BlackArcherBlackArcherBlackArcherThink of it this way – what exactly is the primary threat profile for the Philippine Air Force? And then examine which airplanes fit that role and are then affordable. The Gripen C is a lot more capable than the FA-50 for sure, but its a lot costlier too and that is something that any small air force will have to worry about. And a FA-50 can, like the T-50TH (Thai variant) perhaps perform the role of a LIFT as well, which is a useful capability for smaller air forces that may find it too costly to buy dedicated fighters in large numbers.
the FA-50 versus the Gripen C will always result in the Gripen C out-performing the FA-50, but what does the PAF’s threat profile include? Fighting off hordes of PLAAF or PLANAF fighter jets? Or being able to carry out long range CAP and reconnaissance missions over the hundreds of islands of the Philippines and disputed islands in the South China Sea? Being able to attack surface warships from a stand-off distance? I think that anti-shipping missile capability would be extremely valueable to the PAF and there, the Gripen C has a clear advantage with the RBS-15, whereas the FA-50 would need to get in close and use AGM-65 Mavericks.
Anti-radiation missile capability may be a useful capability- even though the PAF is unlikely to go over land into enemy territory and take down radar stations, they may in the future need to deal with China building artificial islands and putting up no-fly zones around those islands thanks to mobile radar installations with SAM batteries.
Tejas Mk1 is affordable and would bring in more Gripen C level capability than the FA-50, but it needs to mature a bit and that will take some more time. the IAF has now invested in the type and will make sure that it is going to be a very capable 4th gen light fighter. But for an export to be successful needs a lot of other things to work out and that I don’t see happening any time soon.
Used F-16s, like the ones that the Indonesian AF procured, are not cheap and won’t last anything like 13,000 hours. the Indonesian upgrade cost ~$32 million apiece and will give the jets another 15 years worth of flying life.
BlackArcherIf you zoom in the Egypt Mig-29M2’s middle wings, you will see them look like a 2-piece-wing, not complete (1-piece) wing. Even thought they fix the wing, 2-piece-wing will not be strong like 1-piece-wing.
The MiG-29M2 did not retain the wing fold mechanism from the MiG-29K/KUB. Neither did the MiG-35.
BlackArcherThe Gnat was a terrific little fighter, nearly unbeatable in close combat thanks to its tiny size and light weight, but it was a jet that gave the IAF real nightmares as far as its problems were concerned. It was inducted into the IAF as an extremely immature and untested fighter and the IAF had to learn its faults the hard way, suffering quite a few crashes as a result. But it was also much loved, earning the nickname ‘Sabre Slayer’ due to the number of PAF Sabre jets that were shot down by Gnat pilots in the 1965 and 1971 wars.
As to its flaws, here’s one
One also had to be familiar with the “Gun Dip” system of the Gnat. This was a novel phenomenon of the Gnat, whereby, when you fired your guns above 15,000 feet, the engine was automatically throttled back for a few seconds. The reason was that the guns were mounted just outside the intakes on both sides of the aircraft. And, when the guns were fired at higher power settings, above 1000 feet altitude, the engine could surge and flame out!! So, one had to remember to put the “Gun Dip” switch “On” if you were expecting to do air combat above that altitude and be prepared for the reduction in power, perhaps at crucial times.
But check out its amazing performance versus the Hawker Hunter. Put the Hunter to shame as far as its climb rate went.
Incidentally, we could “Scramble” (Start up and take off) within 45 seconds, from cockpit readiness and in one and a half minutes if were in the underground readiness room. This has never been achieved by any type of aircraft in the World. The timing for the Mig-21 was two and half minutes from cockpit readiness and it was very similar for other Eastern and Western fighters.Throughout my first tenure in the squadron, we flew without drop tanks and we were cocks of the walk. We had three hunter squadrons on the base. I would tell their commanders that they could take up their formations and call me after take off. After acknowledging their call, from my office where I had an aircraft radio installed, I would walk out to my aircraft and wait for them at 40, 000 feet!! I did this repeatedly and later on would wait for them with a pair of aircraft!! What made it more humiliating was that we would spot them early and, being used to sighting camouflaged Hunters, they would not spot the tiny silver Gnats till we were in firing range!! They were a very chastened lot. They didn’t realize that it took only 20 seconds to start up a Gnat, we took off from the short runway, from the intersection, about 500 yards from my office and dispersal and that we reached 40000 feet in 6 minutes. They would be climbing laboriously in formation to get to that height and the Hunter with drop tanks, in formation could take upto 15 minutes to get there.
Most of the senior ‘Hot’ pilots in other squadrons just would not believe us when we talked about the power/weight ratio of 1 and the ‘run away’ performance of the Gnat. But one by one they flew the Gnat and came back shaken men because they were not prepared for it. Great pilots like Bharat Singh, Omi Taneja etc were in that lot and their experience was aptly put by Mickey Blake in an e-mail years later, who said “The little ****** ran away with me and I was at 30,000 feet before I caught my breath”.
We took part in the annual Armament meet in December, 1960 and to the surprise of everybody, including ourselves won the air to ground gunnery trophy. We were competing against the Hunters, a very steady platform compared to the jittery Gnat!! They had four guns and could ‘spot’ harmonize, which we couldn’t. But I was first and Jatar was second.
Jatar, Baldy Mehta and I went for conversion training to Kanpur where a Handling Flight had been established to fly the Gnat and write out the Flight Operating Manual etc. It was commanded by Sqn Ldr Mally Wollen and had Sqn Ldr Sudhakaran, my close friend and test pilot, and Flt Lt VK Singh, who later on joined my squadron when the Handling flight finished its work. I flew the Gnat for the first time on 5th February 1960 (IE1072).
“The little ******” as Mickey Blake called it years later, was all that Mally and Sudha had told me about and more. It just ran away with one. By the time you got the nose wheel off the ground, you were airborne and seconds later, when one raised the undercarriage, the pitch up was so sudden and the power was so great that one seemed to be going into orbit. No pilot that I know could trim the aircraft on the first sortie to the recommended climb speed because it was so unbelievably steep. Added to that was the fact that the nose was so much above the horizon that nobody could continue a straight climb comfortably and had to dip the wing and turn, to see if the ground was still there.
It was an amazing aircraft. We could take off in about 500-600 yards and land in about 800 yards.. We could just pull back on the stick after unsticking and it wouldn’t stall but do a roll off the top or loop as you wanted!! We didn’t do this but Wg Cdr ‘Dasu’ Das, the test pilot who had grown with the progenitor of the Gnat, The Midge, and now commanded A&ATU, did quite frequently when he was asked to do a display. He visited us at Ambala often from Kanpur to see if we were getting on OK. He was so avuncular and would readily put on an impromptu air display to the thrill of the entire station.
When you got into the cockpit for the first time, you felt that there were a lot things missing. There was no flap lever, no airbrake switch, no fancy air conditioning controls, no rear view mirror like the Hunter etc. There were a few unusual things like the lever for splitting the tail in an emergency, a lever for streaming the tail parachute and a lever for emergency jettisoning of the canopy. Many were the people who split the tail when they wanted to release the tail parachute and, years later, somebody jettisoned the canopy trying to split the tail!! There was this very small magic lever that operated the under carriage, drooped the ailerons to act as flaps and stuck the undercarriage halfway to act as the ‘dive-brake’!!
BlackArcherRTAF receives its 2 T-50THs finally
KUALA LUMPUR—Two Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) T-50s light trainers finally have been delivered to the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) after a delay caused by damage suffered in bad weather.
The aircraft arrived at the RTAF’s Takhli base in Nakhon Sawan province, 240 km (140 mi) northwest of Bangkok, on Jan. 25, 17 days after they left South Korea for the ferry flight.
Just a few hours before they were supposed to land in Tahkli on Jan. 11 the T-50s were forced to abort to Kuantan airport, on the east coast of the Malaysian peninsula. The crews had encountered difficulties after flying through severe weather over the South China Sea.Checks on the ground showed that the single engine of each aircraft had suffered slight damage. The RTAF demanded replacement engines.
RTAF commander Air Chief Marshal Johm Rungswang, who took delivery of the trainers, confirmed that KAI had fitted the new engines, according to the Bangkok Post newspaper.
The other two aircraft from the 2015 order are expected to be delivered in March as scheduled, Johm says. Thailand designates these aircraft as T-50THs. Although they will be used for training, they are fitted with radars and wired for weapons, giving the capabilities of the FA-50 light-attack version of the T-50.
Eight more T-50s, worth $258 million, were ordered in July 2017; deliveries are expected by 2020. T-50s will replace Thailand’s L-39 trainers, which also operate from Tahkli.
BlackArcherThanks for those pics TR1. The MiG-35 looks beautiful. What radar on board? Zhuk-M?
And what is that sensor next to the nose mounted FLIR? MAWS?
BlackArcherBad news for KAI. Looks very likely that Indonesia may withdraw from the KF-X program due to budgetary issues. Meanwhile, there are reports that Indonesia is looking at Western options for its next fighter jet, reportedly the F-16V and Typhoon at this time, with Rafale and Gripen E likely to join the fray. And 11 Su-35s about to be bought as well.
KUALA LUMPUR, SEOUL—Budgetary pressures could force Indonesian withdrawal from the Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) KF-X fighter program, depriving it of funds and the endorsement of a second operator.
If Indonesia does not quit the KF-X entirely, it may take a smaller role.
Jakarta is behind in its monetary contributions. The finance ministry has refused to authorize a payment of $124.5 million due at the end of 2017 for the program, known in Indonesia as IF-X.
The issue is attracting a high-level response. The Republic of Korea Air Force said on Jan. 17 that its chief of staff, Gen. Lee Wang-kuen, had traveled to Jakarta in January to talk to the head of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, Air Chief Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto, about the program.
Indonesia will indeed pull out of its 20% share of the KF-X, says an Indonesian industry source who has spoken to government officials on the subject. And Evan A. Laksmana, a senior researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, regards Indonesia’s continued participation as doubtful.
Indonesia, which has sent engineers to the program as well as earlier funding installments, reportedly had planned to buy 50 KF-Xs. South Korea’s requirement is for 120. Development of the initial version is supposed to be complete in 2026.
Jakarta’s KF-X contributions are due twice a year, but the Indonesian parliament heard in October that the finance ministry had rejected the defense ministry’s request for the next payment, of $124.5 million. The money still has not been paid, and the KF-X is not even in the 2018 defense budget.
Laksmana points out that Indonesia’s procurement budget is tight, only $1-2 billion annually, and the total allocation for the military in 2018 has fallen to $7.98 billion this year, from $8.17 billion in 2017. Yet the problem goes beyond money. The Indonesian Air Force is politically unpopular because of a corruption investigation resulting from an unauthorized acquisition of a Leonardo AW101 helicopter. The industry source and Laksmana both point to that issue as a factor.
South Korean industry officials are looking for a way to keep Indonesia in KF-X, South Korean sources say. One option must be to reduce the partner’s role and therefore their contribution. Seoul would have to pay more, but at least the program would keep the endorsement of a second operator. South Korea’s parliament authorized the launch of the KF-X program in late 2015 on the understanding that KAI could export it, a challenging prospect for a new entrant in the combat aircraft market.
Even before Indonesia’s withdrawal became a serious risk, the KF-X already looked likely to exceed Seoul’s budget. Development of the twin-engine aircraft, with an empty weight of more than 11 metric tons (24,000 lb.), has a programmed cost of 8.7 trillion won ($8.1 billion); Indonesia’s share is 1.7 trillion won. But the total has been criticized in the South Korean parliament as improbably low.
Development of the Lockheed Martin F-35, an aircraft not much larger than the KF-X but somewhat more sophisticated and using a new engine, was estimated in December 2015 to cost $55.1 billion.
If Indonesia stays in the program it will presumably have to shoulder its share of cost overruns.
Withdrawal would yield funds for more immediate acquisitions. They could include a batch of Western fighters that Indonesia is negotiating for.
BlackArcherThing about Australian Mirages is that their safety record is as bad as Luftwaffe F-104 – 36% losses.
Thanks for the link. Wasn’t aware that the RAAF lost 42 Mirage IIIs out of a total of 116. The breakdown of the reasons for the losses helps to understand the reasons behind such a high attrition rate. Engine failure, loss of control input and undercarriage malfunction were the top 3 reasons for accidents with the fleet.
Pilot error isn’t blamed for any of these losses, but I guess the accident reports may have given more details into the specific reasons for each of the losses. Only the collision and landing accidents seem to be obvious pilot error related accidents.
42 losses as a percentage of the total fleet of 116
18 engine failure 15.5%
11 loss of control and impact 9.48%
6 undercarriage malfunction 5.17%
3 landing accident 2.58%
3 collision with another aircraft 2.58%
1 tyre failure 0.86%
42 lost equals 36.2% of fleet
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