FBWYes iam aware that we are discussing mid course update , but between a system that provide bearing and another one that can provide bearing , distance , velocity then it hard to deny that the later one is superior.
I’m sorry I fail to see why you are posting this. No one is arguing which provides superior targeting data, it would obviously be radar.
The question predicated on the ability of these systems to provide data for mid course updates.
FBWRadar was used for range and velocity data through
Again, we were discussing mid-course updates. As I stated, information on the these systems to use entirely passive targeting for missile engagement is sparse and vague. Never stated that the AN/ALR-94 definitively had to provide all the target quality data needed to launch.
FBW[
Well perhaps they can but they would be the only aircraft with such a capability if it were true.
Cuing radar again seems like a very sensible use of RWR. Using radar to determine range, again very sensible.
You have a bad habit of selectively cherry picking points irrespective of what was actually being discussed.
‘Nearly all, the information necessary’. So again we have the case of a passive intercept briefly use a more precise active method to get range, which is the kind of intercept we’re familiar with.
Are “we” familiar with this? Because you were arguing above about this very same capability, tracking and targeting using these integrated defensive avionics.
You stated this:
ASQ-239 but mid-course guidance generally relies on a much more accurate track than that provide by simple RWR.
– which is wrong as mid course guidance updates the missile on changes in target bearing and speed, which the AN/ALR-94 can provide via datalink.
Then you stated:
I haven’t seen any material detailing an entirely passive targeting of a missile BVR in a live test
In none of the posts above did I say this was the case. We were discussing mid course guidance, I did say that these systems MAY be capable of entirely passive targeting engagements but information was vague and sparse.
Then you stated that they wouldn’t be able to detect a target at any great range:
IRST was infinitely more accurate than even the best RWRs (certainly on bearing) and even it’s capacity for longer range engagements is questionable
Well first off these systems are able to provide more accurate bearing than range. What is questionable is your claim that they are incapable of long range engagements. Obviously the tracking range for the AN/ALR-94 far exceeds that of an IRST.
Using RWR alone for detection also seems like a bad tactic against IRST for the F-22.
Using an IRST as your only sensor sounds like a bad idea. Unless said aircraft is equipped with a narrow beam LOS datalink, the first time it attempts to communicate or send information via network it reveals it’s location.
I’m sure Sweetman fabricated the simulation shown to him and embellished the briefing information on the AN/ALR-94 that he then submitted to a very reputable journal read specifically by people who have expertise in EW systems.
FBWAs I said, if you are looking for official documents, or P.R. releases, your not going to find them, or much of anything else except a vague description of what the AN/ALR-94 and AN/ASQ-239 do. Frankly, I don’t care if you don’t find that satisfactory. As clearly these systems can track the target independently of radar, there is zero reason that it cannot provide target location updates to the AMRAAM.
Whatever people feel about Sweetman, he was not writing op-ed. He was describing the simulated engagement the L-M engineers allowed him to see. Not to mention that the Journal of Electronic Defense isn’t exactly “Popular Mechanics”. As c
7/1/2000; Publication: Journal of Electronic Defense-
A target which is using radar to search for the F-22 or other friendly aircraft can be detected, tracked and identified by the ALR-94 long before its radar can see anything, at ranges of 250 nm or more. As the range closes, but still above 100 nm, the APG-77 can be cued by the ALR-94 to search for other aircraft in the hostile flight. The system uses techniques such as cued tracking: since the track file, updated by the ALR-94, can tell the radar where to look, it can detect and track the target with a very narrow beam, measuring as little as 2[degrees] by 2[degrees] in azimuth and elevation. One engineer calls it “a laser beam, not a searchlight. We want to use our resources on the high-value targets. We don’t track targets that are too far away to be a threat.”
The system also automatically increases revisit rates according to the threat posed by the targets. Another technique is “closed-loop tracking,” in which the radar constantly adjusts the power and number of pulses to retain a lock on its target while using the smallest possible amount of energy.
High-priority emitters — such as fighter aircraft at close range — can be tracked in real time by the ALR-94. In this mode, called narrowband interleaved search and track (NBILST), the radar is used only to provide precise range and velocity data to set up a missile attack. If a hostile aircraft is injudicious in its use of radar, the ALR-94 may provide nearly all the information necessary to launch an AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missile (AAM) and guide it to impact, making it virtually an anti-radiation AAM
.
FBWClassified they may be but nobody has ever mentioned an RWR based kill during a live test so I hesitate to call it a capability as of yet. Whilst exact details of RWR spec may be guarded I’m quite sure news of the test would be released publicly even if the exact range wasn’t. .
And they won’t release information about passive targeting. The information is vague whether the systems can provide totally passive targeting. Some articles state that the AN/ALR-94 cues the APG-77 to the target eliminating the need for the radar to be emitting in RWS/LRS/TWS modes. The AN/ALR-94 giving bearing/range allow the radar to tailor emission to lessen the probability of detection. But the ability to provide mid-course updates has been stated several times.
Before Sweetman declared war on L-M, he had considerable access to the F-22 program. He was presented a simulation with Lockheed engineers which he wrote about the AN/ALR-94 twice:
“It can determine a target’s bearing, and to some extent, it’s range. It can even provide mid-course guidance for AMRAAMS”
He expanded on this in the 2001 Journal of Electronic Defense, describing the synergy between the AN/ALR-94 and APG-77 for targeting.
The AN/ASQ-239 is based on the AN/ALR-94. Once again, after some interesting early descriptions, there has been little released.
Here is an article from 2003 describing the system:
•All-aspect radar warning capability, supporting analysis, identification, tracking, mode determination and angle of arrival (AOA) of mainbeam emissions, plus automatic direction finding for correlation with other sensors, threat avoidance and targeting information
•Defensive threat awareness and offensive targeting support–acquisition and tracking of� main beam and side lobe emissions, beyond-visual-range emitter location and ranging, emitter ID and signal parameter measurement
http://www.aviationtoday.com/av/military/JSF-Integrated-Avionics-Par-Excellence_1067.html
This from Armata International-
BAE Systems’ AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda system is derived from the F-22 Raptor’s AN/ALR-94 EW suite and provides
Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and high sensitivity electronic surveillance capabilities, full-spectrum situational
awareness and multi-spectral missile countermeasures. According to certain sources, the Barracuda offers precise geolocation and targeting of potential hostile
http://armadainternational.com/assets/images/pdf/Aircraft_Self-Protection.pdf
The F-22 introduced the ability to Geolocate with increment 3.1, currently 3.2b will have enhanced geolocate 2.0
http://dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2013/AirForce/stamped/0605213F_5_PB_2013.pdf
BTW, DASS does not, as of 2016, have the ability to geolocate emitters, this is planned for the upgraded system as I stated.
FBWI understood that to be what he meant but I would think IRST was infinitely more accurate than even the best RWRs (certainly on bearing) and even it’s capacity for longer range engagements is questionable.
The distances that the AN/ALR-94 detect and track targets is said to be considerably in excess of the APG-77. As to accuracy and exactly how capable these systems are? They are about as classified as it gets. Companies will discuss radar, personel and company spokesman will discuss the capabilities of systems like EOTS. You will here nothing but generalities about these integrated defensive avionics systems. So if your looking for specifics, good luck.
I posted a journal that discusses the missile warning and countermeasures aspects of these systems in the “not F-35” thread
FBWHow is that not true ? A lower profile will have a lower RCS. To use an extreme example, are you saying that a stealth F 35 will have a lower RCS than a non stealth F 15 remote control replica ? The replica will have a lower RCS
Yeah, spud don’t you know you have to be small and sleek to be stealthy?
I don’t think it would be very difficult to make remote control f-15 toy have a high RCS, or the whole decoy concept really wouldn’t work.
FBWThose bulges on the F-35 bottom are even less stealthy than that..
Did you test a flat bottom f-35 against a “bulgey” f-35 on an RCS range to reach this conclusion? Or is this the usual eyeball RCS, we like to use around here?
There is nothing obvious to suggest the shaping on the bottom is an RCS hot spot, but then I’m not an expert RCS eyeballer.
What I see on the underside is an effrontery to aesthetics.
Edit- my spelling when typing on my phone is a disgrace to the English language.
FBWlastly some elements can be expected to stop functioning on an aesa, the team on f-35 decided a degradation over life is acceptable
/ better than having to re-apply RAM material for each inspection
Not as much an issue with the F-35, it would have taken you exactly 30 seconds to look up the F-35 maintenance access points. The extensive process of cutting through the RAM to get to do maintenance, sealing it back up, waiting for the treatment to cure, then applying tape pretty much went out the window with the F-117. The F-22 (and some access panels F-35) do require gap filler, reapplication of coating. The more durable coating on the F-35 has been applied to some areas of the F-22. Even the B-2 has seen application of more maintenance friendly coatings and methods developed from the F-22/35.
FBWWell Marcello, I am sorry to hear that. It was not my intention for you to take this personally. I did not call you a liar, I think two of your claims are inaccurate that is all:
1. First over the cost effectiveness and accuracy of using unguided munitions. This is not an indictment of the Russian bombing campaign. If they had a stockpile of guided munitions, I’ve no doubt they would be using them whatever the claimed accuracy of the SVP-24 system. GPS guided bombs like the JDAM have a proven CEP, low cost, and are plentiful in western arsenals. An unguided bomb dropped by a digital bombing system,may approach the JDAM CEP in perfect meteorogical conditions and and absence of pilot error. Those are two big IF’s when your talking about an urban environment and close proximity to friendly troops. The few extra thousand in cost is nothing compared to the cost of having to retarget and launch another sortie.
2. The assertion that the rebels, ISIS, terrorists (whatever we label the various groups) are out in the open. The majority of the fighting is in/around the population centers. Even ISIS in eastern Syria are hiding thier fighters and operations centers in cities and towns to avoid drone strikes. They learned the lesson in Kobane, if they are accessible, they get pulverized.
Because of this, collateral damage and combat lines that are in close proximity to the population, accuracy counts.
Again, I’m not attacking you. I disagree with what you are arguing because it does not hold up to scrutiny. I too, have degrees in history and political science.
FBWPk is a theoretical number. In reality you can not afford not to assess what’s going on. The data I could gather for AMRAAM tells me a Pk of 50% for AMRAAM in the last conflicts against weak, badly trained, mostly non manoeuvring opponents. And now imagine a Pk against a challenging opponent. What’s an acceptable Pk for you for not assessing the results?
I’m not sure how you are not getting this. One aircraft fires said missile and turns away, handing off guidance to another aircraft that provides mid course guidance, updates. The two way datalink allows the aircraft to “assess” missile location, when it actively acquires target, retargeting, hit/miss. The Meteor and Aim-120D are capable of this. The closer the “shooter” can be, the higher the kill probability. The “shooter” does not have to stick around, the wingman can provide guidance from a safer distance.
Btw, the success rate of AMRAAM launches is not the Pk. Probability of a kill has to do with launch parameters, and target bearing, speed, alt. The supposed 50% success rate of the AMRAAM based on launches means little. How many were launched outside of missile envelope? Multiple missiles against the same target? etc. The best missile in the world isnt going to have a high rate of success in tail chases, or against targets a the edge of the missile envelope.
No one claimed that AESA sets are magic, however they have extended tracking and targeting ranges compared to the sets they replaced. Not to mention they are more resistant to ECM, that is one of thier clear advantages services have talked about.
FBWIt’s naive to think that every missile hits. How want you assess the success of the missiles? It is a short term thinking to think that you can turn away after releasing the missile… Every shoot needs assessment. If you fail to shoot immediately after your missile failed you will be shoot.
You completely missed the meaning. With the Aim-120D and Meteor two way data links, the aircraft that fires the missile does not have to be the one to provide mid course guidance or even initial target lock. This is especially important considering the effective range of the AESA sets are in excess of ranges where a missile like the AMRAAM would have acceptable Pk.
FBWSo , your response to my post is to call me a liar?
Well continue like so, you are doing a great service to your country .:applause:Great heart and mind win!:applause:
Liar? no I refuted your suppositions with accurate information.
FBWYou are allowing your nationality to cloud the terrible evil that your government is doing.
Not at all, I am well aware of the mistakes made by the U.S. and know the price that family and friend have paid serving abroad in a conflict without end.
So, in essence, you are both claiming that the media and governments of all the nations listed, including your nominal ally of India, are lying about the this?
None of what I posted is incorrect. I see some Russian posters blinded by their own propaganda blitz, readily swallowing any negative story about the west, and parroting the state propaganda machine no matter how outrageous the lie. In truth, it is not due to any anti-Russian bias that I am engaged in what I know will be a pointless discussion with some of you.
It is the opposite, I don’t, and the majority of educated Americans did not view Russia as an adversary (at least until very recently). Hence the disbelief at reading the state media stories generated in Russia about the U.S.
FBWIt really boggles my mind that people actually believe the “Russia troll bot” conspiracy theory. Nothing fails the Occams Razor test like the “troll bot” story.
Just about every government and media outlet that has been targeted believes this “conspiracy theory”:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29/world/europe/russia-sweden-disinformation.html?_r=0
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmdfence/668/66804.htm#_idTextAnchor004
https://euobserver.com/opinion/134890
http://spectator.sme.sk/c/20256765/propaganda-tactics-remains-the-same.html?ref=njctse
http://www.smh.com.au/world/who-controls-our-news-welcome-to-the-era-of-russian-and-chinese-information-war-20160907-grapkr.html
http://www.afr.com/opinion/the-dangers-of-russian-social-media-propaganda-and-disinformation-20160509-gopmjb
http://www.baltictimes.com/latvia_concerned_over_spread_of_russian_media_spread/
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/we-need-a-robust-cyber-security-policy/article9107956.ece
Latvia, Australia, US, UK, Slovak republic, Finland, Czechs. Do I need to go on? -wait! India too.
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