ELPELP, the North Dakota ANG was the last operator of F-16ADF and they retired them earlier this year.
Thanks Eagle
ELPI never got that actually, looking at posts in f-16.net, the ratio is about fifty-fifty.
The air to ground stuff for the F-16 is practiced by the F-16C groups, not the ones with the National Guard which are flying upgraded F-16As. The air to ground stuff is also practiced by the F-15s that are either Strike Eagles, or any Eagle updated with the multi-role APG-63V1.
One problem occurring with the F-15 groups is that the plane is aging, and the more it ages, the more training restrictions are placed on it, including allowable G limits. An F-15C group may get more BFM practice than an F-16C group, but the latter may probably push the edge of their aircraft more during those practice times, like hitting 9G.
Very few of the ADF A’s are left in Guard service. ADFs in the current expeditionary ops era are useless to the way USAF is operating now. The latest Brac pushed more of those out. For the F-15A-D it depends, each unit has some sickly ones (by serial plus there was a bad batch of Cs that had to have a special wing rebuild in the wing shop at the depot) yet there are a bunch that aren’t, they are just thrashed and tired for other reasons. Plus the F-15 is a PDM jet, which means it gets a complete depot rebuild every 5-7 years. It isn’t all about pulling G’s, it is setup and continuously working on certain training blocks all the time. We still only have 18v1s at the moment. And of course E’s have better things to do with their training plan than do A2A stuff all the time. Both communities have pilots go through the system. ( We aren’t Israel who get more years out of their fighter pilots). So again, on any given month, a typical F-16 unit here has a lot of stuff on their plate that doesn’t include A2A. Given that the F-16 is pretty deadly in BFM this just all depends on what day of the weak the practice took place. 😉 One problem now that isn’t particular to either aircraft type is funding. We could get 90% MC rates out of F-15A-D if they were willing to pay for spares and other resources. And yes A-D are approaching ends of original airframe hours but in the case of that jet, it is hard and F-4 ish enough that a SLEP would carry some of the batches. They aren’t new so USAF and the mil industry complex is always on the buy new tread mil. We are so tapped out on funding now that MC rates are going down for lack of maintenance funding/spares and in a few cases some trying to fix what wasn’t broke by assigning multiple jets to a crew chief. Canary in the coal mine stuff.
ELPCrobato, when i said F15s usually comes out on top I was referring to ACM not the specs. Yet, as you indicated most of those “specs” the F16 was considered as “more manueverable”.
Also include that BFM is a perishable skill. It takes a lot of routine practice to keep up.
Look at a typical F-16 squadron monthly training schedule and then look at one of an F-15C. The F-16 squadron has a bunch of air to ground stuff to work on too during the month, which means less BFM practice.
An F-15C squadron, after all the safety-recurrent training stuff for the aircraft type, has a combat portion of their schedule that is mostly BFM. If that is all you did most of your time for combat skillsets, you’d be good too.
ELPNeed to lose that two piece canopy and/or get some serrated edge action going there.
ELPHmmm don’t remember, is that engine deal for the S of putting GEs in still going? Maybe not, Saudis at the time a couple years ago were pissed about something with PW and threatened to re-engine the whole shootin match with GEs. That is going by what some U.S. guys that did the JDAM wiring upgrade told me. Haven’t really kept up with all that drama lately. Remember too that U.S. recently has pushed the issue of that BAE investigation again. My National Inquirer theory is that this deal if it goes through, will sweep that under the rug.
ELPA batch of Saudi F-15s were wired/configured for JDAM a few years ago by U.S. techs. Of course this meant that a JDAM deal of some sort was being looked at for the future.
ELP* Great office , M-M interface and reduced workload FALSE – the brief was to equal the F-16, and according to independent sources, that’s all it does.
LOL
* Awsome Situational awareness FALSE, as above
OMG
* 3 gen. AESA radar By the time it enters service, so will everything else.
WTF?
…
ELPI’d go with Storm Shadow if only to send a message. I think contractors get complacent and think the government will just keep feeding them money. Look at NG’s performance in shipbuilding lately.
There is also a next generation Storm in the works.
ELPSame sort of story as the Aussie Kaman Sea Sprite purchase contract, where they had to pay Kaman more and more, in the hopes of a working helo.
Except for the Aussie Seasprite it is also a Defence thing not being able to write a good contract. Even after the last parole from death row by the governor, the Aussie Seasprite will go to sea without proper salt water protection common with most naval warfare helos. NZ’s have proper salt water protection. It will be fun on a ISO/Phase after the RAN Seasprites have a tour at sea.
They are similar in that they are both contracting screw ups by the Defence/Defense government. DOD wrote a good contract but didn’t make sure the QC was good enough before authorizing full production. The JASSM problems should have been caught and stomped out long ago.
ELPI don’t have any comment about the MANPAD thing as I don’t know. Anything is possible. However F-16s crashing out due to engine failure for any number of reasons is hardly new. Look some months back when we dumped 4 of them in a short time span here in the states and nobody was shooting at them. For USAF, a cost of doing business for the life of the F-16 program. Something Hornet people of all colors know, sometimes you have to shut down an engine that goes bad and in their case they have a backup to get home.
ELPF-104 did not tolerate low hour pilots… and experienced pilots loved it. Putting it into the ground strike role with low hour pilots, soupy euro-weather yet pilots trained in the SW United States (dry and sunshine)…and fast approach speeds for landing and the above mentioned low level attack routes where a better aircraft would have done well,….helped the big accident rate. Add to that maintenance consistency was dodgy for the high attrition rate users. The aircraft was easy to maintain IF you had consistant skill/experience in all the maintenance skillsets required for field ops (airframe, hydraulics,avionics). Experienced maintainers loved it. An avionics box not working at the last chance check before take off? Go in to the van and swap it out with the engine running. However though for new maintainers,….It wasn’t an F-86. 😉 .
The vertical tactics of skilled F-104 users embarrassed some people. One time there was a set up to see how the new F-106 v the F-104 would do. The F-104 not playing a turning game routed it. Then there is other things. You have to have some respect for a aircraft that can super-cruise at 77,000 ft with the pilot using a P-suit. (about the only way to get some range out of the aircraft). In another exercise it did an intercept of a U2.
One would think that the F-104 earned the Yeager motto of don’t fly an A model of anything. The downward ejection seat in early models caused some problems, as did early engine problems. The engine out dead stick approach to an airfield procedure looks pretty scary. Space shuttle like stuff. Certainly a Darwinism kind of jet for young pilots that couldn’t keep up with it’s demands.
—–
F-4….. ended up being… the first Joint Strike Fighter.:cool:
ELPOh… I was talking about Aussie F-111s when they retire them.
😀
ELPHopefully they will save a few for the museums there. 😀
ELPSaw the Te Mana ( an NZ Anzac class) up close (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMNZS_Te_Mana_%28F111%29) visiting in Newcastle 2 weeks ago. Went up to the gang plank and talked to a watch officer for a while. The posts mentioned above about manpower issues for both HMNZS and RAN are so so true.
ELPThe Hornets Nest Article was pretty fair. Didn’t see any bias in it at all.
This usually happens when something Defence doesn’t like to hear ( i.e. any criticism ) comes up. Too bad.
The idea that the F-111 was unsafe past 2010 is …. wrong. So Defence will have to try something like…. facts… instead of fearmongering and creating a justification for the Super after the decision has been made.
Re: the “Correcting the record on the JSF” from Defence. Saw that. http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/NelsonMintpl.cfm?CurrentId=6835
The actual figure is $131 million, it is the AVERAGE unit procurement cost that John Harvey is using, and it is in 2006 dollars.
Assuming the mid point of any Australian buy will be 2016 (i.e. buy over period 2014 to 2018), then for a mean inflation figure of 2.5%, this equates to an average unit procurement cost of over $166 million in 2016 dollars. This does not include any cost increases due to technical risks materialising or the reduction in buy numbers by the US Air Force or the US Navy or budgetary constraints applied by the Congress.
Actually, this media release represents a significant movement on the part of Defence with respect to their public pronouncements on the JSF costs.
Now I could be confused here (in keeping with what Defence clearly want people to be), but is this not the first time, at least on the public record, that Defence has spoken about the JSF costs in terms of both ‘unit costs’ and ‘total fleet costs’, at the same time, citing cost figures for both (even if they are not the real cost figures)?
And, while we are at it, wouldn’t you think that after 5 years on the job with all the overseas trips and endless meetings, with over 50 people working for the NACC Project Office, that they would have done the “very detailed analysis of costs” and have a costing model that can predict what the costs will be, including inflation (as others have done); would know what the costs are; and, moreover, would not have to resort to such caveated generalisations as –
“Typically the cost of these broader project elements adds about 50 per cent over the cost of the acquisition of aircraft, providing an approximate per aircraft total cost of around $A120 million.”
and
“The specific numbers used here are for illustrative purposes only.”
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