Though it was rather on the large size (I believe it was pretty much the max the Valiant could drop…). Britain needed to prove to the US that it could build a thermonuclear warhead, partly to gain access to the more developed US weapons. If memory serves, the demonstration drop was actually the big fission bomb, rather than the thermonuclear weapon, as they could at least guarantee it would work as planned…

It is correct, however, to suggest that a modern weapon in that yield range would pretty much have to be thermonuclear.

The beauty of RAM is it’s modular “bolt-on” capability, with Sea Ram using Phalanx chassis units it’s essentially a self contained system of genuine effectiveness. That does offer the type a genuine self defence capability if needed to conduct MCMV or security ops in or near hot zones without a major weapons upgrade being required. Whether to go with Sea Ram or the lightweight, modular drop in VLS developed for LCS (which should easily be able to be accomodated as just another mission module given the intended modular architecture of C3) is a debatable point though. But I agree, the RN have to make sure that C3 doesn’t become an alternative warship and excuse to further cut hull numbers of the Frigate force.

As far as I’m aware, the LCS uses the normal RAM launcher, not a modular VLS – there is a sort of modular VLS for Netfires, which amounts to a VLS for Hellfire size missiles, but not SAMs. I suspect the best bit would be to go for the SeaRAM or the 21-round RAM launcher, perhaps using an ASRAAM body instead (though to be honest, I would be tempted to just stick to the RIM-116 RAM). C-3 needs to have a main gun, CIWS (either Phalanx, Goalkeeper or even the Millenium Gun) and a SeaRAM launcher, perhaps plus wiring and space for things like Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

The reason I advocate a simple basic Lafayette style empty box (with a standard basic weapons fit), but with different specific equipment. This would allow C-2 and C-3 to have very high commonality, up to and including most of the command and control spaces (basic Barco consoles, plugged into the ship’s data bus). The C-2 then has all the nice bits bolted in/on, giving them their fleet role, and the C-3 embarks equipment as needed, i.e. MCM gear, boarding parties etc… This does potentially carry some risks of the Treasury wanting cuts, but to be honest, there’s not really any way around this – the RN wants no less than 24 new ships! Building a follow-on batch of T-45 derivatives, and then a further large batch of varying-spec ships might be the best bet. The other possibility would be a lease-to-buy deal, at least for the C-3s, i.e. the RN buys outright the eight C-2s, and leases the eight C-3s for, say, ten years, and then makes a modest balloon payment, and gets the ships outright. By going for a suitably modular design, we build in the ability to build in much greater capability if the need ever arises, e.g. if a major ASW requirement is recognised, then C-2 can have a VDS fitted, and ultimately, so can C-3, with sufficient upgrade.

One sticking ground, as already identified on this thread, is the possibility of fitting a VLS, which adds a fair bit of cost. It might be worthwhile simply building a suitable empty space (and the weight allowance) for fitting if needed. As such, they can be built for, but not with, an ASTER launcher for up to 32 rounds (it is empty space, so building it for thirty two cells is not much more expensive than building it for sixteen non-existant cells…).

There are good arguments on both sides, the C-2 can be either an up-gunned C-3, or a down-gunned C-1/T-45. There is good potential, I suspect, for three versions of the Type 45, i.e. the AAW destroyer, C-1 ASW vessel, and a C-2 (perhaps even a land attack version). This would actually mean a total of around 24 ships, which could potentially yield similar value-for-money to the American Arleigh Burke class.

For C-3, perhaps the best thing is then to aim for a cheap, but still highly flexible design. I would argue that the C-3 should still be a genuine warship, even if it is more of an Aviso type, i.e. a light patrol frigate, with emphasis on patrol… The VT design wouldn’t be a bad option, as long as it is capable of being fitted with modular armament. It is for this reason, at the risk of being shot for bringing it up again, I advocate something similar to the Danish patrol ships, which are cheap, but still well armed. If these vessels are to be sitting off the Falklands, and potentially off Iraq (supporting maritime interdiction ops), then I would rather accept needing a few more crew, and having the ability to defend oneself against more than just a few bad guys with RPGs in a RHIB! I would definitely push hard for the highest reasonable tonnage, to give good seakeeping (especially off the Falklands).

Type 45 – as is; 8 total

C-1 – If we assume these are mostly for fleet ASW, then could be stretched or shrunk T-45, or just normal T-45 plus towed array; 8 total

C-2 – Overseas patrol presence, preferably stretched T-45, equipped for land attack; 8 total

C-3 – Lower cost patrol combattant, but still moderately well armed (i.e. 76mm gun, CIWS and short range defensive SAM, and ability to carry anti-ship missiles), and with good helo facilities. 8 total, but ideally more over time, to replace the current OPV(H)s.

Displacements: (Just for purposes of debating)

T-45: 7500 tons (ish…)
C-1: 6,500-7,500 (ish…)
C-2: 7,500-8,500 (ish…)
C-3: 3,500-4,500 (ish…)

I agree Steve, the one thing I would say is that it could do with being diesel engined (for cost reasons). The Formidable class, or the Danish or Dutch so-called ‘Patrol vessels’ would be a very good way to go. The Danish ones would perhaps be the ultimate option, given their significant displacement, and ability to mount significant armament. The Danish patrol ships will be able to carry a 127mm gun, anti-ship missiles, torpedoes and a VLS (Mk 41, whereas a British one would presumably opt for one of the Sylver launchers). Despite their significant size, they are supposed to be very cheap, especially whole life-wise (sadly I’ve had whole life costing drilled into me over the last few years…). Diesel engines are a good option, especially given their future ability to switch over to bio or synthetic fuel sources, and their relative economy. I also like the potential to give them a two-helo hangar, allowing them to embark either two manned helos, or potentially more UAVs. There has even been mention of adding Tomahawk capacity to the Danish patrol ships.

Before people say these designs are too big, it is worth noting that the Spruance class proved to be a great ship for the US Navy, in large part because it was bigger than necessary. Building in growth capacity into the new ships is a very positive thing. As such, I would be very happy to see an order for a C-2 and C-3 both based on a common hull, as long as the base version (for C-3) is cheap enough. I would certainly push for at least 4,000 tons, preferably a fair bit more than that, to allow greater capacity. One major benefit of going a bit larger is that it allows for greater autonomy, and generally greater capability. This is why I would push for even the C-3 to be sufficiently well armed to defend itself properly, which means a minimum of short range SAM (possibly in a sealed VLS, thus protecting it, which helps), and a good CIWS.

Frankly, I suspect VT or BAE would go weak at the knees at the prospect of being given an order for sixteen new ships of a common design – it might be worth giving the entire order to, say, VT, and having them build the basic hull, and then allowing the actual equipment fitout to be competed separately. Sixteen T-45 versions (8 T-45s and 8 C-1s, which the general consensus here says should be a stretched cheaper version of the T-45) and sixteen overseas patrol vessels, i.e. eight medium-high intensity ones, and eight low-medium intensity ones.

That was my point, Distiller, the 737 or A-320 are not suited to low level flight, hence systems are being developed/revised to allow operation at medium level instead.

The best bet is probably still a converted airliner, but I certainly wouldn’t bet on a widebody, unless you want to build in other roles (i.e. to justify the costs). An Airbus A320/321 or Boeing 737 is probably the best bet, since they should offer sufficient internal space, and are a lot cheaper than a widebody. I would ideally want to have some other roles transferred over to modified versions of the same airframe in time, e.g. AWACS (once they need replaced), and frankly, I would still have liked to see maritime patrol being done by A-321s with the MRA-4’s systems!

As mentioned, the conversion of an MRA-4 is probably the only realistic choice, which is a great pity. The best bet, given all the troubles with the Nimrod fleet, might be to simply scrap the rebuild program, and either have BAE build totally new MRA-4s, or switch to another airframe. New build MRA-4s would make some sense, though I am concerned about the prospect of building old flaws in new aircraft. The problem, obviously, is that switching to a totally new aircraft like the A-320 would bring new problems, and most notably, delays. It could easily take five more years to get an A-320 patrol aircraft ready for service entry. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as it may prove better to wait a few more years to get an aircraft that is 30-50 years (depending on which way you count it) newer!

There is good potential for a British-designed A-320 derivative, especially if combining the AEW and ELINT roles. If you add up all the different versions and numbers, it could be thirty or more aircraft, possibly more if the budget were available.

As for Jackonicko’s suggestion that 5-6% of GDP spending is needed, I do disagree on the figure – a lot more than now could be done with 3-3.5%, and more pallatably. The good thing is that finally there does seem to be a rising consensus that the armed forces have been run down too far, especially given the tempo of current operations.

Frankly, I disagree with a lot of your conclusions, Distiller.

Firstly, the idea of a unified air corps has consistently been rejected for good reason. Okay, there is some duplication of effort, though not all that much, but it has proven effective. Different missions call for different capabilities, and also a different ethos. There is potential in the future for a degree of commonality, i.e. the F-35 will be in service with USAF, USN and USMC, but you certainly do not want to be trying to have USAF pilots flying off carriers. Also, significantly, by unifying all airpower into one service, it becomes very insular, and generally ends up neglecting other needs.

Also, how much duplication is there? You list the C-17, tactical airlifter, FCS, UCAS, LHAs, and KC-X. I really do not understand why you would list any of these, and none (with the exceptions of UCAS, which was joint until the USAF decided it didn’t want any, and the tactical airlifter, which is a joint program) are very suitable for joint procurement. The simple fact is that most defence programs are very service-oriented – one of the few genuinely arguable areas is with the Army and Marines, but even here, a lot of assumptions are deeply flawed. If the Marines had canned the V-22, it is likely they would have ended up buying the H-60 (probably the MH-60S), but they didn’t.

As for the new bomber, I agree with Jon, the best bet would be something in the same class as the B-2, though perhaps a cheaper version. A slightly smaller B-2 – perhaps using a pair of commercial-derived CFM-56s, or just switching to newer engines with more dry thrust – would be a good option. A new round of procurement for this ‘B-3’ needs to see at least eighty aircraft built.

I would also look very seriously at a new FB-22 class lighter bomber, to bulk out the bomber force. It would need to be capable of carry much better payloads than some of the FB-22 proposals, though. It needs to be able to carry a good number of 500lb weapons, as well as at least two, preferably four, 5000lb class weapons. One of the proposals was to use a stealthy pod on the wing, to carry a single 5000lb weapon under each wing; these being capable of carrying 2 x 2000lb weapons instead, in tandem. If the new FB-22 were to have four of these pods, then this would allow for up to 10 x 2000lb class weapons (four under each wing, and two internally in bulged fuselage weapons bays).

A bomber fleet consisting of one hundred heavy bombers, and two hundred much lighter bombers would be a fitting replacement for the existing fleet.

As for using a 767 as for close support, this is far from practical, and not especially sensible. Just because current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan face less anti-aircraft threat, does not mean that there is no threat. Also, the costs of running a tactical jet are not bad compared to trying to use a larger airliner. Also, tactical jets are able to transit very quickly, especially useful in Afghanistan, where the distances involved are significant, which an airliner could not do. Also, I seriously doubt that you could get a properly designed 767-bomber in three years – it is not just a matter of bolting a couple of pylons on the wings, or putting a bomb bay in the baggage hold.

One more sensible idea for the cruise missile launching bomber role, would be to go ahead with the proposal for launching cruise missiles from the back of C-17s. This is not actually too difficult, a lot of thought has already gone into it, there just hasn’t been an actual requirement.

The better bet for cheaper CAS would be to simply bring more A-10s back into service, preferably upgraded to A-10C spec. If you feel you need even more aircraft, then you could opt for a new subsonic trainer derivative, e.g. a tactical version of the Navy’s T-45, i.e. the BAE Hawk. These would be able to carry most weapons you need, and at a much lower cost.

As for your proposal to scrap the LHA program in favour of one more CVN, why? The Marines need to replace the old LHAs, so you would have to cut their capability sharply, just to add one CVN. It makes little sense – it adds a tiny amount of capability to one force, at a massive cost to another force.