FBWIs it even confirmed Izd.30 use variable bypass?
Nope and Flateric @ Secret Projects has stated it doesn’t. Considering his track record, I’ll defer to him.
FBWGreat Bayar, bring it over to the Turkey thread and explain all about it there. Doesn’t belong here for several reasons:
Turkey most likely won’t be part of the F-35 program after this summer if there isn’t a reversal on the S-400. Therefore the value of this discussion is moot.
Every thread doesn’t need to be subjected to a barrage about Turkey’s aerospace ambitions, their planned procurement represents roughly 3% of the global F-35 market, so this discussion shouldn’t be dominating the F-35 thread.
Thanks
FBWSo my main interest in how the SA did against the simulated enemy at Red Flag is that it is a pointer at how capable and flexible the X could be when working with other assets. But, from what I’ve been reading, it looks like we might not be simulating stealth aircraft in the aggressors yet.
That I wouldn’t be so sure about. You essentially have different scenarios in every RF. Some are limited to US/NATO, others like Red Flag 19-2 have more diverse participation. In RF with NATO or US only, the simulated threat environment can be ramped up. I’m not necessarily saying that F-22/35 have served as red air, as the focus is integration, but just as they simulate high end IADS, they can do similar with Red air.
While there is no evidence that F-117 have been used as LO threat aircraft, the fact that they are spotted over Nevada regularly is thought provoking.
FBWYup, odd he reposted it today. Threw me off, forgot next SAR would be 2020 not 2019. Thought the procurement numbers were a bit odd considering 2020 budget.
FBWhttp://www.f-16.net/forum/download/file.php?id=27020
2019 selected aquisition report F-35
Courtesy Spazsinbad F-16.net
FBWA step in the right direction… if funded by Congress, but odds are good. The FY 2021 advanced procurement is even better news considering the FY2020 budget which neglected the planned procurement uptick due in 2021.
FBWIn case context is needed, the last report for Rafale B&C readiness rate was 48.5% in 2015 with spiraling operational costs increasing by 30%.
In perspective, Rafale C achieved IOC in 2006, the F-35A in 2016.
FBWSome things are inevitable, taxes, death, and POGO trashing every weapon procurement plan. The Services are well aware of the need to improve readiness across the board for all combat aircraft (80% MC goal across the USAF). The F-35 isn’t where it needs to be, but operational deployments have shown it is far from the “hangar queen” our dear friends at POGO and Defense-Aerospace have opined.
Probably a a waste of time, but I find it peculiar Hallow comes to vociferous defense of the poor Rafale readiness rates in the AdlA by quoting MC rates in operational deployments, and spent several posts trying refute the damning CAG report from India. Something about “convenient watchdog groups, while trashing others”. An interesting pile of stones in his glass house. Still waiting for Defense-Aerospace deep dive in to the Readiness rates of the Rafale and accurate costing expose from Defense-Aerospace, but that would probably conflict with De Briganti’s funders.
FBWdefine 5th gen engine?
E jet, with its simple architecture, is an excellent high speed high altitude engine. Otherwise, lack of inlet guided vane (variable geometry) make of it a “single task” oriented engine.
The idea was to reduce weight and lifecycle costs. It has a higher BPR compared to similar F414 and smaller M88, Overall, the Ej200 has less stages operates at a higher pressure ratio, higher BPR compared to the M88. There is more than one way to achieve efficiency, low SFC, and power in a turbofan. And be careful, as your only referring to the LP stage, the EJ200 does have variable inlet guide vanes on the HP compressor stage. Both engines have very similar SFC (.79-.81 for the EJ200 and .78 for the M88)
Pointing out one characteristic that the EJ200 lacks compared to the M88 without looking at the overall design is silly, it’s an excellent turbofan with significant growth potential. Designers claim that careful Blisk shaping eliminated the need for LP IGV, and I’ve never heard of the EJ200 having surge issues like the RB199 (which also lacks IGV).
I doubt such a design will be attempted in the future though as VIGV on the LP stage will be a de facto necessity with variable cycle engines.
FBWI read the full report days ago. And many Joshi papers. Most of them look LSD driven. rFor the sake of the thread i will not link the latest news about Christian Michel… and Ghandi family corruption in favor of EF..And SAAB leverae over the same family due to Bofors
We aren’t talking about media articles with an agenda. I mean your talking about an external auditor report. It savages the entire process that went into the “competition” that led to the Rafale being the favorite and your response is it looks “LSD” driven? Based on what? What details do you have to refute the finds that the “fix was in” because reading the report… that’s what happened.
Seems a bit too flippant a remark for such a sober and damning report, not just in regards to the MMRCA but the entire procurement process from Chinook, to Rafale.
FBWcalling saurabh joshi an analyst is a very far fetched compliment. Clown would fit much better.
Obviously, you didn’t read the CAG report. That is beyond damning as far as the MMRCA evaluation goes. Doesn’t change my opinion that India made the correct choice purchasing Rafale with the benefit of 2019 hindsight. What is more astounding what the missed opportunities to acquire the Mirage 2000 over a decade ago.
FBWThe Entire CAG report is here , any one can read and draw their own conclusion
The CAG report points out issues with the tender process, perhaps they should look at the whole need for the tender process in certain situations when they have a suitable product in mind that fills a pressing operational need.
1. If the IAF outlined the need for a “Chinook class of helicopter”, then streamline a procedure to acquire them without a competition. What isn’t mentioned, why did the IAF structure the requirements for the Chinook? There must have been a less than satisfactory operational experience with the Mi-26.
2. The original single vendor proposal for MMRCA would have given the IAF Mirage 2000 aircraft over a decade sooner than the mulit-vendor process that ended up being largely a failure. Again, the IAF had already identified the product they had in mind to fill the requirement. Making it a multi-vendor competition due to the Defense Procurement Proceedure policy stalled the process.
AF, again in March 2001, resubmitted its earlier proposal of acquiring 126 Mirage 2000-II aircraft on a single vendor basis, justifying it on the basis of a cost benefit analysis of the available options
Another lost opportunity, just unbelievable there was no alternative for streamlined procurement as an exception to DPP.
Contention of the Ministry that RFI process led to an increase of vendor response is incorrect. The additional vendor viz. M/s EADS was included for issue of RFP based on the firm’s own request.
As early as the RFI, they were already “cooking the books”, the IAF knew what it wanted.
n the Technical Evaluation conducted in May 2008, five of the six aircraft could not meet all the ASQR parameters. The other four aircraft had one to two deviations, Rafale aircraft could not meet 9 ASQR parameters prescribed in the RFP.
Shocking considering the ASQR parameters were written to favor the Rafale. Also confirms the rumors at the time that the Rafale had been eliminated.
Two aircraft viz., Eurofighter and Rafale were cleared based on their presentation in the lab as to how they proposed to meet the shortcomings in meeting certain ASQRs. Therefore the aircraft were technically accepted without evaluating the significant modification/ enhancements made on them
Considering one of the failed performance parameters for the F-16 was sustained turn requirements due to refusal to allow it to be tested without the conformal tanks, one has to ask why they held the exhaustive trials in the first place.
The L1 sub-committee, while comparing the prices took this price as nil while calculating M1 for Rafale aircraft. But Capital Expenditure for production was included in the price bid of M/s EADS
One has to wonder how these admissions will impact vendors (especially Eurofighter consortium nations) future responses to Indian RFI.
FBWFor those who consider F-358 as a nimble plane. Powerful? Yes. Agile? Just compare. time to bank, roll rate etc.
Bat turn at 4 mins…
So as to compare…
Makes me want to recycle my old “YouTube Wikipedia stopwatch” flight comparison bit. Really Hallow? Your going to plant your flag on comparing flight demos ( one of which is from the heritage flight series, which isn’t even a true flight demonstration”?) I thought better of you.
If you want to state the Rafale is more agile, you’ll get little argument from me (though this seems more apropos for the F-16.net thread where a few members like to state that the F-35 is second only to the F-22 in agility and maneuverability), my suggestion is to re-sign into F-16.net and have it out with them there.
We have had a rough Idea of the baseline goals for maneuverability on the F-35 for quite some time, I’ve heard more than a few pilots discuss their opinion. The overall impression of “F-16 like/F-18 like” seems to be very well accurate. Inferior to the F-16 in sustained turns and energy retention, superior as an angles fighter with better subsonic acceleration. It slows down quickly and regains energy quickly. As far as roll rate, I strongly disagree with your opinion from what pilot’s have said, excellent roll and pitch rates.
It’s never going to compare favorably to a slicked off Rafale in certain areas, notably sustaining in the transonic region that was the design goal of most previous generation fighters (F-16, Gripen, MiG-29, F-15), therefore certainly inferior to the Rafale and Typhoon in that respect. As an angles fighter? I’d say it’s quite good, (time to corner speed, nose authority, pitch + high AoA speed braking) and that makes it highly dangerous in the newer agility metrics in this age of all aspect, off boresight AAM missiles.
FBW@ B-i-O- Dunford made the argument for “cheaper” the other day, in both procurement and operation. As we see above, the argument for procurement being cheaper is relatively weak. I don’t even want to touch on the “50% cheaper to operate over it’s life”. I’d love to see how they generated those numbers, certainly not in CPFH.
@ Sintra- You are confusing costs. Gross weapon system cost does not include maintaining or operating costs, so I’m confused by these parts of your argument:
f acquiring and suporting
acquiring and maintaining
Please clarify.
Those Non-recurring costs may include initial spares, tools, booklets, training of maintainers, software development, carts, etc. But it does not include lifetime O&S costs.
FBWNo they are NOT. You have the exact numbers right in front of you, they are NOT similar.
The first batch of eight F-15EX has a bigger Weapon System Unit Cost, all the other four batches have a lower cost, exactly what i´ve written before, this is not disputable.
Really? You consider these cost not similar? Are we arguing semantics over a few million?
Excluding the outlier year of 2020, the F-35A has a gross weapon system unit cost of roughly 6 million more. That again is not a positive for the F-15EX, That compares an aircraft for which the non-recurring costs should be minimal as they’ve stated that the EX should be able to share 90% of the spares and support from the F-15E. The F-35 is STILL setting up, that adds up to much higher non-recurring costs: training equipment, spares, simulators, software development, on and on.
The fact that the F-15EX is 6 million cheaper as a weapon system on average after 2020 is pathetic, and undermines the whole rationale for “cheaper”
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