My brother in-law used to fly the CH-46 when he was in the USN.
One of the Sea Knights he flew was built in 1967 and had almost 15,000 hours airframe time – and you could still spot the repair work done after enemy gunfire damage during the Vietnam war.
He also said that Duct tape was a very useful commodity to have on board for carrying out any small repair work when away from the ship!:eek:

The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) aerobatics team, the Black Knights,

Did they have such people as “Knights” during any period of Singapore’s history at all? Seems like a very strange name to give to an air force display team from South East Asia!

It’s as if a European air force’s display team decided to call themselves the Seven Sumarai, the Flying Ninjas or the Dancing Shaolin Monks – or something like that…:rolleyes: :rolleyes: :diablo: :diablo:

A privately owned display team can call themselves whatever they like, but I should think a nation’s air arm would have strict limits on the type of names they can call themselves?:confused:

Are there no famous, illustrious group of warriors or fighting men from Singapore’s history whose name could have been used instead?:confused:

IN unhappy with performance of Sea Dragon System

The Indian navy isn’t satisfied with the performance of their new II-38SDs following tests in the Barents Sea in which the Il-38 failed to detect the target submarine within the required distance.

No India Defense Payment

India stopped payment on a $150 million contract for airplanes from Russian state arms dealer Rosoboronexport, Kommersant reported Friday, citing unidentified people familiar with the matter.
The contract involves installing the Sea Dragon search and targeting system in five Il-38 airplanes, the newspaper said. Indian officials made the decision after observing a test of the system in the Barents Sea, in which Sea Dragon did not meet their expectations, Kommersant said. (Bloomberg)

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/09/10/061.html

http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=802105

On the funding options of more QRA forces , heres a crazy idea, what about taking four Hawk T.1a and using them as a shadow aircraft with a air of 9 limas? Now before someone calls the guys in white coats for me, contartry to popular belief a QRA scramble isnt like a 1940s BOB scramble, in most cases you have a hour or twos warning especially if its a russian bear or backfire, its picked up by RNAF F16s so you end up knowing roughly an hour the hooter goes that you will be scrambling so the hawks lack of speed isnt a issue.

I think there may actually have been a precedent in this idea, I do faintly recall the RAF using the Hawk as some sort of point defence fighter over the UK during the 1980s, arming it with a pair of Sidewinders.
What’s the range/endurance of a Hawk armed so, and with the maximum amount of extra long-range tanks fitted, I wonder?

Some of the most famous, potent and experienced air arms in the world today weren’t formed until the 1940s or Fifties. When do you think the air forces of India, Israel, Pakistan, Communist China, the two Koreas and Japan along with a host of Arab air arms – were actually formed?:rolleyes:

Not to forget the air power of those countries of the former Soviet Union such as Russia and Ukraine, which were only created in the early 1990s!!

Here’s an article concerning Russian-Chinese relations from the Guardian newspaper you might find interesting:

China’s threat to Russia
Andrei Piontkovsky
August 27, 2007 4:00 PM

http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/andrei_piontkovsky_/2007/08/chinas_threat_to_russia.html

Russia and China have been holding joint military manoeuvres in the presence of both Russian president Vladimir Putin and Chinese president Hu Jintao. But a new strategic alliance between the two countries is not likely, as it is China that poses the greatest strategic threat to Russia, although many in the Kremlin seem blind to this as they rattle sabres at America and the west.

China, for instance, has territorial claims on parts of Russia’s far east which are often noted in Chinese school geography textbooks. This is consistent with the Chinese strategic concept of “vital space”, which includes all spheres of a state’s strategic activities, on land, at sea, under water, in the air, and in space.

The dimensions of “vital space” are determined by a country’s economic, scientific, technical, social, and military capabilities – in essence, its “total power”. According to Chinese theorists, the “vital space” of great powers extends far beyond a state’s borders, whereas the “vital space” of weak countries is limited to strategic boundaries that do not always correspond to the borders of their national territory.

Today, China has territorial claims against 11 of its 24 neighbours, including India, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, in addition to Russia. In China’s relations with all of them, the potential use of military force was and remains an important factor.

In September 2006, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted an unprecedentedly large 10-day exercise, involving the Shenyang and Beijing military districts, the two most powerful of China’s seven military districts. Shenyang abuts the Russian Armed Forces’ Far Eastern District, and the Beijing district shares a border with Russia’s Siberian Military District. During the exercises, Shenyang units advanced 1,000 kilometres into the Beijing district, where they engaged in joint war games.

To military observers, the Beijing/Shenyang exercises seemed to be practice for a possible offensive operation against Russia, because exercises on such a scale are undertaken only at the final stage of a multi-year programme to train troops to enact specific strategic and operational plans. The geography of the exercises, and the offensive nature of the tasks undertaken, leaves little doubt that Russia was cast in the role of “potential adversary”. Such a show of force is an ancient, traditional Chinese political technique.

Paradoxically, these exercises were undertaken during a period when bilateral political and economic ties appeared on the surface to be at their highest point. Russia has an important place in Chinese geopolitical calculations, as a supplier of both modern weaponry and energy resources needed to continue its modernisation. Therefore, the Chinese are doing everything possible to strengthen their economic and political position in Russia, and to draw Russia into their sphere of influence.

And China is succeeding, most importantly, by consistently reinforcing Putin’s anti-American and anti-western agenda. While the Beijing/Shenyang exercise should have indicated to Russian leaders that China’s intentions toward Russia may not always be benign, Russia’s political and military leadership seem not to sense any threat; on the contrary, they continue to sell advanced weapons to the Chinese.

Russia’s current diplomatic tilt, indeed, is clearly against its own long-term national security interests. China will never be interested in Russia’s economic and political modernisation, for it prefers Russia to remain a source of mineral and energy resources and a vast “strategic rear” in its looming challenge with the United States. Likewise, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which just concluded its annual meeting, is in China’s eyes a tool of regional policy that helps strengthen China’s influence and control over Central Asia’s natural resources at the expense of Russia.

No nation threatens China’s land borders. China can solve its domestic problems, such as separatism, by itself. China is militarily self-sufficient and needs military cooperation under the SCO framework only in order to free its hands if any conflict should arise that affects its interests.

In fact, conflict between Russia and China is possible precisely in Central Asia, given the clear differences in the two countries’ economic and political interests in that region. Aside from control of the region’s energy supplies, water has become a potential source of conflict, given China’s serious shortages. Yet, while the Chinese clearly understand these contingencies and are preparing themselves to deal with them diplomatically and militarily, the Kremlin remains myopically obsessed with the phantom threat of America.

Thus, as the Kremlin dreams of re-establishing its domination over what Russians refer to as the “near abroad” (Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic countries, and the other post-Soviet states), China is increasingly looking at Russia as its own “near abroad.” Will the Kremlin finally wake up to this?

Thirty-six years ago, Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong turned world politics upside down, as both America and China realised that it was the Soviet Union, and not each other, that posed the greater threat. Vladimir Putin needs his own “Nixon moment”. Alienating the west is a foolish strategy when the greatest long-term threat to Russia comes from the east.

In cooperation with Project Syndicate, 2007.

What do you think of the writer’s opinion about the Chinese military exercises in September 2006?

That sounds very much like polite, whitewashed PR talk. Low signal-to-noise ratio.

Sounded like perfect sense to me, and in line with what a lot of other highly qualified people have to say also.

What do you think he should have said?