Yes I read it a few days ago and thought mmm should I post ???

An interesting article from Flying magazine : Air France 447: Was it a Deep Stall?

Hi Ralph
Yes I read it a few days ago and thought mmm should I post ??? Then decided against it in case some one took my head off for suggesting the ‘what ifs’ or the ‘maybe if they dids’.

It is a frank and very interesting article –
“….It remained in this unusual attitude not because it could not recover, but because the pilots did not comprehend, in darkness and turbulence and amid a tumult of conflicting warnings of mysterious system failures, the actual attitude of the airplane. They held its nose up. So far as we now know, there is no reason to think that if the crew had pushed the stick forward, held it there, and manually retrimmed the stabilizer, the airplane would not have recovered from the stall and flown normally.

Far from a deep stall, this seems to have been a conventional stall in which the airplane displayed exemplary behavior: It responded to roll inputs, maintained the commanded pitch attitude, and neither departed nor spun. The only thing it failed to do well was to make clear to its pilots what was going on. “

I have been deeply engrossed in watching many of the relevant Nat. Geographic Air Investigations and there are quite a few that draw much earlier parallels to the AF447 tragedy e.g. pilots circadian rhythms/’jet lag’- desynchronosis (Capt. in 6 days previous had been through 18 time zones) in the China Airlines situation of a Boeing 747 found finally to be technically faultless as an aircraft, the first error being that the flight engineer attempted re-starting an engine at 41,000 ft with the bleed air valve open, followed by complete dis-orientation of the crew in the dark with no horizon, failing to disengage the auto-pilot sooner and take control (early use of rudder) when one engine failed, (the auto pilot isn’t capable of moving the rudder);

then Air Transat an Airbus A330 – where the cross feed valve stayed open as the manual did not say it should be shut off, following it’s opening by the pilots following fuel starvation of the starboard engine. The aircraft computer systems logic did not have at the time built in to it an ability to say that the cross feed valve must not be opened if an engine consumes more than it’s maximum possible fuel for the given time period (it must be a fuel leak – which in this case it was – shoddy maintenenace). The software was fixed following. Here too the flight crew did everything by the book and relied on the instruments (while in their minds subconsciously disbelieving some of the instruments) and got so pre-occupied with the problem that they failed to simply say “unless there is a leak we cannot possibly have used so much fuel”. They lost all their fule due to this.They were lucky to get the aircraft down with no loss of life on supposedly the longest glide made by a passenger airliner.

I have already posted previously in this thread that many good senior pilots following the the AF447 tragedy are calling for an urgent recognition of all pilots being trained in handling an aircraft in as many situations when ‘Normal Law’ does not prevail and drawing on their technical experience rather than purely reliance on automation.

It’s really a serious matter of “staying in front of the game” as yet a human brain can beat the best and fastest computer in logic although conceding to the computer in number crunching. An experienced captain can win in a completely new/complex situation if he/she uses his/her experience and skill against systems that depend on their programs/logic being put together following previous real time events/failures.

No the problem isn’t a show stopper to prevent launch customer deliveries

No the problem isn’t a show stopper to prevent launch customer deliveries

Even if it meant swapping newer wings into previously assembled aircraft it would have been all part of the Boeing plan.

This is Boeing in full swing for ANA – “Boeing to fly 787 to Japan for readiness Test” http://www.boeing.com/Features/2011/05/bca_SROV_05_26_11.html

“….It is the aviation industry’s equivalent of a dress rehearsal.

Boeing announced it plans to fly the new 787 Dreamliner to the home of its launch customer ANA in early July to simulate in-service operations across several airports in Japan…

….Steve Gregg, a Boeing airplane maintenance engineer, will accompany ZA002 to Japan. He and the Boeing team will work alongside ANA mechanics to perform ground procedures and nightly inspections.
“It’s going to be great to have the interaction with the customer, be able to help introduce them to the new airplane.”
Boeing plans to deliver the first 787 to ANA in the August to September, 2011 timeframe. ….”

On target for Q3

Here are few more re-assuring videos –
http://www.boeing.com/Features/2010/10/bca_787_test_limits.html
http://www.boeing.com/videos/video.html?fr_story=2995b7c7b2753933b5cef1c7dd0297ac4eb24ea5&rf=bm
http://www.boeing.com/Features/2010/09/bca_fatigue_testing_09_13_10.html

These three vids. of CVR, FDR and engine recovery – awesome examples of perseverence

These three vids. of CVR, FDR and engine recovery are awesome examples of perseverance

AF447 CVR Recovery (BEA)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OqVfSfKmShM

AF447 FDR Recovery (BEA)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sx2MTbwujSE&feature=related

If as we understand both CVR and FDR data are readable after 2 years submerged at the extreme cold and depth, Honeywell deserve a prize for ruggedised design.

AF447 Recovery of airplane parts (BEA)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLb_sY-CIQc&feature=related

The last one shows how badly mangled the engines are.

Hats off to the entire salvage team for an example of men working with technology including robots and succeeding.

Today is the 2nd tragic anniversary of the fateful crash

Today is the 2nd tragic anniversary of the fateful crash.

I personally pay my respects to all those bereaved, to those in positions of authority who didn’t capitulate but persevered to seek answers (albeit extremely expensive) and to all those brave souls who are battling atrocious conditions at sea to complete salvage work.

And to the 228 souls who perished may you RIP.

Message from Air France today to mark the anniversary.

http://corporate.airfrance.com/en/press/news/article/item/rio-paris-deux-ans-deja-rio-paris-ja-faz-dois-anos/

Found this on CNN just now – Total human remains recovered now 75

Found this on CNN just now – Total human remains recovered now 75

http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/05/31/france.jet.crash/index.html?hpt=T1

“…Seventy-five bodies have been recovered from the wreckage of an Air France plane that crashed off the coast of Brazil two years ago, more than doubling the number of remains that have been found, the vice-president of the French victims’ association told CNN Tuesday…..
….The remains have not yet been identified, Robert Soulas said……
….Many bodies were still in the fuselage, investigators said at the time. Only about 50 bodies were recovered in the days following the crash….”

The rest of the report gives details already reported.

This is progress of a macabre nature but essential. All praise to the determined salvage crews working under extreme conditions.

This article without being controversial raises some valid points

This document may be useful for those technically in the picture.

It also will give meaning to the sometimes unintentional literal translation of French to English in some of the early reports.

http://www.smartcockpit.com/data/pdfs/plane/airbus/A330/systems/A330-Flight_Controls.pdf

See Flight Controls Normal Law p4 and p5

This article without being ‘ultra’ controversial raises some valid points http://www.suite101.com/content/faulty-pitot-tube-ice–pi-stall-caused-air-france-447-to-crash-a373234

I shall leave out the already reported aspects and concentrate on the aspects of the article that raise valuable (in my humble opinion) points –

“……The Controversy
This tragedy reignites the long standing controversy over two fundamental principles: technological protection verses individual recognition and recovery.

Technology – advocates believe automation improves safety and the Airbus 330 is one of the most advanced aircraft flying. Investigative journalist and pilot Peter Berendsen wrote in the May 2011 issue of Professional Pilot Magazine, “Airbus engineers believe in cockpit automation, since they have to sell their aircraft to a fast-growing worldwide market with limited supplies of qualified and experienced pilots.”

The A-330 is a fly-by-wire aircraft, meaning the pilot does not directly control the aircraft but enters instructions into computers. The CPUs interpret these pilot inputs and manipulate the flight controls as requested. In normal operation (called Normal Law) the computer restricts the pilot from entering unsafe information. However, in cases where computers fail Alternate Law leaves the pilots vulnerable without certain protections. In these situations the pilot can stall the airplane as happened in AF 447.

Technique – advocates believe pilots must always be aviators and until the late 1980s every airline simulator training session began with a skills review of basic airmanship. However, with the advent of advanced computer technology (like the Airbus), there has been a flow away from aeronautical skills toward becoming system managers. Today’s pilots are rarely taught the rudimentary aspects of flight, such as steep turns, stall recovery and unusual attitudes, in large airliner aircraft.

Conclusion
Seasoned pilots and investigators believe these fundamental skills can never be engineered and designed. They believe these skills require repetition to become natural and are always necessary for safe flights ultimately controlled by airline pilots. With the advent of new training programs, dictated by aircraft manufacturers like Airbus and approved by government agencies, pilots saw these skills programs disappear. Aviation consultant and former Braniff Airlines pilot John Nance told Lisa Stark of ABC News on May 27, 2011 “…in reality, it comes down to training. What we have here is a major training issue, training and proficiency,” Nance argued.

On the PBS program “NOVA: Crash of Flight 447,” broadcast several times during 2010 on WGBH TV, another seasoned accident investigator and former US Airways pilot Captain John Cox asked the rhetorical question, “Was this crew one that was…very slow to pick up the unusual [attitude] information,”

Veteran air accident expert Tony Cable, who investigated the Concorde crash (Air France 4590) and Pan Am 103 (the 1988 Lockerbie bombing) criticizes technology on the same PBS program. According to Cable, the computerized airplanes have “raised the question whether the situation is actually being made worse by the increase in automation whereby crews don’t get a great deal of opportunity to manually fly the aircraft.”

Unfortunately, BEA results indicate that these were the skill sets needed by the young pilots flying AF447. Captain Nance put it best when he argued “I would think one of the major points that has to come out of this [accident] is that pilots — not just at Air France, but all over the planet — need to be massively trained.“

*PI = pilot induced

**An IRO (International Relief Officer or Cruise Pilot) is another First Officer (or co-pilot)s”

Why do I like this article and think it has salient points for the future. Until a personal family tragedy made me resolve never to be technically indispensable, I had as my proprietary UNIX profile slogan or signature “I fly this computer with all users on board and in my hands it does not crash”

May sound arrogant but on the contrary my users knew that I had some of the world’s best ‘uptime’ figures. (e.g. 4 hours user downtime in 3 years)

The computers ranged from the largest most powerful supercomputer to the smallest server. I ran and managed the computers; not the other way around. I did not purely depend on layer upon layer of supposedly management software to monitor and control the system. I knew what to look at, look for and how to keep the system and all essential users safe even in a crisis. I knew the strengths and weaknesses of the system and every critical failure point. Now administrators are so dependent on multiple different layers of management software that often produces multiple delays in identification and response resulting in far more crises and downtime.
I ‘fly’ computers to a great extent using information but by the seat of my pants.

This I believe is the similar cry I hear from the expert pilots – “please let pilots fly, learn to fly and learn to handle crises in parallel with using the automated systems.”