I have to seriously question the assertion alluded to in the article that $2.7bn is a bargain, and that a new ship would cost $4bn. It has to be taken into account that the ship is fundamentally an old ship that has been re-worked. The $4bn figure is suspiciously high, considering the costs of other carriers – heck, even the British CVF project only just touches that figure (c.£4bn for two – c.$8bn for two, i.e. $4bn each); and that is for very large, very capable carriers. I suspect that the Indians would have been much better getting the French to simply build them a modified Charles de Gaulle, with conventional propulsion. This would have been a bit more expensive, but far more capable – the Indians had a long experience of CTOL operations prior to buying Harriers, and it makes more sense. I also suspect that a deal with the French would have allowed the new Indian-built carriers to be of the same design – the French would build the lead ship of the class. As it is, India is getting an elderly orphaned ship, from a supplier that seems to be becoming less and less cooperative. Not an ideal situation!

It would appear that the Russians are really playing a dangerous game with India. Lately they seem to be messing the Indians around a lot, with the Gorshkov and Mil deals especially. It is actually pretty odd – at a time that the US is trying to make inroads into the Indian market and buy their favour, the Russians should be trying to cement their relationship, not sour it!

I think that part of the problem is that making some space for the slanted Harpoon-type launchers, whereas a VLS needs a lot more space, and also weighs a lot more than just a missile in a fairly simple tube. As it is, Boeing have designed a VLS-compatible version of Harpoon, but as far as I know, there hasn’t been much interest in adopting it. The US Navy seems to be perfectly happy using Standard as an anti-shipping missile, alongside smaller numbers of Harpoons. Basically, for a variety of reasons, the US Navy has placed a lower priority on the classical anti-shipping mission, especially given the lack of major surface threats (other than small ships).

For the purposes of the British C-1/C-2, there are a lot of major questions, as were discussed in Sealord’s C-1/2/3 thread. The general consensus was that C-1 should either share the basic design of the T-45, or should have a common design with the C-2. The C-2 can be either a full spec warship, probably with land-attack capability; or it can be a cheaper large patrol ship. For the latter role, a modified Absalon could suffice, since the ability to carry a small special forces or boarding component would make some sense. Speed is not really as important as overall endurance for the extended patrol duty.

I would definitely, however, want a good size flex-deck onboard the C-1 and C-2 (and C-3 preferably), allowing them to embark similar packages to the American LCS. They should be able to carry MCM gear, ASW gear, or whatever is needed. All the ships should have enough internal space to carry at least two 11m RHIBs and two or more WLD-1 UUVs, or equivalent. Add in some extra berthing space, allowing up to around sixty troops to be carried, and you’ve got a reasonably good capability.

Tinwing: As for my point about the speed, as I have mentioned before, the best tool for use against small boats is the helicopter. I would contend, however, that the LCS should not rely on other ships for its own defence (beyond the single RAM and 57mm gun). The Brits learned the hard way in the Falklands that you cannot always rely on the umbrella protection of other ships. I would argue that at the very least, adding ESSM would make sense – heck, one possibility would be to have two different versions of LCS, the normal LCS, and a version of the multi-mission one discussed elsewhere. The multi mission versions would make a possible replacement for the old Perry class (pre SM-1 removal), allowing a slightly more balanced surface fleet. As it is, the fleet is heading for a very unbalanced fleet, with the huge, heavily armed Arleigh Burkes at one end, and the lightly armed but fast LCS at the other end.

http://www.shipsandharbours.com/picture/number3697.asp
May I humbly submit the Swedish stealthy corvettes, like HMS Härnösand? A bit small (650 tons), but with the requisite range (2300 nm) and perhaps sufficient armament too. Not that Sweden would bash anyone else’s country, they stopped doing that a few hundred years ago!

I agree, if we are genuinely talking in terms of littoral combat, the Visby is pretty decent. My only concerns with it are the lack of a hangar – the tanker wars in the ’80s and the Gulf War showed that the best defence against missile boats is the helicopter. The Visby potentially packs a heck of a punch, though it may suffer in terms of terminal defence (i.e. no real CIWS), though I may be wrong, as the Unkhonto may suffice. Unfortunately, as the Israelis and Brits can attest, terminal defence against air and missile attacks are essential.

By the way, Papa Lima, do you have any news on the integration of Unkhonto, and also the RBS-15 Mk3 (I know they were planning to just fit Mk2s, but I hope this has changed)? The Visby might even be a good option for some of the Baltic nations, especially Poland, to replace their old patrol boats.

There are good reasons for keeping SSKs, though one of the best has always been the simplest: to keep the industry busy! They are good for many roles, and, for instance, if Argentina became more unfriendly, then stationing an SSK would make sense (if it means not needing to permanently task a much more expensive nuclear boat). Equally, if the UK wanted to maintain a watch on any choke points (GIUK, Gibraltar, Suez, Hormuz, Singapore etc…), then SSKs would make a lot of sense. I would argue that if we can only get 8-10 SSNs, then we really should look at getting some SSKs. If the capability is right, and the price is right, it could even form some kind of collaboration with Australia’s Collins replacement project.

It also has to be remembered that the Gripen is a pretty advanced fighter, from a company that has many decades of producing very advanced fighters. In contrast, the Tejas is basically coming from a company that hasn’t got much of a track record for design, and isn’t exactly cutting edge design-wise. The Gripen is very much a 4.5th generation fighter, where the Tejas is more of a 4th generation fighter.

Ankush: I agree wholeheartedly, and I appologise if I seemed to be implying there was anything wrong with the general idea. My problem was more to do with the amount of effort involved for the gains. The same basic aircraft could have been in service years ago if it had aimed to use off the shelf parts from the start. My concern is that India is putting a lot of money and effort into making a reasonably good aircraft, where it could have either saved money and had an equally good aircraft, or had a much better aircraft. One possibility might even have been to do a deal with France, buying more of the excellent Mirage 2000s and finishing the development work on the Mirage 4000, or even getting work on the Rafale project.

Personally, I think that the MRCA competition could have the potential to help a lot, especially if the Rafale is chosen. The future Indian Air Force certainly has the potential to remain an excellent force. If the future involves Flanker, Rafale, Fulcrum and Tejas, then that’s a lot of capability. In a sense, it is just a pity that LCA has taken so long to come to fruition!

As has already been mentioned by Swerve, the C-17 purchase is going ahead. The fact that Antonov An-124s and Ilyushin Il-76s are readily available and cheap has hurt the case for C-17s, and rightfully so. As odd as it is seeing Antonovs flying missions in support of NATO operations, the simple truth is that they are darned effective, and cheap. Some would argue that given Ukraine’s moves away from Russian influence, that Aviant in Ukraine should be contracted to build An-124-210s for the NATO airlift requirement – more capacity and capability than the C-17, and at lower cost!

As for the whole tanker deal, I very much doubt that the deal will be altered. The simple fact is that the USAF have too much experience lately of the GAO slamming their decision making where there is any element of doubt as to the motivations. I suspect that they will have made very sure they have dotted all the ‘i’s and crossed all the ‘t’s on this one, because the potential for fallout on this deal is just too big.