Recent history shows that the oppsoite is true, the cheaper Mig-29 variants have achieved only penny packet deals to a small number of countrys where as the Flanker, usually in its most advanced and expensive variant at the time has achieved remarkable success.

China and India both made triple figure orders, Malaysia, Algeria, Vietnam, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea (despite already operating the smaller/lighter/cheaper Mig-29) and Angola have all ordered smaller numbers.

On the other hand post cold war Fulcrum deliverys have been limited to Yemen, Peru, Iran, Sudan, Myanamar and Eritrea, all in small numbers and largely in basic variants.

The lesson seems to be that whilst there is a place for a lighter cheaper fighter it may well not be as succesful as a bigger stablemate from the Russian market.

The issue is a little more complex than that. Most of the “big-ticket” FLANKER purchases were made by states that have both large and flourishing economies – especially China, India and Malaysia. Other buyers include countries such as Algeria and Vietnam which have a large landmass and/or offshore interests. It is possible that the market for large, long-range, expensive fighters will become exhausted as these large (physically and economically) customers satisfy their needs. Much more numerous are the countries whose landmass and economy will allow for only modest purchases of shorter-legged fighters that are cheaper to maintain and to purchase in the first place. Much of Eastern Europe and many states in central Asia fit this bill as do a number of Latin American countries and pretty much every state in Africa. Should these countries be in the position to buy new fighters in the future (many of them are currently using aging and obsolete Soviet fighters) they might be looking for something lighter than a FLANKER. If Russia’s aviation industry is not in a position to offer anything to compete with late model F-16s, Gripens or even Eurofighters, J-10s etc. then these potential clients may well shop elsewhere.

Of course this scenario is by no means certain – its just that MiG might be counting on its possibility and thats why they are working on a lighter fighter – and it might also be the cause of Sukhoi’s concern.

There is an internal optical targetting system.

Hm? Where?

Let me be the first to say: really?

Didn’t know anything about this… Whats the point? I thought TOPOL-Ms were supposed to replace SATANs etc?!? How do you know its heavier? How many warheads?

If you know its weight can you speculate about range? This is big news.

Thanks guys, got it now.

Operti, thanks for posting that – it looks pretty interesting.

Sounds like a bit of dodgy info there. The only reason I can think of for Iran getting any Russian kit via Syria would be to stop the US and Israel getting all hot and bothered about it. But then if that is the case, why make the deal public at all?

If anyone is interested, the text of resolution 687 can be found here:

http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm

Garry,

I think we agree on most things – Zare ironed out the misunderstandings pretty well I think.

There are a couple of points I would like to comment on however:

The condition the US and Europe will be in when it gets to their airspace, I doubt it would matter whether it was easily detectible. Of course flying low and fast in the 5,000km vicinity of the target area should make it hard to detect and difficult to intercept.

I agree here but I think that it would be a good thing (from a Russian perspective) if the new bomber could threaten CONUS without having to go to such lengths… Or if it could threaten CONUS without a nuclear war having taken place first.

Simply replacing three very different aircraft with one platform that can do the job (remember a replacement for the Bear also suggests a replacement for the Tu-142 MPA as well) as well as if not better than the existing three aircraft perhaps for less cost and able to be made in the 100s to provide a viable strategic force and a theatre force as well.

I agree – in fact I was going to suggest that it might have to cover so many different roles that it might be worth having a number of variants that have a high degree commonality that would ease the maintainence burden for the fleet as a whole.

… and hey, why limit ourselves here… this new bomber could be a replacement for the Tu-142, Tu-95, Tu-22M3, Tu-160, AND Mig-31 and A-50, not to mention long range jammer/DEAD type aircraft.

I question the need for a new “bomber” to replace aircraft such as the A-50 whose requirements (even if we talk purely in terms of engine performance) are likely to be so different that it would be very difficult to achieve. I believe that an air-liner airframe may be more appropriate here – perhaps Sukhoi’s RRJ or similar. As for replacing the MiG-31 – it looks like folly to me to stretch the design so far that it can cover all these bases. Perhaps if they stuck to replacing the Tu95s, the Tu-22M3s and the Tu-160s they would be better off. Even the Tu-142 could be replaced by a totally different airframe – perhaps also something based on an airliner – or a Be-200 … or something else.

The fact is that, from a purely military point of view, designing and building a new strategic bomber that will not add capabilities that go beyond what the current Tu160 fleet offers will be a gross waste of time!

Lets not beat about the bush here, realistically speaking, a Russian strategic bomber has to be able to threaten the continental United States and othe US interests (such as ABM bases for e.g.) worldwide. To do this it must not only have an inter-continental un-refueled range but must be as stealthy as it is possible to make it. One of the reasons that Blackjacks aren’t much of a threat to the CONUS is that they are likely to be detected so that, even if they cannot be intercepted, an attack will not come as much of a surprise. Furthermore, the new Russian strategic bomber must be able to effectively strike at US carrier groups – for this a high degree of stealth (as much as is possible) is also a must. Stealthy bombers firing stealthy, passive homing missiles will have a much greater chance of success against a carrier group.

The third main role of a Russian strategic bomber would be to precisely strike ground targets with large numbers of guided munitions in a local or low-scale conflict. On the surface it seems that in this role there is little reason to make the airframe stealthy… And yet this may not necessarily be the case. Russian oil pipe-lines, and therefore strategic national interests, are winding their way through a number of not-so-stable neighbouring states that could prove troublesome. The ability to militarily threaten these states, or even to intervene in their affairs is indispensable. The strategic air forces must be able to do this effectively, which would often involve extinguishing the air-defense system of said country – a task much more easily accomplished if barely detectable/undetectable aircraft are used.

EDIT: It is clear, I think, that unless the Russians produce an aircraft that can perform these three roles effectively, with little warning to the target (i.e. stealthily) there is no point in building a new strategic bomber. The Blackjacks can already strike at CONUS unstealthily, the Tu-22M3s can strike at US carrier groups (or maritime forces of other nations) also unstealthily and both aircraft (as well as the Bears) would, with minor adaptations, be capable of delivering high-precision satellite guided munitions in large quantities… The new bomber needs to do these things too but without letting the target know that they’re going to happen. Otherwise, whats the point?