ironically, Chinese warships made its first ever port visit to Japan today.
ironically, Chinese warships made its first ever port visit to Japan today.
by itself, I think the F-16XL has a lot of potential and is also quite the best looking F-16 variant.
However in the frame work of the competition it was in, the F-15E design better suited the requirements, especially since its two engines gave it more power potential in hauling A2G ordinance.
I personally think that Japan should’ve adopted the F-16XL design for the F-2 instead of what it currently has.
Sorry for reviving an ancient thread, but I was looking around the archives and found this thread.
Now that some significant time has passed, how have your after thoughts changed? or do they remain the same?
for most of the 80’s, I definitely would have to agree with the Tomcat. Its not my first choice due to the maintenance costs for such a complicated machine..but since the question stated “no costs, just air superiority”, I would go with the Tomcat followed by the F-15C.
Pics fron Deino on another site
As Borat would say “nice..varrry nice..i like”..:D
the anti-glare black paint is now being applied on all MK series fighters all along the canopy rim..saw it first on the MKM and its there on the MKA too..first few MKIs did’nt even have anti-glare paint fore of the canopy..
I personally don’t like the black anti glare paint.. reminds me of what the US did decades ago. If it’s not too much, do you have pictures of an MKI with out the anti glare paint? 🙂
based on the answer here it seems that
1. perhaps the biggest reason is political. France used to be a good alternate source of western equipment, but these days, has found difficult competition from Russians who once sold degraded models, but are now selling models better than what they operate for much less. Cheaper US aircraft due to a weaker dollar as well as an abundance of used ones. And that France as of late, has a tendency to tack on other products to customers that they don’t really want. Also the stronger Euro doesn’t help as well yes?
2. hardware wise, the French (in the Rafale’s case) excelled in the light fighter niche and should’ve stuck to it.. but instead attempted to go heavier and more complicated making a “compromise” fighter that is great for France, but difficult to purchase for many other nations who cant afford it or don’t need its advanced and more complicated abilities. Others who can afford it, find its abilities to be too immature at the moment. Also, it has to compete with a saturation of used equipment of the same generation technology that came earlier (or to make it simple, the French counterpart came a little too late).
some thoughts.
often I hear that the Rafale is too pricey..yet most sources I’ve read indicate it is slightly cheaper than the Typhoon, yet the Tyhoon has had some limited export success outside of the original 4. Also, the Rafale’s systems are immature, but isn’t the Typhoon’s as well?
on the Leclerc, is its size and autoloader actually a downside? on tanknet at least, many vet tankers prefer a human loader but of course, in political purchases, It doesn’t seem that they factor this in yes? Leclerc has been in a number of trials I believe.. I’m not sure but I think its been in the Swedish, Greek and Turkish trials. how did it fare there?
Also, as sated earlier, French navy equipment has been more successful. however in comparison to say the tank and aircraft market, one could argue subs, frigates, etc are more saturated with a variety of competitors, how did the French exceed here but not in sales of the above products?
Sure, there is the high-profile case of Rafale and also the relative failure of the Leclerc, but does this warrant such a broad generalisation???!
Exports statistics show that France is the fourth largest arms exporter and, over the past six years, is way ahead of the UK !
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_industry#World.27s_largest_arms_Exporters)
the question never was in regards to France’s over all position in the world in arms sales. But if you noticed, I did say “These days”, which means, its a comparison of France’s exports today versus those a few decades ago.
To my knowledge, France’s arm sales has generally been higher than the UK now and back then as well.
It should be noted that the French were going to cut off spares support to Australia, if they chose to use their aircraft in Vietnam. There are quite a lot of other examples, not all of them being very pleasant, since a few of them had the French bullying the ‘good guys’. Every military sale involves politics, it was only that the French politics tended to be internal, or resource oriented, far more so than those of the US or USSR.
The French kit is, however, excellent stuff, and ironically the example of the AMX-30 versus Leclerc one really ruffles my feathers. The AMX-30 was a pretty lousy tank, being unremarkable in armour, firepower, and overall capability, and seriously compromised by having unstabilised armament. The Leclerc is another pretty unremarkable tank, but at least is comparable in capability to its rivals.
Basically, if you buy French, you still have to play their game, it is just a different game to that of the US or Russia. If you do something with the equipment that they don’t like, then you still face the prospect of having support cut off.
I agree about the AMX-30 being not up to par with its contemporaries, say the M60A3 or T-72, but why do you feel the Leclerc is unremarkable? I always felt its lower profile, weight, modular armor, and use of an autoloader were one of its strong points?
in reply to some of the other comments above. I also thought the Rafale was generally cheaper than the Typhoon and at the present time, better integrated for A2G
Given Kommersant’s history of reporting.. I’m surprised a number of people are using it as a basis for the following articles:
http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw071031_1_n.shtml
Non-Subscriber Extract
Possible J-10 sale to Tehran raises red flagsBy Robert Hewson
31 October 2007
Iran, China and Russia may have reached agreement for the supply of Chengdu J-10 advanced combat aircraft to Iran, according to Russian media reports.
The Russian business daily Kommersant published the story on 23 October but it was picked up and translated into English by the state-controlled Novosti news agency the following day. Kommersant has an acknowledged track record for monitoring Russia’s dealings with Iran and Novosti’s involvement gives the story an official seal of approval.
China, perhaps surprised by the extent of the Russian reports, has moved quickly to deny them. According to the state-controlled Xinhua news agency, Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao told a regular press conference: “The report is false and irresponsible. China has not conducted any negotiation on the so-called fighter issue. We hope the Russian newspaper could clarify its report.”
Quoting sources within HESA (the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company), Kommersant said the Iranian military will take delivery of 24 J-10s between 2008 and 2010 to equip two squadrons. This is a similar number to the elderly Chengdu J-7 fighters previously delivered from China to Iran – raising the possibility that the J-10s will replace the obsolete J-7s.
Iran was previously thought to be negotiating a large package of Sukhoi Su-30MK fighters with Russia. However, it may have opted instead to acquire the more affordable but still capable J-10 from China. In Iranian service the J-10 would primarily be an air-defence platform, equipped with Chinese weapons such as the SD-10 active-radar air-to-air missile.
250 of 576 words
© 2007 Jane’s Information Group
End of non-subscriber extract
and
http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/global.php?id=1385181
China to Sell J-10 Fighter Jets to IranBy Richard Fisher, Jr.
According to an October 23rd report by Russia’s Kommersant, “Iran has signed a contract with China for the delivery of two squadrons of J-10 fighter planes…Representatives of the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company said China would deliver the total (24 jets) in 2008-2010. Engines for the jets will be supplied by Russia…estimating one fighter at $40 million, put the contract’s value at $1 billion.”
On October 24th a reputable Asian source confirmed this sale to the IASC, noting that it will include 20 single seat J-10A fighters, 4 J-10S twin-seat fighters, 120 SD-10A medium-range self-guided air-to-air missiles and 120 PL-9C short-range air-to-air missiles.
However, denial of the sale was quick to come from the Chinese Foreign Ministry. On October 25th Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao stated, “It’s not true, it is an irresponsible report…China has not had talks with Iran on J-10 jets.” Well, China is marketing the J-10 to other countries to include Pakistan (up to 40 J-10s) and countries in Southeast Asia, so it is at least plausible that it is also offering the J-10 for sale to Iran.
While further confirmation or denials can be expected from other Russian, Iranian and Chinese sources, such a sale remains possible given Iran’s requirements and its relationship with China. But at a time when U.S. and Israeli officials are increasingly considering the heavy burden of having to attack Iran’s nuclear weapons related facilities, China’s sale of the J-10 to Iran may signal the beginning of a deeper Chinese effort to protect Iran’s nuclear aspirations, much as it has ensured North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. The J-10’s defensive capabilities would be formidable, as would its ability to perform all-weather strikes with new precision guided weapons against Israeli or U.S. targets. For Israel a J-10 sale to Iran would mark a sobering betrayal of Israel’s considerable efforts to help China’s military modernization, to include its substantial help with the J-10 program, and one of its air-to-air missiles, both of which may apparently arm Iran.
Factors Favoring the J-10 Sale to Iran
Iran has been striving to modernize its air forces while also investing mightily in an indigenous aerospace sector to meet its needs. Its efforts are thus divided between seeking technology to pursue indigenous designs like the Saeqeh and Azarakhash, which are derived from the old Northrop F-5E design, and the Shafaq, which may be assisted by Russia, while also pursuing new combat aircraft from Russia and China. Defections of Russian-made aircraft from Iraq in 1991 and subsequent purchases show that Iran now has about 25 MiG-29 fighters and 30 Sukhoi Su-24 attack bombers. Russia reportedly offered Iran the sophisticated MiG-31 interceptor in 2003. In July 2007 reports emerged from the Paris Airshow that Iran was seeking to purchase 250 Sukhoi Su-30MK fighter-bombers, which were denied by Russian sources. Iranian interest in such a number of Russian fighters is also plausible given a large proportion of Iran’s Air Force relies on old U.S.-made fighters (25 F-14; 70+ F-4D/E; and 60+ F-5E/F) that in turn rely on an extensive espionage network, aided by China, to supply spare parts. A force of 250 Su-30MK fighters would allow Iran to retire its U.S. fighter force while significantly increasing the air defense and attack capabilities. During his recent visit to Iran, Russian President Putin reportedly approved the sale of 50 RD-33 engines that Iran will use to build its Azarakhash fighter.
Both Russia and China have sought to cultivate strategic relations with Iran which have cooperative and competitive aspects. Both have worked to shield Iran from U.S. and international pressure, particularly in the United Nations Security Council. At times both have provided assistance to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and both have supplied Iran with modern conventional weaponry. For the later there is perhaps a more competitive relationship, with China now seeking to ensure its “market share” in the face of Russian efforts to sell advanced air defense systems and combat aircraft. As such, an implication of a potential J-10 sale is that China may also be marketing its advanced air-defense missiles to Iran, like the FTC-2000, which also draw on Russian technology.
Another reason for Iran to purchase the J-10 would be to replace the 24 or so obsolete Chengdu F-7M fighters that it purchased in 1987. The F-7M, a Chinese copy of the Russian MiG-21C Fishbed is a relatively simple supersonic interceptor with a short range and very limited weapons payload. The J-10 is a modern 4th generation multi-role air combat and attack fighter. But for China, beyond its desire to strengthen its military relations with Iran, there is perhaps a more direct political imperative: China’s desire to further improve its relations with Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards (IRG), or Pasdaran (Guards), which apparently, at least during the early 1990s, controlled many or most of Iran’s F-7M fighters. While IRG Air Force is more recently described as controlling Iran’s Sukhoi Su-25 ground attack fighters, China’s sale of 24 J-10s, a number that may be similar to the number of Iran’s F-7Ms, may indicate a revival or strengthening of China’s relationship with the IRG.
Since 1979 the IRG has been a parallel military force in Iran directly loyal to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Government. It bore the brunt of the fighting during the Iran-Iraq war, is responsible for internal security and border security, controls Iran’s long-range ballistic missiles and is responsible for exporting Shia Islamic revolution, via the Hezbollah movement which controls much of Lebanon and by aiding Islamic radicals in Iraq and Afghanistan. The IRG is also quite economically powerful in Iran. For China to have close relationship with Iran, it must have a strong relationship with the IRG, hence, the logic of its willingness to sell the J-10 fighter to Iran. In contrast, the United States is preparing to designate the IRG as a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction, and to designate the IRG’s “Quds Force” as a supporter of terrorism, which would allow the U.S. to sanction companies and countries doing business with it.
Furthermore, Iran seeks full membership in the Beijing-centric Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Military cooperation is a main binding activity for the SCO, as represented by its large-scale combined arms exercise in Russia this past August, called Peace Mission 2007. By selling advanced weapons to Iran like the J-10, China can bolster help “normalize” Tehran’s image and ease its entry into the SCO, which will substantially help its geostrategic heft.
Threats Posed by Potential Iranian J-10s
Even the sale of a small number of J-10s will pose new challenges to Israel and to U.S. forces in that region. The J-10 program dates its origins to the early 1960s, and was bit declassified by the Chinese until January 2007. In the J-10 the People’s Liberation Army has succeeded in building its first “indigenous” 4th generation multi-role combat aircraft. Even though it has been “declassified,” neither the Chengdu Aircraft Co. nor the People’s Liberation Army has provided any official performance statistics for J-10.
However, there remains a great deal not yet known about the J-10 performance. The estimates above from the March 2007 issue of Aviatsya i Vremya gives the J-10’s range with external tanks as 2,900km, whereas another published estimate holds that the large fuel tanks of the J-10 give it a 2,500km radius, or a potential 5,000km total range. Such a range would be astounding for basically an F-16 size fighter. The J-10 is usually estimated to have a 550km to 600km combat radius. But one cannot be sure due to China’s refusal to reveal real numbers. The radar for the J-10 is another “indigenous” Chinese design which has drawn heavily from Russian and possibly, Israeli technology. At the 2004 Zhuhai Airshow Russian sources revealed that China is claiming this radar can guide four simultaneous air-to-air missile engagements, while the Russian believed the radar could only successfully guide two under fast moving air combat conditions.
For Israeli and U.S. forces that may have to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, the J-10 presents more than a speed-bump. The J-10 can carry two to four SD-10A/PL-12 self-guided air-to-air missiles. The PL-12’s self-guidance radar is derived or copied from a Russian Vympel radar similar to that which guided the Vympel R-77. However, the PL-12 uses a “lofted” missile flight profile which allows the PL-12 to achieve a 70km head-on engagement range, compared to 50km for the R-77 against a maneuvering target. Louyang’s PL-9C is derived from the Israeli Python-3 air-to-air missile. At the 1997 Zhuhai Airshow the author learned that China had equipped this missile with a copy of the Ukrainian Arsenel helmet sight to increase its short-range combat potential. China may also sell Iran additional “Chinese” air defense assets like the YJ-91, which Asian sources have told the author combines an Israeli technology anti-radiation seeker with the motor of the Russian Zvezda Kh-31 ramjet powered attack missile. The YJ-91 would prove ideal for attacking AWACS aircraft or AEGIS air defense destroyers that might be supporting a U.S. or Israeli strike packages.
The J-10 is also a fully capable all-weather offensive strikes. It will be equipped with a new low-light targeting pod, developed with Russian assistance, which can mark targets for laser and navigation-satellite guided weapons. New Chinese precision guided weapons include Louyang’s laser-guided LS-2 and CMIEC’s 100kg, 250kg and 500kg nav-sat guided bombs. It appears that the J-10 may be able to carry up to eight 250kg bombs, along with two refueling tanks and two PL-9C AAMs. Iran already produces copies of the Chinese anti-ship missiles that could arm the J-10, to include the C-802 and shorter range missiles like the Kosar/C-701 and the JJ/TL-10A, both of which use optical guidance for attacking a range of targets. The J-10’s offensive potential is also represented by its ability to provide escort for other conventional or future nuclear weapon armed Iranian strike aircraft.
In addition, a successful sale for the J-10 would not mean that sales would be limited to two squadrons. Iran could easily decide that the relatively inexpensive J-10 should arm further squadrons of its air force. In addition, Chengdu has been working on advanced versions of the J-10 that may include stealth features and thrust-vectored engines. Russia’s Saturn engine concern has also sold China a version of the AL-31FN with an axisymetric thrust vectoring nozzle, which will give the J-10 an extreme maneuvering capability that in some scenarios may help it to evade many types of intercepting missiles. A future dedicated strike-fighter variant of the twin-seat J-10S is already being marketed in Southeast Asia, and has likely been discussed with Iran.
Israel’s Military-Technical Engagement
The sale of the J-10 to Iran would constitute a betrayal of Israel’s extensive aid to China’s military modernization efforts during the 1980s and 1990s. Originally encouraged by the Carter Administration in the late 1970s, in the effort to encourage China’s strategic tilt toward the West and against the Soviet Union, Israel sold China a wide range of army, electronic, naval and aerospace technology. However, after the June 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, when the U.S. and Europe placed arms embargoes on China, Israel refused to follow suit. Many Israeli officials supported continued military technical sales to China not just to make profits necessary to fund future military products, but also because they felt that such sales would persuade China not to sell advanced weapons to Israel’s enemies. The sales, which continued even as the United States objected, probably also represented an Israeli effort to develop her own independent relationship with China, that could begin to free her from dependence on the United States.
However, continued Israeli military cooperation with China became an increasing source of friction between Israel and the U.S., culminating in the mid-2000 decision by President Bill Clinton to force Israel to cancel its sale of the very advanced Phalcon phased array AWACS radar to China. This issue was not settled until late 2005 when Israel and the U.S. negotiated a more formal agreement that Washington would review all substantive Israeli military technology sales to China.
At the time of Tiananmen Israel was likely near the height of its involvement in the Chengdu J-10 fighter program. Israel had agreed to sell China fighter aircraft technology from its Lavi (Young Lion) indigenous fighter program, which was aided and subsidized by the U.S.(40 to 90 percent of its $1.5 billion development cost), until Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger became convinced the Lavi would pose unneeded competition to U.S. fighters. The J-10’s anhedral wing and its empennage reflect the Lavi’s design influence while other sources note that Israel provided technology to assist China’s development of “fly-by-wire” or computer control technology to enable greater stability and maneuverability. In 2005 a high Russian official told the author that during his visit to Chengdu’s J-10 development building in the early 1990s he saw wall posters written in Hebrew.
Russian assistance also made a substantial contribution to the J-10’s eventual success, to include sale of a specific variant of the Saturn AL-31 high-power turbofan engine, design assistance to accommodate the engine in the J-10 airframe, plus assistance with the J-10’s radar.
In addition, Israel sold China co-production rights for its Python-3 short-range air-to-air missile in the 1982, with the Chinese designator PL-8. China promptly copied it as the PL-9, with different fins, and later added a helmet sighting capability. U.S. sources have expressed to the author concern that Israel may have sold the more deadly hyper-maneuverable 4th generation Python-4 to China. At the 2002 Zhuhai Airshow China’s AVIC-1 consortium featured a promotional video which gave a very brief glimpse of an AAM with characteristics very similar to the Python-4. Israeli industry reps at that show would not comment on that missile’s similarity to the Python-4. However, Louyang officials have told the author and others that they are working on an advanced short-range AAM.
China’s early 1990s assistance to Iran’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs likely mean that Tehran never took seriously Israel’s plan to separate her from her Chinese ally. China’s demand for Iran’s oil plus its desire to force Iran’s Islamic radical leadership to ignore the plight of China’s Muslims sealed its decision to support Iran’s Mullah government. Israel and the United States now face an Iranian-Chinese alliance having a clear military character. China now appears prepared to use Israeli technology to help Iran defend its nuclear weapons program aimed at Israel and the United States.
# #
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Richard Fisher, Jr. is Vice President, International Assessment and Strategy Center and Director of the Center’s Project on Asian Security and Democracy.
© 2003-2007 FamilySecurityMatters.org All Rights Reserved
If you are a reporter or producer who is interested in receiving more information about this writer or this article, please email your request to [email]pr@familysecuritymatters.org[/email].
Note — The opinions expressed in this column are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions, views, and/or philosophy of The Family Security Foundation, Inc.
TOKYO, Japan (AP) — A Japanese fighter jet crashed an instant after takeoff and went up in flames Wednesday at an airport in central Japan, leaving the two pilots with minor injuries, an official for aircraft’s manufacturer said.
The F-2B fighter was on a test flight prior to delivery to Japan’s air force when it crashed, said Hideo Ikuno, a spokesman for the Daiya public-relations firm representing the plane’s maker, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.
Footage on commercial broadcaster TV Asahi showed the jet taking off from the runway in Nagoya, only to suddenly tip downward and skid along the ground in flames. National broadcaster NHK showed the pilots jumping from the burning plane.
The flames were extinguished within 10 minutes of the crash, Ikuno said. The two crew members were taken to a hospital with minor injuries, Ikuno said.
Ikuno said the company was seeking further details about the crash.
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/10/30/japan.jetcrash.ap/index.html
If anything, the US avaition industry is far more dependent on Chinese orders that vice versa. Boeing is basically banking its future on China, and even chose the name for their dreamliner to best suit Chinese tastes (787, 8is considered lucky in China).
I would assume that it is called the 787 simply because it was the next designation Boeing would use, especially considering that the 707,717,727,737,747,757,767, and 777 were already used.
Hello folks, haven’t posted here since 21st June. Does SOC still hang around here? If so, I have a reply for him to ponder upon 😀
Limited & Superficial Comparison of Air Assets of the PAF & IAF
Hi, I read it and am more interested in what happened between you and the FBI. 😮
As for the response to SOC’s post. I haven’t read his analysis so I can’t comment too much..but I would like to mention that your blog post has too many uncertain variables. When I mean uncertain, it is most of the information you are using to prove your point, are mostly in the future and because of that, we do not know for sure if things will happen the way you predict they will.
most of the arguments are “IAF has this, but PAF will have that”.
I think if you are to use that kind of argument, you should also contemplate what the IAF will procure/upgrade/etc in the same time frame as well.
China denies reports it will sell fighter jets to Iran
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/25/asia/AS-GEN-China-Iran-Fighter-Jets.php
China denies reports it will sell fighter jets to Iran
The Associated Press
Published: October 25, 2007
BEIJING: China denied Thursday published reports it had agreed to sell its homegrown fighter jets to Iran, saying no talks had taken place.
Reports in Russian and Israeli media said Iran had signed a deal with China to purchase two dozen of its home-designed fighter jets known as the J-10, which could signal greater military cooperation between the countries at a time of continued tension between Iran and the West over its nuclear program.
“It’s not true, it is an irresponsible report,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao told reporters. “China has not had talks with Iran on J-10 jets.”
Chinese state media revealed at the end of last year that the Chinese air force was equipped with a new generation of the J-10 fighter plane.
Ties between China and Iran are largely absent of the tensions between that country and the West, and it remains an important oil supplier to feed China’s growing economy.
The J-10 has been in development since the late 1980s, according to Global Security, and has utilized Russian technology.
The Russian news reports said the planes would be delivered starting next year, and the contract could be worth US$1 billion (€700 million).