Thats the Falcon 21 AKA F-16U like i mentioned it, the Falcon 21 ++ was an altogether diferent beast, it was described in the documents of a Congress earing in 1991; both the Falcon 21 ++ and the F-15XX (an Eagle with a new wing, new radar, F-119 engines, and some frontal RCS management https://www.flightglobal.com/FlightP…20-%202652.PDF) were alternatives to the ATF program.
Later LM picked the work done by GD, changed it and called it the “F-16X”.

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I captured that image from a 1991 Senate hearing back in 2013.

Yesterday I enlarged it and looked at it again, and the aircraft in it looks like a Falcon 21 with twin tails.

Its wing is a clipped delta like the Falcon 21 and it looks like the aircraft has both inboard and outboard trailing-edge flaps, at least to my eyes.

So, the blurry image here might be the Falcon 21++ indeed, IMHO.

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Attached slides show the scenario of a war game conducted from 8 to 10 November 1976 to test the E-3A’s capabilities.

Three waves of simulated Warsaw Pact aircraft – 85, 93 & 80 – attacked NATO SAM sites, airbases and nuclear storage facilities.

It’s an idea dating back to 1989.

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My question is whether F100/110 is at the same tech level of F414/M88/EJ200 and their proposed developmental variants, or whether it would require significantly more investment from Turkey to bring it up to that level, if that is even possible.

F135 in its present form would seem foolish given that it is a very different design tailored for F-35B lift system. Might F119 be available?

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From http://www.energy.kth.se/proj/courses/Seminars/KTHlecture2_ulfolsson.pdf

South Korea’s KF-X
KF-X Costs, Prospects Disputed By S. Korean Agencies
Aviation Week & Space Technology Apr29, 2013 , p. 49
Bradley Perrett
Beijing

South Korean defense agencies clash over KF-X prospects

Printed headline: Achievable or Not?

If South Korea builds its proposed KF-X stealth fighter, it will need to export it. So one key question hanging over the much-delayed project is whether the country can build the aircraft cheaply enough and attract adequate demand. Another is whether South Korea can build it at all.

Following a two-year concept-definition study of the program, the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), the program ‘s chief proponent, says the KF-X could indeed be developed at an affordable cost and carve out a sizable niche in the world fighter market. The other view, held by the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA), is that the country is not ready to embark on such an ambitious project.

Both organizations belong to the defense ministry. Discord between them, bordering on antagonism, is a factor in the 10-year impasse in the project’s decision-making, although KIDA shows signs of relenting, suggesting that South Korea should try to modify a foreign fighter.

The ADD foresees a cost of 6 trillion won ($5.5 billion) in developing an all-new KF-X with two engines each producing at least 18,000 lb. of thrust. Building 120 units would cost another 8 trillion won, and operating them for 30 years would cost 9 trillion, it told an official seminar in January. KIDA counters the development cost alone would be more than 10 trillion won. It cites estimates by Boeing and EADS . The top of EADS ‘s range was 17 trillion won, almost three times ADD’s figure.

To assess KF-X’s export potential, ADD sought advice last year from two consultants, IHS Jane’s and Strategic Defense Intelligence (SDI). IHS Jane’s believes that 220 to 676 KF-Xs could be exported to countries such as Indonesia, Turkey, Singapore, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India and Finland if the aircraft is priced at $70-90 million per copy, presumably without spares or training. The consultancy estimates the price of the best-selling Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 50 at $70 million and the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet , Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale at $83-132 million. SDI offers slightly lower KF-X sales estimates, while adding five Latin American countries as potential customers.

KIDA argues that KF-X’s accessible market is only about 500 units and that the consultancies have been unrealistic in their assumptions of the fighter’s potential market share. It sees the T-50 advanced trainer of Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) as an example of a project justified by inflated sales estimates . The think tank says Teal Group, a U.S. consultancy commissioned by KAI, estimated sales of 800 T-50s in a market of 3,000 aircraft. Eight years after putting the T-50 on the market , KAI has so far taken only one order, for 16 aircraft for Indonesia. Jeon Young-hoon, the T-50’s former chief engineer, has also criticized the KF-X target price as unrealistically low, saying the fighter would have no cost advantage over the Super Hornet in materials, labor and overhead.

Technological readiness is another area where ADD and KIDA sharply disagree. ADD says an independent group of South Korean experts determined that the industry was mature in 89% of 432 technology items required to develop the KF-X. The areas of immaturity included flight control, radar and infrared stealth , data fusion and twin-engine integration. ADD proposes to address these deficiencies by seeking help from the winner of the separate the F-X Phase 3 contest for 60 fighters. The competitors are the Lockheed Martin F-35 , Boeing F-15 Silent Eagle and Eurofighter Typhoon .

But KIDA notes that Boeing and Lockheed Martin say they can provide assistance in only about half of 48 technology items requested, due to technology transfer restrictions. According to KIDA, the U.S. companies will neither invest nor take a risk in the KF-X, but EADS is willing to consider investment if South Korea buys the Eurofighter .

Siding with KIDA, Jeon says flight control is an area of unmanageable risk, because South Korean experience in flight control is limited to conversion of an algorithm into a different programming language. Lack of experience in flight control is part of the reason why ADD has prepared two series of designs, one for an aircraft with its horizontal stabilizers aft, which it considers to be a U.S. style, and one for a so-called European fighter, with a canard stabilizer. The origin of the flight-control technology will determine the configuration.

KIDA proposes modifying an existing fighter such as the Super Hornet or F-16 . ADD concedes that a modified Super Hornet would meet South Korean air force requirements, but stresses that it would not meet other goals, such as exports and aerospace industry development. Neither ADD nor KIDA cites the KF-X ‘s combat effectiveness in future war scenarios in supporting their view . That reflects the South Korean tradition of assessing weapons development industrially instead of militarily.

Gripen A/B RWR (VMS1) has standard deviation of accurancy of 7 degrees.
Gripen C/D RWR was upgraded with interferometric arrays. Standard deviation of accurancy error 1 degree.

Gripen E/F will use scattered conformal broadband antennas. Accurancy not public.

Are these data from an official source?

If so, I’d appreciate if you could post a link/screen capture or cite the source.