ELPWhat you’ve latched onto was a fundamental shift in Naval Aviation requirements that happened at the end of the Cold War.
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True. And the thinking at that time with shrinking budgets was that one kind of fighter was needed that could do all the missions in a then thought of lower threat environment and do it for a low price because they have to pay for big grey floaty things.
That was met with the Super Slow Hornet simply because after it was done; there were really no colors of money to do anything else:
The F-35 does not–for the huge expense and risk–offer anything the Navy really needs.
The need for big, long range, Soviet fighting aircraft like the F-14, A-6, ATA, NATF and A/F-X was replaced by a need for smaller, cheaper multi role aircraft like the Super Hornet and F-35.
“F-35” does not belong in the sentence above because it is not “cheaper”. Even NAVAIR came out and said so a few years (operating cost and procurement). Given predicted operational weights and wing area, the F-35C certainly isn’t “smaller” by any worthwhile measure.
ELPI fully support Burbage when he states, “We’re dealing with the laws of physics.”
Joint Strike Fighter may miss acceleration goal
ELPI fail to see how an F-35 without STOVL would somehow be a faster more agile aircraft? The things which make the F-35 wide are its internal weapon bays not space set aside for its lift equipment. Its fantasy to think that JSF minus STOVL would be a twin engine mini F-22/F-23. USAF were set on the single engine for cost reasons and besides what engine?
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If CV and CTOL were the only requirements they would have built the airframe around basic CV needs… like an A-7, F-4 etc. That kind of a “joint” design was workable.
With the STOVL, you have certain COG needs that affect the other variants. You have 2000 -/+ pounds of dead weight in the motor for the CTOL, CV variants and in this case because the guys with the lift-fan won, you have dead areas in the airframe that have to be accounted for: including more thermal / heat-sink issues.
And as we have seen already; a lot more cost. If it had been a CV / CTOL only requirement we would have been much further along with less problems.
As many in the program have stated since its start; STOVL drove the influence on all 3 JSF variants.
ELPIt may be a awhile before we see the production aircraft parked at Eglin AFB, training new pilots.
Burbage claims that the unsafe fuel-dump system may have a fix in testing by the second quarter of this year.
When that fix appears on all of the production jets at Eglin is unknown.
Get that fixed and there are scores of other things to get done.
ELPFlying mission systems in a test-bed is great and good. However the massive amount of mission systems have to fly in a go to war config’d aircraft which currently has lots of thermal issues and other design problems to get over.
It isn’t until later LRIPs that they start putting in the new computer hardware that will drive the software for final Block 3. And all that has to be tested too.
The work left to do is tremendous. I would be more OK with that if we didn’t hear all the endless empty platitude over the years. On-track, is not on-schedule.
In the end, all this talent is going toward building the wrong aircraft. It is time to get all of that talent toward building the right aircraft. Or, the pain is going to get worse.
ELP, just that as of now this is what the F-35 has.
….With all the poor program management…has yet to prove. Funny is looking at one of the paper-thin weight margin charts and they mention EOTS. LOL
ELPSpin
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/01/dn-design-blamed-for-f35c-tailhook-issues-011712/
Burbage dismisses claims that the F-35C will be unable to land on a carrier as falsehoods.
“That’s patently not true,” he said.
😉
And Aboulafia, who is about as accurate on mil-aviation issues as a Vietnam-era Sparrow:
“They turned the YF-17 into a carrier plane, why couldn’t they correct carrier-hook problems here?” he said. “This does not appear to be a killer problem.”
I’m seeing it now. The YF-17 is just like the F-35C. :p
ELPThat is total nonsense. JAST (which became JSF) was not forced down the throat of the US Navy. JAST was mostly founded in the Navy’s A/F-X program. A/F-X wasn’t combined with MRF to form JAST for the sake of commonality but because the US couldn’t afford a fourth and fifth new combat aircraft program in the 1990s (in addition to B-2, F-22 and RAH-66).
The specification for the JAST, later JSF, is exactly what the Navy needs and doesn’t fail to achieve a mission requirement like the F-111B does. Further you add in this made up nonsense about how the STOVL component somehow ruins F-35 capability. No evidence needed of course just opinion.
These are marginal problems caused by problems in the development program. They are completely different to the F-111B’s complete inability to be a successful dogfighter. Something it was never designed for nor reasonably expected to do. Which was why it should never have been forced onto the US Navy in the first place. No one can make such an argument about the F-35C.
When they asked the Navy what they wanted in the form of a Joint Strike Fighter, the answer was: two-engines, two-aircrew and 1000 mile radius. Since there were never going to be two-engine STOVL aircraft, yes, STOVL drove the requirement for all services.
Which is where we are now. Engine forward to support COG needs for STOVL= burned horizontal stabs with too much and/or sustained power. 2000 +/- pounds of dead weight in the A and C motors to support commonality for STOVL. Placement of the tail hook: where and how were you going to place the tail hook once the STOVL design was semi-figured out? The kind of weapons bay. Two separate vs one like the F-22. Again to support various F-35B STOVL plumbing requirements. This has other design effects and not just the weapons bay btw. Then there are the paper-thin weight margins and efforts like the 2003 weight reduction event (removing quick-mate-joints which were to aid assembly) and the 2004 SWAT which was a wild-west show to shed any weight and damn the consequences, or some of the consequences. The most important goal for management being that of hitting pay-day milestones.
The STOVL requirement drove the design of all 3 variants. You may look through the history of this program and find top people stating that very thing. Again. And, again.
ELPNone of this bears any resemblance to how the F-35 program is financed. Spudman has pointed this out above.
The 3,300 is the number of commitments. You can’t actually sign a contract for an F-35 at the moment that is more advanced in production schedule than LRIP5. You won’t be able to contract for more than next year’s production until the Multi Year Production (MYP) lots begin. This is how this program is financed very differently to the Typhoon.
As to the cost, profit relationship this is a very simplistic interpretation. Much of the cost increase is via inflation and since aerospace costs are inflating at a higher rate than CPI this actually results in a loss of value from the profit margin. Further Lockheed Martin has been required to take quite a few hits in the SDD funding to work to make up for delays.
Various (read not LM press releases) reports cite cost increase not due to just inflation but poor management of the program. For instance the 2007 marketing effort known as “Lighting Strike”, which was to get partners to sign up for early buys, failed because there was nothing resembling a combat jet to throw money into. The poor program management has shown that out. Years later, there are still a lot of question marks. Five more years from now testing on all the then new LRIPs with the supposed fixes (including the actual computer hardware needed to run the final Block 3 SDD software) will not be complete. That of course assumes no more technical delays. The consistent performance metric is delay and rising cost due to poor project management. That is the one given to bank on. Given all of the empty promises, we can expect part or all of the program to be cancelled by then. What is left will be a feast for the legal industry.
ELPNow the F-35C meets the air combat specifications set down by the Navy and is having some trouble at the start of its carrier suitability testing. Which is worse? Especially since the F-35C’s trapping problem is likely to be solved by something as simple as a redesigned shape to the hook on the end of the tailhook.
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-There is no proof that the F-35C is meeting the air combat specification set down by the Navy. There is no operational squadron in service. There is no OPEVAL.
-The shaping of the hook as falling into the “likely to be solved” class of problems also needs significant proof.
ELPAs the Good Book so eloquently puts it:
“The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.”
It is good to bring faith into the conversation. The true believers of the F-35 program use faith at every turn in seeing “thy will be done”.
Every time the engineering woes see the light of day I can almost hear, “What, then, shall we say in response to this? If God is for us, who can be against us?” from the F-35 believers.
I have no problem with God. It is His fans which I find annoying.
ELPSNAFU no one is denying that the F-35 is over budget and behind schedule and that this is not a good thing. That you insist that people answer yes to questions of this nature so you can then follow up with further questions is petulant, pathetic and an insult to everyone else on this forum. Get over yourself and try and make a real contribution. By the way this is not tackling the man rather than the ball but judging you negatively for the type of message you post here.
Over budget and behind schedule because of massive program management issues.
ELPAgain this is more nonsense. Firstly the orders for the F-35 are limited because it is still in LRIP. Customers can only sign contracts for aircraft that are going to be in the next LRIP. So one can argue that the “confirmed orders” are very low compared to the commitments. Then of course you have the push back in LRIP due to the development problems. So, for example, Australia has approved the acquisition of 2 and then 12 F-35s from LRIPs but no contract signed yet. Because the LRIP years for these aircraft have not progressed to contract stage. So ELP and others can claim that these aren’t confirmed orders but the customer most definitely wants them and has approval to buy them from their governments.
As to the comparison of 750 F-22s and 100 (sic) B-2s these figures were much earlier in their schedules than the F-35 is now. For the B-2 the order had been slashed from 132 to 75 and then to 20. The cut to 20 (later increased to 21) was announced in 1992. Which if adjusted for the F-35’s development schedule would have been made at the same place the F-35 was at in 2009-10. Of course a similar cut did not happen to the F-35 at this time nor would it considering the B-2 cut was all about the Peace Dividend at the end of the Cold War.
As to the F-22 the cuts in its numbers happened far earlier in the program. It went from 750 to 648 in 1990, then to 438 in 1994, then to 339 in 1997. All before first flight. Its production numbers had been slashed by 55% before it even flew. No such similar cuts to the F-35.
Bleating various figures may be good enough for silly blogs like ELP but provide a decent benchmark if you want to be taken seriously.
LOL. Ever heard of the passage of time? Sure the Typhoon is in squadron service but that would be expected from a project that started about 15 years before the F-35. The F-35 is only five or so years from first flight. Compare that to the F-22, Typhoon and Rafale and its position on the schedule from glint in milkman’s eye to gainfully employed citizen and it don’t look so bad.
Except that the word is already out, what JSF partner nations are looking at is a defence program with massive problems. To be “taken seriously” one has to recognize that reality.
ELPWell I would say that, but it is increasingly obvious that the use of facts around here is clearly frowned upon, if they happen to relate to a project some of the people have a personal issue with…
What the hell, I’ll do it anyway and at least be consistent…
Fact.
The F-35 program has confirmed orders from 7 separate nations all bar one (the UK) of whom are still waiting for their first aircraft to roll off the production line.
Who here can tell me the other fighter project in the world that can better that fact? Which other fighter program has 7 (or more) customers signed up, still waiting for their jets?
Offhand, even the F-16 isn’t doing so well, only having orders for new build aircraft from Greece, Turkey, Iraq, Oman and Morocco that remain unfulfilled.
“Confirmed orders” needs real definition. You have gullible defence communities that have signed off on an MOU as part of a plan. Much like 750 F-22s were a plan; or 100 B-2s. The program has to show better health before the dream approaches reality.
Comparing the F-35 to other existing programs can of course only go so far. Those other programs actually work and are in operational squadrons vs. something so faulty it is a mess of program management incompetence. Not a few teething troubles. Major problems that have to be resolved.
ELPAgain, we have to look at relative, not absolute numbers. I think we can agree that the confidence of the partner nations in the JSF program is sinking rapidly. It’s better to recognize/admit that now when it’s still time to get at least part of the mess fixed than put on rose glasses and then watch orders being cut from 100 to 60 to 30 to 20. Although at least part of the cuts would be be inevitable even if everything in the F-35 program was running OK from day one.
Yup.
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