EdLaw… of course what we have actually works but now we have commonality with the US Navy which wont exercise with us because of our no nukes policy and their neither confirm nor deny policy.
A bit late, the US Navy only ordered the SH-2G (sixteen total) for the US Naval Reserves, and it was retired completely in May 2001. As such, any ‘commonality’ would be pretty one-sided, ANZUS or no ANZUS!
EdLawActually, the whole point of the permanently deployed force is to simply ensure that the equipment is in place for reinforcements that can be flown in at short notice. The aim is basically just to hold out for long enough for a couple of C-17s and Tristars to fly in an infantry battalion or two; this basically just means holding out 24-48 hours. Since any build-up by Argentina would likely be identified with at least a few days notice, this should be enough. Now, obviously it would be better if the fighters deployed down there can be equipped with an anti-shipping missile, this would be much better.
As for comments about there being no chance of an invasion, I strongly recommend you take a look at the rhetoric coming from Buenos Aires. The simple fact is that they still want to take the islands, and this will increase in coming years with the hydrocarbon resources discovered near the islands. When these are judged attractive enough for exploitation, this rhetoric could increase, and the prospect of invasion will rise dramatically.
Jon James: I don’t think that “if you invade our Falklands prepare to have your capital city wasted by cruise missiles” can be interpreted easily to mean the targetting of military targets. As has already been said, capital cities rarely contain much in the way of military targets, and ‘wasting’ a city generally does not mean precision strikes on a few military targets (which wouldn’t be much of a deterrent anyway).
EdLawMate, fair enough on all points; I’d even agree with your argument if there was something called consistency. Sadly there seems to be no consistency in any of this and therefore no proportionality. I can’t defend my countries actions in Iraq because they stand by and do nothing in Zimbabwe, a country that at least used to be full of expats. I can’t morally defend the West over whats happened in Iraq when I look at what happened in Rwanda. Then I look again and I see definite potential, potential for western political and economic gain in a country like Iraq. I look at Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa, I hardly see as much potential. That makes me wonder if your 2nd point holds any water.
So because Britain (et al) do not always intervene where there are human rights abuses warranting intervention, you argue that they should be barred from ever intervening? The simple fact is that it would be very difficult to intervene in Zimbabwe successfully; even just getting basing nearby would be almost impossible. In the case of Rwanda, it was a major failure of the UN Security Council members to commit resources; the sad thing was that the political will to carry out extensive peacekeeping (and peace enforcement) in Africa simply was not there.
As for supposed economic gain in Iraq, this is frankly absurd – if you actually look at the costs of operations, nobody in their right mind could possibly consider it profitable. Yes, some companies have made profit out of it, but again, it is absurd to think that a few companies decided to force a country to war simply to make some money.
Now, I suggest we put the whole issue of Iraq (etc…) away, and focus on the issues, i.e. the Falklands.
EdLawAs usual, I agree with Swerve, Sealord and Fed on this. It is ridiculous to think that the UK would maintain international support if it went round threatening what would amount to total war (i.e. the destruction of civilian targets in response to military actions). He is also completely correct with regard to international law (trust me…), proportionality has to be a major consideration.
Proportionality is something that permeates our lives, and dictates how we respond to many influences in our lives. On the international level, look at the Lebanon/Hizbollah conflict in summer 2006 – at the start, Israel actually had a great deal of international support. It was strange, even some Arab countries were reluctant to condemn Israel’s initial response; overall, Israel had a lot of backing. However, as soon as Israel was portrayed as targetting infrastructure and quasi-civilian targets (e.g. Hezbollah targets in civilian areas), things immediately changed, and Israel was almost universally condemned. The point is that any military response must be proportionate, and restrained in nature. Simply levelling Buenos Aires would be a warcrime, so whoever decides that it is the right strategy is risking a non-first class trip to The Hague…
EdLawThe A400M is plumbed for AAR as standard, & the hose unit is supposed to be very quick & easy to remove & install, so however many hose units you buy, the entire fleet are potentially tanker-transports.
Sorry for the confusion I caused, I know that they are all supposed to be capable of doing the AAR mission. I was simply meaning their actual assigned duty, i.e. sixteen would be primarily transports, and sixteen would train for the tanker mission as well. The actual physical differences between the two would, of course, be pretty much nil other than the actual hose and drogue kits being almost permanently installed on sixteen of the airframes. The idea was simply to illustrate the point that rather than just sixteen A-330s for tanking, with more available if absolutely necessary, there would be sixteen A-400Ms assigned the role as well. Hence it would be as many as thirty-two tankers when desired (which is good, since the current tanker fleet is over-stretched, partly due to being downsized over the last few years).
EdLawThe deployed RAF force do not sit there doing nothing 24/7, they still carry out intercepts of Argentine aircraft probing the airspace. The UK will be deploying Typhoons in a few years, and if there is need to deploy tankers and/or transports, the best bet would be the A-400M, which is a perfectly capable tanker.
The simple fact is that, 25 years or not, the Argentines still maintain an interest in taking the islands again; the UK wanting to defend the islands is nothing to do with pride. In fact, if anything, the rhetoric from Argentina has increased in recent years, so maintaining a garrison force is no bad thing, and is likely to need to continue for many years.
EdLawThe best hope actually lies with the A-400M, which is much cheaper, and still has similar capabilities (as a tanker) to the VC-10s. If the A-400M order can be increased, then things should improve somewhat, ideally allowing an end fleet of:
– 16 A-330s in the tanker role (all full-time RAF, not PFI…)
– 16 A-400Ms in the tanker-transport role
– 16 A-400Ms in the transport role
– 8 C-17s for transport
– 16 C-130J-30s in the inter-/intra-theatre transport role
– 16 C-130Js in the tactical intra-theatre role
All of these numbers should be achievable, and at least yield a better fleet than today – more tanker capability when needed, and more transport capacity than today.
EdLawI don’t really see it making much sense – just because the naval Lynx can be exported, does not make it worthwhile to subsidise it at the cost of actual capability. For the Army, the Lynx is simply proving too small and underpowered; its replacement needs to address these issues, not simply prolong them. For the Navy, I would argue that more Merlins for ASW, and a lighter, cheaper off-the-shelf helo for utility roles would make more sense.
The Army really need something in the H-60 or AW-149 class – heck, an up-engined AW-139 would be progress! The one problem, as I see it, is the lack of progress on the AW-149 (since the 2006 announcement, there doesn’t seem to have been much). Building the AW-149 to be naval-environment compatible would be an excellent move – a launch order for sixty for the Army, and twenty for the Navy (in a utility role, with some more Melins for ASW) would be a good idea. This would give the helo the ‘shot in the arm’ that it needs, and hopefully the order would then be doubled in time, allowing complete replacement of the entire Lynx fleet.
EdLawThe sad thing is that the Blackhawks actually offer a great deal more capability than the Lynx (of FLynx), with more cargo capacity, more seats, and other abilities. The only problem would be with the naval variant – I cannot see the UK buying the MH-60R, since it would need to be completely re-engineered to use British avionics and systems. An obvious alternative could have been to boost the Navy’s Merlin fleet, and give the Army either Merlins or Blackhawks, or both.
EdLawThere is no chance whatsoever of the Russians backing Kosovo, so trying to buy their friendship would be a costly exercise in futility. Russia will back Serbia, but Russia is not stupid enough to actually support any military action against Kosovo.
As for buying tanks, even that probably doesn’t make much sense – buying anti-tank weapons probably makes more sense (84mm Carl Gustavs, Spikes etc…). As I mentioned in an earlier post, the best bet is probably to adopt light infantry or even SWAT type tactics, with small units, using a range of weapons as needed. As such, light transport helos make the most sense – even Mi-17s could be considered overkill in some ways.
Another option aircraft wise might be the Cessna Caravan, which has apparently been giving sterling service over Bosnia, in support of the EU mission there. They would similarly make sense for the utility transport role, allowing a common fleet – perhaps eight Cessna Caravans in the two versions, plus eight Hueys would be an excellent small fleet.
EdLawThey would be smart to buy some Mil helicopters, Su27s, Russian SAM systems, and T-series tanks…..that would be interesting. Who cares if they need it…objective achieved. SOC, this should be considered as a borderline post, i didn’t discuss about their independence, but military hardware are always linked with politics. 🙁
That would make no sense at all – the population cannot support that sort of procurement. The protection of the new state will rely on the pledge of security granted by other nations, i.e. EU/NATO nations. They will probably try to join the Partnership for Peace as soon as possible, with an eye on NATO/EU membership.
EdLawIt might be worthwhile for some of the various NATO nations to sponsor a modest air capability, to replace their own deployed assets. This would most likely consist of a few Hueys, and perhaps some ex-German PAH-01s. A dozen helos at most, perhaps augmented by a very small number of light aircraft, e.g. Diamond DA-42 aerial surveillance aircraft (which would be cheap to buy and operate). The primary risks are not really military – Kosovo by itself really cannot cope with that threat alone – but from internal/cross-border violence. As such, a nice cheap air surveillance capability is actually very desirable. In a sense, they should really be thinking more along the lines of setting up a sort of police helicopter unit, to accompany a military that would basically be a well-armed SWAT force!
EdLawOne possibility for the Dutch, Danish and Swedes might be to cooperate directly, i.e. outside of SAC. Together, they could easily afford to pick up a couple of C-17s, to be operated jointly. This would have the benefit of actually owning the aircraft directly, and less chance that any of the three would monopolise the aircraft. Even two C-17s could be enough to operate efficiently, though obviously four would be better.
EdLawTo be honest, the most likely bets would be:
UK – strong possibility, especially given past statements
Sweden – possible, but more likely through SALIS
Germany – possible as a leased option, pending the delayed A-400M program
and of course:
SALIS – boosting airframe numbers given the number of parties to it!
I wouldn’t write off the possibility of Singapore, who have made moves towards an expeditionary capability, especially for humanitarian purposes. Two would be a small but effective fleet for a nation with modest needs.
EdLawAs far as I know, the new tankers are to MRTT spec, i.e. roll-on roll-off pallets for seating, allowing cargo pallets and/or troops as needed. Given their substantial cargo capacity, they should be very useful.
In some ways, it is a pity they didn’t just order 32 Airbus A-310s when the production line was shutting down (perhaps getting a bargain on them).
There is a lot of confusion over how on Earth just nine to fourteen tankers are expected to replace the currently over-utilised VC-10 and Tristar fleet. The A-400M might be an answer, since it allegedly has similar abilities to the VC-10, and therefore sixteen extra A-400Ms could address a lot of the problems; especially if combined with a conventional procurement of sixteen A-330 tankers. I would definitely double the A-400M order, even though they aren’t ready yet, in order to actually replace the tankers, and complement the C-130J fleet. This would, once in service, sort out a lot of the RAF’s transport shortages, and boost overall UK capabilities a lot.
Sign In
