Blenheim II
Massively hyped on launch.
Promising technologically but bound to be obsolete before long.
Over reliant on one aspect of performance.
Tiny, inadequate internal bombload.
Anyone? Per-lease!
Aw, go on go on go on go on.
“I’m surprised there’s not too many replies to this.”
Indeed.
This is a great milestone for the programme, though perhaps the real milestone will be when the unit is fully equipped, and when it is declared properly operational.
The Indians still have about eight in service, there’s an ex-RAF Warbird in Australia, and one in UK, and two ex-RAE examples still fly for a private test outfit in the USA.
Though holed beneath the waterline, I predict that RonOoooo won’t sink. Just yet.
He’ll continue to hold to the lowest released JSF cost, while simultaneously holding to the highest Typhoon cost (even though EF GmbH have disowned it, the NAO can’t explain it, and even though it’s £20 m higher than other, equally well audited figures from all other partners, and even though it would mean that the UK was paying £20 m more per jet than Austria, when the original EF agreement dictates that EF MUST charge more to export customers (7% profit, and usually, though we don’t know about Austria, a 10% export levy).
Even had Austria been a dirty ‘loss leading’ deal, you’d still have to explain why the UK is paying more than Germany. And how and why this £20 m increase in unit cost has gone unremarked.
You never answered these questions when they were posed before.
“Since you choose to believe the £64.8 m figure and to reject all of the other evidence, do you find such an increase credible, Ron? Do you find it credible that such an increase would go unnoticed and unremarked by the NAO? Can you explain how Austria paid £42 m per jet while we’re paying £76 m? How the other partners are each paying about 33% less per jet than we are?”
One thing that is certain is that the NAO 2005 MPR figure was not “calculated by the MoD based on real checks cut and real contracts signed” – the contract values and estimated contract values for T1 and T2 are well known and give a considerably smaller figure. It is suspected that the figure is inflated by an inappropriate application of RAB, or by a hitherto unincluded chunk of support costs. We will soon know, but in any event the £64.8 m figure is misleading and not directly comparable.
For JSF:
“the average procurement cost (APUC) (which does not include R&D or other “sunk” costs) is estimated at $94.8 mn per aircraft”.
Still think the UK will be allowed to buy at less than average? The NAO doesn’t. Nor do the Aussies.
The Brits expect to pay US $10 Bn for 138 aircraft – $72m each. (plus $2 Bn SDD, $14.5 m each), or, according to other sources, it will be US $10 Bn for 85 aircraft – $117.6 m each. (plus $2 Bn SDD, $23.5 m each).
The Aussies expect to pay A$15 Bn for 100 aircraft – A$150 m each. (US $110.424 m)
RonOo asked:
“My fundamental question for the UK is why continue to poor money into the Typhoon program to develop a fighter aircraft into something that can never compete in a2g with JSF. Why not save that money, cancel Tranche 3 and purchase more JSF?”
From a UK PoV, the full three Tranche, 232 aircraft order is required to support a 137 aircraft fleet through life, which gives seven squadrons of what many suspect will be an eventual 12 Squadron FJ Force. Typhoon’s swing role capability, deployability, flexibility and Net Centric capabilities make it a more versatile and in some respects more useful asset than JSF.
The question therefore isn’t whether we should can T3 (which would be difficult and costly) to buy MORE JSF, it’s whether we shouldn’t replace some or all of the JSF order with MORE Typhoons.
Assuming that operational sovereignty is sorted, the case for JSF, IF we get the carriers (if they aren’t cancelled) is extremely strong. There’s no doubt that any other option would be second best, at best.
There’s no doubt that JSF is also an unmatched Day One A-G platform, and if we can get the OpSov we need, would be a useful asset to have in the force structure, and one that would more than justify the costs of a whole new logistics infrastructure. But if we don’t have the carriers, and if we can’t get the OpSov we need, then an all Typhoon force looks a better option (albeit without some key capabilities) than a mixed force.
It also looks likely to be a significantly cheaper option.
Unless the UK waits until after LRIP to order its F-35s, presumably it will have to pay LRIP prices (no export customer can buy cheaper than the USA) which will be something over $116 m (that’s the F-35A LRIP price, we’re ordering the pricier F-35B).
I’d concede that Riccioni has better contacts than I have on JSF, F-22, etc. and I’d personally hesitate before labelling him a ‘disgrace’. Just me, I guess.
Sferrin,
KKM57P is just echoing part of what Riccioni has to say about Stealth. And I’d trust his (Riccioni’s) judgement before I trusted yours, because he’s forgotten more about fighters and fighter design than you or I have ever known.
Austria paid €62 m for each Typhoon (about £45 m).
I’m inclined to agree with the sentiment that you get what you pay for. JSF promises to deliver an unmatched niche capability (Day One air-to-ground) that is worth the price tag.
If you can afford that niche capability, then an F-22/F-35 mix is the best possible option, or failing that a Typhoon/JSF mix.
The problem is that the niche capability is, for many customers, going to be prohibitively expensive, and if it is, then it’s better to concentrate resources on the more flexible multi-role platform – especially as it’s cheaper.
“the rah! rah! stuff to which RonOO is responding.”
No-one’s claiming that Typhoon has any appreciable all-aspect Stealth characteristics, it’s just being pointed out that EF’s frontal RCS has been managed and optimised for the classic BVR case, and that some of the claims for JSF (four times the effective detection range because of reduced frontal RCS) are exaggerated, and ignore the plethora of other factors influencing the outcome.
As to supersonic performance, Typhoon supercruises (whether at Mach 1.4, or Mach 1.5, who cares?) and has better supersonic acceleration and agility than F-35.
As to radar performance, REAL parametrics are of course highly classified, but even the mechanically scanning Captor is a pretty impressive piece of kit, especially when it comes to detection range.
In any case, RonOo doesn’t seem to be claiming JSF to be superior for AD (“It’s a luck country indeed that gets two such fine aircraft as Typhoon & JSF complementing each other performing the roles they were designed to do: Typhoon for air defense and JSF for ground attack from both land and sea.”)
The primary argument with Ron is over relative price. He selects the lowest available JSF price (Lockheed’s, which is the least credible) and dismisses all of the others, and does the opposite with Typhoon, selecting the highest available EF price (which is far out of line with all other prices, and which is the least credible). He also fails to address the fact that while cost growth is inevitable in both programmes, because Typhoon is over the worst of the R&D hump it is less likely to be as intense as it will be for JSF, for all of the reasons so succinctly summarised by the GAO.
“The UK MoD has stated the average flyaway of Typhoon T1 & T2 is £64m. That figure has been audited by the UK’s National Audit office. That figure has been quoted by the UK Minister of Defense in parliament 2 months ago. Repeated assertions that the number is incorrect is just retarded.”
That figure was stated once, in the 2005 MPR. As such, it was bound to form the basis of any Parliamentary answer, right or wrong. That figure is £20m out of kilter with ALL previous and subsequent UK, German, Italian and Spanish figures – ALL OF WHICH HOVER AROUND £45 M – and is higher than the price paid by Austria (the contract was leaked so we KNOW what that price was) which would be illegal.
In the NAO major projects report 2004, the unit production cost (excluding R&D) was quoted as £49.1 m (assuming a full 232 aircraft buy). (£11.39 Bn + R&D)
It was later said (by the NAO and the Government) that our 55 Tranche 1 aircraft were costing £2.5 Bn, representing a unit production cost of £45.45 m.
Figures released in Germany, Italy and Spain would all suggest that the Typhoon’s UPC is in the region of £40-45 m ($73-83 m).
So if 55 Tranche 1 aircraft cost £45-49m each, how does the average Tranche 1 and 2 UPC suddenly get to £64.8 m? The 144 aircraft would have to cost £9.333 Bn (excluding R&D), and since Tranche 1 costs £2.5 Bn, the Tranche 2 aircraft would have to cost £6.833 Bn, or £76 m each – £30 m more, per jet, than Tranche 1.
Since you choose to believe the £64.8 m figure and to reject all of the other evidence, do you find such an increase credible, Ron? Do you find it credible that such an increase would go unnoticed and unremarked by the NAO? Can you explain how Austria paid £42 m per jet while we’re paying £76 m? How the other partners are each paying about 33% less per jet than we are?
Correcting the figure, however (and in doing so contradicting the minister) is clearly causing some problems for the MoD, but the figure has already been contradicted by the CEO and MD of EF GmbH, and by NETMA, and I confidently expect that it will be explained soon enough (probably by attributing the change to the introduction of RAB).
To pick one, isolated figure for Typhoon (and to pick the highest UPC ever quoted) and to ignore all of the others really IS retarded, and it’s just as retarded to believe that Lockheed’s price aspirations (the lowest available cost estimates for JSF, first quoted years ago) when there has already been dramatic cost growth, and when the GAO, the JSF Programme Office, the Australian MoD and the UK NAO and MoD all give higher prices.
The first 424 aircraft are prototypes? Those are the jets costing just $116 m each. And in 2013, when that price is the current US price (EXCLUDING R&D) how much do you think the US public and politicians would accept as the export price for the UK and Australia. Hint. $50 m would go down like a far.t in a space suit.
There’s no doubt that JSF will be unmatched as a day one fighter bomber, with good all round stealth and a really robust self defence capability. But as a BVR A-A aircraft there’s an awful lot of over-statement based mainly on a limited understanding of the aircraft’s LO characteristics, and of the significance of certain Typhoon capabilities and characteristics.
So how much does JSF cost?
The first five production aircraft cost $870 m – a unit price (excluding R&D) of $174 m!
“The cost to build each Joint Strike Fighter will average $150 million through the end of the decade, says U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Steven Enewold, who directs the Pentagon’s JSF program office.”
“Flight tests for the first fully integrated developmental JSF are scheduled for 2011. By that point, the Pentagon plans to have already ordered 190 aircraft for $26 billion, or $137 million apiece.”
“Testing is to wrap up in 2013, at which point 424 aircraft are slated to have been built for about $49 billion, or about $116 million apiece.”
The US will be paying between $116 m and $174 m for its first 424 aircraft.
And export customers can’t buy cheaper than the US forces…..
The Aussies expect to pay A$15 Bn for 100 aircraft – A$150 m each. (US $110.424 m)
The Brits expect to pay US $10 Bn for 138 aircraft – $72m each. (plus $2 Bn SDD, $14.5 m each), or, according to other sources, it will be US $10 Bn for 85 aircraft – $117.6 m each. (plus $2 Bn SDD, $23.5 m each).
Yet RonOo continues to believe Lockheed’s figures….
Interestingly, the US needs export customers to subsidise the core programme.
“The JSF program’s foreign partners will buy 646 aircraft, which the report concludes will lower the total cost by $9.2 billion.”
1) F-35 is an all aspect Stealth aircraft, but the Frontal RCS figures of both aircraft are far closer than is often claimed. The supposed radar range advantage enjoyed by F-35 is unproven, and will be eroded by Typhoon’s DASS. For JSF to exploit its claimed RCS advantage it would need a robust passive detection/designation/engagement capability and a passive or fully fire and forget weapon. And once you’re in a multi-versus-multi situation, each JSF is either limited to two or four BVR AAMs, or loses all of its Stealth advantages, while each Typhoon carries six.
2) The point of Typhoon’s supersonic agility in BVR means that it can get to its gimbal more quickly, making the return missile shot more difficult (and when that return shot is with an AIM-120, with a smaller NEZ, the advantage becomes even more clear).
Typhoon’s performance imparts more velocity to the missile at launch, further increasing reach and lethality.
And we’re comparing what JSF is hoping to achieve when it enters full frontline service in ten years time (and before the planned initial production configuration has even flown, and with the flight test programme only 1% complete) with an in-service Typhoon, whose development programme is virtually complete.
“If the JSF is goint to be superior to the Eurofighter in BVR…..”
It isn’t.
No supercruise. Slower acceleration. Slower speed. Shorter range weapons (AMRAAM vs Meteor, -9X vs ASRAAM). Fewer A-A weapons. No DASS. Less agile. etc.
RonOO
You keep referring to the £64m figure used ONLY in the 2005 NAO MPR, and ignore all of the other available figures. It represented a near £20m increase over the 2004 figure. EF GmbH have explicitely said that they do not recognise the £64m figure, and cannot explain how it’s been arrived at.
“It would not suprise me in the least for them to be lower than the UK is paying. Nothing wrong with that. It’s a free market.”
It would surprise me. And it would surprise Ays Rauen and Brian Phillipson, too. It is known that the terms of the Eurofighter agreement dictate that no export customer will ever pay less for a Typhoon than the NETMA partner nations, and we know that Austria paid €62m (roughly £42m). The partner price therefore MUST be lower than that.
The total cost of 232 jets was originally planned to be £16.7 Bn (later stated as £17.4 Bn), including R&D.
That gave a unit price (including R&D) of £72 m (later £75 m).
The NAO subsequently revealed that this had increased to £19.7 Bn, including R&D
That gave a unit price (including R&D) of £85 m.
The NAO later settled on a total programme cost of £19.014 Bn, including R&D
That gave a unit price (including R&D) of £81.96 m.
In the latest (2005) major project report, the total programme cost is now “commercially sensitive to protect our ability to negotiate on subsequent purchases of the aircraft.”
In the NAO major projects report 2003, the unit production cost (excluding R&D) was quoted as £56.8 m (assuming a full 232 aircraft buy). (£13.18 Bn + R&D)
In the NAO major projects report 2004, the unit production cost (excluding R&D) was quoted as £49.1 m (assuming a full 232 aircraft buy). (£11.39 Bn + R&D)
This reduction was in line with the expected reduction in costs with each successive Tranche, and reflected some cancelled weapons integrations, and the shift of some costs from production to R&D.
It was later said (by the NAO and the Government) that our 55 Tranche 1 aircraft were costing £2.5 Bn, representing a unit production cost of £45.45 m.
By 2005, the cost had reduced again.
Figures released in Germany, Italy and Spain would all suggest that the Typhoon’s UPC is in the region of £40-45 m ($73-83 m).
Moreover, the plan is for the UPC to reduce, Tranche by Tranche.
The £64.8 m figure is sole source from NAO 2005 MPR, and is entirely uncorroborated by any other source.
While JSF will cost $67 m (Norway) or $66-104 m (UK).
JSF procurement (exclusive of the SDD phase and long-term support) is quoted at $10-billion for 150 aircraft. That represented a $66.67-million UPC in 2002, with an adjusted UPC growth to $75.75 m in 2003, $90.15 m in 2004 and $104.6 m in 2005.
It seems as though the latter figure is what we’re going to be charged (in addition to the $2 Bn SDD funding we’ve already committed).
Thus the Typhoon costs us about £40-45-49 m today, and the JSF will cost us £57.01 m, both exclusive of R&D.