And clearly according to you the development of a something such sophisticated as an aircraft starts even before the project definition is complete.Obviously thats how things are done in your country…why am I not surprised…

rayrubik, actually Buraidiah’s quotations of Dr. Harinarayana were accurate. However, he misinterpreted the first metal cutting in 1993 to be a delay due to ADA, and not IAF.

I once again reproduce the excerpt from the article I posted earlier :

After consideration, including by special committees, the Indian Air Force and the government gave the real operational go-ahead only in late-1993.

Buraidiah later validly questioned about the beginning of not metal cutting, but the design, to which it was replied that PD began in sept. 1987 till 1988 after which 1/7 scale model was tested in 1990.

In the 1970’s (not 1978 in particular), only the need for such a fighter was informally or unofficially put forward, just like the need for MRCA was first proposed sometime in 2001. The agency to develop the Tejas itself was formed in 1983.

Glad you came down from 1993 BS, so lets bring it further till you arrive at 1983:p. According to you a project start where cutting the plate for plane???

LCA was originally conceived in 1978but it was only sanctioned ahd entrusted to the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) in August 1983 for completion in eight to ten years. ,
http://www.flightglobal.com/PDFArchive/View/1988/1988%20-%203419.html

As you can see the LCA was conceived in 1978, and Govt sanctioned it only in 1983.

So, do you think the developers fooling the Govt and the people??? Are they comiiting to something which they knew they could not fulfill?? That will make them……:D

Note that as per Air Marshall Wollen (retd) and the article by Mr. Raman Puri and Ashok Parthasarthy, the production of Tejas began in 1993 only, due to the inordinate delay by the IAF. The IAF along with numerous govt. committees, delayed the final clearance to late-1993 instead of 1990, prior to which production could not begin.

Thus, from the above it is clear that Tejas got delayed by procedural delays by IAF and govt. committees, and not due to ADA.

Hence, as the Tejas actually began production in late-1993, the development time of the Tejas has been 15 years only and not 23 years as the media claims. Even if one does “latch on” to the date of 1983, it can be noted that most of the time from that year upto 1993 was spent in sanctioning, preparing PD, reviews, and giving operational clearance and other such bureucratic delays only.

This discussion of LCA and its never ending story is coz someone posted LCA is in league of F-22, Typhoon, Rafale ……..and hence can also be in running of MMRCA.

We have discussed before that the context of that discussion was the pioneering effort of the countries of the aircraft mentioned.

The onus may now be on you to prove how Tejas cannot compare to Gripen, Rafale and Typhoon in the technologies involved like avionics, radar, weaponry, and stealthiness as we have already discussed in opposition to this issue before.

The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project was launched in 1983 and hopes for a first prototype flight by 1992. The aim is to produce a state-of-the-art single-engined,multirole, all-weather fighter. Following the critical-review stage, a compound-delta planform was chosen for the wing. ADA freely admits that many of Dassault’s software tools were used in the design process, together with access to the French company’s knowledge base. Involvement by the USA has been limited to flight control systems, composites and avionics simulation, for key systems such as the radar, the ADA is carrying out a joint definition effort with Ericsson of Sweden.

The above is inaccurate. While Dassualt’s consultancy was taken in the Project Definition (PD) stage, composites and avionics simulation were not done by USA. In Project Definition stage, an on-paper plan or “sketch” of the plane is created. Some CAD-type tools may have been used at that time to arrive at the PD on paper.

Note that Tejas is said to be globally the first fighter of all time to have a compound cranked delta planform.

Selling software and manufacturing composite is two different things…….. here is what reality is:
Carbonfibre technology for the wing will also be imported, as NAL would take nine years to begin production of composite wings, says Dr S. R.Valluri.

The above is the same news as initial import of composite wing panels from Italy. Currently, the fabrication of all the composite structures for wings, fuselage, rudder, fin is now undertaken by NAL as mentioned in page 3 of this document. For the LSPs, NAL has already completed the setup of composite fabrication technology.

Buraidiah, the focus of discussion is Tejas’ viability as an MRCA contender. The information posted by you regarding Dassault and costs incurred in every phase has already been in the public domain since 8 years as in here.

Please understand that the test rigs, simulators and integration for FBW was done using F-16 Vista sims, as is mentioned on various articles on Tejas, including wikipedia.

Here, I would briefly digress from the topic to focus on the oft-quoted media phrase of, “wings from Italy and avionics from France”. Only the frontal display panels are sourced from France : processors and mission computers that run in the background are Indian developed, as in Su-30 MKI.
ADA has beaten major composite manufacturers in the sale of software to Airbus Industrie, which is used for designing 3-D composite layout. This does not imply that the latest Airbus A-380 is Indian, instead of French. Similarly, if initially Italian composites were purchased, it doesn’t imply that the Tejas is Italian.

Mr. Hormuz’s article “clubs” Tejas, Gripen, F-22, Typhoon and F-2 because they were pioneering efforts for their respective nations.

Composites does not alone make 4+ generation aircraft. it has to be multirole. It has to lift heavy weights as M2K-9. U havent shown me photo of Teja ETs. how big they are? smallish like

star49, Tejas is a multirole plane as per the developing Agency, ADA. It can carry air-to-air missile (recently test-fired R-73) and drop tanks. A2G weaponry will also be tested.

Regarding its being 4+, it is because of its technologies like avionics package, digital quad FBW, Elta (and later AESA) radar, which are equivalent to Rafale or Gripen. Its composite percentage is higher than Typhoon too, as per official webpages of the 2 fighters.

There is difference Rafale was mostly developed with indigenously developed technolgies. LCA started with imported stuff & will go indigenous over time.
so Rafale still didnot took that much time despite budget was mostly in 1988-1992 period.

I may reiterate that components imported for Tejas are engine (same as Gripen and T-50), cockpit displays (same as Rafale), gyroscopes, testing equipment and integration of FBW from Lockheed Martin, and the Litening pod from Israel (later version used in JSF).

Of these, the displays, gyroscopes and target pod have been developed indigenously and are to be deployed on later production versions. The Kaveri engine development is ongoing.

MRCA= Multirole combat aircraft
MMRCA= Medium Multirole combat aircraft
F-16E/EF/Rafale/MIG-35 comes around 24 tons Maximum. Only F-18/Gripen will be outliers.

But those contenders are now claiming 4++. So u need one another Plus for LCA. I want to see the load out pictures even conceptual drawings will be appreciated.

See, there are no 2 or more contracts, but only 1 contract for 126 fighters for which 6 contenders are said to be competing.

The Tejas is a 4+ G fighter plane on virtue of highest percentage of co-cured composites globally, and avionics and flight-control being comparable to Gripen-C and Rafale. AESA radar is also being discussed for the same.

No doubt it was effort under taken first time but there was foreign consultancy available in late 80s to 90s along with licensing of foreign aircraft. so it is not that India was starting from clean sheet in complete isolation from outside world. I doubt that was the case with Rafale. Rafale was technology beyond Mirage-2000 in stand alone basis.

The Tejas project was not undertaken on a turnkey outsourcing procedure like Taiwan’s Ching Kuo, Japan’s F-2 and S. Korea’s T-50 fighters. These are F-16 clones with substantial and major contracts outsourced to Lockheed Martin and many other US companies.

The Tejas project was commenced wholly indigenously. Where unavailable, technology was procured for example, gyroscopes and displays from France, ground rigs and simulators for flight-control from US (F-16 vista sim was used), and the Litening target pod from Israel. However, parallel development of all these is completed or ongoing.

If, as you say, Rafale was “technology beyond Mirage-2000”, then by the same measure it may be said that Tejas may be in “another dimension” compared to post-WW2 HF-24 Marut.

A long long time ago and in a galaxy far far away, I had written this:
Clicky

Victor, the above views are accurate. As you mentioned, the actual timeline for Tejas begins in 1990, and not 1983 as most critics mention.

The following article by Mr. Parthasarathy, former scientific advisor to the Prime Minister, and Vice Admiral (retd) Raman Puri not only describe the case for the continuation, but also the enhancement of the Tejas and most importantly, its case as an MRCA contender.

The authors were the apex authorities on defence procurement of the 3 services upto 2006. This article is very important in that regard :

The case to support the indigenous LCA programme

Ashok Parthasarathi and Raman Puri

The facts with regard to perceived cost and time overruns and performance shortfalls in perspective

There have been several articles in the press critical of projects of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in general, and specifically the programme relating to the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), now named Tejas, and the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme. Indeed, whenever a significant event that involves indigenous R&D, particularly defence-related, occurs, or a crucial decision is set to be taken, articles originating from within the defence “system,” or from vendors who see their business prospects threatened, appear. The real facts relating to the programme need to be put in context.

The two issues on which the LCA project is criticised are cost and time overruns, and performance shortfalls. As regards the so-called time overruns, when the zero/go date for the project is taken as 1983, the critics fail to mention that what was sanctioned in 1983 was an ad hoc Rs.560 crore, pending full preparation of the Project Definition Document (PDD) — which is a fundamental step even to start the design and development process. The costs were to be finalised based on the PDD. This required the setting up of infrastructure in a hundred academic institutions and R&D laboratories and building up expertise to undertake the fundamental and application-oriented R&D required, and harnessing the design and engineering effort available largely in the public sector units for such a complex, state-of-the-art aircraft. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) discussed with Air Headquarters the Air Staff Requirement (ASR). Air Headquarters had requirements added to what was originally to be a replacement for the MiG-21. As a result, the ASR that was finalised was practically that for a Mirage 2000. But in the public perception the LCA remained as a replacement for MiG 21.

It look seven years, till 1990, to formulate the PDD. Based on this the ADA, in a report to the Ministry of Defence in 1990, gave a time-frame of seven years to develop the LCA and projected a financial requirement of Rs.4,000 crore. This included the building of four prototypes also. There had been a 25-year gap since the only fighter aircraft ever indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, namely the HF-24 Marut, had entered squadron service. So the period of seven years to set up a more advanced R&D infrastructure and build up even the core personnel needed to develop the technologies that the LCA’s ASR and PDD called for, was modest.

After consideration, including by special committees, the Indian Air Force and the government gave the real operational go-ahead only in late-1993. Even that “go-ahead” covered the development of only two Technology Demonstrator Aircraft (TDA) without weaponisation. The funding approved was only of Rs.2,000 crore — half the amount requested for full-scale development. The first TDA flew in 2001, eight years from the real operational ‘go’ date, despite much additional R&D work that had to be undertaken due to the U.S. sanctions imposed in 1998.

Comments appeared in the media in 2001 quoting IAF sources to the effect that what the ADA had achieved was just a flying machine that was yet to be weaponised. Considering the nature and scope of the approval accorded in 1993, what else was to be expected? Using the money sanctioned for two TDAs, the ADA built four. Full-scale development, for which another Rs.2,000-plus crore was finally sanctioned, thus started only in late-2001. Some 1,200 hours of flight testing was to be undertaken to secure Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) from the IAF.

At that point, apart from the weaponisation requirements the project had to undergo extensive redesign to accommodate an air-to-air missile chosen by the IAF, which was considerably heavier and longer than what had been specified till 2000. The IAF had again changed its mind. This necessitated the complete redesign of the wing structure, using only composite materials in order to keep the weight within limits. The period of this redesign was also utilised to upgrade the avionics, to a completely open architecture.

Consequently, in “generational terms” the LCA is a fourth generation-plus aircraft with full networking capabilities. This made it more than comparable to anything the IAF had, and possibly would have, even after it acquires the 126 Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) now on tender, with first deliveries due eight years hence.
On the engine

It is true that the Kaveri engine for the LCA that the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) of the DRDO has been developing for 12 years has not yet met its technical performance targets and requires redevelopment. So far the GE 404 engine from the U.S., which powers the F-16 fighter-bomber, has been used to power the LCA. The problems the GTRE has with the Kaveri are not unusual in a complex fighter aircraft engine project being undertaken for the first time. Moreover, the financial sanction of about Rs.320 crore given for engine development was possibly only to cover the Project Definition Phase and some high-risk technology development effort. We do not know of a first-of-type high-technology fighter aircraft engine being developed anywhere in less than a multi-billion dollar programme and a 20-year-plus development cycle. Even Snecma, the sole fighter aircraft engine manufacturer in France, despite decades of experience in developing and manufacturing engines for Mirage III, V and F-1, took about a decade and $2.2 billion to develop the M-88 engine for the Mirage 2000. The development of the Kaveri is unlikely to cross $1 billion.

The LCA with a GE 404 engine has done 800-plus hours of flight-testing. Even with that engine the performance has been not only vastly superior to that of even the recently upgraded MiG 21 BIS (the IAF is operating almost 400 of the series), but it has shown itself to be comparable in many critical parameters to the Mirage 2000. Modifications to the aircraft structure are under way to reduce weight and improve engine performance. When the GTRE’s joint venture with a leading foreign engine manufacturer for further development is completed in the next four years, the Kaveri will be brought up to a performance level, superior to the GE 404. Fitted with it, the LCA will be truly comparable to the Mirage 2000 and in many respects even superior. And all this in an aircraft much lighter than the Mirage 2000.

As for network-centric capability, which intrinsically needs indigenous systems for secrecy, security and inter-operability, it is superior in the LCA compared to any aircraft in the IAF’s inventory.

So it is a fallacy to think that we can continue the importing spree and still have such network-centric capability.

As recently as in 2005, the IAF’s requirement for 126 new aircraft was only for an upgraded Mirage 2000. At Rs.120 crore to Rs.140 crore a plane, compared to at least double that amount for any of the aircraft types now bidding for the 126 MRCA, is not the LCA a highly cost-effective fighter for volume induction into the IAF?

As for development costs, the LCA has remained well within the sanctioned $1.2 billion — which is about the lowest anywhere.Time overrun in the strict sense is only by a year or two, despite the sanctions. A first-of-type aircraft of this degree of complexity has not been developed anywhere in the West or in Russia in less than two to three decades.]

The F16 series that was inducted into the U.S. Air Force in 1975 is today at Mark 60. That is how aircraft of this level of complexity are improved after induction. That this imperative applies even more to the LCA has to be recognised.

It is for the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister to ensure that this effort is not belittled or scuttled, and that the LCA programme is given all-out support — as successive Prime Ministers have ensured for our atomic energy and space programmes.

(Ashok Parthasarathi was Science Adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Vice- Admiral (retired) Raman Puri was Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman, Committee of Service Chiefs, remaining closely involved with the inter-service weapons acquisition process from October 2003 to February 2006).

Reference :-

http://www.hindu.com/2008/03/09/stories/2008030955051000.htm