Pinko

You are doing it again. You even stated in your post that an OTH resolution cell was roughly a 400km sq box defined by range and angular (azimuth) resolution. You have written a factually accurate description of the scanning technique but dont seem to understand that, despite it all, you arent getting a better return than your basic resolution cell allows.

Its amazing how a poorly phrased quote can create so much confusion.

JORN did not detect a C-130J at 1500kms. It got returns from a resolution cell of 400km square that, somewhere in the cell, was an airborne contact doing several hundred knots. When it was checked off against what was flying in that rough area at the time the answer came back that there was a C-130J there at that time. Hence JORN ‘detected’ a C-130J at 1500km. The detection of the turn is also a bit misleading as what was detected was the signal intensity and velocity change of the contact as it changed aspect and lined up.

Jonesy, my goodness, let’s do a quick summary to see how much smoke you keep throwing in to cover your receding position post after post.

1.Smoke bomb 1: OTH radar only got too many contacts. A CVG contact is no way to be detected from them.

Countered: outstanding Velocity solution of OTH radar can be employed to identify a contact with substantial aviation activities, a contact with such activity is unique and standing out from the vast rest.

2.Smoke bomb 2: Velocity is non detectable because of lacking “fixed, known reference” and rough range/angelus resolutions of OTH radar

Countered: Radial velocity of aircraft is determined by Doppler shifting which is totally independent of range/azimuth resolutions, the radar itself is the fixed/known reference to determine a high speed target which can be classified as aircraft.

3.Smoke bomb 3: OTH radar can’t get range and Velocity readings at same time. You only got a velocity in a 1500kms, 2.5 degree fan sector.

Countered: In a range-azimuth coordinate system, range is always not problem, you can get a velocity via CIT in certain range cell.

4.Smoke bomb 4: Jonesy’s patented way to interpretation of Norman’s description of JORN OTH radar

My counter here: Keep smoking instead of never realizing how significant Norman ‘s description of OTH radar in related to identify a CVN from the rest of surface ships: The JORN OTH not only detected the C-130J some 1500kms away but also its landing approach! If a OTH radar is capable to do so, guess even a school boy once he sees a contact is landing in the deep ocean, he would have drawn the conclusion what a target is.

Its the same as the statement that OTH can detect a B-2 at 2000km. Its technically true but, unless there is something with a conventional radar 2000km away to report back that it doesnt hold any contacts within the specific OTH cell that the contact is held within, the OTH operators have no idea that they have a hit on a B-2.

Do you understand now?

Well, I don’t get you why u want to know it’s B-2 or F-18 or E-2?, the idea is to differentiate a CVN from the rest of surface ships by means of its unique aviation activities? Nobody saying the OTH radar is working solely, all the quotes from Jane’s ONI , USNI are such OTH/ground or space airborn sensors working all together for a workable detecting and tracking system. You use OTH radar to isolate a CVN to a limited OTH cell, comparing to a 1500X1500kms 60 deg fan sector, the rest, more precised sensor asserts can be cued into that particular range cell being IDed by OTH radar for tracking grade information. To end this, I would like to just quote what SOC got in his blog:

http://geimint.blogspot.com/search/label/ASBM

The OTH-B system as currently deployed would permit long-range acquisition of naval vessels. Target identification would be provided by Chinese-produced derivatives of Russia’s Kornet EO and radar satellites, the first constellation of which is scheduled to be operational in 2009. This effectively solves the issue of OTH-B resolution, allowing the OTH-B to provide early warning while the space-based assets confirm target identification and provide positioning data for ASBM launch, being cued to potential targets by the OTH-B radar system. The advantage of a long-range ASBM system, cued by OTH-B and space-based assets is such that aircraft carriers could potentially be at risk well before their air wings are within range to strike at the Chinese mainland.

Pinko,

I find it amazing that you get yourself so fired up by what I write when you actually read so little of it.

How are you even discussing this when you know so little about the topic!!!!. Read how OTH works before throwing up such meaningless drivel. You dont need to have a fixed 3D reference point to determine velocity. To put it terms you seem to have some comprehension of see the VS mode available in many contempory multimode AI sets – no range readout just azimuth and velocity!.

Well, Jonesy, have you ever seen an actual OTH radar screen? It’s always displayed in Azimuth- range Spatial Polar Coordinate System. The target trace is displayed in so called “range cell” so you will never miss the range information as long as the OTH radar is concerned, the cell could be 20 x 20kms or whatever depending on how good your range resolution is. You get your velocity information from the CIT, an OTH radar beam scans at certain azimuth interval, stay certain time for coherent integration so you can get your velocity, a Doppler spetra contains certain amount of range gates from what you get your range information. After CIT for each unit azimuth, the beam steered to next unit azimuth for another scan, your azimuth resolution is determined by the azimuth scan interval. So are you clear now? what’s the matter you concern no range reading when the range is part of your coordinate system?

So any contact exceeding 100knts within the radar FoV is automatically indicative of the general location of an aircraft carrier is it?. You dont see the very basic problem with that for cueing targetting assets?.

The speed is displayable on your screen which basically is a range-azimuth coordinate system, what you want to argue?!

Russians used their OTH radar mostly for ICBM early warning, that’s decades old when massive computing power just doesn’t exist. If you really want to give examples, why not try the most modern ones, like those deployed in Australia/Canada and US. Their jobs are even tougher, dealing with small boats/aircrafts with illegal immigrants, or drug dealers. And work just fine. If like what you said, many contacts is such a determining factor, how they can pick up a small Cessna from many contacts or a boat with smugglers? As I said, the technology of OTH radars are evolving and better signal processing could dramatically improve the efficiency of the OTH, this advance of data processing ability today can’t be matched 30-40 years ago when USSR was in cold war with Yankees.

BTW, OTH radar still uses Doppler to detect the targets’ velocity. so angular resolution doesn’t affect the speed determination. An OTH radar can give velocity resolution below 0.1 knot, it’s no problem for OTH radar to pick up a huge speed difference between a aircraft and a ship.

Obviously, that is not the only source, for example, USNI analyst Raymond Pritchett also quoted Vice Admiral Bernard J. “Barry” McCullough ‘s testimony to congress

Rapidly evolving traditional and asymmetric threats continue to pose increasing challenges to Combatant Commanders. State actors and non-state actors who, in the past, have only posed limited threats in the littoral are expanding their reach beyond their own shores with improved capabilities in blue water submarine operations, advanced anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. A number of countries who historically have only possessed regional military capabilities are investing in their Navy to extend their reach and influence as they compete in global markets. Our Navy will need to out pace other Navies in the blue water ocean environment as they extend their reach. This will require us to continue to improve our blue water anti-submarine and anti-ballistic missile capabilities in order to counter improving anti-access strategies.

http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/SPEF073108/McCullough_Stiller_Testimony073108.pdf

Report: Chinese Develop Special “Kill Weapon” to Destroy U.S. Aircraft Carriers

Advanced missile poses substantial new threat for U.S. Navy

U. S. Naval Institute
March 31, 2009

http://www.usni.org/forthemedia/ChineseKillWeapon.asp

With tensions already rising due to the Chinese navy becoming more aggressive in asserting its territorial claims in the South China Sea, the U.S. Navy seems to have yet another reason to be deeply concerned.

After years of conjecture, details have begun to emerge of a “kill weapon” developed by the Chinese to target and destroy U.S. aircraft carriers.

First posted on a Chinese blog viewed as credible by military analysts and then translated by the naval affairs blog Information Dissemination, a recent report provides a description of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) that can strike carriers and other U.S. vessels at a range of 2000km.

The range of the modified Dong Feng 21 missile is significant in that it covers the areas that are likely hot zones for future confrontations between U.S. and Chinese surface forces.

The size of the missile enables it to carry a warhead big enough to inflict significant damage on a large vessel, providing the Chinese the capability of destroying a U.S. supercarrier in one strike.

Because the missile employs a complex guidance system, low radar signature and a maneuverability that makes its flight path unpredictable, the odds that it can evade tracking systems to reach its target are increased. It is estimated that the missile can travel at mach 10 and reach its maximum range of 2000km in less than 12 minutes.

Supporting the missile is a network of satellites, radar and unmanned aerial vehicles that can locate U.S. ships and then guide the weapon, enabling it to hit moving targets.

The ASBM is said to be a modified DF-21
While the ASBM has been a topic of discussion within national defense circles for quite some time, the fact that information is now coming from Chinese sources indicates that the weapon system is operational. The Chinese rarely mention weapons projects unless they are well beyond the test stages.

If operational as is believed, the system marks the first time a ballistic missile has been successfully developed to attack vessels at sea. Ships currently have no defense against a ballistic missile attack.

Along with the Chinese naval build-up, U.S. Navy officials appear to view the development of the anti-ship ballistic missile as a tangible threat.

After spending the last decade placing an emphasis on building a fleet that could operate in shallow waters near coastlines, the U.S. Navy seems to have quickly changed its strategy over the past several months to focus on improving the capabilities of its deep sea fleet and developing anti-ballistic defenses.

As analyst Raymond Pritchett notes in a post on the U.S. Naval Institute blog:

“The Navy’s reaction is telling, because it essentially equals a radical change in direction based on information that has created a panic inside the bubble. For a major military service to panic due to a new weapon system, clearly a mission kill weapon system, either suggests the threat is legitimate or the leadership of the Navy is legitimately unqualified. There really aren’t many gray spaces in evaluating the reaction by the Navy…the data tends to support the legitimacy of the threat.”

In recent years, China has been expanding its navy to presumably better exert itself in disputed maritime regions. A recent show of strength in early March led to a confrontation with an unarmed U.S. ship in international waters.

You haven’t studied what jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention is, have you? It doesn’t mean the coastal state has any control whatsoever over non-intrusive surveys or research. It can only restrict activities which conflict with its (limited, specific) economic rights over the waters & seabed. Non-intrusive (i.e. without building things, or drilling, or setting off explosions, or trawling) surveying is permitted without restriction. Laying cables, pipelines etc is permitted as long as it does not conflict with the (limited, specific) economic rights of the coastal state. Etc., etc.

1.So, your study is just your wishy washy explain of my quoted Article 56 of UNCLOS?
Until you provide solid /credible backup of your claim that “ China’s jurisdiction rights over marine scientific research or survey is only restricted to “activities which conflict with its (limited, specific) economic rights over the waters & seabed”. Then I would rather refer to the UNCLOS general provisions itself which never state such thing as you said.

2. if you are not able to backup your claim as in point1, then the spy ship violated China’s certain jurisdiction in its EEZ. Since the ship violated the law assumed to protect 1st. why bothering to pick it up and protest by using it later?

3. The funniest part of your story is while crying foul that Chinese disturbed the spy ship in the name of other activity. Do you ever realize you bunch of guys are actually doing the same trick you accused people? By claiming the Impeccable was passing/laying pipe or cable etc, but it was spying as officially acknowledged by DoD. Spying/sniffing/peeping activities are hardy not intrusive. If you like to try to disguise the spy ship’s illegal/nonpeaceful activities as innocent as you can in the name of passage or cabling/piping, so as to justify the certain jurisdiction right favoring the coastal nations. Why so irritated when people just repeat the same tricks after you? Obviously I don’t know which civilization can come out so advanced logic, in our humble view, it called “double standard”

The coastal state does not own the waters or the seabed, it has a set of carefully defined & limited rights over them.

I note that neither you, nor any of the other “China can do no wrong” crowd have chosen to comment on Chinese naval intrusions into Japanese territorial waters. Do you think that is OK?

Have us claimed PLAN’s behavior is correct? As a matter of fact, the Chinese government already issued official apologies, should we say more if there’s a official statement? Do you think that is NOT correct?

BTW, what about the bit I’ve highlighted in red? China is clearly in breach of that.

See, you can breach it but not us. I’m so tied of it…

You, along with everyone else arguing the Chinese position here, does not know the difference between EEZ & territorial waters. Read what Tigershark has posted, e.g.

Consider the implications. The freedom to navigate, lay cables & pipelines etc in EEZs is guaranteed by the law you claim says the opposite. Surveying is implicitly one of those freedoms (can’t lay cables or pipelines without some idea of where you’re laying them, good charts are desirable for navigation, etc), & I’m sure it’s explicitly mentioned as one of the other “lawful uses of the sea . . .” elsewhere.

You don’t need permission to survey outside territorial waters.

Article56:

Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone

1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) …

(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;

(ii) marine scientific research;

(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;

(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.

2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.
As usual, only good at manipulating the old trick of “obscuring the concept ” by saying the world renowned spy boat “ the Impeccable” was there laying cables and pipelines doesn’t make you immediately” more civilized”, quite on the contrary, make themselves laughable when people wondering which telco or oil firms can hire the top rated USN service in such economic downturn.

Steaming 75 miles off the coast in international waters is harassing?. !

75 miles maybe a far distance to any of human organ but not the machines solely developed for that sniffing/peeping purpose. 75 miles still within China’s EEZ