some variaints of The mossie i think were fitted with a nose mounted 57mmm mollins gun, a similar caliber was also fitted to the B25….

The most bizzare has to be the a flamethrower on the rear end of a Ju88 (or was it a Do217)

The ‘cannon’ fitted to the B-25 was a 75mm! 😮

I think the flamethrower was mounted in the tail of a Do17.

As has been said there is a photo of it being tested in flight in ‘The Hardest Day’ by Dr Price that covers the 18th August 1940 (when the aircraft in question was shot-down).

Israeli P-51 Mustang ‘ECM’ Flights

Surely the most ingenious, cost-effective and hair-raising ‘armament’ must go to the Israeli Air Force P-51 Mustangs.

During one of the Arab-Israeli conflicts these were deliberately flown through the wires of the desert telephone lines! 😮

Ah, really? I know there was a second sub down there apart from Conqueror, but I’ve sadly neglected my RN/Falklands reading. Why could the 25th May not have been hit? Surely she was out there for long enough, and her location was pretty well known, as recounted by e.g. Ward re the recce mission carried out by 801 Sq that picked up radar emissions from the Argentine carrier group.
Regards, hps

IIRC there were actually three nuclear submarines in or around the Total Exclusion Zone at the time the Belgrano was torpedoed (and these were joined by a single conventional diesel-electric submarine later).

I think that many people would be surprised that during that critical time only the Belgrano was actually being shadowed by one of the three nuclear submarines. It is one of the main reasons that she was sunk.

I’m sure also that the British ‘let slip’ the fact that there were three (or more) nuclear submarines in or around the TEZ and that helped to convince the Argentine Navy to stay in port once the Belgrano was sunk.

Sorry, didn’t have time to actually go through the Wiki page to correct my mistake! :rolleyes:

No criticism intended. I just wanted to highlight the appalling decision this young man had to make.

And the Lancaster gunner falling out of his aircraft, sans chute, and surviving.

He didn’t fall out…he jumped out!

Perhaps too much to hope for? They did staggeringly well as it is. I don’t think anyone has ever denigrated the Blackbuck missions in terms of logistics, navigation and bombing accuracy, which exemplified the highest standards of the RAF.

Agreed. I’m certainly not denigrating the skill or bravery of the Black Buck crews. Luck aside I’m sure they did as well as anybody could given the equipment they were using.

But to return rather pedantically to the theme of this thread, I’d love to see some honest and/or authoritative anlaysis of the strategic/tactical VALUE of the raids: some attempt to assess the extent to which Blackbuck caused Argentina to transfer assets, change plans, show extra caution, and so on… AFAICS Sharkey Ward’s rough & ready assessment still makes sense.

Argentina never based Mirage, Dagger, Super Etendard or Skyhawk at Stanley airfield even though other combat aircraft were based there long before the Task Force arrived. To me that says they never intended to.

While the British were keen to close the airfield the Argentines were desperate to keep it open…and keep it open they did.

However ‘open’ is a relative term. From 1st May to 14th June only about 50% of the C-130 Hercules transport flights managed to land the rest were turned back by Sea Harrier activity (or the weather) and when they did get in loading/unloading was conducted (mostly) during darkness with engines running.

The combination of Black Buck and Sea Harrier bombing together with naval shelling must have made life very difficult at Stanley airfield and the ‘cost’ to the Task Force of the Black Buck operations was exactly zero…no aircraft or aircrew risked, redeployed or lost…no fuel or bombs used…no negative effect at all.

Vulcan Bombing Technique

A ‘textbook’ runway cutting bombing profile was used.

The Vulcan attack heading was 235° selected to be at 30° to the runway at Stanley (approximately 265°).

The bombs were dropped (at 0.25 second intervals) to impact at 50 yard intervals so twenty-one bombs should cover about 1000 yards from the first to the last (in five seconds).

The aim was to put the middle bomb in the middle of the runway but we now know the first bomb landed on the edge of the runway almost exactly at its mid-point.

However from the post-raid photos it always looks to me like there would be more chance of success if the attack angle across the runway had been less (maybe 15°).

Incoming!!! 😮 (expecting hostile posts.)

I’ve just read Commander Sharkey Wards excellent book, “Sea Harrier over the Falklands”…

It took, in his estimation, 1.1 MILLION pounds of fuel to get those first 21 bombs near their intended target (which incidentally) could have been repaired within 24 hours.

He also states that with the same amount of fuel, his Sea Harrier force (801 Sqn) could have delivered 1300 bombs a damn sight more accurately.

Putting the runway out of use (to all types of aircraft) was a major aim of the British during the war.

The Sea Harriers of 800 Squadron, nine of them, did attack Port Stanley airfield in daylight after the first Vulcan attack. They attacked with cluster bombs.

Presumably if they had thought that they could do significant damaged the runway itself they would have tried to do so.

The Sea Harriers never tried an attack on this scale again and the runway continued to be used until the very last hours of the conflict.

I can only think that the Sea Harriers were unable (or unlikely) to damage the runway or that it wasn’t worth the risk of losing them trying to.