Our Apaches can’t unless they have been updated since I last checked and yes I know the current Harriers have a very limited air to air capability as well as no BVR capability but at least it was something now we will have nothing.

They were tested even with four AA Starstreak missiles, which was cool like hell. If need arises, it is certainly possible to arm them.

But that wouldn’t be fleet protection anyway.

I think I’m going to cry when I see the costs or redesigning the CVF’s for CATOBAR

I saw a 750 millions figure for moving the carrier to CATOBAR configuration. It probably would be cheaper and faster and safer using US EMALS instead of designing UK ones… This is the classic decision i dislike and that’s potentially dangerous. If Off-the-shelf buy was ever indicated for something, THIS was the case.
What the hell is the UK going to do with ITS OWN cats and traps…? No one else will ever buy them…

Certainly the Bay being retired will be sold, plenty a navy worldwide that will be eager to get a nearly new and cheap to run assault ship at a bargain price!

Sad but damn true.
Couldn’t the Department of International Aid come up with a smart idea to somehow get the decommissioned Bay for itself?
To help Haiti it worked awesomely.
And it would allow to keep the damn ship available in the UK, for the UK needs at the same time.
After all, the Aid guys are the only ones laughing, lately. Let them be actually useful for once!

As previously pointed out, the tornado replacement is unlikely to be a single type, or indeed a single manned type. The move to CATOBAR opens the door for the carriers to field UCAVS as well as the RAF being able to pursue everything Taranis and its progeny have to offer.

Yeah, well, that’s awesome and shiny, but even ignoring the budget considerations, you can bet the pilots, given the choice between piloting physically an F35C or remotely control from a screen the flight of a mostly autonomous Taranis, will choice the first forever.

Understandable, too.
You know, Air Force pilots all over the world are arguably the least happy people about the UAS triumphs.
And a manned platform will still be needed badly, even by 2020 and past, i feel.

Also Fox has been making much of the ability of Illustrious to field UAVS between now and the arrival of the new carriers. What are they likely to be?

Watchkeeper, most likely. It was long ago reported for use on the CVF as well.

There was even a proposal to have a “Sea Watchkeeper” that could cover the MASC requirement.

‘We will buy 12 additional heavy lift Chinook helicopters. We will extend the life of the Puma helicopter to ensure that sufficient helicopters are available for our forces in Afghanistan. The Merlin force will be upgraded to enhance its ability to support amphibious operations.

The Puma upgrade would continue, but a statement made to the RAF Families Federation by the Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton the same day states that 24 Pumas will be upgraded rather than the 28 originally announced when the contract was signed in September 2009.

‘Taken together with the continued introduction of the Wildcat helicopters for reconnaissance and command and control purposes, this programme will deliver a properly scaled and balanced helicopter force to support our troops into the future.’

Although it is clear that the Wildcat is secure, the report does say the numbers of maritime helicopters would be ‘aligned to the overall size of the future maritime force structure’. The number of surface warfare ships is being cut from 23 to 19, and this may also be reflected in the number of naval helicopters. No mention has been made in the report about the upcoming retirement of the Sea King, still due to take place in 2017.

The decision to continue building the two Queen Elizabeth II-class aircraft carriers and to order the conventional carrier-version of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35C, means there is still a requirement for an airborne early warning aircraft to replace the Sea King ASaC7 to operate from the ships, but this is not mentioned in the report.

An outcome decision on the SAR-H programme is expected when the government reveals the details of the Comprehensive Spending Review on 20 October. The cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 is likely to leave a significant dent in the UK’s search and rescue capabilities and put increased pressure on the Royal Navy’s Merlin fleet as the UK’s only dedicated airborne anti-submarine platforms.

About the wider helicopter strategy. I don’t like the possibility of the Wildcat Navy numbers shrinking even more.
With Merlin destined to be busier than ever and possibly become an almost constant presence on the CVF (with 12 F35C on board in peacetime, the RN will undoubtedly deploy on them a 6 Merlins ASW flight as often as possible, also to “crowd” the deck up a bit), helicopters are not going to be overabundant even if there’s less warships to equip with them.

Also, the SDSR makes no direct comment on the transferral of Merlins to the Navy’s Commandos.
There’s only mention of “Merlins upgrade to make them better suited to amphibious operations”.
Again, another thing we’ll have to see with time to fully understand.

I keep hoping in Merlins “navalized” and going to the navy.

Though in all seriousness, Northern Ireland has zero fighter cover of its own and the British mainland provides cover for the South too. A base in Wales could provide that cover, and supplement cover for the South West. Oh but no, Scotland needs its full 5 squdrons!

Man, where would bombers going to bombard Belfast come? From the Atlantic? They’d come from the East, and Leuchars is in the perfect position to intercept anything coming from that direction.
Similarly, who the hell would attack Wales from the sky???? Ireland? Again, here threats can come only from East and South. Thus Coningsby is perfect.

Don’t create false problems when we drown in true ones.

The Review contains some flaws worse than i ever thought possible in the latest days of moderate optimism. In particular, it is total rubbish:

-To scrap the Nimrod
-Even more so to scrap the Sentinel that’s the finest capability the RAF has to offer to ground troops. COIN or high end warfare, to loose them make NO ******* SENSE AT ALL. Be it Afghanistan or any other war, they are INVALUABLE.
-Type 22 and a Bay to be lost…? TO RETAIN WHAT? Type 42 about to bow out anyway…??? DEMENTED. TOTALLY DEMENTED. The Type 42s should have been withdrawn tomorrow in the morning, and that would have been a better end for it.
-The MOD site reports “retain Tornado”. ALL of them??? A bloody massive force of 30 years old bombers while you scrap the five radar planes capable to pinpoint the targets for them…? But what kind of sense should this make…???
Later in the document a “reduction” in the force is announced, but not explained. How much will that be…?
–

Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft to provide independent strategic intelligence gathering; and a range of remotely piloted air systems.

The MOD site reports this, which seems to suggest that the RIvet Joint order will continue… While the “range of drones” means everything and nothing at the same time. Is SCAVENGER safe? Mantis and Taranis’s development will continue…?
Again, the safeguarding of the Recon/ISTAR capability makes total sense, but sincerely, it clashes with scrapping Nimrod and Sentinel.
Wasn’t it smarter to cut Rivet Joint instead, and retain Nimrod that could so cover TWO roles…? It’ll cost over a BILLION to get 3 Rivets, while the Nimrod was virtually entirely paid for, and the Sentinel even more so since it is actually already working as well, and doing very well and pretty cheaply too thanks to the platform that was chosen for the system. One of the most succesful RAF buys over, and you throw it away…???
The Sentinel is the Uk’s very own excellence in NATO! It is almost on par of the US Joint Stars radar plane… Truly, it is absurd to scrap it. I totally think it is absurd.
–

Decommission either the helicopter landing ship HMS Ocean or HMS Illustrious following a short study of which would provide the most effective helicopter platform capability, and place one landing and command ship at extended readiness

I can accept mothballing one of the Albions. The LPH to go should be Lusty, since she’s far less suited than Ocean to landing ops. But you can bet, somehow, that it’ll be Ocean who goes, if the “study” is as demented as the decisions highlighted above…
Only justifiation being eventually that Lusty is in better shape and can expect to have a longer life.

As i had announced as soon as the Harrier decision came out, however, the Invincibles are all at the end of the road.
Sorry mates, but i was right. Sadly and painfully right.
I so hope i wasn’t.

Anyway… The 40% of 5 Challenger Regiments is 2 Regiments axed. 3 Regiments remaining means that only 3 of the 5 new “Multi-Role” brigades will have a Tank Regiment. Logic suggests, however, that only the 16 Brigade should lack the tanks (for obvious reasons). The other four brigades ideally should definitely have 1 Tank, 1 Armoured Infantry, 1 Mechanized Infantry and a Regiment of AS90 each.
And 35% of 5 AS90 regiments (which logic suggests are the “heavy artillery”) means… 1.75 regiments…? How the hell… Will every regiment see the number of batteries/guns reduced even further…?
Surely they can’t think to axe the UNIQUE GMLRS regiment as well, right…? Because that, again, would totally be idiotic.

Remove Harrier from service in the transition to a future fast jet force of Typhoon and JSF. This will mean a gap for carrier fast jet operations. JSF, like Harrier, will be operated jointly by RAF and Royal Navy pilots;

No clue about the number of JSF to be bought, nor any real indication of the type.

14 mine counter-measures vessels, based on existing Hunt and Sandown class ships

Arent’t the Hunt + Sandown a total of 16?

carrier-strike based around a single new operational carrier with the second planned to be kept at extended readiness. The carrier will embark Joint Strike Fighters and helicopters (see box overleaf);

the Royal Marines, whose 3 Commando Brigade will provide one key element of our high readiness Response Force. They will be able to land and sustain a commando group of up to 1,800 personnel from the sea from a helicopter platform and protective vehicles, logistics and command and control support from specialist ships, including landing and command ship. It would allow us to conduct an operation such as Sierra Leone in 2000;

Uhm. Are they kidding us with a pun or there’s a plan to still pursue Ocean’s replacement? Because if the carrier is in extended readiness to act as a CARRIER, and there’s the need to deploy 1800 Marines, an LPH is INDISPENSABLE.
Can the navy renew its hopes for a dedicated LPH then…?
It would be awesome to get an answer to this.

a fleet of resupply and refuelling vessels scaled to meet the Royal Navy’s requirements;

Fantastic.
The **** does that mean, though…? What about replacement of current tankers? What’s the plan for that???

a global oceanographic survey capability and an ice patrol ship;

I take it that the norwegian icebreaker will finally be bought to replace HMS Endurance for next year’s planned deployment, then…?

We will need to operate only one aircraft carrier. We cannot now foresee circumstances in which the UK would require the scale of strike capability previously planned. We are unlikely to face adversaries in large-scale air combat. We are far more likely to engage in precision operations, which may need to overcome sophisticated air defence capabilities. The single carrier will therefore routinely have 12 fast jets embarked for operations while retaining the capacity to deploy up to the 36 previously planned, providing combat and intelligence capability much greater than the existing Harriers. It will be able to carry a wide range of helicopters, including up to 12 Chinook or Merlin transports and eight Apache attack helicopters. The precise mix of aircraft will depend on the mission, allowing the carrier to support a broad range of operations including landing a Royal Marines Commando Group, or a Special Forces Squadron conducting a counterterrorism strike, assisting with humanitarian crises or the evacuation of UK nationals.
•
A single carrier needs to be fully effective. As currently designed, the Queen Elizabeth will not be fully interoperable with key allies, since their naval jets could not land on it. Pursuit of closer partnership is a core strategic principle for the Strategic Defence and Security Review because it is clear that the UK will in most circumstances act militarily as part of a wider coalition. We will therefore install catapult and arrestor gear. This will delay the in-service date of the new carrier from 2016 to around 2020. But it will allow greater interoperability with US and French carriers and naval jets. It provides the basis for developing joint Maritime Task Groups in the future. This should both ensure continuous carrier-strike availability, and reduce the overall carrier protection requirements on the rest of the fleet, releasing ships for other naval tasks such as protection of key sea-lanes, or conducting counter- piracy and narcotics operations.
•
The strike needs to be made more capable. Installing the catapult and arrestor will allow the UK to acquire the carrier-variant of Joint Strike Fighter ready to deploy on the converted carrier instead of the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant. This version of the jet has a longer range and greater payload: this, not large numbers of aircraft, is the critical requirement for precision strike operations in the future. The UK plans to operate a single model of JSF, instead of different land and naval variants. Overall, the carrier-variant of the JSF will be cheaper, reducing through-life costs by around 25%.
•
The current, limited carrier-strike capability will be retired. We must face up to the difficult choices put off by the last Government. Over the next five years combat air support to operations in Afghanistan must be the over-riding priority: the Harrier fleet would not be able to provide this and sustain a carrier-strike role at the same time. Even after 2015, short-range Harriers – whether operating from HMS Illustrious or HMS Queen Elizabeth – would provide only a very limited coercive capability. We judge it unlikely that this would be sufficiently useful in the latter half of the decade to be a cost-effective use of defence resources.
This new carrier-strike policy is consistent with the Strategic Defence and Security Review’s overall approach of holding defence capabilities at different levels of readiness appropriate to the strategic context. It makes strategic sense to focus on developing a more effective and appropriate carrier-strike capability to deal with the uncertain evolution in type and scale of potential threats from various states in the next decade and beyond. To provide further insurance against unpredictable changes in that strategic environment, our current plan is to hold one of the two new carriers at extended readiness. That leaves open options to rotate them, to ensure a continuous UK carrier-strike capability; or to re-generate more quickly a two-carrier strike capability. Alternatively, we might sell one of the carriers, relying on cooperation with a close ally to provide continuous carrier-strike capability. The next strategic defence and security review in 2015 will provide an opportunity to review these options as the future strategic environment develops. Retaining this flexibility of choice is at the core of the Government’s adaptable approach.

So i’m guessing we are aiming for 36 ACTIVE F35C in three ACTIVE front-line squadrons with one being Navy so it is deployed REGULARLY on the carrier and two maily-RAF?

Again, no numbers. But this explanation rules out a buy of just 40 planes, unless it is, again, just kidding.

The Army’s five new multi-role brigades will consist of around 6,500 personnel and provide a wide range of capabilities, allowing them to operate successfully across the variety of possible conflicts that could arise over the next decades.
Key to the utility of these multi-role brigades is their building-block structure, allowing greater choice in the size and composition of the force that might be deployed, without having to draw on other elements from the rest of the Army as has been the case in recent times. Small groups from within these brigades, such as an infantry battalion with minimal vehicles and supporting elements, could be deployed quickly to evacuate British nationals such as in Lebanon in 2006. At the other end of the scale and with suitable warning time, the brigades could be combined to generate a larger formation suitable for full scale war.
The multi-role brigades will include: reconnaissance forces to gain information even in high-threat situations; tanks, which continue to provide a unique combination of protection, mobility and firepower; and infantry operating from a range of protected vehicles. The brigades will be self-supporting, having their own artillery, engineer, communications, intelligence, logistics and medical support. Territorial Army personnel will be fully integrated into the new structures, in both specialist roles and reinforcing combat units.

This seems to suggest that EACH brigade will have a tank formation. That would mean retaining 5 tank battalions. How can it be done if the 5 current formations are to be cut by 40%…??? Idem for AS90 artillery.

five multi-role brigades (see box) each comprising reconnaissance forces, tanks, and armoured, mechanised and light infantry, plus supporting units, keeping one brigade at high readiness available for an intervention operation, and four in support to ensure the ability to sustain an enduring stabilisation operation;
•
16 Air Assault Brigade, a high-readiness, light, short-duration intervention capability, organised and trained for parachute and air assault operations, with its own supporting units;
•
precision Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets that can strike targets up to 70 km away, and Loitering Munitions able to circle over a battlefield for many hours ready for fleeting or opportunity targets;
•
a new range of medium weight armoured vehicles, including Terrier engineer vehicles and the Scout reconnaissance vehicles and in due course the Future Rapid Effects System Utility Vehicle (FRES UV) which will be the core of the Army’s armoured manoeuvre fleet;
•
protected support vehicles, replacing unprotected versions that are no longer suitable, to move logistic supplies around the battlefield;
•
heavily armoured vehicles, including Warrior infantry fighting vehicle, AS90 artillery and Titan and Trojan engineer vehicles and Challenger tanks, in smaller numbers than now but sufficient to conduct operations in high-threat situations;
•
a range of ISTAR capabilities including: Watchkeeper unmanned aerial vehicles; man-portable and vehicle-fitted electronic warfare equipment; deployable surveillance to protect forward operating bases; and a force protection system to protect against indirect fire such as artillery and mortars;

FRES UV to resurrect at some point then! Awesome.

Reassuring. GMLRS safe then, and Fire Shadow too, along with Watchkeeper. A C-RAM system to be acquired? It seems the case, from what’s said here.
We’ll see.
It also looks like, to me, that we are looking to a FIVE Multi-Role brigades PLUS the 16 Air Assault. It is unclear if the Multi-Role High Readiness brigade IS the 16 AS or ANOTHER brigade.

For the RAF, confirmed 14 new tankers, apparently. No mention for a 8th C17 however.
22 A400M confirmed, all C130 to go, the J variant from 2022.
Chinook buy slashed to 12 from 22 as widely expected.

Nuclear policy:

consequently, take the second investment decision (Main Gate) finalising the detailed acquisition plans, design and number of submarines around 2016
•
work with British industry to improve efficiency and optimise to expected demand its capacity to build and support submarines.
As a result of our reassessment of the minimum necessary requirements for credible deterrence we will:
•
reduce the number of warheads onboard each submarine from 48 to 40
•
reduce our requirement for operationally available warheads from fewer than 160 to no more than 120
•
reduce our overall nuclear weapon stockpile to no more than 180
•
reduce the number of operational missiles on each submarine.

The review has concluded that the overall cost of the submarine and warhead replacement programmes and associated infrastructure remains within the £20 billion cost estimate foreseen in 2006 at 2006 prices. To drive value for money we will:
•
defer decisions on a replacement to the current warhead
•
reduce the cost of the replacement submarine missile compartment

We have also determined that the next generation of submarines can be configured with only eight operational missile tubes, rather than the 16 on the current Vanguard class. Together with the US, we will now proceed with a common design for the missile compartment that provides that capacity.

Since the US plans 12 tubes and are highly unlikely to change that, the “Common” missile compartment will not be so “common” anymore, possibly.
Hope this penny pencing does not end in higher overall cost as often happened in the past.

We have reviewed the scope to extend the life of the existing Vanguard class submarines and have concluded that, with sufficient investment, we can safely operate them into the late 2020s and early 2030s. This affords us the opportunity to adjust the build programme of the replacement submarines to match, reducing cost in the short-term with the aim of delivering the first new submarine in 2028. Later this year detailed design work on the new class of submarines will begin. This will provide the information needed in order to determine whether maintaining continuous at sea deterrence would require four submarines, or a fleet of only three. A decision on submarine numbers would be required at the Main Gate point of our acquisition programme, around 2016.

This is highly likely to mean a major SLEEP refit for the Vanguard class will be needed around 2020.
I take this occasion to underline that it might very well end up sucking more money than is saved by deferring decisions and the building of new subs.
Unless CASD rule is relaxed, alternating Vanguard patrols with French SSBNs patrols, such a lenghtening of the submarine’s life is highly unlikely to be possible without major work on the boats.

Cooperation with France to include:

aligning elements of our armed forces in order to provide high readiness joint formations for future operations, including improved interoperability, information sharing, and logistics cooperation
•
developing joint military doctrine and training programmes relating for example to noncombatant evacuation operations, and responses to counter-improvised explosive devices
•
extending bilateral cooperation on the acquisition of equipment and technologies, for example in the areas of complex weapons, and increasing significantly our investment in joint projects, including unmanned aerial systems
•
aligning wherever possible our logisitics arrangements; including providing spares and support to the new A400M transport aircraft
•
working together to develop a stronger, globally competitive defence industrial and technology base
•
enhancing joint working on emerging security concerns such as cyber security, where we will work together to understand and defend against potential threats.

Overall, the conclusions I PERSONALLY make from reading the SDSR document are that:

The single carrier will therefore routinely have 12 fast jets embarked for operations while retaining the capacity to deploy up to the 36 previously planned, providing combat and intelligence capability much greater than the existing Harriers. It will be able to carry a wide range of helicopters, including up to 12 Chinook or Merlin transports and eight Apache attack helicopters. The precise mix of aircraft will depend on the mission, allowing the carrier to support a broad range of operations including landing a Royal Marines Commando Group, or a Special Forces Squadron conducting a counterterrorism strike, assisting with humanitarian crises or the evacuation of UK nationals.

-Two aircraft carriers, both with cats and traps, but with only one truly operative
-At least one Squadron of F35C Navy-owned, to deploy REGULARLY on the carrier
-At least two more frontline squadrons, possibly RAF owned, as Tornado replacement and completition of a full airgroup for the carrier.

However, it also adds:

To provide further insurance against unpredictable changes in that strategic environment, our current plan is to hold one of the two new carriers at extended readiness. That leaves open options to rotate them, to ensure a continuous UK carrier-strike capability; or to re-generate more quickly a two-carrier strike capability. Alternatively, we might sell one of the carriers, relying on cooperation with a close ally to provide continuous carrier-strike capability. The next strategic defence and security review in 2015 will provide an opportunity to review these options as the future strategic environment develops. Retaining this flexibility of choice is at the core of the Government’s adaptable approach.

3 Commando Brigade will provide one key element of our high readiness Response Force. They will be able to land and sustain a commando group of up to 1,800 personnel from the sea from a helicopter platform and protective vehicles, logistics and command and control support from specialist ships, including landing and command ship.

-HMS Ocean. Up in the air, literally. Logic suggests that HMS Illustrious will go and Ocean remain. Either way, FOR NOW, a LPH remains.
Total uncertainty for the future: plan calls for an amphibious capability and strategy that pretty much REQUIRES a dedicated LPH.
Wheter HMS Ocean can still hope for a successor or the Amphibious requirement will be sized down brutally once she goes without replacement is a hard guess.
I hope it is the first, and fear/believe it is likely the second. The navy will have to fight hard to ensure the LPH replacement is somehow obtained.

As soon as possible after 2020 the Type 23 will be replaced by Type 26 frigates, designed to be easily adapted to change roles and capabilities depending on the strategic circumstances;

Future frigate target to be no higher than 13 vessels in TOTAL, that added to 6 Type 45 give the 19 level required.
C1 and C2 concept apparently dead, Type 26 takes all, with the objective of like-for-like Type 23 replacement.

14 mine counter-measures vessels, based on existing Hunt and Sandown class ships with a replacement programme which will also have the flexibility to be used for other roles such as hydrography or offshore patrol. This capability provides a significant level of security and protection of the UK’s nuclear deterrent;

Does it mean that the end of C2 and downsizing in frigate force is expected to be “balanced” by a growing “C3” (i know it is not the right name anymore but at least is something we all get) requirement from 8 to 14 hulls?
I hope so, but there’s no firm commitment.

There will be 7 Astutes, and that’s a great news, even if 8 was the minimum requested for the role and 10 the previous target.

There will be 14 air tankers, apparently going to be named “A330” in UK service. The glossary reports “A300” but i think it is a print mistake since it seems that the rest of the document uses A330.

Indications that Storm Shadow integration on F35C will be resurrected come from this paragraph:

the Storm Shadow cruise missile carried by our current and future fast jets – a state of the art capability to strike ground targets at medium to long range;

Similarly, SPEAR appears safe:

advanced air launched weapons to complement the capabilities of Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighter;

A “Reduced” Tornado fleet is mentioned, just like a “reduced” order for F35C, but numbers are options that the SDSR does not want to tackle, evidently.
No indications at all of expected force structure for the Typhoon, either.
Cuts to the Typhoon are NOT mentioned, but Tranche 3B is certainly dead all the same. Possibly that will be all of it, however.

not bring into service the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft programme. We will depend on other maritime assets to contribute to the tasks previously planned for them;

This seems written by old Ainsworth.
Does this mean that a navy with less ships will somehow magically tackle a new 365-days a year commitment in the North Sea detatching a Type 23 + Merlin in there…?
Of course no. But admit that the UK will be entirely blind there would have been too harsh.

For the army, FRES UV seems to have a future (one day…), Warrior upgrade is totally neclected and never even hinted at (bad signal), while Fire Shadow appears to be safe. (thanks god)
FRES SV safe (to a degree) and destined to 5 “redesigned” RECCE formations for the new Multi-Role brigades.

The Multi-Role brigade is a neat concept, if you ask me. I like the idea. I think the army’s part of the review is the smartest and best thought one.
However, it is funny to see how much the Multi-Role brigade reminds the all-encompassing, self-contained formations of old URSS.
Those even had their own NBC force, however, and this will miss in UK formations despite NBC threat from terrorism being very high on the list.
A flaw.

Open hints to C-RAM seems to ensure that some kind of serious capability in this field will appear, and let’s hope so.

We will also maintain our existing policy of close cooperation with the US and our other NATO allies on ballistic missile defences, and we intend to support proposals to expand NATO’s role.

Interesting remark. We’ll see what that equates to, at the end of the day, when facts and not words matter.

RN apparently will get a new HMS Endurance soon. I hope so.

SAS safe and about to get more kit and money, apparently. WHAT will that be is a mystery.

All in all, is a good review.
With many uncertainties left, however, and two large flaws:
-Nimrod
-Sentinel
and in smaller measure the loss of 4 Type 22 and a Bay LSD(A) when losing the Type 42 immediately would have been far less of a loss if looked at in the optic of “next-five-years” reasoning.

These 3 cuts are totally wrong choices for me, and in particular the first one leaves a massive gap in coverage and capability, apart from being the worst possible decision ever in terms of value for money.
Basically, it is ultimately making the Nimrod history TRULY a total economic suicide.
But then again, the Tory will be able to use this to blame labour, and this probably had large merit in ensuring the Nimrod was killed for good, if you ask me.

It must have been just too tempting to make Nimrod the ultimate “labour-disaster” to show to the public.

SDSR document: http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf

Because Ark Royal is the one Invincible particularly fitted out to work with the Harriers. In MOD words “the nation’s sole Strike Carrier”.

As i had already said, no Harriers, no Invincible. And it is still good if it is only one of the two, because i was pretty much suspecting both Lusty and Ark would go.

It’s insane, we just spent a bundle on her life extension and refit.

If that’s just it, the last of the Type 42 being refitted was completed… what…? A couple of months ago, or even less…?

Not really true, since it was the RAF which tried in every way along the years to kill off the Fleet Air Arm and ultimately obtained the Sea Harrier death and the Joint Harrier Force agreement that allowed the RAF to claw control of the airplanes at sea, as it had always wanted.
I don’t think the navy would be unhappy by being given back the possibility to maintain its own air force, you know…

The tornado fleet was supporting British and American forces in Iraq whilst the harrier was in afganisatan.

And the whole mighty fleet of some 7 frontline squadrons back then was unable to detach 8 planes to Afghanistan…?
Should we really believe it…?

I don’t.

And again i point out that Typhoon was planned to go in Afghanistan next year in place of Tornado, instead. RAF official plan it was. Now, of course, they can’t do it or they make it evident that their cry about Tornado is far less serious than it seems.

Deckhandlers and mechanics can also train on the current VTOL with helicopters, which would still leave them decent assault carriers, especially if the AH-64 goes to sea.

Operating helos or operating jets, i think i can say, is even more different than VTOL or CTOL, so i have to disagree on this point too, personally. And that’s CATOBAR, actually. CTOL is Conventional Take Off and Landing, while CATOBAR is Catapult Assisted Take Off, Barrier Assisted Recovery, if i recall correctly.

F35A is CTOL
F35C is CATOBAR