TinWingRe the blame game, the feeling amongst my mates who are ex RAN is, as sealordlawrence has been saying, that it is now time to show respect for the fallen sailors from both ships and to help their surviving family members to find closure.
The surviving family members might have found closure in 1941 if the RAN and Australian government had simply made public the accounts of the German survivors in a timely and truthful manner. Of course, in an atmosphere of wartime propaganda, such an uncomplimentary report might have undermined confidence in the civilian and military leadership – and rightly so. The unnecessary loss of the HMAS Sydney was not an isolated incident, but part of a general pattern of failures in naval leadership and planning, culminating the entirely avoidable destruction of the combined ABDA fleet.
Conspiracy theories about Japanese submarines and official government and navy coverups have been going on ever since Sydney’s loss and future examination of the wreck will hopefully help resolve some of the unanswered questions.
It is entirely certain how Sydney met her fate, much in the same way that it was very well known how the Bismark met her fate. Examination of the wreck might indicate the extent of the damage inflicted by the Kormoran and the final cause of the sinking, whether it was a magazine explosion, flooding of multiple compartments, or whether the ship capsized. It will not alter the fact that the Sydney’s loss was entirely avoidable and the ultimate cause was a failure of leadership.
Until evidence is found that can provide new clues as to how Sydney met her fate it seems to me that speculation is fairly pointless at this stage.
The cause of the sinking, enemy action by a lone German “Auxilary Cruiser,” is well known – and almost universally accepted outside of Australia.
TinWingThe good news is the wreck was found by a team led by David Mearns (man who found HMS Hood) so both wrecks will sooner or later be subjected to a forensic examination which will silence old propoganda once and for all.
And i hope the arm chair admirals give it a rest trying to poke blame on the Sydney’s loss until the facts are found.
curlyboy
The facts have been known since November 19, 1941. The light cruiser HMAS Sydney was lost in action against HSK Kormoran, having imprudently approached within 1 km of the suspected merchant raider without having taken any manner of defensive precautions. Despite obvious advantages in armament, armor and fire control, and every other conceivable measure of combat effectiveness, the Sydney was was devastated by 150mm – and even 20mm! – gunfire from the Kormoran before even firing a single shot in defense. HMAS Sydney eventually responded, inflicting relatively minor damage to Kormoran, the result of which was an engine room fire that ultimately lead to the loss of the German vessel.
In short, an ably commanded converted merchant ship sank a poorly commanded light cruiser. HKS Kormoran was in a hopeless situation, and despite the title of “auxiliary cruiser,” was in no way suited to engage a light cruiser. The loss of a cruiser to merchant raider was unprecedented, but same can be said of the poor leadership of HMAS Sydney as it closed on Kormoran without apparently even manning action stations, despite the near certainty that the vessel in question was an armed merchant raider. At very least, the officer in command of HMAS Sydney at the start of the engagement, whether it was Captain Joseph Burnett himself or a subordinate, was guilty of dereliction of duty and general incompetence.
TinWingThe real lesson is that this is a time for mourning……………not petty finger pointing.
The time for mourning the crew of HMAS Sydney was in late 1941, but sadly, the grief of the families was compounded by the official cover-up. The loss of the Sydney was a shock to the Australian public and a major embarrassment to the RAN. Prevailing anti-foreign prejudices, reinforced by the shameful wartime propaganda, allowed the credible German accounts of the loss of the Sydney to be officially suppressed, while specious and manufactured reports were circulated of Japanese submarines and survivors being machine gunned.
TinWingYou forget that Russians actually care about littirial combat and coastal defences. Fast and nimble, and with shallow draugth these ships would be quite effective in low intensety conflicts along russian shore line, lot more usefull than some DDG-21s . Also i have understood these ships serve in border guard, and knowing Russians tendensies in that area, I only see this class a logical follow on from Pauk and Svetlak desings.
Indeed, these ships are comparable in size to the Pauk/Tarantul, large for a fast attack craft, but rather small to be termed “corvettes.”
Perhaps the term “artillery ship” is better translated as “gun boat?”
TinWingFurthering Wanshan’s excellent statement, with that out of the way it seems appropriate to show some respect to those brave men who sacrificed their lives on that vessel and for whose families were never given the opportunity to properly bury their fallen heroes.
At the same times, regret should be expressed for the cover-up that followed the loss of the HMAS Sydney – and apologies should be made by the Australian government for failing to release the crew of the HSK Kormoran until January 1947!
The needless loss of all 645 crew aboard HMAS Sydney should have taught the RAN the lesson that complacency, and even outright incompetence, had become institutionalized into the fleet. If the accounts of the German survivors had been heeded, leadership changes might have save lives in future engagements in early 1942 against the Japanese where the RAN failed miserably.
Mourn for the 645 men who perished aboard the HMAS, but remember that their sacrifice was unnecessary to begin with, and rendered meaningless by a wartime cover-up. The real lesson here is that competent leadership is more important military superiority – and that public accountability should never be sacrificed to wartime censorship.
TinWingSome intelligence reports said that she was sunk by a Japanese sub which then machine-gunned the survivors, which would explain why there were no
survivors from HMAS Sydney and yet about 318 out of the 390 crew of the
Kormoran were saved….
Is is right to perpetuate wartime propaganda that was meant to cover-up failed leadership and incompetence?
TinWingThe loss of the HMAS Sydney is no more an “enduring….mystery” than “Custer’s Last Stand.” It was a complete failure of leadership that apparently lead to the loss of the HMAS Sydney with all hands and German accounts would seem to be largely accurate. That HSK Kormoran was lost in return had far more to do with the engine room design defects of German motorships, which were prone to engine room fires, than the relatively light return fire from Sydney. The loss of the HMAS Sydney was no doubt viewed as a national tragedy at the time, but prevailing bigotry and wartime censorship prevented the Australian public, and the RAN, from accepting the true cause of the loss for far too long.
TinWingArgentina and Brazil have been potential collaborators in SSN development since the mid 1980s. Nothing has happened for the last 20 to 25 years in terms of Latin SSN development, except a failed and corrupt reactor development program in Brazil in the 1990s. In truth, Argentina probably is more advanced in reactor technology than Brazil, but Argentina also lost any submarine building capacity years ago. Brazil’s submarine building remains limited, and considering the current lack of funding for submarine construction and the severe social inequality in Brazil, a major submarine building program, let alone a collaborative SSN, looks like a very improbable, long term prospect.
A Latin American SSN today is no closer to service than it was 20-25 years ago.
TinWingC3 has to be over 3000 tonnes or it not going to have enough capability also how will 25knts be to slow i thought CVF was 25knts
An escort should have a greater flank speed than the ship being escorted!!!
In any case, the British CVF is abnormally slow for an aircraft carrier – glower than the inadequate CdeG – hence the rumors that the CVF-Fr will have greater propulsive power.
TinWingIf they do get a 2,000 tonne vessel then, what will it be able to accomodate?
My feeling for a minimum capability then, to be useful as a multi-rolled vessel is that it “needs” the following:
- a main gun (76/114mm) and CIWS (Phalanx);
- helicopter deck and hanger (Merlin?);
- modular area sufficient for one of MCMV/Survey/Boarding to be fitted at one time;
- endurance comparable to Clyde
On a 2,000 ton hull, even the flight deck for a Merlin, even without a hangar, is going to consume a large percentage of overall length. You can either have the aft deck area for the MCMV/Survey role, or a flight deck.
At best, you might manage a Lynx capable hangar and a Merlin sized flight deck for the patrol role, unless you’re talking 3,000 tons and up.
Phalanx would be desirable, especially since it’s self contained, and many would argue that it was very much necessary for the MCMV role in the Persian gulf. The problem is locating Phalanx on such a small hull. If the aft area is devoted to MCM gear, that would only leave a forward placement like the Sa’ar V frigates.?
So, either a medium caliber gun or CIWS, but not both? Unless you want to give up the flight deck/aft MCM gear?
I think this is possible in the size but wait to be educated:) (and what if we add the requirement for higher speeds e.g. 25 knots?)
25 knots isn’t fast enough to keep up with the task force, or even to keep pace with a large modern container ship.
If the RN really wants a patrol capable MCMV, 20 knots is sufficient, but it also means that fleet escort or true surface combatant capabilities will be largely absent.
TinWingJust when was this ship design first proposed, and when was it offered?
1995?
TinWingI second that. A hangar really needs to be an absolute.
A hangar, or even a flight deck, wouldn’t be necessary for every C3 unit.
The RN’s helicopter fleet has become relatively modest in size, and many patrol tasks don’t require a helicopter. Drug interdiction and SAR might benefit from an embarked helicopter, but fisheries and environment patrols probably wouldn’t. Unless the UK procures minehunting/minesweeper gear for its helicopters, there isn’t much point of embarking a helicopter for the minecountermeasures task either.
It’s tempting to view the C3 as a means of expanding the diminished surface combatant fleet, but in reality, this type needs to smaller, cheaper and more austere than a true combatant.
A fitted for but not with solution for CAAM would probably suffice, especially if a decent medium calibre was to be fitted such as the 76mm which seems to increasingly be a feature of Italian ships self defence suite against missiles as well as small boats.
Italy prefers the 76mm Super Rapide because Italy produces the 76mm Super Rapide! It is not certain that this system is the last word in CIWS, but it is certain that Italy’s OTOBreda is leading producer of gun systems and the Italian navy typically overarms its ships with OTOBreda gun -which serves to “support the home team.”
I would be inclined to say that a 76mm/57mm gun would be advisable against the “small boat threat” in a region such as the Persian gulf, but only as an addition to a Phalanx type CIWS.
The viability of CAAM for a small, cheap, MCM/OPV platform remains in doubt. The C3 is to be procured in fairly substantial numbers, and any escalation in unit costs might put paid the entire class of ships.
TinWingHi,
I have some more for you, don´t know if they are “real” though.
…..second is the stretched F-100.
I’ve seen these pics for the last couple of years. There has been talk about a hypothetical “land attack D-71 Lepanto” from Bazan/Izar/Navantia, and while the unbuilt F-110 designation might be real, and there may be a “9,500 tonne Destroyer” on the drawing boards at Navantia, I don’t believe these images are entirely genuine?
Correct me if I’m wrong!
TinWingThe CH-14 is just a prototype ordered by Argentina`s army and it might be the begining of a domestic helicopter industry in Argentina and probably in South america.
This seems to be very unlikely.
In general if this helicopter advances into a production model and gets comercial success it is probable it will become the basis of the whole mercosur and latian american domestic helicopter industry.
Isn’t it premature to make this sort of statement? So far, all we see is a demonstrator with dynamics that would have seemed outdated 40 years ago, and a pseudo-stealth fuselage shape.
Helicopter production in South America is more likely to stem from an established international consortium like Eurocopter, than an inexperienced start -up. I could more easily imagine a production line moved from Germany or France to Brazil, than a crude domestic design gaining international sales.
I agree the Ansat has more advanced features but the AH-14 Cicare is just the begining and it has a disadvantage of 50 of experience with respect Russia.
The Ansat is the result of a long design process, funded by international sales of Kazan produced Mi-17s. The Ansat is credible design that has evolved over time, from an established company.
TinWingBeing more realistic, this helicopter can make a good replacement for Argentina’s MD-500’s.
It would also seem to be a far less advanced than the current MD-500, or even the very earliest Hughes 500.
Doesn’t anyone notice the crude 2 blade rotor?
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