Lets hope the current Ukraine crisis will help in making the right decision to opt for a local engine and ditch any option for a German engine.

Let’s hope not. If there’s any western country that has played a constructive role throughout the crisis, it’s Germany. Isolation from the west is not in Russia’s interest. It may not be in her power to prevent it without compromising strategic imperatives, but there is no need to burn bridges one doesn’t have to.

Glad to hear the pilots are safe.
Would you have the timeline (dates) of all the 5 crashes along with causes.

From Shiv Aroor: Feb 2013, Dec 2011, Nov 2009 & April 2009.

And now October 2014, obviously.

So, somewhere between CH-53K (max takeoff weight 38.4t) and Mi-26 (56t) in size/payload?

It reads like Russsia isn’t planning to induct the helicopter itself, which seems like a mistake to me. Why not take advantage of the joint-funding opportunity? Even if it isn’t a perfect match for what Russia wants, surely it is better (i.e. cheaper) than going it alone at a later date.

Secondly, there is the economic and skills argument- a case in point is the MiG-35. The RuMoD has been desperately trying to escape this contract for some time now, however with UAC taking a 62.77% stake in the company it has returned from oblivion and UAC will want to see returns on it’s investment.

The takeover has ensured a retention of the scientific-technical/ know-how personnel base and prevented a ‘brain drain’, selling cigarettes from street-corner kiosks or unemployment (whatever the initial cost to the government, the multiplier of relatively good wages more than compensates). MiG personnel will work on Sukhoi’s heavy UCAV.

Skills retention is certainly important, and can help explain the otherwise inexplicable, such as funding and production of both Mi-28 and Ka-52 (to say nothing of Mi-35!). But that only highlights the need for a long-term national-strategic vision that calibrates military requirements with available resources. After all, it is no use inefficiently spending scarce(!) resources to maintain design and production personnel at e.g. MiG in the present if there is no credible long-term future for them. As for the suggestion that the military knows what it needs — this is not something the military can handle alone. Russia will shed 20m people by 2050, the working age population shrinking (“falling off a cliff” might be more accurate) even as the elderly population grows. How will the Russian state handle this? Not with the same distribution of resources we see in 2014, one hopes!

It looks more like a type used for special forces operations, Low Observables for insertion, and capable of being armed for hot extractions.

It looks like a shuttlecraft from Star Trek: The Next Generation.

Which ones on the j-20?

Is what TomcatViP is referring to I believe.

I am becoming increasingly concerned at trends in Russian military projects and spending. The need to recapitalise degraded assets is urgent and a flurry of activity and spending over the 2010-2025 period in particular is to be expected, yet consideration must also be given to long-term sustainability of both forces and industry in the context of national finances. And when one looks at the list of programs that are known or suspected to be active, I’m not sure this is happening. Even as new capabilities such as unmanned systems are (rightly) receiving considerable attention and funding, and expansion of certain existing capabilities (e.g. carriers) is plotted, there is little evidence of a readiness to sacrifice or consolidate existing capabilities.

It could be that my concerns in this regard are misplaced. After all, it is only natural that many projects be considered for the few that are given the go-ahead and ultimately enter service. I am voicing these concerns because I do not wish to see a militarised Russia unable to invest appropriately in the welfare of her people and the broader development of the nation, or to see Russian forces and industry projects starved of resources, abandoned, etc. as a result of insufficient care taken to ensure a sustainable spending path.

That deterrent failed as recently as 2008 during the Mumbai attacks, when it was the IAF that was raring to go, whereas the IA wanted more time to build up its warfighting stocks. After the new Govt, the renewed focus on the military as versus the deliberate neglect during the previous regime (who didnt want a strong military which could retaliate strongly on its own and hence scupper MMSs desire for a Nobel prize) is obvious. The growth in economic and military strength is pretty much going to happen with a renewed focus on using hard power, not merely talk, and “dossier diplomacy” or running to Uncle Sam at every opportunity.

Military expenditure for all nations should be as low as possible, commensurate with threats to national security. It is in the interests of both India and Pakistan to constrain military spending, thereby freeing up resources for more productive purposes such as infrastructure, health, education, etc.

India’s military spending has declined modestly in GDP terms over the past 25 years, and this is to be applauded, but further reductions in military expenditure are constrained by the growth of China. Fortunately, things could be far worse in this regard: China’s own military spending is modest — although it has grown since the mid-1990s — and the greater part of its attentions are directed elsewhere.

In the absence of major diplomatic developments, there seems little room in the short-term for further reductions. The best we can hope for is that China’s spending will remain modest, allowing India’s to remain relatively modest, in turn allowing Pakistan’s to remain within reasonable limits. The alternative scenario whereby Chinese military spending spikes would be unfortunate for all nations, but particularly for the peoples of less-developed nations such as India and Pakistan.