The sad thing is that if Japan really wanted a big-wing more strike capable F-16 derivative, they could of course have just put the F-16XL into service. Perhaps even add the drooped nose with the Hornet’s radar, as the USAF tested on one of the development F-16s. Even add in the thrust vectoring of the MATV, and combine all these features – it would probably still cost a lot less than the F-2!

Hmm, I do agree that there were more tactful ways of putting it, but that just happens sometimes.

I would suggest that the unit cost of the F-35C would reduce overall with a greater number ordered, by virtue of it being produced in greater numbers. It is basic production run dynamics that a larger batch generally equals a lower unit cost. In this case, rather than buying ‘x’ of a cheaper type, and ‘y’ of a slightly more expensive type, you aim to buy ‘z’ of the more expensive one, hoping that the reduced unit cost of the more expensive one will save money overall. Frankly, I do doubt that the latter is true, i.e. it might make the -C cheaper than it would have been before, but it is unlikely to be cheaper than the average unit cost of the -As and -Cs in their numbers.

Basically, it is a big equation, since it involves very uncertain numbers, both in terms of cost estimates, and estimates as to numbers. I doubt they will cancel either the -A or the -C, and almost certainly not the -B. I would argue that what is really needed are more cheap fighters, possibly even just F-16s or even refurbed A-10s, but that’s enough to get you shot in the USAF procurement circles…. :diablo:

If anything, it could be argued that the -C version is the ‘least necessary’! The Navy have the Rhino, and seem quite happy with it, and have the UCAV program on the go, so it is arguable that they don’t really need the F-35C. This is especially true if the Marines do get the F-35B, and put one squadron on each CVN, thus still giving a single squadron of stealthy fighters, to supplement a larger batch of Rhinos.

Perhaps that explains the long projection off the bow typically known as a “briddle catcher.”

I do have to wonder how many times you could reuse this type of cable?

I’ve seen pictures of a tremendous number of strops being stored near the elevators on Clemenceau/Foch. At the time, I assumed that the sheer number of these cables indicated only a single use?

Yeah, the bridle catcher was for strop catching if memory serves. It was arguably an inelegant solution, but it did its job.

In terms of the strops, they could be reused a few times, though you would always test them. You can generally tell how damaged a strop is by the feel of it, and there is the test gear for them, and you simply have to replace them frequently. I’ve done this myself, and its not all that hard, once you know what you’re doing.

Well, I suspect that Dakota with the AI.23 probably had a better endurance than the Lightning! Perhaps it was for the northern QRA? :diablo:

I doubt it, though I wouldn’t be all that surprised if Iraq hires in, say, Ukrainian Hinds, to be flown on their behalf. It is, though, important to differentiate between private companies operating aircraft on behalf of a government (this scenario), and them operating them for their own purposes. I suspect Iraq may well ‘contract out’ provision of attack helicopters, to get well trained crews, and be sure of who is using them. I doubt PMCs will try to do it themselves – ultimately, somebody has to be paying the bills for a PMC to be interested. It is certainly arguable that the most important thing for Iraq is to get ‘boots on the ground’ of their own, and then probably use western PMCs for facility protection. This makes a lot of sense, since you can be reasonably sure of the loyalties of contractors, but your own troops can often have other loyalties (as has been shown in Iraq…).

Once the US draws down forces in Iraq, probably down below 50,000, I suspect they will simply pull back from major cities etc… It is actually what they should have done years ago, and just operate out of much safer bases in western Iraq. You then rely on small observation units in the cities, which can be resupplied by air if necessary – if they spot bad guys, they can hit them, but you don’t need the overt presence of foreign troops. With fewer troops, in safer locations, casualty rates would go down a lot, and you can still prevent bad guys from taking hold of areas (you keep up surveillance, and hit them when they come out into the open). You then provide reconstruction, medical care etc, so that the Iraqis only see you doing good things, hence appreciate the presence more.

The Iraqi government has the biggest problem – how to rebuild their armed forces, in such a way as to be able to help defeat the insurgency, and yet have a proper national defence force. The last thing they need is to end up in five years with no real national defences, and have, say, Iran decide to do a land grab! This is why PMCs are very useful, they allow you to bring in niche capabilities, without needing to try and develop them yourself.

In terms of getting more firepower, I think the big step will be if they start using Hinds – they won’t get any western genuine gunship. This will not happen until the US Army pulls out. It could (and probably does) happen in Afghanistan though, and makes a lot of sense there. Being able to scare the bad guys is never a bad thing, and as long as Afghanistan is dangerous(!), there will be a need for PMCs to be well armed!

One interesting thing to note is the experience in Rhodesia, where the elite troops chose SLRs over AKs pretty much every time, despite the very ready availability of the latter. They found that the 7.62 NATO round would take down enemy infantry with single shots, and even go through small trees, whereas the AK needed a few rounds to take down a determined enemy. I find it very interesting that they chose the SLR over the seemingly greater firepower of the AK, and the latter’s greater magazine capacity. Mind you, I have read that some troops were able to modify the old Bren L4 (7.62mm conversion of the old Brens) mags to fit the SLR, allowing a 30 round mag.

I would probably want a 5.56mm weapon for close range or urban combat, and a 7.62mm NATO weapon for long range field work. The AK may be nice, but for me, it’s just too inbetween, i.e. its neither a good long range weapon, nor a good close combat weapon (being a bit too heavy for the latter). It does, however, have the major advantage of reliability. I would avoid drawing conclusions about accuracy based on the AK’s main users, who seem to like the ‘spray and pray’ method, firing as fast as possible in the general direction of the enemy. When used by well trained, well disciplined troops, the AK is a very effective weapon – just look at the Polish troops nowadays!

The major problem is that if Iran launched ballistic missiles at Israel, Israel might logically deduce that they are likely filled with non-conventional warheads… If this is the case, the Israeli response would likely involve a few Jericho missiles, with mushroom-inducing warheads!

Basically, the Iranians can only really hit Israel with long range missiles, since any airstrike would likely fail. Any visible Syrian involvement would spark outright war – this may make Iran happy, but I doubt Syria would be very happy about it! For Iran, they may be risking losing a nuclear facility or two, and maybe a few hundred lives, but Syria risks a conventional war, one which would likely cost many thousands of lives.

I do agree, however, that Iran could get Hezbolah to kick up the dust, and fire some rockets etc. The problem is that Israel has had a year to re-think how to do things, and know how to do, and how not to do things. Israel would, if they’re sensible, avoid hitting Lebanese government forces, and generally just be more precise with actually hitting the bad guys.

All in all, Iran has two basic options, conventional strike, as already discussed, or non-conventional (CBR strike). If they use CBR weapons, then things will instantly escalate out of control, with nuclear weapons flying, and lots of people not living to regret a stupid move by someone else.