Overkill.
Though capable of small ship operation, the Merlin is a bit big for the former SCMR role now being addressed via FLYNX (RN) and Merlin CSP
The aircraft is also big and complex for the AAC to look after, and too big for the ‘Find’ element of BLUH being addressed by FLYNX (Army), and indeed for the light utility role.
The aircraft is ideally sized for the remaining unfunded element of the Future Rotorcraft Capability requirement – the former SABR/FASH requirements for a Sea King/Puma replacement.
Much like we were with the Apache, the Danes are unprepared for the influx of Merlins, and the resulting gap in deliveries will help their training pipeline produce the crews so that when they do arrive, there will be someone to fly them.
The Portugese had no such issues and said “No” to the MoD request for four of their cabs.
The aircraft are the TTTs, which are the first aircraft for Denmark and the last five off the line (A/C 2-9 are SAR aircraft). The first aircraft was retained at WHL for trials, but was recently delivered. The final five are on the line at Yeovil.
I do not believe that anything will be removed, though some functionalities may be disabled (particularly the laser-based wire avoidance system).
They are, of course, but one imagines that they’ll HVA CAP them.
The H-53 is too big and too noisy, too, which is why the HH-60 exists in the first place. The HH-60, though, is really a bit small, and the HH-71 represents an excellent compromise – a nice big cabin, in an agile and VERY quiet helicopter, and one whose hot and high performance (even in current RTM engined versions) is great.
And one without such extreme downwash as to make winching problematic.
If the USAF has written a requirement which does not emphasise quietness, low signature, speed, agility, and winching performance for a CSAR aircraft then that requirement is plainly awry.
It would be like writing an air superiority fighter requirement that ignored agility and BVR weapons and sensor performance.
I don’t think that is what has happened however, and I’m confident that when it comes to the core, ROLE RELEVANT parameters within the requirement, it will emerge that the HH-71 beat the HH-47 on every count.
No-one would deny that the Chinook isn’t a great heavy lift helicopter – and had the requirement been a straightforward heavylift requirement, I’d have been a Chinook cheerleader. One wonders whether CSAR-X isn’t actually being used as a back door way of getting more heavy lift helicopters. We all know and appreciate that the US Army love the Chinook – so do the RAF. As a heavylift helicopter it’s untouched – except by the Mi-26 in certain sub-sections of the role.
But for this specific mission, the Chinook is every bit as bad and as every bit as unsuitable as I “seem to think.”
This ancient design has its limitations, and in the CSAR role, the biggest of these are noise, and being an exceptionally poor winching platform. There is also some over the top puffery being pushed here – “Plus for hot-and-high operations nothing beats the Chinook” – sounds great, but the UK RAF operates both Chinook and Merlin, and Merlin is proving second to none in Iraq, and to be capable of performing IRT missions that the Chinook can’t because the latter is too noisy.
It’s a good job that there’s lots of room for firepower on the HH-47, because the chances of arriving unannounced at an LZ are remote with a Chinook, which will helpfully flag up the location of survivors to the enemy.
Phantom II,
I see a world of difference in buying a second-best aircraft (for industrial/political reasons) if it will do the job adequately (eg KC-767). I’m even quite impressed that the politicians should be far sighted enough to take the decision to protect a vital industrial capability.
But if you buy second-best and your choice is as severely compromised for the advertised role as Chinook is, then you’re putting servicemen’s lives at risk, and I’m less impressed by that.
In either case, you should have the guts to admit the real reason why you’re making the purchase decision you’re making.
There’s also the argument that if you expect your allies to standardise on F-16s, F-35s, C-130s, C-17s and the like, then you should occasionally be prepared to reciprocate with buys of foreign equipment – especially when it’s demonstrably superior.
Explain to me how a big, slow, VERY NOISY helicopter, with poor winching characteristics will ever be a better CSAR platform than a quiet, fast, agile helicopter that is proven in the role, and that is proven to be a good winching platform?
Don’t refer to spec points, plain simple explanation is all that is required.
And I don’t think anyone is a fool – I just suspect that this decision was made on political grounds.
Are you being deliberately obtuse, or disingenuous?
Is it really beyond your comprehension that regardless of the detail of the requirement a fast, agile, quiet helicopter, already in service in the CSAR role, and proven to be a good winching platform is, by definition, a better CSAR platform than a big, slow, VERY NOISY helicopter, never proven in CSAR and known to be a poor winching platform?
Is that really so hard to grasp?
If the Chinook ticks more boxes, it can only be because the requirement was deliberately written to obtain a particular result.
The greater suitability of F-22 to meet the USAF’s requirement for an advanced fighter, compared to the F-15 ACTIVE is equally obvious, and a Mach 0.2 speed differential is as irrelevant to the fighter role as the Chinook’s greater capacity and payload is to CSAR.
The problem is that neither you nor I can substantiate those claims so that they are acceptable to all !
And you take maybe 1 parameter , maybe 2 . What about the 498 other parameters ? What about USAF requirments? (500 of those) and what about RISKS? What about the boeing design being close to Block0+ then the others ? What about the Unknowns?
Anyone familiar with the CH-47 and Merlin will see straight away that the greater suitability of the smaller, more agile, faster, quieter, better winching platform for CSAR is obvious.
As to risk, the CSAR Merlin (with radar, FLIR, wire detection, etc.) is already in frontline service. The existing Danish CSAR Merlin looks damned close to Block 0, and an initial VH-71 with GE engines, BERP IV, etc, certainly would be.
There’s no need to obscure the fundamentals with unnecessary detail, though again, I’ll happily put money on HH-71 beating HH-47 in all role relevant parameters.
Merlin: Faster, Quieter, better winching platform, in service in the role now.
Chinook: Slow, noisy, poor winching platform, too big, and at the limit of its development ‘stretch’ potential.
It’s very, very difficult to winch from the V-22. It’s hard enough from Chinook.
“What’s JackoNicko’s requirment for sound ? I bet its one which the Euro designs more closely meet!!”
Easy. A CSAR or SOCOM helicopter should be as quiet as possible, and with a nice, non directional sound – not the whistle of a Gazelle, nor the heavy beat of a Huey or a Chinook. It should be quiet enough to allow a covert approach. I see and hear Merlins, Pumas and Chinooks every week, and know that a Merlin can be hovering at the bottom of the garden and I will not hear it without the window open, whereas I’ll hear a Puma if it’s hovering or flying past. And I know that I have time to go downstairs, find binoculars, grab a diet coke and saunter out to see whether the incoming Chinook is a Mark 2 or a Mark 3, because it’s a whole step noisier. A Chinook flew over at high level last Thursday morning as I was taking in the recycling bins and they vibrated in my hands.
On the basis of some pretty unfair inside tips, I’ll bet you that the HH-71 exceeded more of the [u][i]role-relevant[/u][/i] parameters than the Chinook, and by wider margins. (Not numbers of seats, not underslung load weights, because no-one denies that the Chinook isn’t a better heavylift helo).
CSAR-X and KC-X happen to be the only requirements where the European option is superior.
It’s not an indication of European superiority, but of good timing.
For CSAR-X the HH-71 is a modern platform, cutting edge, but de-risked by some service, competing with the ancient Chinook and the immature (and too small) S-92.
In KC-X, the Europeans happen to be offering arguably Airbus’ greatest airliner against arguably Boeing’s least impressive, handicapped by the wrong fuselage cross section, and just that little bit less modern and less advanced. The A330/767 was one of the key things that allowed Airbus to erode Boeing’s lead in jetliners.
Thompson had projected Lockheed would win due to strong support within the Air Force.
“Thompson had projected Lockheed would win due to strong support within the Air Force. He was among six out of nine analysts in a survey by Bloomberg News who had picked Lockheed as the favorite to win the award. One analyst had picked Boeing to win, and two declined to project a winner.”
We can take it as read that Bloomberg would consult only the most credible consultants. Do we think that the six reached their judgement on the basis of prejudice, or on the basis of the signals they were receiving from the programme office, and from their knowledge of which aircraft best met the requirement?
If the Chinook meets the USAF’s sound signature requirement, then that requirement is wrong.
Have you never heard one?
In any case, you don’t need to see the 500 parameters to see that the HH-71 is plainly BETTER suited to the CSAR role than the Chinook. Faster, quieter and in service in the same role now.
And I’ve spoken to a wide range of people involved in the programme, from Boeing, AW, and the USAF, but not from Sikorsky.
You could start with Bloomberg
“Boeing Beats Sikorsky, Lockheed in $13 Billion Helicopter Bid
By Edmond Lococo and Tony Capaccio
Nov. 9 (Bloomberg) — Boeing Co., the second-largest U.S. defense contractor, won a bid to replace the fleet of helicopters that rescue downed U.S. pilots, beating Lockheed Martin Corp. and incumbent United Technologies Corp.’s Sikorsky unit for a program that may be worth as much as $13 billion.
The Air Force, which plans to buy 141 helicopters through 2019, notified congressional leaders of Boeing’s win today. The formal announcement of the initial $712 million contract will be made by the Pentagon at 5 p.m.. The winning Boeing HH-47 is a variant of the twin-rotor Chinook family of helicopters flown by the U.S. Army.
Boeing may have convinced Pentagon officials they could eliminate development risk, streamline logistics and lower overhead costs by picking an aircraft already deployed by the U.S., said Loren Thompson, a defense analyst with the Alexandria, Virginia-based Lexington Institute. The Air Force preferred the Lockheed aircraft, which better met its requirements, he said.
“It appears the HH-47 is the inspiration of the Office of the Secretary of Defense where there is a push to avoid adding new airframes to the fleet unless it’s absolutely necessary,” Thompson said before the award was announced. He had projected Lockheed would win due to strong support within the Air Force.
Thompson does consulting work for the defense industry, including Lockheed. He said he wasn’t paid for any work on the helicopter competition. He was among six out of nine analysts in a survey by Bloomberg News who had picked Lockheed as the favorite to win the award. One analyst had picked Boeing to win, and two declined to project a winner.
Best Value
The Pave Hawk, made by Sikorsky since 1982, reached the end of its service life after helping to retrieve 722 U.S. and allied personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past five years, according to the Air Force.
The shortfalls of the Pave Hawk, also called the HH-60G, include altitude and cabin space limitations that the new airframe must overcome, Air Force spokeswoman Major Brenda Campbell said in an e-mail.
Of the almost 500 mission performance requirements the Air Force set for the new helicopter, Boeing’s aircraft met them all and exceeded close to 100 of them, said Van Horn, 61, who lead Boeing’s team.
“As far as risk goes, with 800 previous Chinooks flying, our risk on production and pricing is, we feel, very low,” Horn said in an interview last week. “This is the best value solution.”
Foreign Ties
Boeing may have also benefited from political issues, including a desire for a U.S. manufacturer, said Merrill Lynch analyst Celine Fornaro, the only analyst surveyed before the announcement to pick Boeing as the likely winner.
Lockheed had teamed with the AgustaWestland unit of Italy’s Finmeccanica SpA for the airframe, while Lockheed planned to install cockpit electronics, computers and communications systems.
That foreign partnership may have been a liability to Lockheed’s bid, said Cai Von Rumohr, a Boston-based analyst with Cowen & Co. who was among analysts surveyed before the announcement who had declined to project a winner.
“Any country buying something has a natural bias to the in- country producer,” Von Rumohr said. He has “outperform” ratings on United Technologies, Lockheed, and Boeing holds shares of United Technologies and Boeing among his personal investments.
Hand-to-Mouth
The airframe tie-up with AgustaWestland means there is little downside to the loss for Lockheed.
For Sikorsky, the loss is a blow. Sikorsky spent almost $1 billion developing the S-92, and has yet to win a U.S. military order for it, said Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace analyst at Fairfax, Virginia-based Teal Group who had picked Lockheed as the favorite to win before the announcement.
“The S-92 needs a U.S. military endorsement,” said Aboulafia. “Every big helicopter needs a home market endorsement. It can probably survive this loss, but it’s going to be a hand-to-mouth existence.”
Sikorsky said the S-92 was the most technologically advanced of the three bids.
Sikorsky’s new helicopter was the only one to feature fly- by-wire flight-control technology, said Mike Farage, 58, director of Air Force programs at Sikorsky.
Fly-by-wire replaces the mechanical linkages between the cockpit controllers and the actuators with an electrical system that improves performance, saves weight and cuts maintenance costs, Farage said in an interview before the award was announced.
There are now 41 of the S-92s flying for governments and commercial customers including oil companies around the world, he said. Due to international orders, the S-92 program is “viable” even without the Air Force award, he said.
Sikorsky provided 6.6 percent of Hartford, Connecticut-based United Technologies’ $42.7 billion in 2005 revenue.”
You might then talk to almost anybody involved in the programme.
You might then go and listen to an approaching Chinook and see for yourself how far away you can hear it. Then do the same with an existing Merlin (noisier than the GE engined, BERP IV bladed HH-71). You’ll find exactly what the RAF has found – Chinook is too noisy for many IRT tasks in Afghanistan, giving the enemy too much warning.
It’s not rocket science.
HH-71: Faster. (FACT)
Quieter. (FACT)
Already in service for CSAR. (Portugal and Denmark)
And re KC-30 vs KC-767, the KC-30 can operate from shorter runways with full fuel than the 767 can. (FACT)
On a typical towline task, the KC-30 has more time on task and more fuel to offload. (FACT)
The KC-30 offers better freight/passenger capabilities. (FACT)
It doesn’t matter so much with the tanker. Buying the second best aircraft to preserve US jobs would still give the USAF an aircraft that can do the job (just not quite as well).
Buying the Chinook for CSAR will give the USAF an aircraft that’s fundamentally unsuited for the role.