In his recent speech Chavez directly refered to US CVs having to stand further of from his coast line after the arrival of the Flankers, so that at least sugests that he’d be interested in long range anti-shipping missiles. No ASMs no real threat, right?

In my opinion, the greatest capacity gap in Venezuela right now is in the tanker, AWACS, long range maritime patrol and airborne Command-post area.

They should have bought the Brazilian R-99s years ago, before relations with the US flared up beyond the political “point of no return”…

Otherwise, a sizeable fleet of Midas/Mainstay aircreft is needed urgently. With them older aircraft such as the Mirage 5/50 could be given a new lease of life through the heavy use of military data-links.

Coments?

Hammer

I believe Fabe has a point. Of course the Venezuelan AF has no hope in hell of fighting and defeating some massive US air attack against the country.

But on the other hand the mere existence of Moskit equipped late model Su-30 may make the planning for such a campaign much more complicated thus much more expensive. Maybe two or three CVNs would be called upon instead of a single one, US costs would balloon tremendously this way.

Historically US military campaigns tend to take some 6 months just to get into full gear and that could make the cost/benefit calculations make any intervention a very bad deal. Let’s not forget that the US armed forces are heavily commited right now in Iraq, Afganistan, Korea and the far east, so the “full might” is dilluted.

Chavez is betting on that if his pilots get a lucky shot and sink a multibillion USD nuclear carrier the repercussions may be tremendous” Within South America, in US politics and it would certainly enbolden other possible military rivals such as Iran and NK.

This could even risk the american taxpayers’ confidence in the mighty 6000 sailor/airmen CVNs. It only tales on lucky shot… Argentinians managed to place some well placed jabs in 1982, Venezuelans might do it in 2007.

What would come afterwards, is another story! The size of the retaliatory attack following a sunk CVN would be massive, but maybe Chaves doesn’t believe the US will risk it! We’ll know it soon enough!

Comments

Hammer

P.S.: About further F-16 sales, what other South American country would buy F-16? Colombia is an easy answer. Argentina a much more unlikely candidate, no money and no great love for the US. Brazil might buy Sukhois, Eurofighters or Rafales, but I don’t see us buying F-16 any time soon. Peru is a classic French/Russian client, no F-16s there… Chile just bought their F-16C/D. Bolivia would never be allowed to buy US with Evo in power, Paraguay, Uruguay, Guyana, Suriname have no real airforce to be able to digest late version F-16s.

So, there we have it gents it’s just Colombia! 🙂

Hammer

great thoughts but the political aspect cannot be forgotten here.

a) If Bolivia intends to get back Acre State from Brazil and the coastal land in northern Chile, It needs an effective aggressive military force able to at least immobilise or deter those two countries….

b) Thus Brazil would never sell to Bolivia offensive armament that could in the end be used against itself. So forget (large fleets of) Super Tucanos and AMXs. On the other hand, selling them mere handfulls of airframes would not matter in the end ad give som Brazil some leverage on their use as well as some embargo capability.

c) The US still considers South America it’s “backyard” and would never allow a long lasting war to break loose there, if at least so there isn’t a huge refugee crisis that may push them to accept some of them due to world-wide political pressure. So in my opinion US-sourced equipment are a no-go even for major components as in the L-159 and Gripen. Israeli components are easily controled by the US government as seen recently in the Venezuelan F-16A upgrade boicott case.

d) Europe lacks a low price and medium tech offers to Bolivia’s needs and also would be quick to implement embargos in case of crisis… Definetly not a safe bet.

I’d place my bets in new equipement from either India, China or Russia. These countries may have vested interests in Bolivia’s oil/gas reserves and assorted mineral wealths. These planes can be flown in rather discretely inside An-124s and they also can spares hundreds if not thousands of “military consultants” to train and eventualy fly them (remember the Korean War?)

Some 60 J-10s/Mig-29SMTs with tons of smart weapons flown by foreigners might be enough to make a major mess in South America before the US is able to send their big guns in…

I disagree that air power would be secondary here, due to the barrier represented by the Andes range cutting Bolivia from north to south aircraft alone would be able to minimise this fisical restriction and simultaneously destroy Chilean and Brazilian advanced operating areas/airbases around the Bolivian borders. In Chile Antofagasta and Iquique Air Bases would be primary targets for runway denial the same way as as Campo Grande and Porto Velho Air Bases and Cuiabá and Corumbá’s civilian airports in Brazil

The swampy terrain in the Brazilian border to the south and the thick rainforest to the north of Bolivia would be natural barriers for enemy armour penetration. Mybe the grasslands in the Argentinian border would do… At the same time the Andes would effectively make it very hard for foreign tanks to reach La Paz at over 4000m above sea level. On the other hands the grasslands is where the economy resides, its there that lie the natural gas reserves and where Soybean farming and cattle ranching takes place.

AS ELP pointed above large numbers of sturdy Mi-17s and Mi-26 helicopters are vital to maintaining the logistics momento inside Bolivia and to place Special Forces units deep inside enemy territory mainly for sabotage action. UAVs and EW and AWACS platforms are now basic requirements even for Bolivia these days…

Comments?

Hammer

Hi guys!

Returning to the Brazilian Skyhawks theme for a while. 😉

a) The Brazilian Air Force was created in 1941 with the merger of the former Army and Naval Aviation units, pilots and mechanics and all their aircraft, no need to say this was done over these services rampant protests…
b) the Navy bought the Minas Gerais (A-11) in 1956 and delivered in 1960 after major upgrades in the Dutch Verolme Shipyards after seeing the good use the americans did with their carriers
c) The then still young Brazilian Air Force considered the purchase of the new carrier a major Navy provocation, a way to force the re-creation of the Naval fixed-wing Aviation force
d)The Navy acting alone without higher authorization bought T-28s Trojans attack planes and Pilatus PC-3 trainers for for pilot development for the the A-11
e) The Air Force for a number of months monitored the Navy’s aviation activities eventualy “denouncing” the creation of an “ilegal” Naval Air Station in São Pedro d’Aldeia near Rio. There were even cases of FAB fighters strafing Navy planes…
f)In 1965 the Brazilian president in order to end the inter-service crisis decreed that the all fixed wing planes onbord the Navy’s CV would be owned and operated by the Brazilian Air Force, Navy helicopters would be allowed on the carier and on the escorts’ helipads
g)The FAB only operated the Grumman Tracker ASW patrol aircraft from 1965 to their retirement in 1996 never deciding to field fighter planes on the A-11. No aircraft was ever planned by teh FAB to replace the Trackers due to lack of funds in the FAB budget…
h) Two years later the Navy obtained another presidential decree allowing it to operate fixed wing planes and immediately purchased the Kuwaiti Skyhawks

The Minas Gerais was very small by todays standards, very few aircraft could operate from it’s short flat top and anemic catapults. The boilers could nos accelerate the ship fast enough to launch newer model fighters. The Skyhawk was a compromise, cheap, limited in terms of military potential but just enough to get the naval aviation rolling with fixed wing fighters. Because of this purchase there was finally a reason for a number of pilots to be sent to Argentina and Uruguay for fixed wing basic school. The FAB now a fully mature force just ignored these navy moves.

The twist came in some years later with the bargain basement purchase of the Ex-Foch from the French Navy now this larger ship much faster could allow for larger and heavier planes such as the A-7 and Super Etandard, but mow the high cost of operating and manning the São Paulo was keeping the Aviation Arm from refurbishing and flying their A/F-1 fighters. The Navy had over twenty pilots and no planes for them to fly in. Unfortunately the size of the catpults, arestor wires and elevators in the São Paulo still limits the size of any future planes to under 20tons thus peventing the adoption of more modern aircraft such as the F-18, Su-33, and the Rafale… There are some plans in the bud for a nationally built and designed new generation CV (the “A-13”) but there is no money at all for this pipe dream.

Harriers have been repeatedly offered and discarded by the Brazilian Navy over the years as not to be forced by the politicians and the Air Force into a small and limited future STOBAR carrier design. The Bailian Navy never settled for anything other thn catapults and long deck.

The A/F-1 as they are today don’t carry any air to air radars Ja, some plans were discussed about applying the F-5BR upgraded cocpit and BVR missile system to the Navy Skyhawks but this too is being restrained by the lack of funds….

There you have it gents, the full story.

Any other doubt?

Regards,

Hammer

Gollevainen would you mind translating these two articles into English for the rest of us? 😉

Best Regards,

Hammer

Originally the French idea was to lease us the 2000s, but the Brazilian Air Force opted to outright purchase them.

As far as I know no Air Force ever bought fighter planes “cash upfront”, payments are always made in monthly or yearly instalments, so I ask you what then is the advantage of “leasing” versus “buying”? Why the KC-767 deal involved leasing some and buying later one some others, why was the leasing decision denounced as a bad deal for the Air Force as it would grow acquisition cost unjustifiably in the end?

If I recall correctly leasing has always been seen as a “rental” equivalent but different in the seller can book it as a real deffered payment sale. If in the end the plane isn’t bought by the lessee the lessor has to book the residual value of the leased items as an “unsale” or returned merchandise… If so the Lease contract can force the lessee to buy the gods in the end or not, if not the monthly instalments tend to be higher to account for the later return costs. Also these two governments involved may be under fiscal restrictions that today keep them from purchasing equipment but at the same time may have no problem with leasing equipment, who knows.

Whatever Cliff, if you are tired i’ll stop my reasoning here… ;|

Regards,

Hammer

P.S. I’m not a Gripen-basher, as I said before its a terrific plane and a great weapons platform, I only think that neither the Swedish Government, Flygvapnet or SAAB have the political power and the economic strength to make it a long lasting successful industrial program and international sales hit, comparable to the Eurofighter, the F-16, the F-35 and the Sukhoi Flanker… By the way right now I think the Rafale appears to be is going down the same road.. I think the Indian 126-aircraf deal will do wonders to clear up who survives and who will sink. Let’s see how it goes.

By sales hit I mean selling over 500 units…