wrightwing
let’s use MPH then.
Not either, it’s hearsay, unknown conditions and unproven datas at best vs USAF and L-M own figures.
Our 2000 “does” M 2.5 remember? (And then again we know it from military sources, not a forumer who have seen a TV programe and doesn’t understand the basics).
On the other hand, we are still waiting for you to explain how you expect F-35 to fly faster than a clean F-16 in Mil.
Here is an accurate simulated drag polar of the Viper as published by Edward AFB Flight Test Center.
Its wingsweep is 40*, that of F-35 33*.
F-16 supersonic region stars at M 1.15 and it have a higher Critical Mach than a 33* wing in the M 1.0+ area, the supercritical wing of F-35 drags MORE passed M 1.0 and have a higher drag polar pick value, it is only better before M 1.0 than a 40* swept laminary (reason for the M 0.98 cruise).
Now please show us how you will make F-35 fly faster than passed its transonic region with equivalent to lower TWR, and CRUISE at this Mach considering the exces of DRAG involved.
When L-M publishes datas on mission profiles giving ceillings and Machs, including cruise at M 0,98 for the attention of their customers, there is a reason for that, and these are NOT KPP figures but near-accurately predicted design points and Maximum.
Nothing stops them, but like I said, they consider supercruise to start at M1.5.
Actually they don’t, you interpret it as being a definition when it is not.
They actually changed from the “supersonic without afterburner” to “at M 1.5”, it doesn’t change the fact that the definition of Supercruise is not defined by L-M and doesn’t mean a particular Mach but SUPERSONIC CRUISE.
The aircraft that exceeded M1.7 were post FOC, so they weren’t preproduction aircraft exploring the flight envelope. Even General Jumper took an F-22 past M1.7 without afterburners.
The AdlA aircrafts that flew at M 2.5 were operational 2000s from ops squadron, this doesn’t make M 2.5 the real operational Maximum Mach of the Mirage 2000, at least we have the honnesty not to come up with this as the “evidence” that it is their top speed.
More relevant would be technical comments on how you guys intend to get F-35 to fly faster than a clean F-16 in Mil power with a lower Critical Mach and similar-to-inferior TWR, we’re still waiting.
The impression all of these spins gives is that obviously F-35 is not going to perform enough for its fans to pretend to be what it is not and beat the European so called legacy fighters (in reality as much of 5th generation as F-22 compared to F-15/F-16 which ARE the legacy) and that inflating figures at all cost became a fashionable thing to do.
Not too impressive.
How do you figure? It’s top speed is >M2.4. Aside from a Mig-31, what other fighter is going to go faster than an F-22, especially carrying weapons?
F-22 M 2.4? LOL!
Let us guess, all these are KPPS and you guys are WAY more competent than those who write them, we’re growing used to it. 😎
December 2008 PDF
Print this pageAir Supremacy in a DowndraftRobert S. Dudney
Editor in Chief (airforce-magazine.com)
The Air Force brand of air dominance has been around quite a while, so long that many now view it as a birthright.
It was April 1953. “TV Guide” was making its first appearance on newsstands. Young geneticists James D. Watson and Francis H. C. Crick were unveiling the so-called “double-helix” structure of DNA. Singer Harry Belafonte was celebrating his first hit single, “Matilda.”And in that same month, enemy aircraft (in Korea) killed a US soldier. He was the last to perish in this way; because of USAF’s vigilance, there have been no fatal air attacks on American ground forces—zero—in some 56 years.
The Air Force brand of air dominance—total, unquestioned, and suffocating—has been around quite a while, so long that many now view it as a birthright. It is not, a point made with special force and clarity by Dr. Rebecca Grant, director of the Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, in this issue’s lead article, “Losing Air Dominance.”
According to Grant, USAF today “is in danger of losing” its ability to guarantee command of the air, and, with it, its power to protect land forces, surmount enemy defenses, and subject an adversary to devastating aerial attack.
As Grant makes plain, the problem stems not from poor tactics or technologies but “from the breakdown of a fighter master plan set in motion after the Gulf War of 1991.” Air supremacy is in a downdraft; the fighter force is old and getting older. Soon, USAF will lack sufficient numbers of advanced fighters to operate in heavily defended airspace.
Grant’s story (excerpted from a fuller study, available at http://www.afa.org/mitchell/reports) makes for lamentable reading. It is a tale of how USAF, in the wake of the Gulf War, chose to forgo purchases of existing F-15s and F-16s and devote its resources to a smaller but highly advanced force of stealth fighters, only to see the plan run afoul of the Pentagon bureaucracy.
As is now well known, the key factor in the collapse was unwillingness on the part of three Administrations—Democrat and Republican—to adequately support the F-22 fighter. Over the years, it has been weakened by foolish reductions, culminating in the Bush Pentagon’s decision to cap the fleet at 183 fighters, about half of the required number.
This decision exploded the Air Force fighter plan. Yet the Pentagon did not adjust the national strategy to take account of this fact. As Grant wryly notes, “There was no announcement that the future threat had changed—just that the future should stop being such a problem for Pentagon planners.”
The demise of the F-22 explains the weakening of USAF’s grip on air dominance. Without sufficient numbers of this potent, world-beating fighter, all other elements of the air dominance mission are put at risk.
It is doubtful that, lacking F-22 support, much can be accomplished by other Air Force fighters, including the other “fifth generation” stealth aircraft, the F-35.
Not everyone agrees with this assessment, of course. Some in DOD think of the F-22 and F-35 as being interchangeable, and that more Raptors aren’t needed.
That, in fact, is the view of Pentagon chief Robert M. Gates and his top aide, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England. Both would sacrifice more F-22s to protect the F-35. Here are, however, some reasons to doubt their analysis:
. Stealth. The F-35’s all-aspect signature is much bigger than the F-22’s in key bands and against certain threats.
. Speed. The F-22’s top speed of Mach 2 exceeds that of the F-35.
. Supercruise. The F-22 can hit mid-Mach 1 speeds without resorting to fuel-gulping afterburners. The F-35 cannot.
. Altitude. The F-22 flies combat profiles at 50,000 feet; the F-35 employs at 30,000 feet.
. Weapons. The F-22, with a full bomb load, can carry four air-combat weapons in stealth mode. The F-35 can carry only two.
. Agility. The F-22 features vectored thrust and can turn at twice the rate of an F-35.
None of this is a military secret; from the start, the F-35 was conceived as the less-potent, less-costly “low” part of a “high-low” fighter mix. It may prove to be a stellar performer, but these weaknesses could make a huge difference in battles with the air arm of a near-peer such as China or Russia.
Final resolution of the fighter problem will fall to the new President, Barack Obama, and his advisors. In the campaign, Obama stated, “We must preserve our unparalleled airpower capabilities,” but no one really knows how he will resolve this issue.
First, top officers are sounding out lawmakers and others with a new proposal for 250 to 275 Raptors. This plan would lop more than 100 of the fighters from the long-validated requirement. DOD officials are sure to resist even this compromise, but lawmakers have expressed interest.
In fact, Congress in November finally forced a recalcitrant Pentagon to spend some F-22 funds that lawmakers had appropriated to keep the Raptor line open.
Second, USAF contemplates cuts in its legacy fighter forces as a way to save billions in maintenance and upgrade funds now flowing into these aircraft. Service officials say Fiscal 2010 will see accelerated retirements of 314 older F-15C and F-16 fighters and a smattering of A-10 attack aircraft.
These two moves, if realized, could leave the Air Force with a highly capable fighter force, but it would be small—perhaps too small to fully support current defense strategy.
Large nations—China, India, Russia—are moving aggressively to improve their airpower. Even less advanced nations are acquiring sophisticated air defense systems that will complicate USAF’s combat missions. The history of recent warfare makes plain that whoever controls the air has an excellent chance of dominating the entire battlespace.
For decades, that has been us. Without some large course correction, however, it might turn out to be someone else.
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2008/December2008/1208edit.pdf
According to the above Graphic the F 22’s cruise speed is 1.5 Mach without ab. We know in reality its 1.7.
Sorry NO; you do not know, they do.
There are differences between Operational and whatever conditions the reported M 1.7 was achieved.
Going this way we can write that “we know” that Mirage 2000 fly at M 2.5 which it have done but operationaly it is limited to 2.2.
I’m sure you can comprehend what FADEC settings can do for you… :diablo:
The .95 Cruise speed without AB of the F 35 is only the initial estimate. There is every chance that it will be over mach 1.0 in reality.
Apparently the drag resulting by flying in the middle of its Critical Mach pic values escapes you and BTW this is NOT an “initial estimate” it IS a design point as is the Maximum Mach of 1.6…
There is a very good reason why it is given for M 0.95, although i would rather write 0.98 myself, knowing that the wing profile is supercritical and the whole design optimised for the transonic regime it doesn’t change what the 33* wingsweep does for it.
Here is the F-16 drag polar, it have a 40* wingsweep.
These people doesn’t repport legends and flight test with all-out performances inachievable with operational aircrafts, they are USAF specialists, not forumers.
The F-22 didn’t bring about the
Russian, American, Indian. In many many articles relating to 5th gen fighters
The definitions are made by the Air Force flight test Center at Edward AFB, since they have to apply very precise standards to conduct tests it makes sens, many western flight test pilots graduates in the US, many French too so we know the procedures and standards.
Roughly:
Supersonic is a Region of the flight envelop where ALL parts of the aircrafts are OUT of the transonic region passed Mach 1.0, NOT “flying above Mach 1.0” which is a misconceiption of the word supersonic.
Technically F-16 doesn’t fly at supersonic speed in military power at M 1.15, being still within its transonic region.
Cruise is defined by the best throttle setting at the best altitude for speed/range, After Burner is of course not considered as a cruising regime.
SUPERsonicCRUISE in effect, means flying out of one transonic region in military power and cruising throtle setting, these depends on engine characteristics, not necessarly 95% but often 89% at typical throttle settings at least with engines such as EJ200 and M88, the F-119 is different being designed/optimised for the purpose.
Considering the known fact that the transonic region depends on the aircraft Critical Mach and therefore the wing sweep, it is unlikely that F-35 with 7* less sweep than F-16 will fly above M 1.05 which happens to be near or at the pic of its drag polar too.
This makes cruising in Mil too costly in drag/fuel consuption and in many cases is not even physically possible due to drag.
So the document posted earlier, published by the Air Force Association and giving F-35 cruising speed for M0.95 looks rather more accurate than all the rewriting and revisionism of aerospace standard we have seen in this topic on the subject.
In SHORT; “supercruise” doesn’t evolve around L-M, USAF or F-22.
Note that delta wings (including F-22 which produces the same vortex lift) are more likely to supercruise due to a much lower supersonic drag.
Mirage III Avon was supercuising in 1963 at M 1.3, so it is nothing expecially NEW nor historically related to the US, F-22 or the USAF.
Doc from AFA.org
That, in fact, is the view of Pentagon chief Robert M. Gates and his top aide, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England. Both would sacrifice more F-22s to protect the F-35. Here are, however, some reasons to doubt their analysis:
. Stealth. The F-35s all-aspect signature is much bigger than the F-22s in key bands and against certain threats.
. Speed. The F-22s top speed of Mach 2 exceeds that of the F-35.
. Supercruise. The F-22 can hit mid-Mach 1 speeds without resorting to fuel-gulping afterburners. The F-35 cannot.
. Altitude. The F-22 flies combat profiles at 50,000 feet; the F-35 employs at 30,000 feet.
. Weapons. The F-22, with a full bomb load, can carry four air-combat weapons in stealth mode. The F-35 can carry only two.
. Agility. The F-22 features vectored thrust and can turn at twice the rate of an F-35.
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2008/December2008/1208edit.pdf
Source: Air Force Association.
Note all the points i previously made (from official sources) are quoted, in particular Maximum Mach, and Ceiling.
On the topic of Critical Mach Number:
Theory.
Significant sweepback (40*, 50*, 70* or more) delays shock stall and reduces its severity when it occur.
It is only the component of the velocity across the chord of the wing (V Cos Alpha) which is responsible for the pressure distribution and so for causing the shock wave; the componentV sin Alpha along the span of the wing causes only frictional drag.
When it does appear, the shock wave lies parallel to the span of the wing, and only that part of the velocity perpendicular to the shock wave, i.e across the chord, is reduced by the shock wave to subsonic speed.
The greater the sweepback the smaller will be the component of the velocity which is affected, and so the higher will be the Critical Mach number, and the less will be the drag at all transonic speeds of a wing of the same t/c ratio and at the same angle of attack.
Sweepback not only increases the Critical Mach Number, but it reduces the rate at which the drag coefficient rises, and it lowers the peak of the drag coefficient – and 45* of sweepback does all this better than 30*.
Source: Mechanic of Flight.
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