I think it is an interesting question as to which baseline design — T-50 or J-20 — is more readily adaptable to a dedicated A2G variant, including increased payload capacity and flexibility, increased range, potentially side-by-side seating, etc. I think it is entirely possible that such projects will be pursued in future, as a cost-effective way of leveraging sunk R&D, systems commonalities, etc. in the manner once proposed for FB-22. Such a “JH-20” would seem particularly useful for China in the naval strike role, replacing JH-7 and early PLANAF Flankers and complementing the longer-legged, subsonic H-X.

When is the Indian government going to build a nuclear proof command and control series of headquarters? And the battlespace c⁴i command network to augment them? Underground hangars? Airborne command posts? What’s the point of buying all the high tech goodies if your command structure isn’t hardened to match?

India is about 25-30yrs behind China by most development metrics (literacy, life expectancy, electricity use per capita, motor vehicles per capita, etc.). Militarily, the gap is somewhat less, by virtue of the importance placed by the Indian government on development of national strategic capabilities, in the context of the credible threats posed by both Pakistan and China. Still, call it a 15-20yr gap. That is to say, India’s military development today should be assessed with reference to where China was in 1995. In the context of comparative milestones, therefore, we can see that Tejas is India’s JH-7, while AMCA will be its J-10.

India had (and has) no problem buying stuff from Britain — or from the US for that matter. It was the US which took a “you’re either with us or against us” view of the world and turned its back on India, not the other way around. In any case, the MMRCA saga demonstrates the implausibility of relying solely on western equipment to service India’s needs. Just too expensive in the quantities required.

FGFA progress right now rests on how PAK-FA is progressing, so I wouldn’t use that as a barometer. Though if the MKI is anything to go by, domestic FGFA production is a looooong way off.

Since the preliminary design contract signed in 2010, we have heard nothing from the Indian side except vague and broadly discreditable rumours and grumblings about e.g. how the 117A engine is insufficient (well, duh) and more recently issues with access to information about the 055 incident. We have heard nothing further about Indian FGFA funding, workshare, configuration, development, timelines, milestones — nothing.

As for Super-30, were there any contractual difficulties? I was under the impression it was tucked in within the already oiled relationship between Irkut and HAL, and quietly proceeding as that sneak shot of the fancy Su-30 cockpit awhile back testifies.

Super-30 could well be progressing smoothly. One certainly hopes so! My point was that there is little to no public evidence of this progress, just as we have little to no evidence of the real state of MMRCA negotiations. I am not criticising these programs or relationships so much as warning against reading too much into what we do (and don’t!) hear in the popular press, about Rafale or any other program.

Speaking of Super-30, I am a bit dissapointed the IAF does not seem to be looking past Al-31FP for it.

RuAF doesn’t seem very interested in the uprated AL-31 variants either. Could be the value proposition just isn’t there. Alternatively, perhaps it is the cost of re-tooling, LRIP, initial teething issues, etc. that has so far dissuaded anyone from making the switch. If that is the case, once someone makes the commitment, other clients should follow.

It would be truly astonishing if, having justified the endless growth of the military-industrial complex over the last forty years with reference to the threat of Soviet communism, the disappearance of that threat would not be the occasion for significant retrenchment — even moreso when one considers the dire fiscal circumstances the nation had been left it in courtesy of the previous Republican administrations.

The real failure here lies not with the politicians who quite reasonably expected the armed services to go on a diet, but with the failure of the services to accept this and to restructure accordingly, to ruthlessly prioritise and make real sacrifices. Instead of making hard choices, they simply salami-sliced in anticipation of a return to the 1980s, and the failure of JSF — amongst many other post-Cold War programs — is the result of this misguided attempt to have it all. To be fair, this was not only a military failure, but a broader political and cultural one. Even something as mind-bogglingly sensible as eliminating the land-based leg of the nuclear triad is a political non-starter.

A330 is a good choice, particularly when coupled with the tanker contract. No options for additional airframes?

Political Compass is the best of these types of things that I’ve encountered. Which isn’t to say it’s very good.

EDIT: They even have a comparison chart for the 2015 UK election.

So the crisis on the border with China does not negate buying JF-17. Interesting.

“With JF-17, we will know which side of the border we are on!”

Sourcing is suspect tho.