Quote:
Originally Posted by ELP
Real issues would be:
-All of the risks that were identified years ago by others becoming reality.
Really? A broken clock is right twice a day. Simply saying that an ambitious new development project is going to be risky is not exactly an indication of great prescience. Like starting to watch the Darwin Awards on YouTube and saying “I think some people are going to get hurt…”
>>>>>>>Nice try, seeing as the Defence bureaucracy is famous for ignoring risks. A proven track-record if you will. Sea Sprite, Collins combat system, EW system for legacy Hornets. Reactionary to F-111 maintenance (surprise!) as opposed to being proactive (the; “they don’t know, what they don’t know” factor). Ignoring a raft of risk when looking at the Wedgetail. That and more. Their proven track-record of performance. Established. Great words in a CV; “We ignore risk and depend on our faith in the entrenched bureaucracy.”)<<<<<<<<<<
Quote:
Originally Posted by ELP
-Defence/DMO/NACC misrepresenting the risks to government and becoming a glorified seller.
When and where? It was the Australian political element which believed they could have F-35s in 2012 and scrape out the F-111 and F/A-18 as delivered until then. It was the Australian NACC office that changed this with the need to upgrade the Hornet and then with the gap fill option of the Super Hornet to replace the F-111.
>>>>>>Look at the 2004 briefing. Look at the June 2011 (“so what” briefing) by NACC. Irresponsible behaviour at best. In the 2004 brief they stated that if the F-35 didn’t work out, we would start over. Good luck with that. Blame it on the “Australian political element”. Now we are getting somewhere. It was Howard who helped push for this fancy show put on by LM. Pitches of phoney industry benefits. Faith-based hope that something this complex would just work. Hey it was the US and they used the word “stealth”. Of course Houston—part of the entrenched Defence bureaucracy jumped right in… “affordable because there are 3000 orders on the book”…. blah..blah…blah. Great stalwart “analysis”.
You are mistaken with your history of the Super. The NACC didn’t change anything. They followed what super-genius Nelson prescribed. Wow; again, great analytical work by the NACC.<<<<<<<<
Quote:
Originally Posted by ELP
–Weak “analysis” by the NACC (much of it copy-paste from the vendor)
Maybe in the public information release but this has a lot more to do with what is cleared for public release by the vendor and the security concerns. The internal stuff is of a lot more rigor and the price scope estimates for AIR 6000 from 10 years ago reflect this.
>>>>>>Interesting, because reading Senate Estimates and Hansard stuff over the years doesn’t give confidence to that theory. BTW, I wonder who has been advising ministers in recent years when the wheels were falling off the JSF hopes and dreams, that there was plenty of “margin” built into the plan? That advice had to come from somewhere.<<<<<<<<<
Quote:
Originally Posted by ELP
–Defence/DMO/NACC having to sell all this to industry. ( I wonder how Production Parts feels about all that? Oh wait, they are now gone). How about Quickstep and their money problems? They, and others were cheered on by the entrenched Defence bureaucracy with no proper risk analysis.
The problem there was not the lack of Australian industry interest in the project but the lack of Australian industry. Boeing Australia couldn’t build F-35 parts at Bankstown without capital investment. They didn’t have the money and now Quickstep do. As to Production Parts the NACC office has been from day one saying the F136 is not something they support. And this company was way under capacity which is why they folded not the delays in the F-35 project. The Australian aerospace industry being more than just building light aircraft expired in the 1980s. The NACC program be it F-35 or license built EuroCanards was never going to change this.
>>>>’F136 not something they support’. Interesting. It would seem our elected officials would want to be briefed on this in hearings. Were they? And Defence in general had nothing but happy flowers press releases… that and the F136 was briefed as solid for years—until the first F-35 Nunn-McCurdy and Davis needed to hatch a plan to lower overhead. Production parts did airframe & system component machining as well as engine component work. But I find it interesting they were once one of the success stories of great Australian JSF partner work–(even under the “best-value” con). Now your beloved entrenched Defence bureaucracy has changed their tune. Production Parts was this or that. Not up to the challenge. I wonder what they will say when Quickstep runs into trouble? “Silly ******s. They just were not up for it”. You are right about under-capacity. Everyone and their brother (more important those investors…and what they were told); think that capacity belonged on a timeline with the great success story that is JSF. $9Billion in work! (in very small words and or ignored by all….’potential’ ) Big orders! Sadly, the Ponzi-scheme is becoming apparent.<<<<<<<<<
Quote:
Originally Posted by ELP
–There were no actual “orders”. Just a dream based on faith-based “analysis”.
They were the commitments made by the partner nations. While some of the smaller European nations and the UK have wavered on their numbers 100 out of 3,000 is not a significant figure (300 is). The F-35 outlook still stands at over 3,000 in orders and solid commitments. Dreaming and faith based opinions are very different to formal commitments by Governments.
>>And no hard risk analysis here from the entrenched Defence bureaucracy. No one thought to do serious study and find out if those numbers were platitude. In the end, those “orders” have nothing with a commitment to money. Someone should have raised the flag. For instance, best to see a real working jet. Pretty sloppy with other people’s money.<<
Quote:
Originally Posted by ELP
Not slander. Facts.
You said with as yet no supporting evidence that the figures offered by the Australian NACC office were “fabricated” as in “Invent or concoct (something), typically with deceitful intent”. Text book case of slander.
>>>>>>>The more someone pays for a fake painting, the more they are less likely to doubt its authenticity. The NACC office has taken taxpayer money and at least got some good holiday trips out of it. Hard work, copy-pasting LM talking points and rebadging them as “analysis”. I don’t see any proof of their competence other than to act as an enabler for the vendor.”<<<<<
>>>And let us look at one other great offender of the entrenched Defence bureaucracy; the failed experiment known as the DMO. Here is a snapshot of what industry thinks of them:
Mr Burns said the Defence Teaming Centre canvassed extensively its 230 member companies to compile a written submission to the Senate’s Defence and Trade References Committee inquiry into procurement of defence contracts.
Its submission maintains the DMO:
LACKS any capacity to learn from its mistakes;
CANNOT attract the right staff to project manage its projects;
SCARES companies into thinking there will be repercussions if they complain;
HAS no drive or motivation;
TAKES an adversarial approach to companies;
MAKES false allegations against companies.
source: http://goo.gl/cM3dS
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