TinWingThere speaks someone who doesn’t have a clue to the operational profile and capabilities demanded by the RAN to undertake their required duties.
There is NO ‘off the shelf’ design that is available that matches the requirements of the RAN. Most SSKs are too small and too range limited to allow the long range transits to operational areas. The ones that are not too small are not available (Japanese basically).
No, I question the original requirement that lead to the Collins class and I question the mistaken logic of pursuing a replacement along the same lines. The RAN deliberately wrote a peculiar requirement that would require a SSK of unprecedented size, opting for a expensive and unprecedented “paper design,” despite the obvious risks and costs. It is time to question the rationale behind a potential Collins class replacement. If the Collins class needs replacement, it is time to reject the limiting notion of a large domestically produced SSK, and to consider a smaller number of more effective SSN, or a larger number of smaller SSKs with innovative forward basing concepts.
I suggest you get yourself a copy of the recent book analysing the project, including the operational requirements, why the Colins class was selected and who was responsible for what issues with the class, plus what was done to fix those issues, it is called “The Collins Class Submarine Story: Steel, Spies and Spin” and is essential reading for any layman to understand what transpired with the Collins.
Having read the excerpt form the publisher’s website, I can only conclude that the author is woefully ignorant of contemporary economics:
Naval shipbuilding reflected deeper problems in the Australian economy. While manufacturing expanded rapidly in the 1940s and 1950s, stimulated first by the war and later by a rapidly rising population, it was dependent on high tariffs on imports. Australian manufacturers were small-scale, technologically backward and focused solely on the domestic market. Industrial relations were poor, labour costs high and productivity low. These factors lay behind the malaise of the Australian economy in the 1970s and early 1980s when high inflation and unemployment accompanied a rapid decline in the country’s manufacturing base.
The reality is that protectionism and organized labor, with the resulting wage-price spiral, were at the heart of the economic crisis of the 1970s in Australia. In the end, the Collins class program was just as “focused solely on the domestic market” because of its complete failure in the export market. Of course, the Collins class program exemplifies how Australia has failed to make a break with the economic past. Domestic submarine production maintains Australian trade union employment, while producing a product that is unsuitable for export. In a broader sense, this state of affairs is hardly different that the shipbuilding practices of the 1960s, and although the outlays have been far greater in relative terms, the outcome has been the same – no exports.
The issues of the Collins class involved most of the players involved, including the Australian Government and the RAN, the manufacturer (ASC) and the designer (Kockums) but the issues have been overcome and there is a reason that the Collins class are considered one of the best SSK classes available anywhere.
In that case, please explain the absence of any export orders?
It cost a lot of money to get where the Collins class are now, but the capability was not available anywhere else.
The uniqueness of the capability speaks volumes.
In the future those same operational requirements exist, and once again there is no ‘off the shelf’ design that meets the requirements, so the decision has been taken that a replacement will be designed and built in Australia, leveraging off the expertise created to build and maintain the Collins.
It is wrong to push forward procurement without re-considering the very peculiar basis of the operation requirements. It is time to question every aspect of the Collins class replacement program, from the seemingly premature nature of the program, driven largely by employment concerns, to the basing of the current subs on the west coast – which only places the submarines farther from potential operational areas, driving up the size and costs of the platform. Other options should be explored. Considering the last boat was only commissioned in 2001, the Collins class is hardly in need of replacement, so there is plenty of time for study.
TinWingCrikey how many times do we have to endure ill-educated claptrap about the Upholder class Patrol sub.
Once and for all the Upholders were only just entering service when they were discarded. The initial boats that went through proper shakedowns were fine. The later boats didnt get this and then got tied up, without maintenance, for a decade. You take the very finest ship money can buy, dont subject it to proper sea trials, then let it rust for 10 years with scarce maintenance and see what the result is!!!
I can honestly believe that the Upholders weren’t properly “mothballed,” but the fact remains that there is some doubt about their RN service histories. The now infamous “dent” found in the hull of the Victoria in 2002, was the result of an unreported incident in RN service. In retrospect, it seems that the Upholders were never fully operational in the strictest sense, and the supposed lack of upkeep during storage wasn’t the true source of all of the later difficulties.
Love to see your justification of ‘inherently flawed and poorly built’ Tinwing. Given that three of the four boats were built at Cammell Lairds, my brother QI’d on them, and I saw them being built I will TELL you, from first hand observation, that those boats were built properly and by people who cared about the quality of their product.
You should have read my post more closely. The Barrow built Chicoutimi/ex-Upholder was altogether unfit for service as an operational submarine, as proven by the fatal 2004 fire. As I said, “…3 out of the 4 Upholders might have successful in British service given time, and a far great financial investment.” The Chicoutimi/ex-Upholder is a uniquely bad example of bad shipbuilding practices.
Of course, the cracked diesel exhaust valves in all of the class, and the transformer fire aboard HMCS Windsor hardly give any great confidence in the material quality of the Victoria/Upholder class. The fundamental design and material quality faults go well beyond the lead ship of the class.
TinWingWell lets just agree to disagree:D
I think the RN should have kept them they certainly found use for them prior to getting rid of them and they certainly could have a place now.
Consider the troubled history of the Upholder/Victoria class in Canadian service. It should be clear that the Upholders were “lemons,” and the RN did well to dispose of them, although it was hardly right that the unsuspecting Canadians were the beneficiaries of such British generosity. Currently, only a single Upholder is partially(?) operation in Canada, and of the four, the Chicoutimi/ex-Upholder will not re-enter service until 2012 because of the fatal 2004 fire!
I suspect that 3 out of the 4 Upholders might have successful in British service given time, and a far great financial investment, but it seems probable that a like number of SSNs would have been sacrificed to keep these SSKs in service. It was far better to sacrificed the inherently flawed, and poor built, Upholders, to maintain the Swiftsure SSNs, in hopes of receiving a like number of Astutes, especially since there was absolutely no chance of obtaining an export order to the Type 2400.
TinWingFirstly let us just get a few procedural issues out of the way.
1) I am well aware that there is no slack in the UK budget for this and so it is an entirely hypothetical and doctrinal discussion.
2) I actually dont have an opinion on this subject which is why i am posing the question.
3) I am also well aware that the BMT concept to which I allude is almost certainly aimed at Australia for which BMT did a Collins class replacement study for.
A few weeks back BMT Defence unveiled is Vidar-36 SSK design which to me at least looks suspiciously like a mini Astute. This got me thinking, the Astute class are very large vessels and their substantial weapons carriage capability and tomahawk possesion makes them little short of strategic assets especially when the small number of them is taken into account. As such these seem unsuitable for any sort of even vaguely littoral operation (please correct me if im wrong). Thus would a smaller vessel for operations close to shore be useful?
Or, with a resurgent Russia on the seen and submarine proliferation increasing generally would a return to the Upholder model of vessel for longish range GIUK/North Sea/North Atlantic operations be appropriate? it is interesting to note that i have seen at least one reference that claims that there were plans to improve the Upholder design and increase its displacement to over 3000tons putting it not far short of the Vidar-36. Does such a concept have potential use?
Mixed fleets in general, the only two countries (off the top of my head) that have mixed SSN/SSK fleets are Russia and China and both appear to wish to continue to follow this model whilst India is pursuing it as a long term objective. Are such fleets useful for western countrys with limited threat perceptions? another question, is there a prospect that for those countries with the technology small SSN’s could be procured in place of SSK’s? Barracuda is hardly huge and Russia is rumored to be looking at a nuclear powered kilo class……..thoughts?
BMT Vidar-36: http://www.bmtdsl.co.uk/?/308/899/
Discuss away and as always all opinions welcome,
Thanks in advance sealordlawrence.
It is interesting to see that BMT has gone to a very conventional design, after the very unorthodox gas turbine powered SSGT. There is a reason why the SSGT was called a “high mobility submarine concept.” Conventional submarines, even the largest such as the Collins class, completely lack the mobility of their WWII predecessors. Snorkeling at 8 to 10 knots, you can’t go anywhere terribly quickly, and even if you have the fuel to make a long transit, the time required is prohibitive. A SSK can’t be based in Europe and routinely deployed to the Indian ocean, but a SSN can make the voyage at 25 knots. The SSGT tried to increase the mobility of the conventional submarine by placing gas turbines powered alternators in the sail, allowing long transits to be made in excess of 20 knots with only the sail above the water – an interesting solution. In now seems likely that this 2004 concept has been supercede by the Vidar-36 SSK, which is entirely conventional, and hardly a great improvement in concept on the current Collins class.
Personally, I question the need to replace the Collins class in the near term. Perhaps the best bet is a service life extension, and failing that, an honest appraisal of long term needs. Instead of seeking yet another oversized, over-specified design, it would be better for Australia to either chose a conventional, off the shelf SSK or consider a smaller number of SSN hulls, sacrificing numbers for greater capability. Either way, the Collins class proves that it make absolutely no sense to maintain a submarine production base in Australia – unless a future government is eager to engage in yet another embarrassing program for the sake of maintaining employment.
TinWingAnd I have a high resolution photograph of the official Blohm & Voss display model taken from above where I can distinctly count each individual cell.
There are 16.
That beats your line drawing.
This only makes sense since 32 cells absolutely will not fit in this location on this or any other MEKO design with a similar layout. To do that you need a longer and/or wider boat which MEKO 360 Mod 3 does not provide in this part of the hull, or you need to lose some other piece of equipment like the hangar and VSR.
It should be obvious that the drawing in question is of a much lengthened Meko derivative. The drawing depicts an unbuilt proposal, not the Meko 360 as built.
TinWingI’ll trust the physical evidence thanks. The module size aft is the same as it is on all the other MEKO 200/360 models – 16 cells just as shown in the builders model put on public display back in 1985.
The physical evidence is a deliberately downsized, low resolution image. I have the full resolution image, and yes, the aft VLS has 32 cells.
TinWingWollen is an IAF man and a head of HAL. Quit making a fool out of yourself by bringing in your Chinese rah-rah Indians bad attitude to this thread with claims of nationalism and what not, when talking of a distinguished combat pilot and aviation professional.
In the absence of supporting facts, anti-Chinese sentiments are always raised. I am not Chinese, or even pro-Chinese, but simply fair and balanced in my assessments.
The article above was published in a professional mag in India and reprinted with permission on BR. Wollen pulls no punches in his assessment of the LCAs project management cons either- note his prescient comment on the Kaveri and accurate prediction of timelines.
Apart from Wollen, Air Marshal P Rajkumars book is also available – the Tejas story, and it clearly catalogues how the LCA project was funded and took off only in the 90’s, and unlike your silly insinuations, clearly catalogues external assistance, from OEMs to consultants. A few wind tunnel models at NAL dont translate into anything tangible either, By the same standards, the HF-24 follow on models were also LCA preproduction design models. There are models at NAL made at considerable expense which are merely representative of industry standard projects and which NAL undertook to ensure design knowledge build up.
So in other words, the work of another IAF Air Marshal similarly ignores the early 1980s connection between the LCA and BAe’s P.106B? This hardly refutes the very real proof of the relationship between BAe and the early LCA program. On the face of it, Wollen and Rajkumars are guilty of the omission of very real and pertinent historical details.
In contrast, Roy Boot was writing as a disinterested participant, without any Indian-nationalist or Indian military agenda. He apparently made repeated visits to India in the early 1980s, and judging by the NAL wind tunnel model, BAe had a very significant influence on the early design history of the LCA.
TinWingTinWing, as quoted earlier, Air Marshall Wollen’s article mentions that Dassault
was chosen out of 4 contenders in 1987. Using Dassault’s consultancy, the Project Definition document was prepared, which was to concretize into the Tejas LCA.Prior to the tendering between the 4 companies before 1987, ADA studied their feasibility studies only, and not designs (designs are a paid service).
Hence, the book that you are refering, is factually inaccurate.
It is apparent that you’ve never read Roy Boot’s book, which is entirely factual and further supported by the NAL windtunnel model of the early LCA/P.106B.
Your sole source of information is a 2001 BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR article:
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-5/wollen.html
Consider for a moment that Bharat Rakshak is a Indian-nationalist website. At a time when the first flight of the LCA had been delayed by 8 years, there was little motivation to emphasize the embarrassingly long duration of the ongoing LCA program, or from the extreme Indian-nationalist standpoint, to mention the early British involvement. It is easy to see why the pre-1985 history of the LCA was ignored by the author.
TinWingTinWing, as quoted earlier, Air Marshall Wollen’s article mentions that Dassault
was chosen out of 4 contenders in 1987. Using Dassault’s consultancy, the Project Definition document was prepared, which was to concretize into the Tejas LCA.Prior to the tendering between the 4 companies before 1987, ADA studied their feasibility studies only, and not designs (designs are a paid service).
Hence, the book that you are refering, is factually inaccurate.
It is apparent that you’ve never read Roy Boot’s book, which is entirely factual and further supported by the NAL windtunnel model of the early LCA/P.106B.
Your sole source of information is a 2001 BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR article:
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-5/wollen.html
Consider for a moment that Bharat Rakshak is a Indian-nationalist website.
TinWingHow do you get 32 VLS cells in a 16-cell sized hole? Again I find myself staring at an actual photograph of the actual, official, Blohm and Voss display model shown on the intermational arms show circuit shot from above which clearly shows 16 forward, 16 aft.
The after superstructure did not suddenly get longer or wider. The size of the weapons module that plugs into that slot is the same size as the standard MEKO 360 module which is exactly the same size as the module that plugs into the same spot in the MEKO 200’s. In other words, 16 cells.
Trust me, the aft VLS has 32 cells.
TinWingSorry to disappoint but it is 2×16 not 2×32 VLS cells. I have a very clear photograph of the model in a naval industry magazine taken at a 1985 trade show. It clearly shows two pairs of 8-cell VLS clusters (2×16) – one group between the CIWS guns and the bridge where the plug was added and the other where the Albatros launcher resides on the standard MEKO 360. Given the configuration shown on the model they had to be Mk 41. The other tell is that the module for a pair of Mk 41 8-cell units will be identical in size to that required for an Albatros or Mk 29 NSS mechanical launcher. 32 cells is going to require either a lot of extra length and/or a lot of extra beam at both positions – and a much larger module.
Correction: a 16 cell VLS forward and a 32 cell VLS aft.
TinWinganother thing- NAL did initially study the canard delta configuration and there was an image floating around the net that showed a wind-tunnel model at NAL which showed this. However, after Dassault was chosen as the design consultant, the design was frozen without any canards and the new wing shape was chosen.
Yes, the image depicted the NAL wind tunnel model of early LCA/BAe P.106B (left) configuration next to a model of the HF-73 (right).
TinWingCould one of you post a link to larger copies of the full drawing… like Ja’s stern section?
Sorry, the Meko 360 drawing is from an Argentine forum and I am not the original poster. Is that the one you’re talking about?
TinWingTinWing, the above is inaccurate. BaE is known to have exited the Tejas program even before conceptual studies began. As per the article by Air Marshall MSD Wollen (retd). who also headed the Tejas program once, Dassault aviation was selected amongst 4 contenders. Though the others are not named, Dassault was the sole contractor for contracting design software/tools and such.
The so-termed P.106 of BaE finds mention as the predecessor of the P.110 fighter bomber, which in turn was the predecessor of the Eurofighter. It is true however, that the P.106B was similar in design to the Gripen.
In any case, BaE was ‘showcasing’ such various designs to potential financiers only. The French refused and went ahead with their indigenous ACX, that was later to become the Rafale. The P.110 in tandem with Italian and West German inputs (from Aeritalia and MBB respectively) became the Typhoon.
India’s ADA around the very same time was interested in an indigenous fighter, but had a lack of software tools to provide even basic, preliminary concept about the design of the fighter plane. These tools and design consultancy was provided by Dassault, which was the winner in a tender competition.
As documented in “From Spitfire to Eurofighter,” by Roy Boot, BAe conducted negotiations simultaneously with the India and Sweden in the early 1980s concerning the P.106B. In India, the main stumbling block was the lack of funding, although development of the P.106B went as far as a wind tunnel model, which was publicly displayed several years. Dassault’s involvement was later in the decade. What is entirely certain is that there was successive British and French involvement in the LCA, with the successive foreign partners largely determining the general configuration of the LCA.
That a canard was not chosen, and a crank and compound were added is the uniqueness of the Indian design.
No, as shown a similar configuration was explored by the Eurofighter consortium and ultimately rejected. In aviation, very few concepts are entirely unique.
TinWingI agree with you that the wing drag may be at the root cause of the LCA troubles given that Grippen seems to have no issues with the 404 engine.
As far as dropping the canards goes, the complexity may have been the issue for movable canards but it should have been fairly easy to add fixed canards to a normal delta wing. The current crank in the LCAs wing is fixed as well and given that neither dassault nor BAe nor LM nor Sukhoi chose the cranked delta of the shape used by the LCA says something about the viability of this configuration. Did they consider the LCA wing shape and reject it due to drag? Any independent studies out there on the LCA wing shape would be interesting to look at.
There were Eurofighter studies, aimed at cost reduction, that considered a similar compound delta wing planform, so removing canards while increasing wing area is obviously a choice for cost reduction. In the end, Germany reduced its Eurofighter buy and remained in the program.
I’m not about to suggest there is anything wrong with the design choice of a compound delta, or decreasing wing loading, only that all design decisions are compromises. The current LCA ended up shorter fuselage, with a bigger wing, the original P.106B, or Gripen. On the face of it, that sort of compromise should have reduced design and production costs, while minimizing weight and maneuverability losses – although greater drag was always an obvious cost.
So, if the LCA is “underpowered,” which is a relative term, it is not only an issue of engine selection but of design compromises.
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