Then let us compute the currency requirements.

A pilot cannot fly over 1000 hours per year:
http://www.risingup.com/fars/info/part121-503-FAR.shtml

Which means 250 hours in 3 months on average.

With 16 hour legs, it means 15 flights in 3 months.

Between a crew of 4, each of them needs 3 landings in 90 days: 12 total in 90 days.

But a 4 pilot crew cannot possibly fly over 16 hours. I cannot find flight time restrictions for a crew of 5 pilots.

We are diverging far from the original topic, but hey….what the heck.

Getting enough landings for long haul crews is actually a very complex topic, and one that has been the subject of considerable conversation for the last few years. A bit of history: One fine day approximately 10-12 years ago, a heavily loaded UAL 747 departed KSFO and experienced an engine failure very shortly after takeoff. The Pilot Flying(PF) was a relief First Officer and he did not fly the airplane properly. In short, he corrected for the yaw with aileron instead of rudder, which is a big no-no (it causes the flight spoilers to deploy). The airplane’s climb performance was severely restricted due to heavy weight and the poor manipulation of the flying controls. The airplane almost hit San Bruno Mountain. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/San_Bruno_Mountain

In the subsequent investigation, it became apparent that the subject First Officer had not conducted an actual (non simulator) takeoff in a B747 in almost three (3) years! UAL researched their pilot qualification database and found that as many as 50 were in a similar situation, with the record holder being eight (8!!) years. It seems that there is a pilot subculture that finds relief flying appealing and purposely bid it. In a normal rotation, the “A” Captain gets first choice on takeoff/landing, then the “A” FO, then the “B” Captain, and finally, the lowly relief “B” FO. Turns out there are almost no landings or takeoffs left over for them. The problem is exacerbated when particular pilots fly only very long flights all the time (correspondingly fewer takeoffs/landings).

It was also found in the ensuing investigation this type of engine failure (it was accompanied by high vibration) was not easy to reproduce in a simulator, and furthermore, when attempted, was very damaging to the simulator! One other quick hit: how much attention should be given to the whole topic given the increasingly remote chance of engine failure due to the engines getting more and more reliable?

Airlines scrambled to amend their requirements in the wake of this incident. Some chose to make their pilots go back to the simulator more often. Others worked with their unions to include some short hops in more rotations. (This was problematic becuase there are only a limited number of short haul wide body trips). Others chose to start counting very closely the number of tkofs/ldgs that individuals had recently, and required the “a” crews to give up some to a relief crew member when necessary.

Long story short, this is a very complex topic, but I hope I have illustrated how complex seemingly simple issues can become for operators (airlines). Often, the manufacturers (both A and B) seem to overlook these in their glowing press releases about the capabilties of their wonderful new birds.

One final point: The UAL incident clearly illustrates that simply adding more pilots does not necessarily increase safety, a point apparently lost on the “5 pilot crowd” in the unions at the carriers that are doing Ultra Long Haul Flying.

Final final point: Sometimes, wedging in a short flight for a long haul airplane can be very productive. For example, lets say a 777 comes into ATL and is scheduled to be down for 8 hours prior to it’s next long haul flight. A round trip to KMCO can easily be accomplished in less than half that time. Doing so generates additional revenue (getting more revenue out of the airframe), provides a lot of seats to a popular vacaction destination, and facilitates pilot training/qualification. Thus, Singapore may have “other” reasons for relative short haul, apparently un-economic flying for their A340-500’s.

I suppose that might be theoretically possible some day. Its pretty doubtful to happen any time soon though. Thats a pretty big difference in size.

However, as I have said, Airbus has greatly streamlined and standardized pilot qualification between the 320/330/340 already. It is a great selling point for them to convince an airline to purchase the entire product line. It’s not quite the “common rating” that the 757/762,3 have but its pretty good nonetheless.

Keep in mind also, that pilots flying very long haul flights, with augmented/extra crew, don’t often get to log landings, because there are so few landings and extra pilots on to facilitate rest time. Being qualified on a smaller type allows them to get some actual practice (non simulator) between long haul legs on the widebody. So some of the pilots like this concept also.

Thanks for the clarification.

According to everything I have ever read, calendar age is not a significant issue as long as proper corrosion control practices are maintained. When they were re-engined with CFM56s in the 80’s, the USAF claimed the 135’s were good out to the year 2040.

The aircraft are relatively low time. I saw a blurb from the USAF recently that the high time 135 (for all fleets) passed 50,000 hours in March. I think many KC-135’s are only in the 20’s but can’t prove it. The high time 747 in the commercial fleet is approching 130,000 hours, and UPS has 1967 era dc-8’s in service that I believe are in the 60,000 flight hour range.

The fact that USAF is willing to take 3 KC-135R’s out of the tanker fleet to modify into RC’s makes me the think the oft mentioned “tanker shortage” is not really there. I’m hopeful that the USAF is actually realizing the current enemy, ie., insurgents/islamo-fascism, and that the U.S. doesn’t need 800 tankers, or even 500 for a cold war era strategic bomber force that doesn’t exist anymore.

I can only assume that perhaps the project wasn’t actually proceeding so well. In the black EW world it’s entirely possible that there are problems that can’t be publicly acknowledged. And it would seem that standardizing equipment with a capable ally would be a good thing in any event.

Wait a minute – over $1 billion, for three very old airframes. Not cheap.

It’s not the frames…it’s all the electronic goodies. Every dollar saved on the frame is a dollar left over for goodies in the kit.

Considering the state of the art capabilities, most of which I would guess are pretty highly classified, and considering the importance of intelligence in the ongoing struggle against islamo-fascists, it seems a bargain.

IMHO, this continues a trend, not likely to change soon, of placing importance on the electronics and sensors vis a vis the platform, which really isn’t AS important by comparison. Witness the Super Hornet. And the concept of investing in the electronics makes all the recent threads arguing which of yesterdays tactical airplanes have the most eye popping aerodynamic performance seem rather ridiculous.

What is the wing area of DC-10-10? The wing areas are 368 sq m for DC-10-30, 329 sq m for Tristar 500, 321 sq m for Tristar 1, and mere 297 sq m for B767-400ER.

Also, how will 767-400ER handle with one engine out at Denver or La Guardia?

I don’t have the data for the DC-10-10 right in front of me but it would seem that it would be rather easy to find on the internet. The other numbers you quote seem about right but I can’t vouch for their veracity.

My statement was that the wing loading was too high on the 764, ie., the wing is too small for the weight, compared to other airliners, so I think we agree.

The engine out scenario you mention is well defined in the regulations and commonly referred to as climb limit weight. A heavy 764 on a hot day would have problems at hot/high airports. Airlines routinely handle that scenario, sometimes by restricting payload, other times by planning a fuel stop. As I stated, the 764 is a dog (comparatively). Having said that, since LGA flights are domestic, the fuel load is considerably less, hence the weight is less. I would think runway allowable weight would be the more limiting factor in LGA for a 764 due to the short runway length.

FYI, “Porn alert stops Qantas A380 live net link”

http://www.smh.com.au/news/travel/news/porn-alert-stops-qantas-a380-live-net-link/2008/09/17/1221330897341.html

The article in the link below is 4 days old, but relevant, as it references NG/EADS being entitled to a termination fee “in the tens of millions of dollars.”

Also, according to Mr. Young, the NG/EADS entry was $3 Billion cheaper than the Boeing bid, and the Boeing bid should have been less because, “was smaller and should have been cheaper” than the larger NG/EADS entry.

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2008189445_tanker19.html

They already have a website, this is pretty interesting:

http://www.teaco.co.uk/