EdLawOkay, drawing a line under the previous thread, let us discuss, rationally, the possible strategies had the conflict not gone the way it did. The majority of the discussion on the other thread was highly interesting, and does merit discussion. The issues of global nuclear war are, obviously, not relevant, or discussions of WW2. However, the issue of whether nuclear weapons were on the table is highly relevant. Through the somewhat disturbing recollections of Mitterand, among other sources, we know that the nuclear option was very much on the table.
Similarly, it is worth discussing the possibility of withdrawal of the naval task force; and the possible encampment on West Falkland. The chances of success in this radical option is certainly worthy of discussion!
This thread is entirely needed, and is not a case of opening several threads on the same subject. This thread is not intended to be limited to a discussion of the issues that the other (now closed) thread dealt with, but rather a more general discussion of the issues surrounding the conflict.
EdLawThe existing threads are specific to the Super Etendard and Exocet, and a Mod has effectively asked that general Falklands discussions (especially about alternative scenarios) must go elsewhere. This thread is for the open discussion of the conflict itself, including the tactics and weapons used, and, importantly, the tactics and weapons that might have been used had things turned out differently. Specific issues dealing with Etendard or Exocet should continue to go on in those other threads.
Basically, I’m not a Moderator here, so it’s not really up to me where discussions should go. However, I have opened this thread to allow a continuation of the discussions that were not welcomed on what is effectively now an Exocet thread. This thread is for pretty much anything anyone wants to discuss, and preferably in as open a way as possible! No restrictions (other than those the forum’s Mods enforce) on what can be discussed. If you want to discuss something in real detail, e.g. AAA or the Mirage III/Dagger, then you might be best opening up a specific thread.
EdLawTake example of 4 small vessels vice 2 larger vessel or 1 large vessel.
Regarless of its size, each vessel would need a complete set of navigation equipment, radars, EW/ECM/ESM. This implies greater cost. Although, clearly, equipping a single large vessel with just one set would probably involve more sophisticated gear. Nonetheless, you catch my drift: more numerous smaller vessel would probably be more expensive.
I agree, to an extent, though it does, of course, depend on what level of capability you’re looking for.
I would propose that there are two very different ‘price points’, i.e. areas where the solution is best for your requirements.
– 20-30,000 ton austere LHD, to operate limited numbers of F-35Bs. These carriers would carry pretty limited defensive fits, probably little more than CIWS, decoys and ESM, possibly a short range defensive missile system (e.g. RAM/VL-MICA/ESSM at most). These would be suitable for smaller nations that still want carriers, yet don’t need, or can’t afford full size carriers. They would be especially attractive for nations wanting amphibious capability first, carrier capability second.
– 50-70,000 ton CV (equivalent to the CVF). These would be much more capable, much more expensive ships, but would allow proper CTOL ops. They would have pretty advanced defensive capabilities, probably equivalent to the more expensive CVNs. Propulsion probably gas turbine based, possibly fully electric propulsors. These carriers would be the better choice for nations needing a much more potent striking force, and for operating in higher risk areas.
EdLawHi there,
I am still struggling to learn how to manage a British company based in Spain and thus I have no time to answer point by point but I DO think that imagination is going too far for my limited intellect.
The sole though of CONSIDERING the possibility to use nuclear weapons from my point of view is absolutely INSANE, LUDICROUS and way off the target,,, in a time when there were more than 20,000 nuclear weapons “per side” just thinking of escalating a small conflict into a nuclear stage is SO crazy that I sincerily think that we are experiencing wet dreams…….
I think that just the treat would have created a situation potentially disastrous to the whole humankind and why not to the world……. remember that the EEUU were governed then by a guy who was a few years ahead of a massive case of Alzheimer……
Also, isn´t it incredible even CONSIDERING the possibility of using nukes? And also a country that even THINKS about the possibility of using nuclear weapons against a country that not posses them……. I sincerely think that should trigger a resolution of the UN to DISARM that country….
Let us remember that the stupid action of the “junta” although crazy as a hatter, was a limited operation, with no casualties whatsoever on the British side and that is a clear sign that what they wanted was a situation that would open a space for negotiating….. remember please how the considered by you invasion, for Argentina was a “recovery”……
And speaking about ridiculous scenarios……… let me remind you how the “invasion” of Egipt after the Suez canal crisis ended………. the Soviets said. get out or we launch……:dev2:
We can imagine all scenarios…….. but….. putting Troops in Isla Soledad, ( West Falkland) would have made nothing more than getting targets closer to the mainland and thus……….. much better in range…..
Can you imagine how all the Latin American countries would have reacted? We are talking about hemispheric possibility of open war…….. all British assets in ANY friend country of Argentina would have been captured and all the British nationals abroad would have been instantly threaten…..
Let us awake and talk of POSSIBLE scenarios if we wish, but. nuclear weapons?
And you guys know what? The British government recognized that they did not have time to remove the said weapons from all of his assets in the theatre.. who was more insane? The “invader” or the people that consider even the use of nukes? And carried them with them with the excuse that they didn´t have time to “remove them”…….
I sincerely would like that we can channel this conversation to POSSIBLE scenarios………. otherwise Argentina could have decided, after a nukes attack the possibility of “terminating” the lives of ALL islanders……… let us get thinking straight.
Sorry but I finish here today as I am so mentally tired that I can´t even spell correctly in English….
Juan.
The problem with that thesis is that Argentina is not a Soviet client state. Egypt had control over one of the most strategically important areas of the world, hence it was very much in the Soviet’s interests to intervene (also in hopes of fermenting a pro-Soviet attitude in other Arab capitals). In the case of Argentina on the other hand, the Soviets have no real interest, and other than annoying one of its NATO enemies, the Soviets had no real interest in backing Argentina.
The fact remains that if you invade the territory of a nuclear-armed country, you cannot then write the rules as to what weapons or tactics are allowed.
The discussion of the nuclear option is actually historically relevant – there was discussion at high levels about the use of nuclear weapons in the event of failure. This makes the discussion of what options were on the table entirely proper.
As for your nonsense about Britain being in the wrong for not having had time to remove the nuclear depth charges from its warships, this is completely flawed. The warships involved carried limited numbers of such weapons, as they were, at the time, considered to be the most effective way of dealing with Soviet deep diving nuclear submarines. The nuclear depth bomb is not intended for use on land at all, it is an ASW weapon. The fact that it was not removed was partly because it wasn’t any real concern. The only reason why it became a concern was the prospect of a ship so-equipped being sunk, hence taking more than 2% of the entire stockpile (the total number in UK service amounted to a mere 49!) to the bottom. Also, since these depth charges were on frigates, unless you are expecting Britain to fly a bombing mission in a Westland Lynx, at 150mph, then you are taking this to extremes.
The UK had the right to use whatever weapons it felt necessary, subject to the usual laws. Yet you seem to think that Britain was morally worse than Argentina, because Argentina only invaded British territory; yet Britain considered the possibility of a limited nuclear strike on a symbolic military target in the event of Argentina having sunk at least one of the British carriers. This would only have been in the event of Argentina having likely killed several hundred or more British sailors and airmen. Yes, I am sure the Argentine Junta were the more moral party here…. :rolleyes:
EdLawCVN21 will have around 4600 crew, rather than 5500 (roughly) as you stated, and whatever the US launches around the time PA2 is launched is likely to impove on this still further!
You need to remember that the American carrier being launched around the time of the CVFs would be CVN-78, i.e. USS Gerald R Ford. It has a predicted entry into service of 2015, i.e. the same sort of timeframe as the CVF. It has a total crew of 4660, versus around 1500 for HMS Queen Elizabeth. The simple fact is that the US ships require a lot more crew, per ton or total.
The equation is, therefore, pretty accurate – 12 x 4600 (low-balling the figures for the US ship a bit) = 55,200; okay, lower than the original figure, but only by low-balling it, and ignoring the fact that for the foreseeable future, most US Navy carriers will be of the older Nimitz spec. The CVF figure, 32 x 1500 = 48,000. So basically however you do the calculations, the larger fleet of CVFs will require smaller crews.
Obviously, there are flaws, since there would be more support needed for the larger number of ships, and more support personnel ashore; but the central argument holds water.
It could be argued that the best thing would be to not bother with dedicated LHAs or LHDs, and instead build a lot of cheaper LPDs, with the aircraft carried on the proper carriers. An LPD carrying the equivalent troops, vehicles and other equipment to the LHD/LHA could be built for a few hundred million dollars, using European examples as a guide.
However, lets switch to the preferred multiples of three (allowing one deployed at all times etc…).
So, lets say:
36 x CVF – $4bn each, 1500 crew each = $144bn total, 54,000 crew
72 x LPD – $500m each, 250 crew each = $36bn total, 18,000 crew
Total cost = $180bn (not bad considering that’s to replace the entire US Navy carrier and amphib fleets!)
Total crew = 72,000
This compares to the current 12 Nimitz, and around 12 LHA/LHDs, plus lots of LPDs, LSDs (especially the horrendously expensive San Antonio class LPDs!).
I think I know which fleet I would prefer!
EdLawStill very little time to make a more comprehensive post I’m afraid, but, briefly – there was a contingency plan should the war go into a protracted phase beyond the ability of the task force to stay on station at maximum strength.
That was the development of a lodgement on W.Falklands. The Argentine presence on West Falklands was minimal and it was considered feasible, just, to set up an austere base similar, but larger, to that established at San Carlos there.
The theory being that RAF GR3’s in strength plus FRS1’s transferred ashore from the departing carriers, with radar/SAM support offshore from the fleet, and Rapier, concentrated on open ground with clear arcs, could be enough to form a bridgehead that the Argentine forces would have a very hard time assaulting. The lodgement, over a period of time, being enhanced with hard-runway capability to allow the RAF to bring in Hercs, Phantom and Tornado.
Logistics would’ve been the hard part of the plan but the winter weather would have hampered everyone equally in the air and the SSN presence wouldve meant a very limited Argentine seaborne challenge to UK transport ships transitting to the islands.
As usual, Jonesy sums it up nicely, and entirely correctly. It was entirely possible to put extensive forces on West Falkland, and these would be rapidly reinforced by air. The UK flew Hercules cargo aircraft down there when needed, with some air to air refuelling, and I suspect could have flown some Shorts Belfasts down as well. The Herc and Belfast fleet would then pour troops and equipment onto West Falkland. Initially, the runway on West Falkland would have allowed Harrier and Sea Harrier ops. Once fully laid, the runway would also allow for Hawks (they were already weapons capable, but in ’83 some were given AIM-9 capability, this could happen as an emergency measure in ’82). It wouldn’t take much more to allow Tornado GR-1 and Phantom ops, and of course, the Buccaneer. Ground forces would have more helicopters brought in – Sea Kings, Pumas, Lynx, Gazelles and Scouts. Airlift also allows heavy guns like the M107 175mm gun, which could fire 34km, allowing San Carlos to be within range from West Falkland.
If the UK gets Phantoms and Tornados onto the island, then targetting the Argentine mainland also becomes a possibility. The UK could, for instance, withdraw the naval task force, having dropped off as much equipment as possible onto West Falkland. The force stays just long enough to allow Harriers and other aircraft to be shuttled in. This should allow, intially, around 40 Harriers and Sea Harriers, and hopefully some rapidly modified Hawk armed trainers (good enough for day fighter and CAS ops). A force of, ideally, 40 Harrier FRS.1/GR-3s and 40 Hawk T.1As would be enough to hold off the Argentines initially. The other important thing would be to move in a longer range SAM system, to supplement the Rapier. The Bloodhound would be a possibility, especially since they were nearing removal from Germany.
The combination of the land based force, plus the submarines prowling offshore – likely including numbers of the Oberon class diesel electric subs. These were slow to arrive, but once on station, would be good enough to help keep the Argentines from resupplying by sea. The UK could set up a support base on South Georgia – e.g. park four or five Sea Harriers there, to guard a small fleet of fleet oilers (to resupply the submarines). Once the remainder of the UK fleet gets back to the UK, and Op Corporate II would begin, say, four months later. What has to be born in mind is the fact that the extra time means we are into September or October, which means, hopefully, better weather. During all this time, it is entirely likely that the Argentines would have lost, due to the land based force. The land force should be able to stop the Argentines from aerial resupply, and the subs stop resupply by ship. The land based forces would use close support and helicopter transport, allowing forces to deploy and redeploy as much as possible.
EdLawIf the first landing operation failed the Argentinians wouldn’t be in any better position since they are only likely to have destroyed amphibious forces and not most of the escorts, carriers and SSN’s! Of course they would have wiped out a few thousands of the UK’s best forces, but that could just provoke the UK rather than make the UK give up. Since the Argentinians could not get ships to the islands, they could not extend the runway or bring in minelaying ships. There were no Exocets available for Argentina to buy, so time wouldn’t help here. As for the Soviets supplying aircraft, if it was going to happen it would have happened before the war started. The Argentinian navy couldn’t go out because of the SSN’s, no amount of time would help them since they are unlikely to be able to hunt and destroy them. If the war dragged on it might have spread, most likely to any Argentinian air bases supplying the islands and the transport aircraft with the aim of starving the Argentine forces out.
The Argentines would never have received Soviet aircraft – partly because it would be supremely difficult for them to actually get there (the threat of interception especially); and largely because of the result. If the USSR backed Argentina militarily, then the US would immediately have joined on the British side. Soviet backing effectively guarantees the US backing Britain.
Regarding nukes, they pose several main issues. Firstly would be that once the British government makes a threat to use them, it must follow up on that threat with action if the demands aren’t met or the UK will look weak in the eyes of the Soviets (a disaster for the UK and NATO)!
However, the nukes would only be a last resort. If the Argentinians obtained a decent stock of anti-shipping missiles somehow and sank many, or all, of the landing ships or aircraft carriers then some might see it as justified though I personally can’t see how it would help us capture the islands (though we’d certainly be the winner)! If our amphibious forces are destroyed, we cannot “capture” the islands and nukes would be unable to perform the role of ground troops, the only way they would be effective would be to threaten their use, but this threat would be easy to call the UK’s bluff on, then if the UK doesn’t carry out the threat it will look even weaker! The UK is also quite limited in what it can threaten, ideally it could threaten to hit large troop concerntrations in revenge and could hit “empty space” as a warning shot, but these concerntrations would be quickly dispersed leaving the UK targetless and letting the Argentinians call the UK’s bluff again making the UK look weak! Finally though, the UK could do the dirtiest trick, go around threatening Argentina’s cities populations with nuclear strikes with the intention of causing a mass panic and creating a huge domestic crisis for the Argentine government!
Part of the problem for the use of nuclear weapons, should Corporate face more problems, is actually choosing what to target. There is zero chance that Britain would go and nuke Buenos Aires, full stop! However, a limited yield weapon (these were perfectly available at the time), used on a purely military target, would be a possibility. A WE177 dropped on, say, one of the southern airbases used for Argentine air-strikes, would be a possibility. It is, of course, a weapon of last resort though. A much more likely escalation (if a carrier has been severely damaged or sunk, that’s escalated it a long long way already) would be a conventional bombing raid on the airbases. A Vulcan could fly over and drop cluster bombs on an Argentine airbase. This is unlikely to cause much in the way of collateral damage, since the cluster bombs would be dropped over the base, hence not spread very far. A cluster-bombing of, say, two airbases, would be possible, potentially without a Black Buck style raid. One possibility would be a more rapid conversion of VC-10 or Tristar type aircraft, allowing a Vulcan to be ‘towed’ more of the way.
If they UK did choose to use nuclear weapons it would also have to choose which delivery system to use, which poses a few issues itself. The Polaris SSBN’s can make a strike that can’t be intercepted, but they are also very vital to oppose the Soviets so might be judged too valuable to use in such a minor strike and they would be excessively powerful for the strike needed (the minimum force would be 3 x 200kt warheads)! The alternative would be using WE.177 air dropped bombs from Vulcan bombers, but only a single target could be hit per “black buck” operation and each would be a huge operation. They might well be shot down if going over the mainland in which case the Argentinians could gain access to a nuclear weapon which could used as a threat (though the UK would likely call their bluff!) or worse be dropped on the fleet though any first detonation by Argentina against the UK would be a very bad move and would just be inviting the UK to make a second strike using Polaris.
Actually, this isn’t entirely true, the Polaris could have been fired with just Chevaline (the decoys) and a single warhead, without any real difficulty. Also, I believe the warheads were adjustable (though in the pre-set sense) yield, so could be set for a much lower yield. Of course, Polaris may be the safest choice, but it is also more difficult to replace – the US may object to replenishing the UK’s Polaris stocks if it considers the strike unnecessary.
Similarly, as I say above, it isn’t really necessary to make it a full Black Buck – remember, a single WE177 is not very heavy, hence the herculean efforts needed for the Black Buck missions is not necessary. Remember, the 21 x 1000lb bombs weighed a heck of a lot, obviously, and meant less fuel could be carried. In contrast, the Shrike missile raids needed a lot less support; also, as I mention above, it is highly likely that the UK would have pressed the VC-10 into tanker use much faster, and would therefore have had an easier time of it.
The other thing to consider is that if Argentina hit Invincible (in a sense, it was considered a lot better than hitting the more capable Hermes), then the UK might threaten to use nuclear weapons, and end up with the US intervening on their side to avoid this. The RN had looked at bringing Bulwark back into service, and a Operation Corporate II would have taken around six months, during which a lot would happen. The UK would get a lot of other systems into service (a lot of crash programs only missed use by a few months, notably the Sea King AEW). It would potentially involve Hermes, Bulwark and Illustrious, plus a couple more container ships, fitted with defensive systems (with the luxury of a couple of months to fit them this time!). All the ships would have had Phalanx, and overall, the force would be a lot more potent. You’re probably looking at around 50 Harriers/Sea Harriers, as many as perhaps ten Sea King AEWs, better equipped ships, and new tankers for the bombing raids.
I very much doubt Thatcher would fall, she would instead try to put the UK on a war footing – there is no chance whatsoever that the UK would simply give up after losing a carrier. Instead, there would be a heck of a lot more resolve to hit the Argentines back! During the gap between Corporate I and Corporate II, the UK would keep its subs down there, sinking shipping, and have the bombers keep hitting targets, and subs landing special forces, to carry out commando-style raids. Basically, it would not be six months of genuine gap, but rather six months of waiting for the UK to resume full intensity ops!
EdLawThe problem is that the Harrier is not very capable when operating in the VTOL mode – hence the change to STOVL ops. When operating in VTOL mode, the Harrier’s payload is pretty poor, and frankly, its now more of an airshow stunt. The Skyhook plan was ambitious, and even then was considered far-fetched as a real capability. You certainly would never want to remove the undercarriage, even if Skyhook ops are the planned ops.
For the UAV capability, it should be possible to pack a UAV in a 40ft ISO container, and one of these containers would take around one third of the space needed for a Harrier or JSF. In fact, because a 40ft container is actually shorter than a JSF, and only around 1/4 the width, it should be possible to pack them even tighter, and get at least 4 UAVs in place of one JSF! So, the British CVF could probably embark 24 F-35Cs (in CTOL form, as I would like it to be!), 4 Hawkeyes, 4 Merlins, and potentially 48 Reaper-class UAVs. Even the Aussie LHD should be able to carry at least 48 Reapers if embarked instead of helos and some vehicles. This would be a pretty neat capability!
EdLawDistiller: On the Cavour issue, I deliberately left it off the list actually, as it is a proper carrier, complete with the costs! Basically, it is a lot cheaper than a single large carrier, but much more expensive than the cheap(ish) LHDs like Mistral and BPE.
Part of the problem for the US Navy is that they can afford sufficient numbers of proper carriers, and therefore this sort of solution isn’t ideal. A CTOL carrier, in pretty much any form, is going to cost well into the multi-billion dollar range. The idea with the smaller carriers only really works with the F-35B, because it is basically the first time that a proper fighter equivalent to land based ones has been available. It allows the small, i.e. 20-30,000 ton, cheap amphib carriers to become semi-viable strike carriers.
As soon as you move up to the 40-50,000 ton range, you end up with something very much like the American LHA-6 design (America class). This, of course, pushes the price up to many billions, and it ends up costing the same as (or more than) the British CVF!
Remember, the US Navy basically sits on a forty year schedule for fundamental change in its carrier fleet. It therefore takes a lot to make any real change, other than a simple scaling up or down. The US Navy would never accept a non-CTOL fighter as their main carrierborne aircraft, and would not accept anything smaller than around 50-60,000 tons as a carrier replacement. At best, this would mean them buying something the size of the CVF as a new carrier, and would not get more than a 1.5:1 replacement ratio.
Don’t get me wrong, a future US Navy consisting of six Nimitz and twelve CVF-type carriers would be pretty attractive in some ways. On the other hand, simply not building the $12bn new CVNs might help the US Navy! The new USN carriers seem to be the same ridiculous path as the DDG-1000, i.e. a massively expensive ‘upgrade’ that ends up just costing three times as much as the alternative!
Schorsch: this has been proposed a number of times already – the US looked at building tiny lily-pad carriers of a mere 6,000 tons, that were expected to carry a couple of F-35Bs max. The aim was to have these sitting off the coast, and presumably function pretty much as FARPs (forward arming and refuelling points). I believe Israel had actually voiced an interest, but the whole project (I’m pretty sure it was one of the many Rumsfeld-isms) fell apart.
Another expression of this concept was the BAE UVX, which was basically to be a weird stretched Type 45 destroyer, with a flight deck aft, complete with angled ski-jumps either side. The aim was basically to carry a few UCAVs on the ship, which would presumably need to be STOVL UCAVs, to allow ops from the available deckspace. Basically, the whole thing was just a complete dead-end – there simply isn’t justification for that sort of thing. It ends up being cheaper to simply build something like the British HMS Ocean, French Mistral or Spanish BPE; all of these would be much more capable, and less risky.
As for UAVs, the problem is that in order to carry any real weapons, the UAV needs to be pretty big, i.e. bigger than the Shadow 200 realistically. Unless it is a helicopter-based UAV, then deckspace is a real difficulty. You could pack anything up to Predator size in an ISO container, to operate from a proper carrier, and then fold it back up afterwards. This does have potential advantages, though there are some issues about safe ops in the maritime environment, and the type of ships it can operate from (e.g. will it need arresting gear?). If it doesn’t need arrestor gear, or at least not the proper gear of a CTOL carrier, then it might be possible to use from the smaller amphib carriers. The UAVs would then be stored in the containers, and parked in the vehicle deck – the containers would be easy to pack in tightly, and should be easy to bring up to the hangar and flight deck when needed. As such, something like the new Aussie LHDs could dispense with their vehicles, and instead carry dozens of UAVs, all fully weapons capable!
EdLawThe problem is that smaller carriers cannot carry large enough airgroups to carry out both defensive and offensive roles at the same time – you need to risk the carrier to carry out a strike. The basic need for defence is generally considered to be 12 fighters, to allow for basic CAP operations. The larger the carrier, the more aircraft over and above the basic twelve aircraft, hence the greater the number of aircraft available for strike ops.
This is not to say that groups of smaller carriers couldn’t be a good option – four small carriers, based on amphibs, e.g. the BPE or Mistral, would potentially allow around 48-64 fighters (12-16 each). This would then allow the group to put up good size strike groups when needed. They then also have the advantage of being able to be used singly or in pairs for less demanding duties, or be used for amphib ops. On the other hand, larger numbers of smaller carriers doesn’t really offer the same thing as a larger carrier. Four small carriers will probably take at least as many people to run them as one large carrier; and they need more escorts if you want them to operate as anything other than a single group.
EdLawI agree in principle, though Sealord’s phrasing is perhaps not as clear as it could be. In effect, the USN is built less on specific naval requirements, and more on the desire to have the most capable fleet possible with the money allowed. As such, if the amount of money available increased, the Navy would increase in size, and the same in reverse should funding levels drop. Many navies are built to achieve the necessary force level to accomplish their mission, i.e. first and foremost, national defence, and secondly power projection. The US Navy, on the other hand, is primarily built for power projection, and not national defence.
This wasn’t always strictly true, and is more a result of the disappearance of the Soviets as a threat. During the Cold War, the Navy had many missions, mostly crucial to national defence – frigates for trade protection; destroyers, frigates, carriers and MPAs for ASW, hunting for Soviet SSBNs and SSNs; and carriers to help intercept Soviet bombers. In essence, the fleet was built heavily around protection of the nation and economy (the trade protection role especially), and power projection as a secondary mission, e.g. putting carriers off Korea, Vietnam, etc… Once the Cold War ended, the Navy shrank, and re-roled itself as primarily a power projection force, with other missions almost being an afterthought.
It’s not a criticism though, it just sums up the fact that the USN is primarily for missions other than strict national defence!
EdLawDamn I’m envious of you, Phantom II, though I’d have picked the Navy! :diablo:
EdLawDon’t think so, I just checked the Scramble database, and it would appear that it stops at M23-38. I didn’t check all the way through from the start to end, but it certainly stops at -38, so it may be possible some were allocated serials even though not active?
EdLawI agree, there are a lot of simple solutions to the problem that mitigate the risks – as Sens rightly says, you have to be aware of the presence of the UAV to hit it! A lot of UAVs can fly high enough, or at least can be given quiet engines, such that they cannot be heard from the ground. I suspect this may become a major design influence in future, since a decent engine would allow most UAVs flying above, say, 3000ft to be pretty much impossible to hear. Similarly, simply painting the UAVs grey helps reduce the probability of a visual sighting, combined with the low speed – the lower the speed, and the further away, the harder it is to detect movement. This is, of course, primarily a concern for human sighting capabilities; a proper visual/IR sight may negate many of these advantages.
EdLawThis may not help much but the Malaysian serials for the Nuris are:
M-23-1 to M-23-42
http://www.designation-systems.net/non-us/malaysia.html
The construction numbers seem to have started at 61-408, and appear to have gone sequentially initially, but I’m not sure how far this holds true. As for the original FM numbers, I am not sure, as I can’t find a source.
Sign In
