But what about the 6.5g limitation and the 8g maximum?

Has there been any updates with respect to the LCA’s g rating ? Are they still limited to 6g’s ?

“Mirage-2000 Upgrade Will Plug India’s Combat Jet Gap”

(Source: Indo-Asian News Service; published Nov. 7, 2008)

PARIS — The Indian Air Force (IAF) can address the alarming dip in its operational capabilities by upgrading its fleet of Mirage-2000 fighter jets, even as it evaluates a global tender it has floated for purchasing 126 new combat aircraft, says French electronics major Thales, which is on the verge of inking the upgrade deal.

“The upgrade will significantly enhance the IAF’s air potential by extending the operational performance of the Mirage fleet and taking full advantage of the aircraft’s world class capabilities,” Francois Quentin, Thales senior vice president and head of its aerospace division, told a group of visiting Indian journalists here.

“As a result, the IAF will have a coherent platform-system combination for the next 20 years at a significantly lower cost than the acquisition of new-build aircraft with equivalent performance,” Quentin added.

At the same time, another Thales official pointed out that a decision on the upgrade would have to be taken by the end of this year so that the project could begin early 2009, ahead of the parliamentary polls that are due by May but could be advanced to February.

“Our experience, not only with India but with other countries also, has been that if an election comes in the way, a decision on a project like this can be delayed by at least two years,” the official told IANS on condition of anonymity.

This statement acquires significance since the IAF is known to have been considering the upgrade for at least two years but floated a request for proposal (RFP) only in April, to which Thales replied in July. Price negotiations are set to begin later this month.

While Thales was reluctant to state figures given a confidentiality clause, the project is believed to be worth $1.5 billion for upgrading the 51 Mirage-2000s in the IAF fleet to Dash-5 levels. This will give the jets multi-role capability with longer-range radars and fire-and-forget missiles, enabling the aircraft to perform a given mission thanks to greater fuel and weapon-delivery capacities.

The upgrade will involve providing the Mirage-2000, which was first inducted in mid-1980 and of which the IAF now operates 51, a state-of-the-art fly-by-wire digital cockpit and an enhanced weapons-carrying capability.

Under the Thales proposal, the company would deliver the first two aircraft from its facilities in France within 40 months of the signing of the contract, and would simultaneously assist Hindustan Aircraft Limited (HAL) in upgrading another two aircraft in India in the same time frame.

Thereafter, HAL would upgrade one of the remaining 47 aircraft every month.

“The IAF will be further enhanced by the integration of new capabilities,” Pierre-Yves Chaltiec, CEO of Thales Airborne Systems, said.

“These include longer range detection across the spectrum, improved tactical situation awareness, longer range weapon firing against multiple simultaneous targets, weapon stealth and extended operating envelope with the capability to engage ground targets while countering airborne threats,” he added.

“The resulting tactical advantage will allow commanders to commit fewer aircraft while achieving a higher success rate, thanks in particular to greater fuel and weapon-delivery capacities. For instance, a typical border protection mission involving two hours on station will require just two upgraded Mirage-2000 aircraft compared with six current aircraft,” Chaltiec said.

The IAF had floated a global tender in September 2007 for 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft in a deal valued at $10 billion. Six jets are in the fray: the US Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet and the Lockheed Martin F-16, the French Dassault Rafale, the Swedish Saab Grippen, the Russian MiG-35 and the Eurofighter Typhoon built by a four-nation European consortium.

The technical bids are currently being evaluated after which all the six aircraft will be put through a rigorous testing process in Bangalore, Jaisalmer and Leh.

The first is meant to gauge the aircraft’s ability to operate in the humid conditions of southern India, the second their effectiveness in the deserts of Rajasthan and the third to study their suitability in the icy Himalayan heights of Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir.

By the time the evaluation process is complete, the size of the order is likely to rise to around 200 jets, as the IAF, which is down to 32 squadrons from a high of 39 1/2, is expected to see a further depletion of its fleet due to the retirement of some its ageing Soviet-era MiG-21 aircraft. The IAF has a sanctioned strength of 45 squadrons.

Rand Study Suggests U.S. Loses War With China
By wendell minnick
Published: 16 Oct 11:45 EDT (15:45 GMT) Print | Email

TAIPEI – A new RAND study suggests U.S. air power in the Pacific would be inadequate to thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan in 2020. The study, entitled “Air Combat Past, Present and Future,” by John Stillion and Scott Perdue, says China’s anti-access arms and strategy could deny the U.S. the “ability to operate efficiently from nearby bases or seas.”

According to the study, U.S. aircraft carriers and air bases would be threatened by Chinese development of anti-ship ballistic missiles, the fielding of diesel and nuclear submarines equipped with torpedoes and SS-N-22 and SS-N-27 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), fighters and bombers carrying ASCMs and HARMs, and new ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

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The report states that 34 missiles with submunition warheads could cover all parking ramps at Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa.

An “attack like this could damage, destroy or strand 75 percent of aircraft based at Kadena,” it says.

In contrast, many Chinese air bases are harder than Kadena, with some “super-hard underground hangers.”

To make matters worse, Kadena is the only U.S. air base within 500 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait, whereas China has 27.

U.S. air bases in South Korea are more than 750 miles distant, and those in Japan are more than 885 miles away. Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, is 1,500 miles away. The result is that sortie rates will be low, with a “huge tanker demand.”

The authors suggest China’s CETC Y-27 radar, which is similar to Russia’s Nebo SVU VHF Digital AESA, could counter U.S. stealth fighter technology. China is likely to outfit its fighters with improved radars and by “2020 even very stealthy targets likely [would be] detectable by Flanker radars at 25+ nm.” China is also likely to procure the new Su-35BM fighter by 2020, which will challenge the F-35 and possibly the F-22.

The authors also question the reliability of U.S. beyond-visual-range weapons, such as the AIM-120 AMRAAM. U.S. fighters have recorded only 10 AIM-120 kills, none against targets equipped with the kinds of countermeasures carried by Chinese Su-27s and Su-30s. Of the 10, six were beyond-visual-range kills, and it required 13 missiles to get them.

If a conflict breaks out between China and the U.S. over Taiwan, the authors say it is difficult to “predict who will have had the last move in the measure-countermeasure game.”

Overall, the authors say, “China could enjoy a 3:1 edge in fighters if we can fly from Kadena – about 10:1 if forced to operate from Andersen. Overcoming these odds requires qualitative superiority of 9:1 or 100:1” – a differential that is “extremely difficult to achieve” against a like power.

If beyond-visual-range missiles work, stealth technology is not countered and air bases are not destroyed, U.S. forces have a chance, but “history suggests there is a limit of about 3:1 where quality can no longer compensate for superior enemy numbers.”

A 24-aircraft Su-27/30 regiment can carry around 300 air-to-air missiles (AAMs), whereas 24 F-22s can carry only 192 AAMs and 24 F-35s only 96 AAMs.

Though current numbers assume the F-22 could shoot down 48 Chinese Flankers when “outnumbered 12:1 without loss,” these numbers do not take into account a less-than-perfect U.S. beyond-visual-range performance, partial or complete destruction of U.S. air bases and aircraft carriers, possible deployment of a new Chinese stealth fighter around 2020 or 2025, and the possible use of Chinese “robo-fighters” to deplete U.S. “fighters’ missile loadout prior to mass attack.”
The authors write that Chinese counter stealth, anti-access, countermissile technologies are proliferating and the U.S. military needs “a plan that accounts for this.”

For anyone who thinks that the AIM 120 will some how redress any balance!

Anyone else find it interesting about what was said about the SU-30 engines? It was not very flattering….

It is true that they are suseptable to FOD isnt it? Who does not remember the Su-30’s having to be grounded because the Fan Blades were being nicked by FOD!

There is no harm in focusing on the MCA. The LCA has not met expectation and there is only so much you can do with tweaks and late modifications. So more focus on the MCA will hopefully result in a better plane which will be more in line with what the IAF needs. And basing the MCA on the LCA would be a good idea as it would allow maximum reuse.

Now if they mess up the MCA as well, then ofcourse it would be terrible news. But hopefully they have learnt their lesson and will do a better job in the case of MCA. If they dont, all top management needs to be fired. Come to think of it, hopefully, MCA will be lead by a different team then the one that worked on the LCA.

The current management needs to be calibrated and upgraded to ensure MCA works!

India really needs to start looking at the way how other countries do their R&D! Get the Indian public sector involved (if they already dont) using 50-50 research programs to kick start the indian aerospace manufacturing sector.

Do away with using HAL has the prime source for everything and anything!

Why the obsession with twin seaters? Surely with the airspace india has to cover it would be better to go with a large number of single seaters?

New Chinese Missiles Target the Greater Asian Region

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by Richard Fisher, Jr.
Published on July 24th, 2007
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http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.165/pub_detail.asp

Imagery made available on Chinese web pages on July 13 and July 15 appears to confirm that China has developed new short range and medium to intermediate range ballistic missiles for use in the Asia Pacific region. First viewed in an unclear image in November 2006, the new medium to intermediate range missile may be a version of the DF-21 (NATO code: CSS-5) or it may be the long-awaited DF-25. The other missile appears to be a new version of the DF-15 (CSS-6) with a terminally guided warhead. The significance of these revelations is that China is upgrading its regionally-targeted missile forces, which will soon pose additional threats to, among others, India, Russia, Japan, South Korea and to U.S. forces in the East Asian region.

New Medium to Intermediate Missile: While the top is an altered image, the appearance of other images of the transporter and missile at least indicate that China is developing a new medium to intermediate range missile to deploy against its neighbors. Source: CJDBY web page

China’s Medium and Intermediate Range Missiles

China has long employed medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles as part of its nuclear, and increasingly, it non-nuclear missile arsenal. These missiles target Russian, Indian, Japanese, South Korean and U.S. military forces in East Asia. Early MRBM and IRBMs include the 2,790km range DF-3 (CSS-2) and the 5,470km range DF-4 (CSS-3). Both are liquid fuel missiles deployed in hangers or caves and towed to launch sites. Both of these weapons date back to the 1960s, and although they have been continually improved, are considered obsolete and due for replacement. In its 2007 report on the PLA the Pentagon notes there are 14 to 18 DF-3s and 16 to 24 DF-4 missiles.

Starting in 1987 China started deploying the DF-21 (CSS-5), a new solid-fuel missile derived from the JL-1 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM). In its latest report on the PLA the Pentagon notes that 34 to 38 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) are ready to fire between 40 to 50 DF-21 missiles. The DF-21 is now reported to come in an initial variant with a range of 1,770+km to 2,150km, and the DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2), with a range of 2,500km. The DF-21 can be armed with nuclear or non-nuclear warheads.

DF-21: The DF-21 was the Second Artillery’s first solid fueled and mobile ballistic missile. Source: Chinese Internet

Asian military sources have told the author that a version of the DF-21 is expected to be the first PLA missile to carry a new terminally-guided warhead to create the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). Both U.S. and Asian sources have stated that this missile was tested in 2005 and in 2006. With the April 2006 launch of the Jianbing-5/YaoGan-1, China’s first dedicated military synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite, and a related new high-resolution digital imaging satellite Jianbing-6/YaoGan-2 last May 25[1], China’s new ASBM may be close to achieving an initial operational status. Russian technology SAR and electro-optical satellites dedicated to counter-naval missions may be launched later this year. These satellites can join existing Chinese long-range Over-the-Horizon radar and land-based electronic intelligence sensors, aircraft and even ships to provide composite targeting data for ASBMs. China will also use its future “Compass” navigation satellite constellation to provide precision guidance for this and other missiles.

First Possible Image of DF-21 ASBM: Appearing on a Chinese web site last May, this image shows an apparent mockup of a DF-21 size missile with a maneuverable warhead shape. The photo is likely copied from a Chinese brochure or publication and dates from early in this decade. Source: Chinese Internet

China’s new ASBMs pose a strategic as well as a tactical challenge to U.S. forces in Asia. At present the U.S. does not have anti-missile capabilities to defend large U.S. ships against this threat, so vulnerable targets, most importantly aircraft carriers, will have to remain out of missile range in order to survive. This factor will further limit the effectiveness of their already range-challenged F/A-18E/F fighter bombers. U.S. Aegis cruisers and destroyers now being outfitted with new SM-3 interceptors with upgraded radar and processing capabilities may in the future be configured to deal with this threat, but if so, they may not be available for other missions, like protecting people. The fact is that no anti-missile system is going to come close to providing reliable defense. For China, ASBMs provide a means for saturating U.S. ships with missiles. While ASBMs are bearing down from above, their attack can be coordinated with waves of submarine, air and ship-launched anti-ship cruise missiles.

The DF-21 also provided the basis for the four-stage KT-1 mobile solid fuel space launch vehicle, which in turn, forms the basis for the SC-19 direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile. A more capable ASAT missile may be derived from the KT-2, which Chinese sources at the 2002 Zhuhai Airshow stated was based on the DF-31 ICBM. The massive debris from the January 11 satellite destruction has forced the U.S. to move one satellite[2], and possibly, the International Space Station, to avoid destruction. The threat from the Chinese satellite debris will exist for about a decade to come.

New Missile

The new medium to intermediate range missile pictured above began to appear on Chinese web pages in late November 2006. The first image was clear enough only to determine that a new missile with a new 10-wheel TEL could be seen on a testing range. Days later another image appeared of the TEL on a railroad flatbed car. The TEL is similar to that used by the DF-11A or CSS-7 Mod2 short range ballistic missile (SRBM).

First Picture: This first vague picture of the new missile appeared on Chinese web pages in November 2006. Credit: Chinese Internet

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Or worse, one learns by surprise. Increasingly, owing to the ability of the Chinese military to conceal, the revelation of a new capability comes as a shock and surprise. China’s January 11, 2007 interception of a weather satellite with a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon was an example of such a surprise. The apparent new medium to intermediate range missile constitutes another surprise. Other than two or three non-revealing photographs from the Chinese web, there has been no official Chinese comment on the new missiles depicted above. Are they nuclear armed or do they employ a new radio-frequency warheads for attacking electronic infrastructure? Or might they carry a new terminally-guided warhead to attack large ships, like aircraft carriers? How many does China intend to build and against whom are they to be deployed? At present one cannot know.

Such Chinese actions do not build assurance or confidence, but prompt suspicion and reaction. China’s missile threat is likely to strengthen resolve in Tokyo and possibly Delhi to proceed with increased missile defense cooperation with Washington. Such defenses pose no threat of harm to Chinese or the Chinese government, other than to lessen the ability of the Beijing regime to coerce its neighbors with the threat of missile strikes. This loss of coercive power appears to frighten China’s leaders the most, motivating its hard-to-overlook political campaign against U.S.-led missile defense cooperation in Asia. Past endeavors like the 640 Project prove China’s past interest in missile defenses, while its recent ASAT demonstration demonstrate it can master the technology for new strategic missile defenses. Rather than let its neighbors rest behind new defensive missiles that cannot reach Chinese targets, however, China instead develops new missiles to overcome their new defenses.

China’s new missiles are creating significant new burdens for U.S. forces dedicated to deterring Chinese military forces in Asia. Few in the US government expected that China’s missile program would be as robust as it has turned out, or involve large numbers of missiles. The conventional wisdom was that China would pursue “minimal deterrence” and spend its money on desperately needed social reforms. But from one missile, the DF-21, China has devised new versions that can target U.S. aircraft carriers and the space information system essential to their successful employment. Additional missiles are now being developed for both missions. Should the U.S. 7th Fleet’s sole aircraft carrier based in Japan be neutralized by Chinese missiles, it may be weeks before another can arrive to face the same Chinese missile gauntlet.

What China’s leaders appear unable to understand is that before too long, Japanese, Taiwanese and even Australians will determine that mere defensive measures, as well as reliance on insufficient American forces, are in turn no longer sufficient to deter China. They may conclude that they will also require their own independent deterrent, maybe even a nuclear one, as India (and North Korea) concluded long ago.