ante_climaxWe don’t need more missiles, like he says no country would accept a casuality that is over 200000 and we can cause it by our current devices.
So he is a JNU wala US puppet, then the people who are so concerned abt the TN device are ‘Chesthumping Hawkish Chauvinists’ to borrow his words.
Our government is not going to test again. The sooner you all come to terms with it, the better.
I see a lot of jealousy from many Indian posters towards IAS officials and people in our high universities, may be there is a bit of jealousy involved as its not easy to achieve their position.
ante_climaxAs Rajaram mentioned, we should rather focus on better delivery systems for a second strike capability rather than fret of the H-bomb. It is not needed for minimum det.
ante_climaxThis is the most level headed response I have ever seen regards to the H-bomb issue. My views are similar as this guys.
ante_climaxThe fizzle doesn’t really matter
R. Rajaraman
Those who worry about the effectiveness of our deterrent should concentrate on ensuring the survivability of the fission weapons in the event of a first strike rather than on building an unnecessary arsenal of H bombs.
Those who worry about the effectiveness of our deterrent should concentrate on ensuring the survivability of the fission weapons in the event of a first strike rather than on building an unnecessary arsenal of H bombs.
Some time ago, the former defence scientist, K. Santhanam, came out with the comment that the actual yield of the thermonuclear device (H-bomb) tested in 1998 was significantly lower than what it was designed to do and what, for that matter, was claimed by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) after the explosion. This is a not a new controversy. Soon after the tests, the official claims of yield were contested by independent analysts both in India and abroad, followed by detailed rebuttals by DAE officials. The dispute was never really resolved, with the officials on one side and the critics of the tests on the other maintaining their stands. But, given that Dr. Santhanam was one of the key scientists overseeing those tests, his recent comments created quite a furore in the media and in political circles.
But within a few days the controversy over the thermonuclear “fizzle” has already died down, even though the substantive differences on the success of the 1998 test continue to remain. The media, as they are wont to do, have moved on to other topical matters. And, as we will argue below, that is just as well. The failure of that thermonuclear device, even if true, is not as serious a matter for our national security as has been made out to be by some commentators.
Our nuclear policyPeople getting agitated over the alleged failure of the thermonuclear test should remind themselves of what our stated policy on nuclear weapons is. In a remarkable act of transparency in what is generally viewed as an area of extreme secrecy, our nuclear policy was spelt out in the draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine of 1999, subsequently formalised with some modifications in 2003. As made explicit in that document, India, unlike the cold warriors of the ‘fifties, embarked on making nuclear weapons not as a war fighting arsenal or for use in a massive first strike, but only as an instrument of minimal nuclear deterrence. This deterrence was to be achieved with “…..sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable…”
This policy has been repeatedly underlined and reiterated several times by the government of the day, despite efforts by hawks bent on adopting a more aggressive nuclear posture. It remains our national policy till today. Therefore the sufficiency or otherwise of our nuclear arsenal should be measured against the standard of what minimal deterrence really requires.
Imprecise conceptThe concept of minimal deterrence is admittedly imprecise in quantitative terms. Its foundations are as much psychological as logical since it hinges on how much damage would be “unacceptable” to your adversary. Nevertheless, certain basic aspects of minimal deterrence are clear. Firstly, it does not call for a boundless open-ended arsenal. It does not even require that your offensive weapons match in number or strength those of your adversaries. It only demands that you have enough capability, in a second strike, to inflict “unacceptable damage” to the other side, should they be so foolish as to initiate a nuclear attack on us.
How much capability does one need for the purpose? Well, the holocaust of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has explicitly demonstrated the damage that the simplest fission weapons can do. Hiroshima was bombed with a uranium-based weapon of about 15 kT (kilotons) and well over a lakh of people were killed. Nagasaki was hit by a plutonium based weapon of about 20 kT which killed over 80,000 people — a somewhat smaller number than in the case of Hiroshima because of its hilly terrain. Some estimates place the fatality counts in both these towns even higher.
Today’s major cities of China and Pakistan have a much higher population density than did Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the ‘forties. There is little doubt that a single 15-20 kT fission weapon dropped on, say, Karachi or Shanghai will kill over a 150,000 people. Thus two bombs dropped on separate localities in Karachi and two over Lahore, (or similarly over Beijing and Shanghai) will conservatively cause half a million fatalities.
Surely, that should be “unacceptable damage” to even a remotely responsible leadership in any modern country. Do proponents of bigger thermonuclear weapons really believe that any foreseeable leadership in China would take the risk of initiating a nuclear first strike at the cost of a guaranteed response that can kill a half a million of its own people and render two major cities unlivable? I don’t believe the Chinese would ever take such a risk. The same applies to Pakistan, whose present and past governments, whatever be their other deficiencies, would consider an unprovoked nuclear first strike if the cost is to be the lives of half a million citizens of Karachi and Lahore.
The spectre of jihadi militants taking over Pakistan is often raised as an argument against this logic. It may be argued that such a fanatical leadership may be willing to accept even half a million fatalities as a price for its jihad. Such a possibility cannot be ruled out. But any leadership that finds half a million civilian fatalities “acceptable” is in any case beyond the pale of rationality. It cannot be relied upon to feel deterred by the prospect of even a much larger attack.
Irrational adversaryTrue, a 200 kT H-bomb will inflict damage over four to five times as large an area as a 20 kT fission bomb will. So, it may end up killing a few lakhs of people instead of one lakh. But if a fanatical “leadership” on the other side is bent on a suicidal adventure and willing to sacrifice a lakh of its civilians, will it be deterred just by increasing the casualties a few fold? Deterrence has no meaning in that situation and building a larger, thermonuclear weapon is not the answer to such an irrational suicidal adversary.
In short, a thermonuclear hydrogen bomb is not crucial for minimal deterrence. Standard 20 kT fission weapons will more than suffice. Pokhran I and II have exploded those successfully. The recent controversy does not cast doubt on that. While the international community of nuclear experts may differ on whether India has 40 or 100 fission bombs in its arsenal no one, as far as I know, questions India’s ability to produce fission weapons.
As a corollary, whether the H-bomb test fizzled or not is not something that vitally affects national security or compromises our minimal deterrence capabilities. Those who worry about the effectiveness of our deterrent should concentrate on ensuring the survivability of the fission weapons in the event of a first strike rather than on building an unnecessary arsenal of H bombs.
There is a small segment of our strategic community which keeps pushing for a more aggressive nuclear posture. They surfaced again during the recent fizzle controversy. No doubt they sincerely believe that their strategy is good for the country. But they don’t come out and openly say that what they suggest goes beyond the declared national policy of minimal deterrence.
It is not easy to resist such hawkish demands since it also has the support, whether willingly sought or not, of chest thumping chauvinists. Nevertheless, sober national security policy makers should ensure that they don’t succumb to the pressure to up the nuclear ante. They should remain firm with the existing policy that the aim of our nuclear arsenal is only to deter others from attacking us and not to wage nuclear wars or to maximise casualties on the other side as an end in itself.
(R. Rajaraman is Emeritus Professor of Physics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and Co-Chair, International Panel on Fissile Materials.)
http://www.thehindu.com/2009/09/16/stories/2009091651970900.htm
ante_climaxShipping Ministry for divestment in Cochin Shipyard
The Shipping Ministry supports the move by the Department of Economic Affairs move to divest government equity in the state-run Cochin Shipyard, India’s the largest shipping and ship-repair yard , a top ministry official said today.
Shipping Secretary A. P. V. N. Sarma also said that 20 public private partnership schemes would be signed this year for port projects, while the Ministry is also working on a better taxation regime for Shipping companies to boost maritime trade.
“We have broadly agreed to the recommendation by the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA). The DEA is likely to ask for 10 per cent disinvestment in PSUs. This includes Cochin Shipyard,” Mr. Sarma told reporters on the sidelines of an Assocham event here.
Cochin Shipyard, which attained the category-1 `miniratna’ status in July 2008, posted a 70 per cent increase in net profit at Rs 160 crore for 2008-09 financial year.
The company declared a dividend of Rs 19.66 crore for 2008-09. The continued profit of the yard had resulted in an increase in net worth from Rs 429.42 crore in 2007-08 to Rs 566.49 crore in 2008-09.
The company had achieved a total shipbuilding income of Rs 986 crore during 2008-09 against Rs 582 crore during 2007-08. Ship repair turnover during the year was Rs 270 crore.
ante_climaxNo reason to doubt yield of Pokhran-II tests: Atomic Energy Commission
MUMBAI: The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has sought to put a lid on the controversy over the success of Pokhran-II saying it has no reason to
cast doubts on the yield of the country’s thermonuclear test in May 1998.The AEC made this assessment at its formal meeting on September 5 to discuss issues in the wake of the controversy ignited by K Santhanam, a retired DRDO nuclear physicist and a member of the team involved in the tests, a Commission release said on Tuesday.
Santhanam had last month described the May 11, 1998 test as a `fizzle’ (failure to achieve expected yield) and said India needed to conduct more tests. His claim was backed by some nuclear scientists including Dr P K Iyengar but was strongly countered by former President and missile scientist A P J Abdul Kalam.
The commission utilised the meeting to reiterate the credibility of the type and yield of the tests as the matter was already discussed several times since May 1998, AEC Secretary K Murlidhar said in the release.
Meetings were held on May 21, November 12,1998 and subsequently on March 26 and November 18, 1999, in the presence of Raja Ramanna, a former AEC member and father of 1974 Pokhran-I nuclear test, he said.
“The Commission had been briefed about the successful tests in May 1998 at its meeting held on May 21, 1998 wherein, details of the type of tests, estimated yields and other technical details were given,” he said.
Some members of the atomic panel had felt that the media reports on whether Pokhran-II generated the expected yield could be more in the form of disinformation campaign, AEC sources said.
ante_climaxOne of them crashed a few weeks ago killing the pilot :(. The rest of the fleet have resumed service now. That is the latest news about them.
Here is more info on the LUSH upgrade http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Harrier.html
ante_climaxSeabed minerals drive India’s naval strategy
By James Lamont in New Delhi and Varun Sood in Mumbai
India’s ambitious plans to modernise its navy are being driven by a scramble for mineral wealth on the seabed, far from the mainland, according to the country’s military strategists.
Senior naval planners have identified the future energy and mineral resources of Asia’s third-largest economy as one of the motivations behind the deployment of more powerful warships in the Indian Ocean.
India has one of the world’s fastest-growing navies with 120 vessels. It plans to add almost 100 warships to its fleet over the next decade, as it seeks to modernise its armed forces and develop low-cost shipbuilding capabilities.The strategists foresee Indian firepower protecting commercial drilling sites deep in the southern Indian Ocean. In some cases, these could be as far distant as Diego Garcia, a British island territory and US military base, which lies 1,000 miles from the India’s southern tip and well beyond its waters.
They also say naval power will be needed to protect reserves within India’s exclusive economic zones – which stretch up to 200 miles from its territory – from infringement. The EEZs include the waters surrounding the Andaman Islands, off the southern coast of Burma.
India regards the Indian Ocean as its backyard. Its southernmost presence in these waters is a permanent base in Antarctica, promoting the country’s strategic interests and polar science. Construction of the country’s third base is to start next year.
Senior Indian officers, such as Admiral Sureesh Mehta, the recently retired head of the navy, have spoken publicly about the inevitability of scouring the seabed for reserves of oil and gas, and minerals such as manganese, cadmium and nickel, as land-based resources are depleted.
They say that exploitation of the seabed has already begun “in a minuscule way” and that, in the future, technological advances will make the exploration of seabed resources “bound to happen”.
According to the Goa-based National Institute of Oceanography, India has surveyed an area of nearly 4m sq km in the central Indian Ocean basin that has led to findings of “significant commercial grades” of copper, nickel, iron and cobalt deposits.
India has exclusive rights from the International Seabed Authority for exploration.
The assessment of India’s strategic needs comes as China likewise extends its naval might into the Indian Ocean. Beijing is seeking to protect the supply of oil to its fast-growing economy and shipments of minerals from its mines in Africa.
It also comes after the May deadline for claiming any extension to the continental shelf beyond the statutory 200 miles set by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bb01cf86-a148-11de-a88d-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1
ante_climaxIt’s advantage India in the Indian Ocean
R S Vasan
For military and strategic analysts apprehensive of the recent Chinese overtures in the Indian Ocean, news of the defence/security agreement between India and the Maldives concluded by defence minister A K Anthony during the visit of the high level delegation from August 20-22 should provide some assurance that
China will not have it all its own way in our maritime neighbourhood.Its long-term strategic and military alliance with Pakistan has enabled China to obtain concessions from Pakistan both over land and in the maritime arena. If Aksai Chin gave China a strategic advantage on land, investment and assistance in developing Gwadar gives it maritime options in the Arabian Sea close to the Straits of Hormuz.
The regime in Myanmar leased the Coco Islands in the Andaman Sea to China in 1992, ostensibly to set up monitoring devices and for military use. India upgraded its command structure in the Andamans to an effective tri-services command more than a decade after the transfer of the said island to China.
India, however, failed to utilise the Sri Lankan offer for investing in the development of Hambanthotta due to bureaucratic delays. China lost no time by stepping in with funds for the strategic port.
As a result of these initiatives, for some years now, there has been concern in India about the ‘girdle of encirclement’ from the Northwestern Arabian Sea up to and including the Northeastern Bay of Bengal. The ‘string of pearls’ strategy remains a much-abused term to explain China’s Indian Ocean ambitions.
The Chinese have been wooing the Maldives, too, by providing aid and investment. There was talk about the use of Marao, one of the largest atolls, by the Chinese to promote their commercial and military interest. However, both due to historical and cultural relations with Maldives and the active role played by India in thwarting a coup attempt by launching ‘Operation Cactus’ in the Maldives in November 1988, ties between the two countries remain very strong.
During the Gayoom presidency India gave a lot of importance to relations with the Maldives. Relations with new President Mohammed Nasheed, popularly called Anni, have also been extremely productive and the new government’s decision to enter into a security pact with India indicates the importance both countries attach to the strategic dimensions in the Arabian Sea. The perceptions of both also appear to converge when it comes to tackling terrorist attacks.
‘Operation Castor’, under which India provided humanitarian aid and relief to the Maldives immediately after the tsunami on December 26, 2004 reassured the maritime neighbours of India’s reach and capability. With its atolls that rise just a few feet above sea level, the Maldives is highly susceptible to inundation by tsunami and global warming, requiring contingency plans to be in place. Such fears have prompted the government to scout for real estate for its citizens in other parts of the world. India obviously enjoys the positional advantage and can provide help and succour in the event of a natural calamity or man-made disaster.
More specifically, India is transferring two helicopters to the Maldives for surveillance and will also install an integrated radar network with links to naval command centres on the west coast of India. These helicopters could be used for surveillance of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and for responding to threats and disasters. From the viewpoint of Indian security in a post 26/11 scenario, India could integrate its own surveillance architecture with the Maldives. India has also gifted INS Tillanchang, a fast patrol vessel (named after an island in the Andamans) in April 2006, to the Maldives National Security Service (NSS). The vessel is now named Huravee after a freedom fighter and would be a component of the response mechanism in the Maldives waters. India would definitely be looking at an arrangement to use the southern-most second largest island that was also used by the British decades ago.
There has been active cooperation between the security forces of the two countries, and many security personnel from the Maldives are being trained in India. It has also been reported that experts from the Maldives would visit the Andaman to learn the manner in which the security of over 524 islands is coordinated by the tri-services commander.
The present development has enormous significance for India’s maritime posturing vis-à-vis China whether intended or otherwise.
It may appear that China has encircled India. In reality, forward posturing in our waters would be a challenge for China given the distances and vulnerable supply chains. In the long run, the PLA-Navy would be looking at Gwadar, Hambanthota and acquire ports in Myanmar and Bangladesh as ‘dependency ports’.
The Chinese recently deployed their frontline assets for extended periods off the Somali coast on anti-piracy patrols, demonstrating their blue water capabilities. Since leaving Hainan for the first time on December 26, 2008, the Chinese fleet has maintained an active patrol in the Gulf of Aden, rotating its units every 2-3 months. It is also interesting to note that one of the guided missile destroyer Shenzhen (DDG 167) called at Kochi on its return passage last month and exchanged notes with Indian naval counter parts. There are no doubts that the Chinese have learnt their lessons in extended operations in far-off areas. In conclusion, it appears that both China and India will continue to compete to extend their sphere of influence among the littorals in the Indian Ocean region. India is doubtless better placed to increase its influence. Of course, we must play our cards well.
(The writer is Head, Strategy and Security Studies, Centre for Asian Studies, Chennai)
ante_climaxAmity Institute of Information Technology (AIIT) to train naval officers
NOIDA – The Amity Institute of Information Technology and CISCO Regional Networking Academy kick started CISCO CCNA-Exploration Course for six naval officers at the Amity University Campus on Monday.
Professor O P Sharma, Director, Amity Institute of Information Technology, remarked that technology is changing fast with more and more enterprises coming closer and sharing their resources.
Briefing the audience about the CISCO programs, he said “Keeping in view the futuristic use of Information Technology (IT), CISCO programs have been started and are offered through various regional academies.
He said the CISCO CCNA-Exploration Course, designed for naval officers, would provide them extensive hands on experience through industry visits planned during the course”.
Delivering the key note address, Rear Admiral K R Nair- VSM, Assistant Chief of Material IT and System, Naval Headquarters averred, “IT has changed the very nature of warfront and has revolutionalised it. Any force which is able to collect and analyse the information first will be the decisive one over the counterpart.
He also said that the Navy has reached a stage where net centric operations have become the need of the hour.
He expressed the hope that the tripartite friendship among Navy, CISCO and Amity would grow and mature in future and urged the participants to take full advantage of what is taught during the course.
The exploration course, spread over 19 days, will cover four modules namely LAN Switching and Router Configuration; WAN, Wireless Networks and Basic Networking Concepts. (ANI)
ante_climaxA BANG AND A FIZZLE
– Doubts about India’s nuclear deterrence may be well-founded
Brijesh D. Jayal
So indifferent is our attitude towards national security that once the Indo-US nuclear deal was done, the many doubts and opinions that were raised during a healthy debate preceding it were promptly forgotten rather than being followed to their logical conclusions. While this suits the nuclear weapon non-believers, such an unstable state will continue to cast doubts on the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, as indeed K. Santhanam’s recent statement in a seminar has done. That the statement was attributed to him when the seminar code did not permit such attribution indicates how fragile national consensus is on as vital an issue as the national nuclear policy and capability.
Not surprisingly, the statement has opened a floodgate of views, counterviews and comments, drawing in scientists and strategists with the prime minister himself having to smother the crescendo. That the debate has turned ugly with personal attacks being made on both sides underlines a prevailing lack of confidence. The last thing the reader needs is further grist to the mill of the subject of the thermo-nuclear test. This is best left to the scientific community to sort out the best it can — one hopes with not more skeletons tumbling out.
There are, however, other important issues that the present debate throws up. The significance of what Santhanam has said goes to the root of our approach to a programme that has a huge bearing on national security and morale. The legitimate targets for weapons of mass destruction are cities and centres of economic value. Thus, a single attack may involve tens of thousands of casualties, if not whole cities. This awareness must awaken the conscience of the nation into demanding greater transparency and clarity regarding our nuclear policy, doctrine and the ability to deliver on the doctrine. These cannot be subjects of secrecy, innuendo and half-baked television debates.
In the realm of airborne weapon system testing and clearance, military specifications, standards and processes have evolved over decades of experience, often at great cost to life and systems. These must be followed meticulously. Those instrumental in bypassing them have done so at great cost to the programme and to national security. The present saga is one such glaring example and the nation risks paying a heavy price unless corrective measures are taken. Brushing things under the carpet or shooting the messenger may give us a superficial breather, but will grievously wound national security in the long term.
Even as the nation embarked on a highly ambitious and classified nuclear weapons programme, we chose to deviate from fundamentals of weapon design and development. We bypassed the established decisionmaking system with the scientific adviser being the sole repository and reporting directly to the prime minister. We had no integrated project management structure with BARC and DRDO working in their respective areas of expertise. The one agency that would normally be able to act as impartial observer and the one which would ultimately have to make the system deliver, was deliberately kept out.
In his book, Weapons of Peace, Raj Chengappa gives us an insight into those times. When V.P. Singh took over as prime minister, he was so dismayed to find a rudimentary and informal command and control structure with regard to the nuclear programme that he is quoted to have told his principal secretary, “This is scary. The matter cannot just be between the Prime Minister and the Scientific Adviser.” Accordingly, he set up an informal committee under Arun Singh to carry out a confidential review of India’s nuclear preparedness.
It was now Arun Singh’s turn to be dismayed when he realized that the chiefs of staff of the armed forces were not briefed about India’s capability. Chengappa quotes Arun Singh as having said, “It was clear we had to end the wink and nudge approach. When it is crunch time you just can’t ring up a chief of staff and say press the button. The army will not take the scientists’ word that it will work. They will want to know if they have a usable credible deterrent. Otherwise they are likely to say buzz off….” Prophetic words, except that the military was reduced to accepting the scientists’ word without a whimper.
Arun Singh also found the lack of coordination between the DRDO and BARC disconcerting: “I thought it was crazy that BARC didn’t know where DRDO stood or vice versa…. It was an unacceptable situation. There was just no institutionalized way of doing things.” Today, we are facing the consequences of not having heeded these valuable warnings.
While Santhanam has only expressed his differences on the results of the thermo nuclear tests, a worrisome concern is that along this challenging design and development route there would perforce have been innumerable technical challenges and design compromises. As per established military procedures, an independent chief resident engineer is located in all such facilities to ensure on behalf of the users that design and technical and safety standards are met. Certainly, no such safety net was available to the armed forces in this programme. This begs the question as to how many areas of difference surfaced during the entire development phase and what compromises were made that are still not known to the users of the weapon systems. How many more Santhanam-like surprises may from time to time rear their ugly heads? Will it then be too late?
Admiral Sureesh Mehta, the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, stated in his farewell press conference, “The tests were adequate. We believe whatever the scientists tell us. The scientists said the tests were enough and tested. We believe the scientists, as they provide us with nuclear capability.” Clearly, he accepted no responsibility for these weapon systems. This is uncharacteristic of military ethos where any weapons system that the services induct, whether imported or indigenous, is put by them through rigorous testing before acceptance. They are then accountable for the achievement of results. The services did not take the word of DRDO scientists in the case of the Trishul missile, which was finally rejected.
General Ved Malik, who was the army chief at the time of Pokhran-II, termed the recent revelations shocking and said that it affects the armed forces, because when they plan the task given to them they have to know what kind of yield each nuclear weapon has.
Unsaid in these comments by two former service chiefs is that they bear no responsibility for the reliability, safety and operational potential of these weapons systems. That is to be borne by the scientists — who, we see, have their differences. While this leaves India’s nuclear deterrence between two stools, the armed forces by their meek acceptance must also share responsibility.
The Santhanam debate has raised a larger issue: of ignoring established procedures for design, development, testing and deployment of military weapons systems for national security. The reliability and pitfalls in the operational exploitation of our nuclear deterrent will always remain a question, thus depriving military and security planners of the confidence and the surety of such actions. National security requires that the ultimate users of weapons systems, namely our armed forces, are also guarantors of their efficacy. By passing the buck to the scientists, Admiral Mehta has not only ducked this responsibility, but has given the nation cause for concern.
It is time for the government to set up an independent evaluation group, comprising scientists, experts and the armed forces, to assure themselves and the nation that the weapons systems constituting our nuclear deterrent are battleworthy. Then the armed forces must take ownership and be held to account.
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090914/jsp/opinion/story_11481281.jsp
ante_climaxESA scientist asks media not to criticize ISRO for Chandrayaan
Bangalore, September 14: Detlef Koschny , an ESA-Chandrayaan scientist urged Indian media to congratulate The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) for Chandrayaan’s success instead of running it down for the mission’s abrupt termination.
According to Mr Koschny, Chandrayaan-1 was a “fantastic success” as it was a very high challenge for a spacecraft to enter the low lunar orbit. He told IANS that all scientific instruments were commissioned, worked flawlessly, and sent images, atomic counts, etc over a distance of about 400,000 km. Chandrayaan-1 had carried three scientific payloads of the European Space Agency (ESA).
He also said that Stas Barabash, principal investigator of the ESA’s Sub KeV Atom Reflecting Analyser (SARA) experiment, had communicated its appreciation of the mission to ISRO.
The SARA experiment, of which Mr Koschny was part, studied the interaction of solar wind with the moon’s surface in order to reveal the surface composition of the moon and associated magnetic anomalies. SARA not only yielded science data but also demonstrated for the first time the feasibility of neutral atom imaging of the solar wind-surface interaction.
Demanding a reconsideration of the “accepted solar wind deposition rates,” the experiment also threw light on the fact that a large percentage of the solar wind protons get reflected back as neutral atoms.
ISRO had said in the Chandrayaan review meeting that it plans to make public the entire data Chandrayaan-1 collected in standard planetary data system format after the one year ‘lock in’ period expires in November or later.
ante_climaxOur Problem Is We Talk Too Much
Madhavan Nair, chairman of Indian Space Research Organisation, takes stock of Chandrayaan-1’s sudden end and tells Forbes India, there is no plan for a manned moon mission as of now
What did Chandrayaan-1 accomplish for India?
This was the first time we went near another [celestial body] and changed the course of the spacecraft to go around that — this technology we have really learnt the hard way. Practically, no detail is available from anybody else. And even the type of orbit we chose, 100 km above the moon, was a bold step and has not been attempted by anybody else.
Another area where Chandrayaan-1 helped was the creation of a deep space tracking network.What is the percentage of objectives did Chandrayaan-1 meet?
On the technological front, that is, travelling to the moon and realisation of the spacecraft, I would say we achieved 100 percent. All of the instruments aboard worked, so based on scientific objectives we achieved 50 percent credit. Then comes imaging, collecting data about the moon’s terrain and surface, for which we had identified minimum criteria well before the moon mission. Therefore, altogether, plus from a scientific perspective, I would say we achieved over 95 percent of our objectives.
How does the cost of Chandrayaan-1 compare with that of the Chinese moon mission?
The Chinese have not released any figures, but estimates are that it cost between $400 to $500 million. In comparison, we have done it in less than $100 million.What areas of weakness did the failure expose?
I think radiation hardening is the prime area of focus. Some of the electronic devices are susceptible to high-energy particles, so we have to either get better devices or provide better shielding for them.Critics say ISRO needs to be more transparent.
You take any other organisation in the country and compare it to ISRO and show me one which is more transparent than us. In fact, I think our problem is we talk too much. But we will not put out half-cooked data. I must also complain about the media. The media wants only sensation; they want only failures.What about the plans for a manned moon mission?
We have to go step by step. First we will go around the earth, the design for which has been completed. We are now in the process of investing in some advanced R&D for that. We are also planning to set up some of the infrastructure for the training of astronauts. 2015 is our target for realising the manned Earth orbit mission. Beyond that it will take another five to six years for the manned moon mission. For that no programme has been conceived as of now.
http://business.in.com/interview/close-range/our-problem-is-we-talk-too-much/4012/1
ante_climaxIndian space program has come of age – Dr Kasturi Rangan
Indian space program which had a small beginning, has now grown to a large integrated program, which is self reliant, application driven, maintaining vital links with the user community and is committed to excellence. From a stage wherein we had to manually build electronic circuitry, we have moved to the 21st century wherein India is an emerging space power in terms of technology and commerce. This was stated by Dr K Kasturi Rangan, Member, Planning Commission and former Chairman, ISRO. He was delivering the Prof V Laxminarayanan Memorial Lecture at Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani on 11th September 2009.
Dr Kasturi Rangan said that the country has developed capabilities to produce world class satellites and launch vehicles which are being applied to diverse areas of national development. Tremendous advancement has been made in our space program which includes Communication satellites INSAT, Remote Sensing Satellites Indian Remote Satellite System (IRS), Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), Geo Synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) besides excellent launch infrastructure, said Dr Kasturi Rangan.
Tracing the evolution of the Indian Space Program, Dr Kasturi Rangan said “Success achieved by ISRO came after early failures which were stepping stones for success”. Citing anecdotes of inspirational leadership shown by his predecessors namely,
Prof Vikram Sarabhai, Prof Satish Dhawan and Prof U R Rao, Dr Kasturi Rangan said, “There is confidence and heritage of excellence in our space program. There is discipline in the operation of ISRO. We need to take the excellence to continental proportions”
A Padma Vibhushan awardee, having worked for 35 years in Department of Space and retired as the Chairman of ISRO for 9 years during 1994-2003, Dr Dr Kasturi Rangan said, the space program is done with very modest budget and the day has come when advanced countries such as US and France have started looking towards India for ideas in Space programs.
http://www.indiaprwire.com/pressrelease/education/2009091233595.htm
ante_climaxScientists to decode moon mission data
BANGALORE: Scientists from the European Space Agency (ESA), National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (Nasa) and the Indian Space
Research
Organisation (Isro) have started decoding the data retrieved from Chandrayaan-1 and said they are coming up with interesting findings which will provide them insights into various aspects of the moon.The data will enable them study two dozen solar flares, which create large explosions on the Sun’s atmosphere releasing huge amounts of energy. ESA said that its payload called ‘x-ray Solar Monitor’ (XSM) has monitored the Sun’s x-ray emission which is particularly high when a solar flare occurs.
Comparing these x-ray measurements with the observations made from the ESA spacecraft Soho which observes the sun in different optical wavelength ranges will allow them to better understand solar flares.
This is particularly relevant as “strong solar flares can knock out power grids on Earth and influence the accuracy of GPS navigation systems. If we better understand the physics of solar flares, we can protect ourselves better from these effects”, ESA Chandrayaan-1 project scientist Dr Detlef Koschny, said.
Scientists say loss of electricity can impact water distribution, perishable food, medication, and sewage disposal. Such outages would create satellite malfunctions and radio blackouts affecting telecommunication, transportation and banking and finance.
ESA said that its payload C1XS, an imaging x-ray spectrometer, developed along with UK’s Rutherford Appleton laboratory and Isro, has been able to identify calcium on the lunar surface. “There are indications of iron and titanium samples as well,” said Dr Koschny.
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