No, because their focus is purely defensive and on the Baltic and not on ‘out of area’ ops.

what’s the meaning of this Report from Russia on a competition being held to replace the 20380 corvette? bad translation? or is Russia really needing to replace something they just built? seems unlikely.

http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100823/160303044.html

Earlier it was discussed in this thread, IIRC, that the navy wasn’t entirely happy with the 20380 ‘as is’.

so i’m guessing you feel the frigate from Russia is pretty much conventional with some new stealth measures added to it.

We’ll have to wait and see, but I’m not expected fireworks but rather down to earth addressing of immediate needs (including building some 11356s to complement 22350s). It seems a logical step from a ‘stealthified’ Krivak III (Talwar/11356) to the 22350: Neustraushimy etc aside, there is nothing else to develop from and we’re not seeing more of those being built. Besides, isn’t the same design bureau for 22350 involved in the INs P17 class? Why not apply some of that experience and stick it onto an 11356 follow on?

Besides, the subs are much harder to find and kill.

A new auxiliary submarine (SSAN) was launched at Severodvinsk Shipyard on 6 August 2003. Nicknamed ‘Losharik’, she is likely to be employed for scientific research and is reported to be similar to but not the same as the Uniform class. It is known both as Project 210 and as Project 10831. It has a pennant number of AS 12 and is reported to have become operational in 2007

http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Fighting-Ships/Introduction-Submarines–Auxiliary-submarines-SSA-N-Russian-Federation.html

Conversely I wonder how many navies which use 76 mm Otobreda Super Rapid do not use a heavy calibre gun?

EDIT: First navy I checked – the Royal Netherlands Navy operate both 127 mm and 76 mm gun

Heavier guns have poorer AAA performance?

The discussion is about the current and planned capability (which is planned to respond to the changing environment).

That’s an easy way out from what you said earlier. See your own post with map.

Your view of the threats that IN can face in completing its objectives that far out at sea are very all-inclusive, there are geo-political realities to consider.

Of course they are. You posted a map with countries ringing the Indian Ocean. I’m just discussing the capabilities of the relevant countries.

For e.g: IN is not planning on taking on the oil blocks AF and Navy, if it has to then the objective has already failed and no amount of naval power can resolve it.

A military should (and will) consider all possible contingencies, even if they cannot be acknowledge publicly because they deal with ‘friendlies’. IMHO, China is a very real possible FOE, which operates Su-27, Su-30, J-11 and H6. Next consider China’s allies in the more immediate area.

when planes, bombers, naval vessels are trying to find you out and sink you with missiles and torpedoes, that does not sound like a time that requires strict emission control (rather a time to use all sensors that can operate without interfering with each other), unless they believe they have the element of surprise on their side and can move into an area undetected by relying on passive measures alone.

That’s how Nato flotilla’s in the North Atlantic evaded USSR long range assets, in the face of significant threat posed by WP forces during the cold war. IIRC, they only ‘lit up’ once sure that they had been detected.

“EMCON is used to prevent an enemy from detecting, identifying, and locating friendly forces. It is also used to minimize electromagnetic interference among friendly systems. EMCON is normally imposed by a commander to control all electromagnetic radiations. Once EMCON is imposed, general or specific restrictions may be added to the EMCON order, depending on the operational, intelligence, or technical factors for the area affected. “
http://www.tpub.com/ans/69.htm

“The objectives of EMCON are to deny the enemy any way that it may locate your position, to support the efforts to disrupt the enemy’s electiveness, and to allow your actions to go unnoticed. To accomplish these objectives, EMCON conditions are designed with the following guidelines:
– Minimize detection by enemy sensors
– Allow effective friendly command and control (C2)
– Support operations security (OPSEC)
– Support operational deception (OPDEC)
– Minimize interference among friendly systems
– Degrade effectiveness of enemy C2″
http://www.tpub.com/content/istts/14226/css/14226_61.htm

How does one fire a long ranged missile on to a target without knowing where the target is? (as i see you said “With 45km russian missiles and -eventually – 70km israeli missiles, you mean you don’t think AShM equipped aircraft out to 1500km from nearest shores are a problem?”)

Info from EW/ESM, long range MPA surveillance, submarines mainly
Not sure how you mean the bit between brackets: I’ve indicated the threat that certain aircraft in the possession of certain countries can/may pose to IN fleet though not that such an operation would be EASY. Definitely possibilities for the IN to consider.

I do see the advantage of a larger area covered by such a missile, my question was, is that enough at sea when the threat could be a long ranged antiship missile?

Trying to flip the argument? You yourself suggest current and planned capability was sufficient. My point was that I don’t think it may be sufficient.

A SHAR and a MiG-29K will have the advantage of being guided to the location of the threat, and a greater situational awareness through the ship based sensors.

Not necessarily. ESM, for example, will detect e.g. radar emissions at far greater ranges than radars themselves can detect a target.

Primary role of the plane is fleet air defense, with anti surface and recon/attack roles.

So what else is new?

What do you mean by ‘how many’, maintenance wise? If four planes are on a CAP and with fuel, then i suppose four are available, along with what ever planes can take off from the deck of the carrier.

And how long/often will you be running a continuous CAP, under what circumstances? The longer you have to run this, the more crew fatigue will come into play and the more the aircraft available will begin to exhibit wear and tear and defects. Over time, it may become more difficult to maintain a CAP, especially if the number of pilots and aircraft is limited (e.g. in the case of the SHAR)

That sounds like the choice a navy will make depending on its requirements.

No, it sounds like you missed the point.

Ka-31s service in Indian Navy is from aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and shore based facilities.

I’m aware of that and that’s why I mentioned heli AEW. They are nowhere equal to fixed wing assets like E-2C in terms of capability though.

And the Navy is looking for fixed wing AEW options
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/awst/2010/06/14/AW_06_14_2010_p48-233219.xml

To be operated from?

Where are these Su-30s coming in from?

From one or more of the countries listed previously?

How do they attain the surprise to attack unchallenged?

By avioding detection e.g. fly low and fast, by good planning e.g. coming in simultaneously along different vectors (forcing the CAP to split), by launching outside of opponent’s missile range etc.

What advantage does a 150km anti air missile have over a 70km anti air missile when the attacking aircraft launches its missile at 200-300kms?

It means that it is more dangerous to use shorter ranged AShMs. Thus the options for the attacker are limited: a) use the limited range missiles but risk to launch platform of b) use a longer ranged AShM and let the launchplatform stand-off. Longer ranged missile may well be bigger and heavier, limiting the number that can be carried by the launch platform, which limits the size of the wave that be launched from a given set of aircraft. Compare e.g. the 4 ton Moskit and 2,5 ton Brahmos with lengths of around 7-8 meters to smaller 4-5m missiles typically weighing well under 1 ton. The former are supersonic but only few can be carried, the latter tend to be subsonic but more can be carried. Only the latest of the latter have sufficient range though due to airbreathing motors.

The MR and SR missiles and CIWS in the service have a role of shooting down anti ship missiles.

Yeah they do, but you’ld be better off killing launch platforms than incoming missiles as the former can return, rearm and attack you again, while the latter can’t.

The main problem for any Air Force attacking a naval formation is actually how to find it.

Even a large naval group cruising, let’s say, 200 nm from the shore will be over the horizon for any land based surveillance network and still capable to menace both a country’s shipping lanes and to strike targets on land, at least targets located very close to the sea, even using only short range cruise missiles like Brahmos. It would take only an handful of hours to close in with the shore and launch the missiles, meaning the other side need to lock several air and naval assets just to prevent it, let alone to retaliate against the enemy’s naval group.

Over the Horizon (OTH) Backscatter and OTH Surface Wave radars may have ranges of over 3000km
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Over-the-horizon_radar

Elint/Sigint/Comint > detection ranges may be a multiple of the ranges of the radars being detects > several hundres of km
E.g. The Kolchuga passive sensor is an ESM system developed in Ukraine. This ESM system, comprises three or four receivers, deployed tens of kilometres apart, which detect and track aircraft by triangulation and multilateration of their RF emissions. Its detection range is limited by line-of-sight but may be up to 800 km (500 miles) for very high altitude, very powerful emitters.

Not to mention passive sonar.

On the other hand, AAW warfare is an higly specialized task, it is not a matter of how many frigates armed with medium range AAW missiles are deployable, nor it is a mere matter of missile’s range.

It’ mostly about sensors, FCS and CMS, enabling at least one single ship to trace a comprehensive tactical environment, tracking all of the own ships and air assetts, neutral air assetts, enemy assets.

It should be able to identify and prioritize both enemy air assets and enemy missiles, and to identify or guess potential targets within own naval group, and deploy a defensive sequence.

The first and foremost requirement for an AAW ship is the ability (better to say its CMS’s ability) to identify as hostile and engage menaces not aiming at herself, and a general purpose or ASW frigate’s CMS is usually lacking this feature, forcing the ship to act just as bastion placed between a potential target and the incoming missile to engage it.

Tend to agree with this.