Yes and not, a F-15C w/o conformal tanks weight less, a F-15E with them more.
But given that any stealth plane have to carry all fuel and a part of weapon load internally I’ll call them apples and oranges.

No, the F-15C. The original empty weight figures of 28,600lbs are 30 years old. The F-15C has added AESA, structural modifications, the MSIP II upgrades that started in 1985 (internal EW, countermeasures, JTIDS). The “C” has gained enough weight over the year that the c.g. of the aircraft shifted leaving the F-15C a bit nose heavy (hence studies commenced in 1991 to remove some of the 250lbs of ballast in the nose). The F-15C’s empty weight has crept up to nearly 31,000lbs.

even 1sqm rcs will be detected at hundreds of kms. a competent rival can plan accordingly. 4ET has weight of 7tons. 2ET will be 3.5tons.

Another operative example that this guy has not idea what he is writing about. 2 US 610 gallon EFT weigh in excess of 4.4 tons (fuel+EFT-more with pylons, as the F-22 does not carry them without EFT)

each engine of EF has 6400kg non afterburning thrust supporting airframe of 11.5tons. F-22 has practically twice the weight without twice the non afterburning thrust. AAM semi-recessed does not add that much drag. you can see this thing in airshows where F-22 use full afterburner thrust at low altitude. you wont see that much flame from Su-35 at low altitude.

Wrong again, The Typhoon has 27,000 lbs of dry thrust and and empty (operational) weight of 24,200+
The F-22 has an empty (operational) weight of 43,430lbs and an estimated 47,000+lbs of dry thrust (the F119 thrust figures are still classified, commentary has put the dry thrust between 23,000 and 26,000. Have seen 23,500 mentioned more than once).
Dry-empty thrust to weight ratios are nearly the same.

Regarding the Danish evaluation

Does the document state why 34 EF-2000 or 38 F-18E/F would be acquired? Why the different numbers? The document states the difference in performance/parameters is marginal.

Two reasons are given: airframe life 6,000 hour vs 8,000 hours and this: “identified a need for 28 Joint
Strike Fighter airframes, 34 Eurofighter airframes and 38Super Hornet airframes, respectively, in order to perform the same portfolio of tasks”
Thus they assuming that considering the 30 years time period, some of the EF and SHornets will reach the end of their fatigue life so attrition replacements are most likely figured in. It also appears that they feel more of the other two are needed to meet fulfill the mission requirements as opposed to the F-35.

Errh..no , Andrea Nativi, Pietro Bonsignore, Fabio Coniglio and a lot of other serious professionals on field of italian defense publishing.
And no, the continuation of F-35 development made a lot of sense just because the introduction of some counter stealth technologies, not sufficient at all to negate the huge advantage of VLO planes but surely enought to force a reconsideration about tactics and modus operandi of said planes when they have to face them.
For the rest, it was not that development of what would become the F-22 started in 2005 or even in 1998 when the F-117 shootdown happened: it started much more earlier.
So when they became fully aware of the problem and it took some time for it even after Kosovo war, the project was near to completion so what would they have done, in your opinion? Scrap all the program?
Or instead keep on trying to find some feasible solution or at least try to salvage something from the project?
They chose the second one, and in the end they obtained not the Air Dominance Fighter they dreamt on at the beginning but almost an excellent 5th gen Air Superiority Fighter able to confortably operate on high altitudes that the F-15C would even find difficult to reach.

So , let’s say that it ended way better than the great majority of those wunderwaffen programs they carried on during the last phase of the cold war and even more during Bush sr and Clinton presidencies that ended regularly in big money for nothing.

I cannot stress this enough, your rationale for why the F-22 program was curtailed is flawed. It had nothing to do with:
1. advances in counter stealth technologies
2. not having a credible mission- the USAF reiterated the “minimum acceptable risk” at 240 F-22, several officers ruined their careers publicly advocating this to the ire of Gates
3. The design features of the aircraft (with a caveat)

It had everything to do with: Gates claiming “next war-itss”. Basically sacrificing the F-22 to meet his requirement for increased drone funding and MRAPS (great investment in overproduction-we are giving them away now). He shut his ears to anything that was not of immediate use in the war on terror. The F-22 also has two great design weaknesses, it is very expensive and time consuming to upgrade the software code, and upgrading early software/hardware blocks is equally expensive and difficult. Just bringing the 140 or so PAI and BAI and attrition aircraft up to increment 3.2 has cost billions, now the fleet is undergoing RAMMP to fix structural issues inherent in the abbreviated production run (early blocks that would have been used differently or for less hours are part of the combat coded fleet). All told, 11 billion spend that could have gone into building block 40 and beyond have to be spent to bring early blocks into commonality due to insufficient numbers. The Raptor had two clear failings, software modularity and politics, not the points you are harping on.

True to a point, unfortunately they are also less important from financing standpoint. Most politicians don’t care what happens 10 years in the future: they’ll rather save 1 billion for next budget year, than 2 billion for budget year decade in the future. Hence, if and when the total procurement numbers are cut, most likely it is done by cutting production RATE rather than production SPAN. This is not a thought exercise, that’s how it has happened with nearly every military aircraft program over last 30 years.

True, this has already occurred with the F-35. This has been eased somewhat by the addition of orders from non-partner nations and cost saving measures initiated by L-M. I don’t think that the USAF production will reach the planned 80 per year. However, if the cost curve continues to drop as it has, then a rate approaching 60+ for the USAF per year and a total buy in the range of 1,300- 1,500 F-35A for the USAF is plausible.

No one with a sane mind and with some rudamentry understanding on economics scale believe that US will produce that many F-35’s.

1763 is a wild stretch. There are allready dire reports that the F-35 will have to be upgraded in the not so distant future to stay in the game.. guess what, that will cost moar $$$.

And with the current status of F-35 program.. well McCain did mention something about over budget and delays.. can’t remember what he said, probably nothing important to worry about.
t.. right Jessmo23?

The F-35A program of record stands at 1763, let’s stick to facts. Where are the Dire reports you are referring to? Like some hinting that an aircraft expected to be in production for the next 20+ years will need to upgraded to stay relevant? Color me shocked! I assumed that manufacturers designed a basic airframe and avionics and built it until obsolescence. After all isn’t what they’ve done with the F-16, Rafale, Su-27? Oh, what….

That is exactly what was done. In the report, the segments where they discussed specific capabilities to justify the scores have all been scrubbed from the document.

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In regards to overall evaluation approach for the survivability and effectiveness.

Yes I get it, I’ve read it several times through. The redacted sections on mission effectiveness and survivability are quite short for each. The Swiss report, by comparison, explained the rationale behind the score on each section, assessed the strengths and weaknesses of each candidate in meeting mission requirements. I’m not saying that the results are incorrect but rather incomplete and lacking in specifics on why the aircraft were scored as they were. In my opinion, it would lend credibility to the evaluation if there were indications that there was a separate classified annex detailing specific threats modeled and what criteria led to scoring the effectiveness in DCA, for example.