleshow/5024571.cms

I do not matt, i merely said it would continue regardless. Thats all.

This is corroborated by fact that even after 11 years the TN device has not been weaponised by BARC while the 25 kiloton fission device has been fully weaponised and operationally deployed on multiplate weapon platforms. It would be farcical to use a 3500-km range Agni-3 missile with a 25 kiloton fission warhead as the core of our CMD. Only a 150 – 350 kiloton if not megaton TN bomb can do so which we do not have.

These are the guys who according to Rajaram wants offesnive posturing of Nukes. But our Nukes are for CMD and unlike these guys say you dont need 350 kt or 1 mt nuke for CMD.

For the rest of the arguments expect them to be countered in the coming days.

Boeing responded to Shiv Aroor’s story ‘Devil in the Details’ (see post #62)

Boeing’s Statement On My “Malicious Code” Story

Just got this response from Boeing to my report on the controversial “malicious code” clause in the P-8I contract. This is a statement from Dr Vivek Lall Vice, President and India Country Head, Boeing Integrated Defense Systems. Here it is:

In your story, “Is Indo-US plane deal a compromise?” (India Today, Sept 11), you leave readers with the impression that a “potentially explosive clause” in the contract India signed for the purchase of eight Boeing P-8I aircraft will allow an unnamed US entity to inject malicious code into the aircraft operating software. In fact, the purpose of the clause is quite the opposite. The malicious code clause, signed by Boeing with full concurrence, intentionally protects India against injection of any malicious software that could inhibit the desired and designed function of the equipment, or cause it physical damage. The Government of India stipulated the requirement, and by signing the contract, Boeing is agreeing it will not include, nor allow third parties to include any malicious software in the delivered system. Boeing has passed this requirment down to our suppliers. Boeing takes this contractual requirement extremely seriously as our company reputation and operation demands the highest ethical behavior. [STATEMENT ENDS]

However, the report on Headlines Today more to do with the following excerpt from the contract:

“In the event of nonconformance or defect attributed to malicious code, Buyer’s sole and exclusive remedy is to require Seller to modify the hardware and/or software to remove the malicious code or to replace the malicious code with code that is not malicious code.”

http://livefist.blogspot.com/2009/09/boeings-statement-on-my-malicious-code.html

Well the GOI claimed that TN was successful , so its upto GOI to prove to its own armed forces chief and to its own scientist that the credibility of TN as a weapon is beyond doubt.

Claiming they have it and yet not willing to do a peer review will not help its own cause or to the credibility of govt claims or nuclear deterrence

Certainly there are lot of folks out here who would be very happy that India is a puppet of US and plays second fiddle to it , to further US agenda in this region

As Rajan said if there was any real doubt abt the TN device then we could have tested again by now, especially when we were already under sanctions.

I am all for a peer review. But I am against further testing at this point regardless of the findings. I am against us signing the NPT or CTBT in its current form.

I do like closer co-operation with the United States in the region, but that is different from being its puppet state. The Onus is on the Obama administration so far I am disappointed. Hoping for Republican administration in U.S next term and continue from where Bush and Singh left off. 😀