I suspect IAF is attempting to undermine FGFA so as to make the prospect of backing out of MMRCA appear less palatable. If this is so, we can expect the dialogue to swing back to FGFA the moment the ink is dry on the Rafale contract — or once it has been definitely buried.

Of course, as Ajay Shukla notes, this strategy could well be undermining the broader national interest by progressively constraining options for indigenous involvement in FGFA as development continues to proceed and contracts are signed on the Russian side. It would hardly be the first time an institution placed its own narrow interests ahead of the national whole.

I read Stephen Baxter’s novel Flood a couple years back: enormous quantities of water are bubbling up from the Earth’s crust, progressively flooding the entire world over several decades, up to and including Mt. Everest. It’s hardly a great work of literature (or even science fiction) but it’s a fun read, if you like apocalypse fiction.

I bring it up because in the middle of this novel’s extended apocalypse, in the mid-2030s, there is a mass migration of people across the United States, fleeing low-lying places like Florida for the (temporary) safety of Texas. And at one point, this human highway of millions is buzzed by an F-15, apparently keeping an eye on things. The novel describes it as a flying antique.

So for Stephen Baxter, the idea that USAF would still be flying F-15s in 2035 was an appropriate symbol for and consequence of the beleaguered state of the US government and its efforts to keep abreast of the apocalypse. Meanwhile, in the real world, the same thing is scheduled to occur, courtesy not of all-consuming floodwaters, but as a consequence of the astonishing institutional mismanagement of the last several decades, which has produced on the one hand a remarkable aircraft that the nation can’t afford, and on the other a more modest, affordable aircraft that the nation can’t afford either.

Still, I know which tale makes for more interesting reading.

Not just politically, but economically. Those factories are all key employers, and all need a slice of the defense pie.

It can make sense to sustain factories with sub-optimal or “make work” on a temporary basis — if there is a realistic prospect of circumstances changing in future so as to permit full and efficient utilisation of that workforce and productive capacity — but not permanently. There needs to be a realistic assessment of what the long-term future is for the industrial base in the context of military requirements and national resources and priorities. I am not convinced that Russia is on a sustainable path in this respect, and the current economic downturn could provide an opportunity to make those difficult decisions in the long-term interest of the nation.

All in all, it’s still pretty understandable, in terms of commonality probably not far worse than with various USAF F-16 blocks.

The difference being those different F-16 blocks weren’t being produced at the same time from several different factories.

It all reeks of production arrangements not according to best interests of the military and the nation, but rather as politically motived, designed to reward favoured patrons.

You could certainly make a case for retiring the frigates, but NATO’s idea of what constitutes good use of those funds has nothing to do with what is useful for Belgium, and everything to do with what is useful for NATO.

This situation will force some serious head-scratching in the MoD, not only will procurement suffer but don’t be surprised if high-profile programmes such as PAK-DA get cancelled altogether.

Some fiscal pressure can be useful in forcing officials and institutions to identify which are core national priorities and which are not. Perhaps this period will finally persuade RuN to abandon its hopes of reconstituting a fleet of aircraft carriers, and to concentrate instead on submarines.

R&D is relatively inexpensive compared to production and maintaining fielded forces. Cancelling PAK DA would, I think, be a monumental mistake. Stretching the development phase and/or scaling it down to be more in the class of Tu-22M than Tu-160 — these are options that could be explored. This period would also be a good opportunity to do away with the ridiculous arrangements that have four (or more?) different Flanker variants being supplied to the armed forces simultaneously.

“China should bomb Myanmar, but otherwise try to keep things as low-key as possible.”

LOL

could you post the article here? I’m not able to access his blog on my work network..:)

I don’t think re-posting of entire articles is permitted, but here is the concluding summary:

Here’s the latest state of play:

1. Russia smells real blood. Through their Trade Office and the Embassy, an existing conversation about additional numbers of the Su-30 & upgrades of earlier units has been re-energised with the additional sweetener of a markedly higher degree of local content and sourcing on any additional Su-30s India may choose to license build in Nashik.

2. Livefist can confirm that Russia has also offered India the Su-35 ‘Super Flanker’, but kept the details open. The type is officially on the table now with Russia inviting India to help configure a Su-35 ‘MKI’.

3. Russia is attempting to contain the twin damage of (a) information about engine trouble and fleet availability. Rosoboronexport has begun discussions with the IAF and HAL. And (b) the issue of the mysterious seat ejections. Both sides have decided to sort out the issue cordially and in private. It doesn’t want to lose the momentum it received from the initial suggestion that more Su-30s could cushion the potential collapse of the M-MRCA.

4. Dassault and HAL are currently working at a furious pace to have something to show to the MoD in the next one week, though it remains unlikely that there will be anything for Prime Minister Modi & President Hollande to announce next week in Paris.

5. On March 18, Defence Minister Parrikar said, “They have to tell us whether they can do it or not. Can’t keep waiting.”