lukosThe PESA just paved the way for the AESA. More than 20 years of development. Capabilities ? I (we) don’t know. Maybe. So, what have they been doing all this time ? We’re not in the right topic I’m afraid.
But came out with an old back end and no electronic attack.
lukosas you said, depends on the scenario.. flying low is done when appropriate, period
In the face of absolute enemy air supremacy is the only instance I can think of. Hence why it was used by some despots during NATO campaigns.
correction, USAF would do it that way, The french would use rafales to their strengths (the ones that guys yourself are in denial of as it doesn’t suit your liking)
What strength are they? Try get within 50km of an S-400 to fire an AASM? I’d say that was a weakness, not a strength. I’d prefer to be firing a SPEAR from an F-35 from 120+km away.
again, cruise missiles are used right now (and will continue to be so even with the likes of F-35 going around). As for ECM, when you can go high with them, you do so (as in Libya), when You feel it’s a better way to go low, you go low. Fact is, once more, rafale gives you flexibility to do it the best way..
:highly_amused::applause: Go figure. Rafale has to go into the weeds to avoid radar because it’s the only way it can do it against a modern radar threat. That’s not flexibility, it’s a constraint. There’s nothing to stop an F-35 flying at low altitude, it’s just recognised as being better flying higher up.
you quote me when I say “a Rafale flying high, out of range of anything from that particular radar” and you answer is “not by the one flying low”… problems reading? or just bad faith? My bet goes for the second one
Maybe your point was just poorly made.
obviously not, as their goal is to be able to get the job done, not get ruined in buying a plane you can’t afford to make fly after you got it 😀
It’s amazing how many people know F-35 operating costs in spite of how few people have operated them. Never ceases to amaze me. Hence why the Rafale protagonist can’t be trusted with any facts and offer so few.
you mean opposition without RWR, radar, workable missiles to speak of (even compared to early US ones), low pilots training most of the times…
Rubbish, the pilots were Soviet trained and a fair few of them were in fact Soviets. The highest scoring ace was also North Vietnamese.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Vietnam_War_flying_aces
The fact that the MiGs didn’t have RWR is because radar missiles were fairly new at the time, which speaks volumes about the technology of the era and why the missiles had such low Pks.
FACT: they put the gun on the F-4 for a reason: it was useful and they messed up when thinking they would not need it
It was useful in some circumstances, but no NATO fighter-fighter kill has been made using guns since 1982. The main issue of not having a gun was in a head-to-head closing encounter at close range. To close for missiles and IR missiles didn’t guide very well from the frontal aspect back then.
lukosTry to get out and visualize yourself 24/7 with your shoulder SAM ,waiting for it. And then when it happens having to get a lock on a low flying 900 km/h +.Shoulder SAM are a good deterrent against CAS, much less so against a fast flying passing by. So a hazard yes ,which would require depth and saturation to perform, hence numbers . No wonder why this has not been used effectively against cruise missiles, whose flying a bit higher and slower, makes for a far more accessible target.
Try to visualise there being more than one person in this MANPADS unit. You are making unfounded assumptions that statistics refute.
Not sure ,as mrmalaya suggest ,the tactics will disappear, it would probably for piloted planes ,but UCAV and cruise missile are likely to pursue the tradition. Deep penetration flying altitude in a VLO , that can now our days already be detected and tracked with mostly passive and/or distributed system ,is putting too much faith in the technology failing to provide the means to engage that no longer elusive target. The race is on, and as it stands the sword has already shown its hand, Let now see what the shield is gonna play.
Even if you get detected at altitude, it’s still safer than low level. This was again proven in 1991. Even ignoring F-117 stats, planes at high altitude had improved survivability. As to the sophistication of low level threat in 2015 vs 1991, the increase is huge.
lukosSo, French Air Force and Marine Nationale are idiots. Is this what you imply ?
Low level raids are inherently and statistically more dangerous than high altitude. That may not have been the case in the past but the short-range threat sophistication has increased exponentially, so whereas a few flares worked in the past, they’re useless now.
lukos:applause: Impressive.
Well let’s face it, it hasn’t spent anywhere near as long being fully developed has it and the Mk2 Captor-E capabilities aren’t even on the cards for RBE2-AA at this point.
lukos@ Scorpion82 and hammy20
thanks for your clarification, pretty much my impression thus far.. It also matches the claims made by Indra Sistemas.CAPTOR-E – Modell der Antenne mit Taumelscheibe
Das CAPTOR-E soll die AESA-Technologie in die CAPTOR-Familie einführen. Um den beschränkten Sichtwinkel fester Radarantennen zu umgehen, wird die Antenne mit zwei Taumelscheiben (engl. swashplate) gekippt eingebaut. Durch den Kippwinkel von 40° und die Drehbarkeit in alle Richtungen kann zusammen mit dem elektronischen Schwenkwinkel von 60° ein Suchbereich von ±100° in Elevation und Azimut realisiert werden. Das Back-End wird größtenteils von CAPTOR-M übernommen. Damit soll die F-Pole-Distanz im Luftkampf vergrößert werden.[84] Allerdings steigt das Gewicht des Radars dadurch um 100 kg an.[85]Die Radarantenne soll wie beim CAESAR aus etwa 1500 TRM bestehen. Für die Prototypen ist aus Kostengründen GaAs-Technik vorgesehen, die Serienversion sollte Module auf GaN-Basis erhalten. Im Vorfeld wurden eine Reihe von GaN-Modulentwicklungen in Großbritannien und Deutschland finanziert. Letztlich entschied man sich aber laut Andrew Cowdery, Vorstandsvorsitzender von EuroRADAR, auf GaAs-Module zu setzen, da die GaN-Technologie noch nicht reif genug sei.
Gemäß Indra Sistemas werden Antenne (LRI #9), Transmitter Auxiliary Unit (TAU) und Antenna Power Supply & Controller (APSC) gegenüber dem CAPTOR-M verschieden sein. Die TAU des CAPTOR-E soll mit 12,75 kVA beschickt werden, sodass nach Verlusten 10,58 kW in die APSC fließen, welche mit über 88 % Wirkungsgrad arbeiten soll. Folglich läge die Ausgangsleistung hier bei über 9,31 kW. Die Kühlung der Komponenten soll beim CAPTOR-E durch Verdampfungskühlung realisiert werden. Die Ortungsreichweite soll bei 59 km gegen eine Lockheed Martin F-35 liegen (Stand 2011).
Nachdem die Entwicklung vom EuroRADAR-Konsortium mit Eigenmitteln vorangetrieben wurde, erklärte sich das britische Verteidigungsministerium 2011 bereit, die CAPTOR-E-Testflüge ab 2013 zu finanzieren. Zumindest die Testradare sollen noch mit einem Trial Interface Processor (TIP) ausgerüstet werden, welcher die Radardaten während des Fluges aufzeichnet. Dazu stehen 240 GB (beliebig um 2x, 4x oder 8x hochrüstbar) Festplattenspeicher mit bis zu 520 MBit/s zur Verfügung, welcher an sechs Glasfaserkabel mit je 1 GBit/s angeschlossen ist. Seit Anfang 2013 wird ein Prototyp des CAPTOR-E in IPA5 eingebaut, der Ende des Jahres fliegen soll
Using wikipedia?
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/EuroRADAR_CAPTOR
@Lukos
Programs like Bright Adder aren’t directly related to Captor-E though they may feed into it to some extend. Captor-E in its initial EIS form is aimed at export customers offering some AA and limited AG capabilities. Physically receiver and processor are retained from Captor-D with minor modifications, TPA and WGU are removed as they are no longer necessary in the AESA configuration, the TAU is replaced by the APSC and the M-Scanner is replaced by the AESA antenna mounted on the double swashplate repositioner. There is also a new provisional LRI called AAU which will be exploited at a later stage.
The OT&E variant shall include full AA and extended AG functions incl. some hardware changes already, the proposed IOC standard shall offer full AG and initial EA capabilities, whereas the EOC standard should provide full EA and some other capabilities. The “Mk1” more or less correlated to the EIS. The Mk1+ to OT&E and/or IOC and Mk2 to EOC. That’s a rough correlation of the different designations. Have to cross check the currency of the four previously stated standards with the 1, 1+ and 2 standards. There might well be hardware differences between 1+ and 2 and not only software changes. Right now the focus is on getting the hardware and initial software developed and integrated with the overall weapon system. EIS was previously proposed to built on P1E, but that’s increasingly unlikely.
As far as linkage of radar and DASS is concerned both were always interfacing with the attack bus. The integration is done by the AC, while interoperability is directly managed between the ESM/ECM processor and the radar processor.
Can’t speak for the export variant, that will depend on who it’s going to and politics but the 1+ allegedly to be released in 2017 has a completely new architecture. Bright Adder was obviously intended to heavily influence Captor-E Mk2, as opposed to just being done for a laugh to waste money.
If all the DASS connections are already in place, it may well be just a software/processor change.
lukoswow, it’s news to me that Turkey is pursuing carrier
I didn’t even think they’d ordered F-35Bs?? The AIR International publication said 100 F-35As only.
lukosLukas, with regard to bring_it_on’s reference to neuron. I think that’s his point. If an Anglo/French UCAV is the future, it will not be flying around in the weeds will it? The tactic has had its day unless you are talking ASMP runs over long range.
so hopefully the tactic has had its day…..
Yeah. The only problem is that ASMP-A is nuclear only and makes Tomahawks look cheap.
lukoswhat I find absolutelyhilarious is all that insistance on “plenty of shoulder mounted SAM systems” and so on, whiule the VLO fighters will go in “safely”..
First, when you go in at first, (frist day strike) you are usually with the advantage of surprise. guys don’t walk aroung with MANPADS on their shoulder whole day long…
Depends on the scenario. Even if you get detected at altitude, you still have a fighting chance, at low altitude you’re just dead.
in that first day strikes, you can go in low level, and you’ll go for targets like communications, radars, and everything that makes an IADS viable. you won’t all of a sudden go to strike the isolated lone target completely behind the SAM curtain, without ever bothering doing anything about those SAMs.. be it in low level or from high altitude. Once you have softened the eventual threats in the first days of that hugely potent, pixie-dust powered radar network that sees anything anywhere, you’ll return to attacking from higher altitudes, using your electronic warfare suite to manage eventual remains of it, go around danger zones and so on…
That’s not the way radars would be attacked these days but yes you would do the SEAD first. I imagine you’d do it by swarming the place with MALDs and drone first and then using satellite recon and cruise missiles, JSOWs and HARM-Es.
Why was there pretty much no low level attacks in the last 20 years or so? Because they weren’t needed, pure and simple. Any war in which NATO and Co were engaged were against oponentsd whose air defence networks could be treated either through cruise missiles first, or with much more modern ECM suites than what the opposite side was using.
Cruise missiles are expensive. Yep, lots spent on ECM, so why make it almost useless by flying at low level?
Mig fantasizes about those radars on top of the mountains.. first and foremost, if you put it there, it will be among the nicest targets in the area, and among the first to be destroyed… Any Rafale flying high, way beyond any SAM that radar may eventually be able to shoot at it will have its position pinpointed and and once the radar coordinates are passed to other allied aircraft in the area, that radar will have the appropriate weapon headed its way very soon.. unless there is a way around it so you don’t need to waste a costly cruise missile or such on it and just fly around.
Not by one flying at low level and you’re also ignoring pop-up threats, where the SAM is separate to the radar and ambushes you as you go for that radar.
What you guys are doing, to try to justify your “argument” is fly a video game… take off, fly straight to target regardless of what’s on the way, and get shot down, just to say “it’s impossible”.
Over Libya, Rafales flew high… no need to go low as they had what was needed to prevent enemy radars to get a lock and fire on them. And if one day they have to face enemies who have the ability to reach them despite their protective suit, other way to get the job done are used.
Like what? Buy F-35s?
Someone pointed out the F-4 experience… made without the gun, they had to change that. Considering “the missiles will do it all just fine” was a mistake. Same way, considering that shape stealth if the sole answer is a mistake. It can be an aid for some things to be done in a certain way, but it’s definitely not an answer to all problems nor is it the only one to the problems it adresses
Missiles no do do the job just fine. Their thinking was ahead of its time but the missile technology wasn’t. That said 3:1 is still impressive given the level of opposition.
lukosF-4 actually achieve 2 to 1 kill
3:1 and 6:1 for USAF and US Navy respectively. What people also fail to realise is the amount of kills made in total even by those extremely low Pk early generation missiles.
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?180731-Modern-fighter-combat-records
lukosIsn’t that the country that built a fighter without guns in the 60ies?
Nic
Nice strawman. Sure they made mistakes but they’ve also studied them in depth and the results of studies showed that the greatest contributing factor to being shot down was being seen.
lukosI guess studies will point to Low level attack UCAV’s as well for the future. Expect the Son of Neuron to be tailored for such a mission.
Why design a VLO aircraft and then fly it at an altitude where it’s VHO.
lukosConsidering you certainly do not have access to MICA data such as performance curves or specific impulse, I’m afraid you cannot make such statement. I’ve had enough of Carlo Kopp like statements on russian missiles range.
Please define kinematic range, because at first glance what you say doesn’t fit with reality.
It’s a very obvious no-brainer. The R-27ER/EA is 230mm diameter vs 160mm and has a kinematic range of 130km vs 50-80km.
That remain to be seen.
Only by you and Corsair.
lukosImpressive demonstration. So what works at sea won’t work on the ground ? Do you really think there are radars on every mountain and that ground clutter is inexistant ?
Flying low makes sense, and that was demonstrated more than once.
Failed more often than not of late too. Tactic was abandoned in Desert Storm. Idiots game, only marginally better than Kamikaze raids. The enemy is not stupid, they know how much airspace their S-300/400 covers and they know where the gaps are, and therefore they know where to put smaller radar SAMs, IIR SAMs, AAA and MANPADS.
lukosFor fneb’s sake, shoulder fired sams are useless in the case of deep penetration missions. They’re useful against CAS planes & such, but when an aircraft hugs the earth at 600 kts along carefully chosen penetration routes, they become much less relevant if there is no prior warnings.
Do you think that some dudes are pointing shoulder lauched sams up in the air h24 or something?
I’ve already covered that point. Modern MANPADS units are networked with a variety of intelligence sources, it’s also possible to hear planes coming if they subsonic and you’d be surprised at range when they’re on top of a hill/mountain. Also I imagine they work shifts and many newer ones were designed to shoot down cruise missiles, so go figure. As regards relying on surprise, you need surprise and luck, and you’ll only get that once at best, whereas VLO platform can weave between radar coverage on a sustainable basis.
Sign In
