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Pro-Russian rebels stole a truck to transport the missile launcher BUK photographed in the city of Snishne few hours before the crash of flight MH17,the vehicle owner told Paris Match .
http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/International/EXCLU-MATCH-Un-camion-vole-pour-transporter-le-systeme-lance-missiles-577289
(In French)
Note the picture is not from Snishne ( Snishne does not have trolleybuses ) Donetsk ??
Lukos would you like to geolocate it? we already know your excellent observation skills .;)

Paris Match claims that this picture was taken by their own journalist in the morning of July 17th in the vicinity of Snijne. So a few hours before MH17 crash
They also called the phone number and managed to reach the owner of the truck who told them that the separatists seized most of his truck fleet and occupy his Donetsk facility since july 8.

However, it seems that the picture could have been taken near Donetsk ?
Nevertheless, that’s quite an interesting clue as it comes from an external source.

On the contrary, it was totally irresponsible for civil aircraft to be flying in a war zone that included the use of airpower on one side and, consequently, the well-publicised use of surface-to-air missiles on the other. It is not incumbent on the parties fighting a war to make life safe for rich westerners who happen to blunder into it, rather it is the responsibility of the Ukrainian government to inform airlines of potentially unsafe airspace, the responsibility of the airline to select safe operating routes, the responsibility of governments to inform travelling citizens of potential dangers, and the responsibility of passengers to be vaguely aware of goings on in parts of the world they are busily flitting over.

I’m sorry but you are reasoning backward

First, “the well-publicised use of surface-to-air missiles” was concerning manpads only. Therefore, the corresponding dangerous airspace layers were closed to civil aircrafts. That did not include the airspace above 30000 ft where MH17 was shot down.

Second, the fact that the people in that plane were

“rich westerners”

is totally irrelevant. What it relevant is the fact that they were civilians flying in a civil airliner in an airspace layer supposed to be safe despite the conflict below.
Contrary to what you assert it is the resposability of the fighting parties not to kill civilians. As far as air space is concerned, it is therefore their responsability to inform civilian organization using their airspace daily which zones are forbiden. Being at war is no excuse and does not magically put your basic responsabilities in a standby mode.

That being said, I agree that the responsability for that tragic event might be shared between several parties.
For instance, if the separatists did it with an SA-11 stolen to Kiev, then the responsability will be shared between the separatists (who call themselves a republic and should have acted accordingly by closing their upper airspace) and the ukrainian government (who should have informed the ICAO of such a threat immediatly).
If the SA-11 was provided by Moscow, then Russia will probably have the biggest responsability share, followed by the rebels.
If Kiev fired the missile then it will be their responsability alone.

Nevertheless, I agree that the International civil aviation organization does have a bit of responsability for having underestimated the potential high altitude threat and the irresponsability of the guys fighting in that area, but this is only a secondary responsability.

Deterrence usually refers to the nuclear arsenal. How does the Rafale’s EW suite deter conflict? Also, deterrence against..?

The Rafale and the ASMPA missile is the second pillar of the French nuclear deterrence doctrine.
Its credibility relies on the Rafale ability to penetrate advanced Air defense networks to the release point of the missile.

Why should they be mutually exclusive – ‘senior’ software or options for independent upgrades?

They are not. But India simply won’t get what France consider to be too sensitive and could compromise its deterrence tools.
But again, we are speculating here. What India won’t get exactly is impossible to know as it was most probably never brought on the negociation table in the first place.
We are talking about technologies that may not even exist yet. 😀

There are plainty of algorithm that certainly can’t be transfered because they are far too sensitive.
What can be done however is to provide the tools allowing India to develop and integrate their own piece of softwares/data

Indian Mirage 2000-5 KT-201 with full mica load on the tarmac of the french flight test center

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Data link in used for BVR shots, after the inertial phase, to update the target position. It is especially usefull when the missile performed long range loft trajectories which imply that the target may no longer be in the missile’s sensor scan volume when the target is in range of the sensor.
Though it greatly increases the PK for long range engagements, it is NOT mandatory. The mica can perfectly find a target with the last data it got before launch, even after a 180° turn, using its INS and sensor scanning if the target is in the sensor range.

That is exactly what was done during the 180° shot test in 2007 with a mica EM. The initial target data were communicated by a 2nd aircraft to the shooter via link16, but no data were transmited to the missile after launch : 180° turn, no aircraft-missile datalink, missile acquiring the target after launch on its own.

It didn’t, as pointed out, and it is still required for some missions. Granted, missions for which low-level flying is a must (CAS, battlefield interdiction to a lesser extent) are those that require specialized aircraft to be carried out properly, so Typhoon won’t be doing them, or at least not much.

low level attack profiles are also well suited to cruise missile and antiship strikes.

Apparently the crash happened at landing. Very sad news 🙁