Laugh if you like but I’ve been back to a very primitive drawing board

Laugh if you like but I’ve been back to a very primitive drawing board, and my early days of being a trainee CPL.

The BEA will report of the causes but what I am trying to achieve is ways to provide a simple lightweight, inexpensive manual replacement to failure of essential parameter displays.

I have possibly succeeded with a fail safe in cockpit horizon indicator.

When I was training to fly there was a centre brace in the middle of the windscreen (a fixed reference point/marker on the airframe directly visible in front of me at all times) on some of the trainers. I used to hang my car keys (dad’s car keys I should say to be honest) on a piece of nylon thread and let it dangle to approximately eye level from anything above on the roof of the cockpit to my right (when flying solo I was in the RH seat). Obviously it would be to my left if I had been on instructor led hours followed immediately by solo as then I may have stayed in the LH seat.

This gave me a wonderful but very useful in cockpit visual 3D horizon indicator (In theory all three X, Y and Z axes).

Why can there not be a simple luminous plumb line similarly in a cockpit, which even in worst case scenario of lights failing could be seen using an emergency micro torch?

I have just reproduced a ‘mock up’ with a piece of thread and a small combination padlock used on travel luggage and it works fine.

Since the egos of aircraft manufacturers would be thrown to admit to such a simple ‘First Aid’ kit fix and have it visible all the time. This could be something that was not normally visible but could be reeled down by either Captain or First officer in a second.

If the electrics haven’t failed switching on landing lights can help once down to a height where there are clouds.
Maybe on this score a cockpit nose light that has two fine intense halogen beams (non fog/cloud penetrating) which shine forward but below flight crew eye level could hit rain or clouds and give a rough but useful indication of speed.
Experienced crew should also know roughly the speed of engines for the position of the throttle levers in the event of failure of speed instruments.

Yes back to some basics but why not as good pilots are very intelligent humans.

Laugh if you like guys but some of this can be implemented and it is inexpensive and a snip to grasp how to use. It also does not require logic design and software programming which needs to be designed, paid for, tested, implemented, etc

Let’s think it out the luminous plumb line could be ready to go now in every pilots pocket with some blu tak to fix it to the cockpit roof (all those items as yet not probably banned in cockpits) even before manufacturers got going.:D

Maybe some union official will say it is a H&S hazard of course.:rolleyes:
I know my response “If it saves all our lives who cares”.

Seems strange that the report says that United/Cont pseudo camouflaged the 737

To me it seems strange that the report says that United/Cont ‘pseudo’ camouflaged the 737, ie took off easy identifiers.

Why ? Surely United/Continental did not cause or can be blamed for the sinkhole occurring?

In the old days a ‘Roller’ (when they were unique) that broke down on the roads was usually whisked into a truck and driven away to save the image of RR.

Likewise prototype cars when driven on conventional or test tracks are ‘patch’ camouflaged (sometimes as badly as the 737). Often a waste of time as the knowledgeable reporter with lens usually identifies the real ‘margue’ below the camouflage.

You have some of the answers to why Boeing is perceived as slow

This decision is not being taken fast enough by Boeing, I know it’s not an easy task but modifying the 737 further does not seem to be the right way for Boeing to go. They may loose orders to the 320 while they come up with a new design but they will definitely have an edge over Airbus in the future, even if that means they loose some business on the way.

There is still speculation that a major Boeing customer may announce a big order for the 320NEO at PAS’11.

You have some of the answers above. In the Airbus- Boeing commercial tussle their will be always ups and downs.

Boeing must make the 787 work, recover losses and also advance their management of new composite airframes including continuously writing new tests and gain knowledge about these new materials being in the conditions 787 customers will put them through.

Somewhere do you not think that the possibility is that they have in their labs the designs for a new aircraft but will see how the success of the 787 goes, also see the progress of the Airbus A-350 before announcing the new project?

After PAS’11 there is F’Borough 2012 and PAS’13 and there will be opportunities for Boeing to take back any lost ‘high ground’.

I firmly believe there is room for both in this world.

In the last part of your quote lies the crux of the matter in general

Good day!!

I’m interested in finding all the deep answers of AF 447 as you are.

Perhaps we may find some answers in the words of an A-320 Instructor pilot to a pilot in training last May 2008 when he said, “The A-320 is easy to fly but difficult to understand.”

Hi fah619
In the last part of your quote lies the crux of the matter.

Fly by wire has brought much advanced monitoring and resources to the industry and to flight crew.

Overall while helping in many ways it has also brought complacency and greed into the industry (both airline and software).

Like systems in other key industries, the origins of the software can be disparate (many backbone operating systems, hardware architectures and programming languages all trying to safely link. e.g. how do the ‘real time’ times stamps guarantee they all synchronise and with what reference device internally and externally).

How many pilots have time to document fully or re-create the exact scenarios faced in some events they encounter/survive? (All these small events can be missed in future systems planning)

How many events aren’t made public/shared due to operator greed?

How do ‘softies’ including analysts manage to include in the logic/algorithm all the possible combinations of critical events that an aircraft encounters ?

How do the ‘softies’ ever visualise what the flight crew really faced as they aren’t in the cockpit when the problem occurs (near impossible to achieve).
(The parallel comes from the pharmaceutical industry and compound/medication trials before marketing begins. How do you make economic sense/clinical use of the medication if you try to test the drug on every possible culture and illness combination in the world? As it is it can take from compound to final release to market 10 years to get a medication safely tested – but in reality is it safe globally – no but needs must and it is sold)

Some good can come of cross training of ‘softies’, analysts and consultants as pilots not in simulators but for real. Likewise it would be useful for flight crew to learn some core software and logic skills to help contribute to advances in logic design.

I can boldly speak to these topics because I wanted to do avionics as a schoolboy, I also was keen to be a pilot and did so until my father passed away and my funding to complete my CPL became sparse. Following that I have worked for early flight simulation, been at the core of many advanced classified and secure commercial software designs based/developed on some of the world’s most advanced environments, while keenly remaining a flying enthusiast. I also for my sins worked as a research assistant in the pharmaceutical industry.

The one aspect that is extremely hard to get right is the ‘HUMAN FACTOR’ – given that all humans react differently in stressful situations (possibly given preceding personal events); which is why ‘fly by wire’ has grown in a possibly foolish attempt to claim to replace human logic and human error.

Yet I remain a proponent of pilots flying civilian aircraft and using the world’s fastest logic (their own acute brains which as yet cannot be surpassed by any computer in true logic). The ‘fly by wire’ in civil arenas will remain ideally supportive to flight crew for a long time, but they must go back to actually being in control.

The fear of disengaging the auto pilot must cease and so must intense pre-occupation with some systems failures sacrificing the humanly do-able skills that all good pilots must have (knowing that their priority is to save the souls on board, including their own lives without a parachute pack on their back).

The opposite can be said of military aircraft as UCAVs can be destroyed remotely (if they get into serious trouble) without sacrificing hundreds of innocent souls on board (in fact no souls on board).

I have hopes that the AF447 is the wake up call the world needs to go positively forward into remote monitoring in real time of aircraft systems (with data archived for ever to help future R&D) and thereby relieve the possible pre occupation flight crew have in trying to grapple with possible erroneous systems caused by unforeseen combinations of events/criteria). The greedy operator can also be identified quickly as the remote sensing can tell independent monitors who cuts corners, etc, sure spy in the cockpit but that’s there already so why not make it ‘bullet proof’? If the unions have a problem with my statement they should think that the value of the flight crews living to fly again is the most valuable asset the airline industry has and that comes from me, now a ‘bean counter’ – the human assets are the rarely measured asset in many commercial businesses where profit (rather than cash flow) is seen as the only means of corporate sustainability.

Pay and rewards shouldn’t be the only motto good flight crew live by but becoming the ‘Luke Skywalkers’ of this world.

EASA prepares to broaden icing certification criteria

EASA prepares to broaden icing certification criteria

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/06/08/357682/easa-prepares-to-broaden-icing-certification-criteria.html

“…. While the European Aviation Safety Agency highlights, in its proposal, the ATR 72 crash at Roselawn, Indiana in October 1994 – the result of freezing drizzle – it also mentions pitot icing and the possibility that this contributed to the loss of Air France flight AF447 in 2009……

…. EASA said it considered the US Federal Aviation Administration’s similar proposed rulemaking of June 2010 but added that, while its objective is to “harmonise as much as possible” the two authorities’ regulations, the European proposal contains some differences.

It will apply to all new large aircraft, not be limited to a specific category, as well as all flight instrument external probes. EASA also proposes clarifying and extending provisions for alerting flightcrew when a probe’s anti-ice system is not operating normally.

EASA said it looked at using terminal radar and airborne sensors to identify icing zones with supercooled drops, but concluded these were “not mature enough”. Another alternative, use of predictive weather tools, was also rejected. Both options would have still required additional rulemaking”

Maybe out of tragedies (some still not completely investigated) are already coming enhancements/developments. A small consolation at least to those bereaved possibly knowing that their loved ones did not die in vain.

The last paragraph is of a poignant note

BEA started analyzing AF447’s cockpit voice and flight data recorders on May 14 at its Le Bourget laboratories. The media and even France’s minister of transport quickly pressured the agency for answers, leading to inconsistent “leaks” and an incredible suggestion that the accident’s cause should be determined before the Paris Air Show in mid-June. Hence the BEA’s decision to issue the update before an interim report is released toward the end of July.

The last paragraph is of a poignant note – one side of me (the bean counter) says “yes business must go on (in an economic recession) hence a politician keen to be seen to be involved rushes to seek a solution/answers before June 20 – the start of the Paris Air Show”
while the other side of me (the technical perfectionist) says “to rush to a conclusion would be futile in the medium to long term interests of business”.

I’ll stay with the second of my thoughts as even the bean counter in me says I’d rather sell medium to long term prospects than have short term gains that completely engulf my organisation with the next crisis by ignoring likely catastrophic failures in systems and/or pilot training causing serious loss of life and aircraft.

This tragedy must after all the expense incurred in seeking answers provide many recommendations pertaining to the technology/industry, software logic and increase pilot training to include extensive handling of other than “Normal Law” situations.

With regards the Paris Air Show, Airbus sales and the future of the aircraft industry it would be far better PR to say that all findings from the BEA investigation interim reports will be used to provide recommendations for enhancements/developments to the aircraft industry (and implementations where feasible to existing models be progressed) but that this could take a minimum period of 2 years until the final BEA report is issued. That would keep things buoyant and by the time of the next Paris Air Show, Airbus sales will have peaked as it will be nearer the A-350 first deliveries (if keeping to schedule)

An ocean is something else especially in the middle of no-where

An ocean is something else especially in the middle of no-where.

I am a keen oarsman (rowing/sculling) and what a shock I had when I went from the calm of the Moselle (even with tandem barges [penache the French call them]) to the 100 km race on the Rhine.

There’s a river to match many oceans, but in reality the major problem on the Rhine is the huge waves created by the immense volume of very fast river traffic (cruisers, large yachts, ships, etc)

I am glad the bay offered the shelter it would as it meant lives were saved in the case of the AN-26 crew