and this is the Q&A section…

Ambassador Jehangir Karamat at Brookings Institution
December 15, 2004
Transcript of Q&A Session

MR. COHEN: General Karamat, thank you very much for agreeing to make this your first public address in the United States and also for, I think, your articulate and eloquent statement of Pakistan’s role in the world today and especially Pakistan’s relationship with the United States. I think if I were writing my book right now, I’d have to change a few things. But we can talk about that in the next session, when we discuss my book.

We have time for some questions and answers. Please raise your hand and identify yourself and the young women with the microphones will track you down.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. I’m Edward Cowan. I’m an independent writer and editor.
Mr. Ambassador, first, thank you for coming to speak to us today. We’re happy to hear what you have to say. I’d like to ask a question that I think is probably the first thought on the minds of many Americans when they think about Pakistan, and that is Osama bin Laden. Why has not Pakistan found him by now? Is it a lack of resources, a lack of political will, fear of antagonism from the people who live in the region where he is presumed to be hiding out? What is the problem?

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: The question should have been, Why hasn’t the U.S. and Pakistan found him so far? Because ever since the U.S. operations in Afghanistan supported by Pakistan, and somehow not only Osama but also Mollah Omar, both ride off into the sunset and are never seen again. That’s where we started from. After that, I won’t take you through the whole thing, but the areas have been combed on the Pakistan side with a large number of troops. The same has been done by U.S. and Afghan forces on the Afghan side. There’s never been a sighting. There’s never been specific information. Interrogations have been carried out of a large number of people, and you don’t have any real lead. I think the reason, perhaps, is, one, difficulty of the terrain; two, perhaps, if he is not dead, his presence is in a very remote area somewhere in the north, which is a very difficult and very remote area. He’s either confined to a compound or some kind of area, not moving around much, and surrounded by people who are very loyal to him. Now, that’s what I can think of. I haven’t the foggiest idea where he is.

QUESTIONER: [Inaudible.] Thank you for your comments about our outsourcing of our al Qaeda problem to you.

QUESTIONER: I’m Christine Fair from USIP. Watching the public opinion polls in Pakistan and the United States raises a number of questions. As you know, our operations in Afghanistan, the preposterous situation that we’re in in Iraq, and a lot of other policies have generated a lot of anti-U.S. sentiment within Pakistan. So to what extent has this domestic attitude in Pakistan constrained the Musharraf government? And what sort of advice would you have for the United States in terms of managing the perception of America within Pakistan? You talked a lot about managing Pakistan’s perception here, but we’ve got the opposite mirror problem in Pakistan.

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: Frankly, I think as the U.S. moves toward some kind of conclusions in Afghanistan, the elections there have gone well. That has had good blow-back in Pakistan. As they’re moving toward selecting cabinet members, the recent move by President Karzai to sort of differentiate between the bad and the good Taliban and try to bring the good ones into the fold, I think, all this is having an effect. Public opinion is changing on that. And I think as you reach a conclusion and make further progress in Afghanistan with rebuilding activities, government control, and so on, it will change further.

The perception of U.S. in Pakistan, you know, it depends on who you talk to. The people who understand what is going on in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, know that we are perhaps following policies which are extremely important for us and we have opted for directions to which there is no alternative at the moment. So that is understood.

But to answer your question, I would say that once we have good trade arrangements coming in, free trade agreement or trade and investment framework, once we have bilateral investment initiative with the U.S., and the U.S. comes in on the economic and social sector, where things work to reduce poverty and directly impact the common man, I think public opinion will change very rapidly.

QUESTIONER: Mike Miyazawa with The Miyazawa Report. My question is about your relationship with the United States. Soon after the withdrawal of Soviet troops out of Afghanistan back in 1989, the United States decided to use the Pressler amendment not only to discontinue all the aid, but also refused for several years to return hundreds of millions of dollars Pakistan had paid to the United States to buy U.S.-made jet fighters. And in 1998, the United States used the Glenn amendment to impose additional sanctions. But everything changed after 9/11 and most of the sanctions have been lifted.

So it appears to me that a chaotic and unstable Afghanistan works in your favor as far as your relationship with the United States is concerned. My question is if Osama bin Laden is captured or killed and stability prevails throughout Afghanistan, do you think U.S. aid and cooperation will continue, or it will be discontinued and sanctions will resume?

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: That’s something which bothers a lot of people in Pakistan. But I didn’t want to go into the historical aspect. But over the years that we have worked with the U.S., it has been a learning process. Believe me.

[Laughter.]

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: The recently declassified White House documents on the relationship in the ’50s, when the relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. was very strongly oriented toward the Cold War, now bring out that at that time, Pakistan was getting state-of-the-art equipment from the United States. In fact, many of the army’s branches which are now stable and progressing were raised with U.S.-support at that time, were started with U.S. support at that time. Now, when you read those documents, you find the Americans saying “we gave all this equipment to Pakistan not to go to war with India but to help in the Cold War with the United States”. Yet we went into the ’65 war because Pakistan had a different perception. So there were different perceptions. Something that the U.S. was doing in its own interest, they thought in Pakistan that this is for us and we can do what we like. So we transited from that into, I think, a better understanding.

Also, I think we’ve learned a lot–I’m not being critical, but learned a lot on the sort of convoluted process that things follow here in the United States, through the Congress and through various laws that are invoked at particular times. And that gives us an understanding of where the Pressler amendment and the Glenn/Symington amendment and all these things come from.

Having said that–and Strobe used to be the one pressuring us all the time–we had to do certain things; we did those things, because there was our national security at stake. So U.S. pressure or no pressure, what had to be done was done. And of course we faced the consequences. But I think I might say that so much has been learned by us, and hopefully the U.S. also has a sense of our security compulsions, that I don’t see that sort of drastic thing happening again–and I think so because, this time, it’s not a zero-sum relationship and it doesn’t have a Soviet or other orientation. It is bilateral relations which stand on their own with Pakistan and with India, and not to the exclusion of either. So that’s why I see a future in this relationship.

QUESTIONER: I’m Barry Jacobs from the Asia and Pacific Rim Institute of the American Jewish Committee. General Musharraf, before he visited President Bush in Crawford, Texas, about a year and a half ago, threw out the prospect of Pakistan perhaps recognizing the State of Israel. Now that there is movement–we hope–in the peace process, under what circumstances, or what would be the conditions for Pakistan to formally acknowledge and establish a relationship with Israel?

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: Yes. You know, there is a stance that Pakistan has on this issue. It’s not so much to do with Pakistan-Israel as it has to do with the whole Israel-Palestine thing. And I think to really get a sense of where it’s going and what could happen, one, you’ll have to understand the public opinion and the way it has to be turned around if ever this is going to happen; and secondly, I think the Israel-Palestine thing has to move on a more positive track than it has had so far, and then maybe this could be considered.

QUESTIONER: Marvin Kalb with the Shorenstein Center at Harvard. Mr. Ambassador, could you help us better understand the role that Dr. Khan played in either selling or sending nuclear materials to Libya, North Korea? And specifically, was there any material sent to Iran, and was there any relationship with the Pakistani government?

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: I think this whole thing has been discussed and so much written on it in the media. But on the specifics that you asked, taking your last point first, there was no government sanction, approval, or any kind of government connection with what went on. That’s one. The other is, I think the U.S. has had enormous access to everything in Libya. The same is not the case with North Korea and Iran, because I don’t think you have that kind of access there.

I think it was the existence of an international network which involved a number of countries, many areas, many people, and that Dr. Khan was perhaps plugged into that network to get what was required and to do what he did. I think domestically Pakistan has resolved that problem; carried out an investigation, settled it domestically. But as for the international network, I think, work has to be done on that to discover exactly what is in Iran or what went into Iran and to discover what happened with North Korea.

And I think that is an ongoing process which is now picking up as the focus shifts to the international network.

QUESTIONER: Lena Avani [sp] with National Public Radio. What are the prospects for the United States selling F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan? And when President Musharraf was here week before last, did he receive any indications from President Bush that this is actually going to happen?

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: If he did, he hasn’t told anybody. But having said that, I think it would be a mistake in our relationship with the U.S. to lock onto a particular item and make it sort of a focal point for everything in our relationship. I would say that the U.S. will make its own assessment of Pakistan’s defense requirements and capability that they want Pakistan to have. I would very much hope that there is convergence on this assessment between what the U.S. thinks and what we think. And if a high-tech aircraft fits into that, we would be very interested.

QUESTIONER: Jiten Donat [ph], [inaudible] University. Mr. Ambassador, we heard you talk about, in the context of the eastern borders of Pakistan, U.N. presence. We also heard the word “flexibility.” Some time ago, President Musharraf had indicated that Pakistan was willing to look at other options than plebiscite and, presumably, the old U.N. resolutions. How does your statement square with what he had said earlier? Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: I think that ties in with that. Not only did he say that we could look at options, but he even offered an option quite recently, which wasn’t really seriously considered anywhere. I think a lot of these options–before we actually decide to veer away from stated positions, a lot of these options need to be debated, discussed, brought on the table. And it’s only then that you can say that, okay, we can move here, we can move there. So I think when he talks of flexibility, he’s talking about it in the sense of looking at options, examining them, and discussing them–bilaterally and domestically.

QUESTIONER: Joel Wishingrad, World Media Reports, WMR News.
What is your ongoing negotiations with India concerning Kashmir, and when will both countries–being yourselves as well as they–begin to put infrastructure monies into commercial type ventures as well as the infrastructure that you need throughout your country? And what are those prospects?

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: India, Pakistan have opted for a composite dialogue, which is in progress. It’s moving ahead by fits and starts. There is some, I think, disappointment on the Pakistan side that perhaps the element of reciprocity in the talks is not being fully brought in, which I think is necessary for these talks to move forward. But having said that, I think they cover a wide range of subjects, and they are, from the subcontinent’s standards, progressing well.

On the commercial ventures, the very fact that these talks are continuing and showing the potential of getting institutionalized into some kind of peace process, it’s a great achievement in the subcontinent. And on the commercial ventures, I would say that there is legal trade between India and Pakistan. I think about 86 items, have been added to the list recently to increase the scope of the trade. I also know that there’s an illegal trade between India and Pakistan which is many times more than the legal trade, and perhaps that has the potential of being brought into the legal trade to at least regularize it.

There is talk of joint ventures–high profile, high impact joint ventures–like energy pipelines coming in and going through Pakistan into India. There are enormous requirements of energy in India as well as in Pakistan. So those are there. I think they’re being discussed. Trade agreements are being discussed. The whole SAARC framework is being strengthened and more subjects brought in, including counterterrorism. So a lot is happening.

It’s difficult to say when something will definitely happen. But I would say everything seems to be pointing both countries in the right direction. And I hope they continue to follow that direction.

MR. COHEN: We have time for one more question. Ambassador Karamat has another appointment.

QUESTIONER: Al Milliken, affiliated with Washington Independent Writers.
As a nuclear power, do you think Pakistan has any significant difference of opinion with the United States in the responsibilities that entails. And also, do you see Pakistan having any special responsibility to Muslim nations that don’t have nuclear power?

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: As far as the United States is concerned, of course, there was a big difference of opinion before the nuclear tests and when Pakistan’s program was under development. We were under a lot of pressure. There were demands that we terminate, roll back, limit; various nuances to those demands. But after that, and especially after this proliferation episode, I think the U.S. and Pakistan are talking to each other on the subject. There is convergence. Pakistan has indicated its preference or agreement to be part of all regimes that will bring proliferation under control export controls and so on. So I don’t see any major difference of opinion there, except that the U.S. would like to see peace on the subcontinent so that there is no possibility of nuclear exchange or even conflict that could lead to nuclear exchange. So on that, Pakistan is totally with the U.S. We don’t want it either. I don’t think India would want it either.

So I would say there is convergence. There is no difference of opinion on the direction that it should take from now on. The past, of course, is something different.
You had another part to that question.

QUESTIONER: Regarding other Muslim nations.

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: Yeah, other Muslim nations. Well, this is a strategic asset which is Pakistani. It is under Pakistan’s control. And I don’t think Pakistan or any other country would want to share it or even indicate that it has got any other purpose except for Pakistan’s security.

MR. COHEN: Let me thank Ambassador Karamat for joining us. This is his first appearance in Washington. You know, among other things, I’m a military historian and I’ve met many generals, mostly retired, in the past. When I met then-General Karamat, when he was army chief in Pakistan, I was impressed by his breadth of his understanding of the issues and problems facing Pakistan and the region. And I thought to myself, here’s a general who really could fit into any army in the world and do well. Because he not only understood the military professional aspects of these issues, but the social and political context in which his army operated.

I’m very pleased that you’ve now changed the nature of your public service. You’ve become an ambassador, and I think you’ll be a very effective one. Let me extend an invitation now, when you leave your ambassadorship to come back to Brookings. Because we’d like to have you back here again. With that, let me thank you again for joining us.

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: Thank you very much.

Indian Journalist:

Pakistan lays down the agenda for the US
By Seema Sirohi

WASHINGTON – Pakistan, the United States’ premier ally in the “war on terrorism”, has laid down the agenda for the Bush administration for the next four years on what it expects in exchange for continued cooperation to hunt down al-Qaeda.

On the menu is a slew of demands, ranging from continued economic aid to a generous flow of weapons. But above all is the expectation of a long-term relationship, especially in light of what Washington is building with India under the title of the “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership”.

Jehangir Karamat, Pakistan’s new ambassador in Washington, wants no less. He, in fact, chose to dub his first public speech “Next Steps” too, articulating Pakistan’s hopes and desires for a partnership that will endure beyond the capture of Osama bin Laden. “We seek sustained and enhanced engagement so that gains continue to be consolidated and pushed further,” he said at a well-attended speech in Washington last week.

But what was noted by observers was the language he used to deliver the message. He sounded more like a teacher telling a pupil the level of performance he expected from the Americans, said diplomatic observers. He seemed to be drawing a clear parallel between payment and delivery, which led to questions whether the changes in policy that Pakistan has pursued post-September 11, 2001, have been made because they are good for Pakistan, or because they bring US arms and aid.

The administration of President George W Bush is currently in the process of dispensing US$3 billion in economic and military aid, apart from having written off nearly $2 billion in Pakistani debt. An arms package approved by Congress worth $1.2 billion includes eight P-3C naval reconnaissance planes, 2,000 TOW missiles, and other weapons, which has raised serious concerns in New Delhi because they counter specific Indian capabilities. New Delhi has told Washington that large-scale delivery of arms to Pakistan will jeopardize the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan.

But Karamat, a former chief of army staff, said that the US largess, both monetary and material, “must” continue. He turned India’s reasons for opposing the weapons package on its head, arguing that it is the United States’ “tilt” toward India that makes peace in South Asia elusive.

“The conventional defense capability must continue to be built up because an unacceptable tilt in the balance of power makes meaningful India-Pakistan dialogue difficult,” Karamat declared.

Among other “musts” for Washington to carry out are a free-trade agreement, or alternative arrangements, and bilateral investment initiatives in Pakistan to “influence public opinion”. “US support must continue to give us access to international financial institutions,” Karamat added.

“The US support for Pakistan’s counter-terrorism effort must continue and capabilities must continue to be enhanced. We need to work with the US to change perceptions based on past happenings and create perceptions based on current policies and future projections,” he said. As for his side of the bargain, Karamat said that “Pakistan will of course continue to address US concerns. The present cooperative and unambiguous relationship will help to do this as everything is on the table.”

Karamat’s categorical tone left some US officials a little embarrassed, for they are not used to ambassadors laying down the line in Washington. “Even Tony Blair’s ambassador won’t use that tone in public,” said one observer. Some others said that Pakistan prescribing the agenda was a case of the tail wagging the dog.

Meanwhile, what surprised some was Karamat’s dismissive tone about the A Q Khan affair, which he labeled a “proliferation episode” while denying any government complicity in it. “There was no government sanction, approval, or any kind of government connection with what went on,” he said flatly. But Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, in his 11-page confession reported in the US press in February, named Karamat, former chief of army staff General (retired) Mirza Aslam Beg and President General Pervez Musharraf as the men on top who were aware of what was going on. As the chief of army staff from 1996-98, Karamat was directly responsible for the safety and security of the nuclear program.

But Karamat declined to elaborate how something so big could happen on his watch, saying that too much had already been written about the Khan affair.

Karamat’s main objective in the speech appeared to be to move the debate in Washington from Pakistan’s past to Pakistan’s future and Washington’s commitment. He said Pakistanis are worried that they will never be let off the hook, because the past is always being dredged up to color policy.

Even though the Bush administration has embraced Pakistan as a key and indispensable ally in its “war on terrorism” and publicly defended Musharraf on every issue – from the Khan affair to the re-emergence of the Taliban to his refusal to relinquish his post as army chief as promised – the US media and many congressmen and senators have repeatedly raised questions about Pakistan’s commitment to the United States. Editorials in respected newspapers have questioned the reliability of Pakistan as an ally, and whether the US is giving Musharraf a pass despite the many problems.

It is Karamat’s job to change this perception, and he took a big leap forward with his first speech. Crafted well and delivered with ease, he presented Pakistan, its role and its indispensability to Washington with flair, said many in the audience.

He said Pakistan had changed “strategic directions” and is now suffering the consequences. “From a policy of active interference and destabilization of Afghanistan, Pakistan is working with the US for a stable and friendly Afghanistan. From a policy of hostility and confrontation with India, Pakistan now has a policy of dialogue and conflict resolution. From a policy of appeasement and political expediency with extremist religious elements, Pakistan has moved to confronting them to end their negative influence and activities. From a clandestine nuclear program with proliferation consequences, Pakistan has moved to a regime of command, control and international cooperation,” he said, giving an overview of the “new” Pakistan in progress.

“This is a major strategic reorientation of the country. And, as in all such strategic turnarounds, there is a price to be paid. This price is paid in terms of the blowback, the resistance and the retaliation to the changes.”

Reaction to Karamat’s presentation was mixed. His host, senior South Asia analyst Stephen Cohen, was full of praise for his candor. “I had never heard a Pakistani official so systematically and bluntly go over the errors of past governments, including one in which they served. Of course his government, and the army, did things that were wrong at the time, and have come to regret, but Pakistan officials have promulgated a new benchmark that the world can hold them to. This is not trivial,” said Cohen.

But others, speaking on background, were more critical of Karamat’s rosy picture. One US official who is familiar with South Asian issues said the ambassador’s storyline was overly optimistic.

Regardless, there is little doubt that the US-Pakistan partnership is fraught with potholes that will take more than a smart presentation to fill up.

Seema Sirohi is a Washington-based correspondent.

SEEMA SIROHI was born in Delhi. She completed her bachelor’s degree in English literature from St Stephen’s College and joined Jawaharlal Nehru University for a master’s in Sociology. She went on to study journalism at the University of Kansas, Lawrence, and returned to India to pursue a career. She joined the New Delhi Bureau of the Associated Press, covering major stories of the day, including Indira Gandhi’s assassination, the Bhopal gas leak;, the militancy in Punjab and Kashmir and India’s intervention in Sri Lanka.

She moved to Washington in 1988 and joined Inter Press Service for a year where wrote about US policy towards Asia and Africa. She became the Washington correspondent for The Telegraph in 1989, writing political stories, analytical pieces and tracking the difficult relationship between India and the United States for eight years.

She also lived in Eastern Europe for three years while the region was undergoing historic changes after the fall the Berlin Wall. She wrote articles from Prague, Bratislava, Vienna and Budapest.

She returned to India for three years and researched for the book titled “Sita’s Curse”.

F104. But US forced the plane to become a winner.

Never ending story… Can’t we just go beyond this plane :rolleyes:

Pakistani group counters Indian-initiated move on F-16s
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_25-12-2004_pg7_31
By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: A newly-formed Pakistani lobbying group has tried to counter moves initiated by the Indian-American community to block the possible sale of F-16s to Pakistan.

A letter sent by Faiz Rehman, executive director of the Pakistani American Liaison Centre, to members of the India Caucus in US Congress argues that it is a mistake to link Pakistan with the independent relationship between India and the United States. India, he writes, enjoys a huge advantage over Pakistan in conventional weapons. Its military is armed to the teeth with weapons supplied by its Cold War era friend, the former Soviet Union. India to date continues to spend a significant portion of its national budget on buying conventional weapons from Russia and other places in the world to increase its already clear edge over Pakistan, it adds.

According to the letter, even if reports that Pakistan is going to get the aircraft it seeks are correct, this will in no way affect the existing imbalance in conventional arms between the two countries. It argues that it is not right for a lobbying group to attack US ties with a third country, in this case, Pakistan, nor should it try to undermine the actions of Congress or condemn the policies of the President of the United States, especially when those policies enjoy congressional support. It calls the Indian effort “inherently anti-Pakistan” and in stark contrast to the Intelligence Reform and Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2004 which was overwhelmingly passed by Congress and signed by the President. It reminds the US lawmakers that the Act has recommended to the Bush administration to ensure long-term engagement with Pakistan and continue to provide it with military and economic assistance.

The letter underscores Pakistan’s importance to Washington, the vital role it is playing and the huge sacrifices made its people and soldiers have made in the war on terror. “The smear campaign against Pakistan and its citizens initiated by the India Caucus co-chair is extremely unfair and negative, to say the least. It does not deserve support from members of Congress,” the letter stresses.

It has nothing to do with economics. Anything that might be negative to one side is seen as wrong. I pass to accept those rules. And about understanding finance. Have been dealing three years stock options and index options on most majour indices. Don’t think that the student upstairs have to teach me lessons. Specially if I said that I explained that I used tghe graph for only comparisation of the economic indicator. Somehow internet kids think they can make the world like they want. Let me finish the conclusions. Pakistani economy is recovering. It was undervalued but now it is showing progress and there is enough money to buy or build decent products. Period.

Well, we all have some language problems. I don’t see any fun in using difficult words to make it look more intresting or even to offend others. Let us skip that language part cause it the forum is not UK only. It is usual one side that makes remarks about language if there are not other reasons left.

Indices don’t say anything at all if I listen to your remark. There are several kind of indices so if you wanna talk about that then I can open my CFA books and explain you the basics. All I wanted to show is that the Karachi Stock Exchange, one of the most important economic indicator for Pakistan, is showing positive results. The economy is extremely recovering. Several hundred %… If you wanna compare to that to others then it is even the best performing in the world. So, after decades of not buying they have enough potential (I think you do know that there are plenty state owned companies in Pakistan, dividend or the selling of state owned companies in better economical climate made Pakistani state richer) so the very often Indian argument (that Pakistan is poor and not able to fund that is why is gets sometimes for free) is just a sentiment or PR from the neighbour. To show the relationship with that nation I used their important indicator. We often hear from this nation that it is superb performing. Then I hink it is an honour to be compared with it.

I do know that it is more shares and market value but you do know that it is not value weighted, don’t you? Let us move back cause none is intrested in economy here.

btw I could have used Nasdaq, Dow Jones, S&P, Nikkei225, FTSE100 but that was not the most related to Pakistan… Enjoy the ride sir, :cool:.

It (new italian cockpit) does look fine to me. Certainly compared to the old pics we have seen. About PAF getting Chinese avionics, just to get the plane faster and stimulate Chinese to buy it. Besides that they secure SD-10 technology. I think they are trying to get better avionics and with TOT. So they will gradually improve PAF JF17 without Chinese input. Besides that they can offer the high end JF17 for export.