it seems that starting from the 3rd generation of aircraft, we see a tend leaning towards the development of multi role aircraft over dedicated aircraft, especially in the 4th generation.
it can be argued that a multi role aircraft will not be as good as a dedicated aircraft in a specific role, especially when it comes to pilot training (training a pilot to be a master of a single role versus one who has to learn many roles but does not strongly excel at one). It can also be argued that such multi role aircraft are much more complex to build and take a longer time to integrate its various components
However others argue that while it may be more expensive than a dedicated aircraft.. it is cheaper to own and operate one multi role aircraft rather than two dedicated one, especially during peaceful times.
what are your thoughts on this issue?
The concept of the “multi-role” combat aircraft is hardly new, but the previous specialization of types stemmed from limitations in payload and avionics, not to mention the demands of differing flight profiles. Take the time to compare the F-105 with the F-106 and the reasoning behind specialization becomes very clear. It is also equally clear why the multi-role F-4 effectively succeeded both types in production.
Since the issue reflects on how much a pilot can handle, it also brings up single seat versus two seaters.. there’s been a tendency for two seat strike aircraft to distribute the tasks (as it may be too difficult for just one person).. as we see in certain F-16, M2000, Su-30, F-15 models.. and a drift towards buying more 2 seaters than planned (Rafale and Typhoon).. however the F-35 seems to break this trend, reverting back to a single seat.. has the work load on the F-35 reduced so much that its role can be done with ease by one pilot?
The truth is that the justification for a two seater fleet is becoming increasingly tenuous. There is invariably a sacrifice in fuel capacity, increased production costs and an increase in life cycle costs due the WSO in the back seat. Is it any wonder that the two seat naval Rafale N was abandoned on cost grounds?
We all know that the two seat F-22B was canceled in the mid-90s, and the shorter legged F-35 will probably never have a twin stick version. Neither type requires a two seat variant for conversion training. In the near future, even the pilot fatigue issue might disappear, removing one of the last arguements for the two seat fighter.
Note the retractable launcher of the defunct LCASW (Low Cost ASW System).
This is system is new to me? Was it a mortar, like ELMA or Hedgehog?
They’d paid for it in gas relief as usual :dev2:
I’m sure that Russia is more than capable of redeeming and repainting this rather decrepit looking Soviet era hulk, but would it be worth the expense?
You really have to ponder if this ship is any better condition than the ex-Gorshkov, or even the ex-Varyag? Was the ship guarded and dehumidified all these years, or was it stripped by thieves and left to rust?
With reference to an earlier thread and the recent Russian excercises in the Bay of Biscay, should these excercises be taken into account in any future defence review?
If Russia is judged to be the primary future threat, a defense review should fund the Trident replacement and scrap CVF, FSC and even further Type 45 units. A Russian threat is a strategic threat, to be countered solely by deterrent forces. If you really believe Russia is the sole future threat, you can forget expenditionary warfare, amphibious forces, big deck carriers, and even ASW escorts because Russian SSBNs in home waters can’t be eliminated by surface combatants.
The truth is that Russia has ceased to be a major conventional naval power. We can expect new Russian ballistic and cruise missile submarines, as a well as frigate sized surface combatants, but Russia is still a long way from rebuilding to the Soviet era levels of conventional capabilities. Soviet era naval policies which emphasized large cruisers and destroyers were mistaken at the time and probably won’t ever be repeated by modern Russia.
Hi,
Sounds interesting, never heard or seen anything about it though.
http://www.armada.ch/06-5/complete_06-5.pdf
The article mentions India as a potential customer for the 27,500 tonne AOR, although there were also rumors that India had already agreed to a purchase from Fincantieri? No additional details are given. In any case, this design concept is very obviously from 2006.
Before, LHD/LPD 20.000 tons design proposed in 2005/6
LHD 16.000 tons design proposed in late 2006 for Turkey. Monday undersecretary of Defence said that Italian Navy build 3 of this ship for replace Santi LPD. In the same hull Fincantieri proposed an 18.000 tons AOR
All information on my website (italian only this page)
There is also the rumored 27,500 ton AOR purchase by India? Perhaps this design is also being proposed to the RN for the MARS requirement?
Here are the specs from the Fincantieri website:
NAVE CISTERNA DI FLOTTA
CARATTERISTICHE PRINCIPALI
Lunghezza fuori tutto 175 m
Lunghezza fra le perpendicolari 162,7 m
Larghezza fuori ossatura 25 m
Altezza al ponte di volo (Ponte 01) 19,05 m
Altezza al ponte principale (Ponte 1) 16,30 m
Dislocamento a pieno carico 27.500 t
Pescaggio corrispondente dal B-L. circa 9,1 m
Trasporto carico utile circa circa 15.760 t
Velocità in economia 16 nodi
Velocità RAS 14 -16 nodi
Velocità mass a pieno carico 20 nodi
Autonomia a 16 nodi 10.000 miglia
MCR di motori diesel propulsivi 2×10.000 kW
Alloggi
Equipaggio + personale supplementare 248 persone
Ponte di volo
Scafo: rivestimento doppio
Capace di rifornire 4 navi simultaneamente
Hi,
It gives 143m OA / 133m WL
According to my measurements of the NAAWS drawing from Marineforum, I came up with 143.25 meters overall, with a beam of 18 meters, assuming a 133 meter waterline length.
Once NFR-90 died Spanish Navy started de F-100 program that in its early stages had strong resemblance with some of the NFR-90 designs.
This is one of the first line drawings published of an early F-100, for comparison:
Actual F-100 has 133.2 m at waterline and 146.7 m overall.
Regards
The early F-100 appears to feature Smart-S on the forward mast and Smart-L aft – although I could be wrong?
In the last issue of “Panorama e difesa” is reported that the Italian navy is negotiating a contract from € 20 million to upgrade the project of all FREMM (including the first 2) with SAAM-ESD and Sylver A50
The number of vls and version of EMPAR are unknown, but is highly likely to be 32 vls and active EMPAR
It sounds as if the Italian Navy is mirroring French thinking in terms of the FREMM-FR AAW variant. Upgrade an existing multi-role radar (EMPAR or Hercules), without a separate long range search (no S1850M or SMART-L), and employing Aster 30 instead of Aster 15.
In the end, Aster 15 isn’t all that much cheaper than Aster 30, and the two missiles apparently interchangeable with the exception of the booster stage.
Some one else posted that the “definite version” of the NRF-90 was supposed to be 134m long.
Roger Schaffer, the Design Integration Manager for the NFR90 requirement, stated that the definitve NFR90 was “133 meters on the waterline” in a letter that appeared in a July/August 1994 issue of Warship Technology.
Do, the waterline length was 133 meters, meaning that the overall lenght was greater than 133 meters.
Perhaps 130 meters was the length between perpendiculars?
The 15.9 meter beam seems reasonable, although Jane’s quoted a 14.8 meter beam, alongside a 133 meter length. Perhaps the beam at the main deck was 15.9 meters, and the waterline beam was 14.8?
In general I wouldn’t rate the capabilities lower than in Spain, Italy, Germany, not to talk of France, Sweden or the UK. The Netherlands could have preserved some capabilities if they had joined the Eurofighter, but they elected not to do so. The workshare (both production-wise and design-wise) they get on the JSF will be pathetic.
The Eurofighter was never a serious option for the Netherlands. Availability was too late to be an alternative to a mid-life update of existing F-16s, and the program was too early to be an F-16 MLU replacement candidate.
Fokker ultimately flell victim to the financial weakness of its German parent company, which illustrates that the Dutch aerospace sector was ultimately destroyed by pan-European collaboration.
As strange as it seems, Dutch withdrawal from Panavia and the sensible rejection of the Eurofighter consortium probably prolonged the life of the Dutch aerospace sector, as well as saving the Dutch taxpayers a tremendous amount of money over the last 4 decades.
Could a moderator please merge this with the existing thread below?
http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?t=65922&page=5
As a reminder, current Tigers in service stand at 30:
France: 10 Tigre HAP
Australia: 9 Tiger ARH
Germany: 6 Tiger UHT
Spain: 3 Tigre HAP
+ 2 unknown
That is just pitiful.
With only 9 airframes at the moment, Australia is the second biggest user for the Eurocopter Tiger?
The Tiger is a pan-European RAH-66 Commanche, to put it bluntly.
Which of course would lead to the Russians cutting off support for their equipment already in Agerian service like the BMPs and of course reinstating the earlier debt that these new contracts cancelled… and for what? So they can have some really expensive Rafales instead of Migs? The Rafale is a nice bird but rather more sophisticated than what Algeria needs and for the price they could buy two Migs per Rafale. Add to that all the western equipment they would need to buy to replace all the ex soviet/russian gear and this could put them in deep debt… in addition to the old debt to Russia.
I think that you missed the point that the Algerians have traded non-renewable natural resources for Russian miltary hardware, and the Russians haven’t kept their end of the bargain. Algeria now has friendly relations with France, Europe and the United States, and defence purchase from any western source would be backed by financing on friendly terms, not the bartering of petrochemical resources.
Russian forgiveness of Soviet-era debt is meaningless because there is absolutely no consequence for the non-repayment of foriegn debt to the former Soviet Union. Soviet era debt was outside of the IMF and other international institution, so it just doesn’t count in the world credit markets.
Algeria has all of the bargaining power at the moment, as well as full access to alternative sources of defence hardware. Russia could cut off support and service for the current fleet of aircraft, but it is certain that this move would result in the loss of all Russian holdings in Algeria, which would be entirely counterproductive from the Russian standpoint.
The best solution would be for the Russian government to fulfill all defence contracts, even if it requires subsidies from the Russian state. Algeria’s experience mirrors that of Malaysia and India, with used, lower standard airframes being handed over instead of the new aircraft promised. This represents a broader problem, as illustrated by the Chinese order for the “out of production” Il-76 and the disasterous Admiral Gorshkov rebuild for India.
An excellent striker, what is not reflected in numbers built for unknown reasons.
The reasons for the relative lack of export success for the Jaguar were entirely obvious. It wasn’t a multi-role type in the same sense as the Mirage or any of the contemporary American fighters. In addition, the British content restricted the sales prospects to embargoed countries, such as Iraq or South Africa, both of which were major Mirage F-1 customers. For a limited specialist role, which as important to the RAF and less so to the French, the Jaguar was superb. However, it was far less marketable than any Mirage or American fighter.