Done in large part to compete against Airbus.
In case you’ve never noticed….The more people/miney a country has invested in a product, the more likely they are to buy it.

Do you think it’s just a coincidence that France, Germany and Spain buy Airbus products, Canada buys Bell helicopters (assembled in Quebec) and Italy & Japan bought 676s?:rolleyes:

Yes but France, Germany and Spain all happily buy Boeing products. Have a look at the 787 order book, civil airliners only have a certain degree of home loyalty.

You have made the argument before that European Airliners and armed forces have some kind of unfair bias against buying American which isn’t born out by the facts.

Does Boeing make 8″ guns? :diablo:

Without looking at their product lineup I dinna have a clue:D

And the reason why the USAF can’t drawn up a requirement which actually fits what it wants is because Congress has dictated that there HAS to be a “competition”. And since the only even realistic “competition” to the Boeing 767 is something from EADS/Airbus & EADS/Airbus wouldn’t/won’t compete for a contract it (& “everyone” else) KNEW/KNOWS it can’t win, the “requirement” HAD to be changed to accomodate the noncompetative A330 EADS/Airbus wanted/wants to offer. Although an HONEST evaluation of even the last “requirement” (which was written as much to keep EADS/Airbus in the “competiton” as it was to actually indicate the real requirement) STILL indicates something along the lines of the 767-200 (if not something smaller & less capable).

But lets look at the two “big” things that appearantly make the KC-30 so attractive.

Fuel offload vs radius: The KC-767AT exceeds the stated offload requirement by more than 25,000 lbs for the desired radius or exceeds the stated radius requirement by more than 500nm for the desired fuel offload. And in the real world if you look at the historical average offload per sortie, the KC-767AT is capable of DOUBLE the average (for Operation Desert Storm & Operation Allied Force at ~1,500nm, for Operation Iraqi Freedom at ~1,000nm & for Operation Enduring Freedom at ~500nm).

Airlift: The only “airlift” requirement given a quantitative value was patient capacity which the KC-767AT can carry double the stated requirement. As an airlift asset, the KC-767AT can carry as many 463L pallets or roughly twice as many passengers or patients as a C-17. Unless you are going to argue that we need to replace all our C-17s with something with significantly greater capacity there is no justification for such in a TANKER [there ARE reasons why the C-17 is what it is & not another C-5]. The USAF/DOD has not done the GAO requested analysis justifying passenger & cargo capability in its replacement refueling aircraft. Nobody doubts the utility of having passenger & cargo capability in a tanker BUT, just like fuel offload vs radius, it is a matter of providing the RIGHT amount of capacity/capability not providing the most otherwise even the KC-30 is too small & we should be looking at the 747 vs A380 (or heaven forbid something akin to the An-225).

No, it is NOT clear from public statements that the USAF attaches far more importance to cargo-carrying capacity & fuel offload than the written requirement suggests. It is clear from public statements that those “in charge” (which is not even the USAF any more) of selecting the KC-X are trying to save face & justify the choice of the KC-30 by exaggerating the advantages of a LARGE tanker like the KC-30 while ignoring the MUCH more important disadvantages. There SHOULD be every bit as much investigation into the KC-30 selection (what went wrong, who is to blaim & what should be done to prevent it from happening again) as there was into the tanker lease deal.

Prior to being FORCED to change the requirement to accomodate the A330 for the sake of having a Congress mandated “competition”, the USAF was quite clear on what it wanted (& why the A330 was NOT it) & the results of investigations into the tanker lease show just how much the USAF was willing to do in order to get it ASAP.

General John Handy, USAF (Ret.) summed it up quite nicely.

Most of us in the Air Force mobility community were a bit surprised by the decision to buy the quite large Airbus-330 tanker instead of the smaller Boeing 767 tanker. But the real shock was in the unusually harsh language used by the Government Accountability Office in overturning that decision. It was the harshest language used to overturn an action by the Air Force that I have read in my entire career.

In that career — spanning 39 years in the Air Force — I was fortunate enough to have been the Commander of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and the USAF Air Mobility Command (AMC) from November 2001 until retiring from the Air Force in October 2005.

I devoted many years to the operation of air refueling tankers in support of the hundreds of other aircraft and tens of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and Coast Guardsmen who depend on them to create the “air bridge” that enables American forces and relief supplies to reach any corner of the world in only a few hours. Without the tankers performing when and where needed, America would not — quite literally — be a “superpower.”

In the many challenges we faced in those years, the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines in TRANSCOM pulled together as a joint team to get the job done on a daily basis throughout the entire time I was blessed to be their commander. We engaged in multiple crises around the world — humanitarian disasters as well as significant military conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The most serious limitation we had was our equipment: the shortage of adequate mobility assets — meaning airlift and air refueling aircraft. First among those problems was then, and is now, the tankers.

I spoke about the air refueling tanker age and shortages on a routine basis with anyone who would listen. And I did so in the context of the other requirement those badly needed assets would support which includes virtually everything the armed services have to move from one place to another that can be loaded onto an airplane.

The shocking language of the GAO decision compels me to do something I’ve never done before: to speak out publicly. I am not employed by either Boeing or Northrop-Grumman. But the service I’ve devoted most of my life to appears to need a bit of help.

Somewhere in the acquisition process, it is obvious to me that someone lost sight of the requirement. Based on what the GAO decided, it’s up to people such as myself to remind everyone of the warfighter requirement for a modern air refueling tanker aircraft.

Recall that we started this acquisition process in order to replace the Eisenhower era KC-135 aircraft with a modern version capable of accomplishing everything the current fleet does plus additional needs for the future. Thus the required aircraft is of small to medium size much like the KC-135. Not a very large aircraft like the current KC-10, which may be replaced later with a comparably large aircraft.

Why a smaller to medium size aircraft? Because, first of all, you want tankers to deploy in sufficient numbers in order to accomplish all assigned tasks. You need to bed them down on the maximum number of airfields around the world along with or close to the customer — airborne fighters, bombers and other mobility assets in need of fuel close to or right over the fight or crisis. This allows the supported combatant commander the ability to conduct effective operations around the clock. The impact of more tankers is more refueling booms in the sky, more refueling orbits covered, wider geographic coverage, more aircraft refueled, and more fuel provided. A “KC-135 like” aircraft takes up far less ramp space, is far more maneuverable on the ground and does not have the risk of jet blast reorganizing your entire ramp when engine power is applied.

The second requirement is survivability. The aircraft and crew must be able to compete in a threat environment that contains enhanced surface to air missiles and other significant threats. The crew must receive superior situational awareness to include automatic route planning and re-routing and steering cues to avoid those threats. They must have maximum armor protection, fuel tank explosion protection and world class chemical/biological protection. All of this means the warfighter has the requirement for a large number of highly flexible and survivable air refueling aircraft.

I also want the acquired aircraft to be integrated with the current defense transportation system. That means 463L compatible pallets; floor loaded on a freighter capable floor all compatible with the current modern airlift fleet. When I put passenger seats in this aircraft, I want to be able to use existing airlift aircraft seats and pallets. When tasked with our precious aero medical mission, I want to be able to use integral medical crew seats, onboard oxygen generation systems, more outlets and be able to use the USAF patient support pallet. I do not want to harness the USAF with the problem of going out to acquire unique assets due to a more radically sized and equipped tanker aircraft.

Now, if you look at these rather simple requirements and look at the previous offerings from industry, you might agree with me that the KC-767 more closely meets these needs than the competition. If that’s what the warfighters need, that’s what they should get.

My purpose is only to help select the right aircraft that meets the warfighter’s requirements. It is not anything else. With that thought in mind, the KC-767 — or another that is the same size and has the same capabilities — is the right aircraft for the USAF. Now let’s see what the new leadership of the Air Force does to obtain the right aircraft for the warfighter.

Keep in mind that General Handy was one of those who has openly called for the future USAF tanker force to include more large KC-10-like tankers & thus knows full well the benefits of such tankers. But he also knows full well the benefits of medium KC-135-like tankers and how large KC-10-like tankers & medium KC-135-like tankers have their advantages & disadvantages vs the other. Thus he, like so many others who know what they are talking about, understands the folly of replacing the KC-135 with a tanker which is larger than the KC-10 but not as good as the KC-135 at doing what the KC-135 does for the USAF OR as good as the KC-10 at what the KC-10 does for the USAF.

You don’t work for Boeing do you pfcem?:rolleyes:

Yes the 767 proposed by Boeing exceeds the performance requirements but there is one minor issue with that! Boeing was offering a Frankenstein aircraft which as of yet has never flown! And is such a very high risk on the other hand Northrop Grumman is offering a type which offers vastly superior performance and is in full scale testing now with the Australian air force making it a far lower risk.

In my own opinion its Boeings own fault for taking the MD11 out of production a type that could of easily met the requirements of the tanker program!