Thanks for that.

It seems amazing that such a mistake (if true) was made in the first place and perhaps even more amazing that the problem did not come to light the moment the first F-35C assembled had the tailhook added and tested for operation. I cannot understand how it would be possible to fail to see the problem at that point.

Because they weren’t conducting full-speed landing tests at that point! The problem did not show up in their simulations, or in low-speed tests, only in full-speed runs.

Remember that the wire is held up off the deck on either side of the landing path, but not in the middle… the tension on the wire is what keeps it up so that the hook point can slide under it.

The F-35C hook reaches the deck just fine, and the point on the hook is the same as that on every F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet in the USN/USMC inventory, so no one thought there would be a problem.

Only when they did a real-life landing attempt on the land test facility did they learn that there was a problem.

The problem is that when the main gear wheels push the wire down to the deck as they run over it, the hook is too close so the wire doesn’t lift back up quickly enough for the hook point to get under the wire.

On all other USN carrier aircraft there is more distance between the main wheels and the hook, so the wire has enough time to lift back up.

The issue of “hook bounce” is no worse than in other aircraft, but again, their hook is trying to catch a wire that is higher above the deck due to main wheel-hook distance, so the bounce isn’t the issue it is with the F-35C.

The first thing they are trying is to replace the hook point with a different design that sits flush with the deck… the problem here is that this sharper point will wear out the wire more quickly, increasing the chance of the wire breaking in use, and shortening the usable life of the wire if it doesn’t break.

Concurrent with the re-design of the hook point is an increase in the strength of the damper to try to hold the hook down against the deck more completely, so as to keep the point in a better position… this would reduce the damage the hook point does to the wire by reducing the number of “dead-center” impacts of hook point against wire.

Only if these measures don’t work will the hook attachment point be relocated.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/asd/2011/12/21/02.xml&headline=Lights%20Out%20For%20The%20Airborne%20Laser

Lights Out For The Airborne Laser

Dec 22, 2011

After nearly 16 years of development and more than $5 billion spent, culminating in a series of ballistic missile target engagements, the Pentagon has finally decided to mothball the Boeing-led 747-400F project known as the Airborne Laser.

Not really surprising… the project is actually over 20 years old, and the base technology for the high-power laser is obsolete.

The two most important parts of the program were developing, testing, and refining the targeting and atmospheric compensation hardware and programs, and in proving that use of a laser from an aircraft against an airborne target was not only possible, but practical.

There would be little additional gain from continuing the project “as is”, and not much practical gain from installing a new-tech main laser.

The programs for tactical lasers mounted in aircraft have shifted to much smaller platforms, and the vast improvement in surface/ship-launched ABMs, combined with the significant reduction in total numbers of possible hostile missiles, has negated the need for large laser-equipped aircraft patrolling against a mass ICBM strike.

Simply put, the 747-400F Airborne Laser program has reached its natural end.

Are there any other flying wings currently in development, apart from the F117 and B2 the latest military aircraft seem to be reverting to a more conventional layout of flying surfaces.

Northrop Grumman X-47 (both the tail-less delta X-47A and the flying wing X-47B):
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/x47/
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/cv-ucavs-the-return-of-ucas-03557/
Note that the X-47B is intended for operation from aircraft carriers.

Lockheed Martin RQ-170 “mini B-1”:
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/rq-170-sentinel/

Boeing “Phantom Ray”:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Phantom_Ray

BAe Taranis, Corax, & Raven:
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/tanaris/
http://air-attack.com/page/74/BAE-Corax-UCAV.html

Dassault nEUROn:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dassault_nEUROn

Hard to believe they would have the spares for anything approaching regular operation of the aircraft. What spares were there in 1945 might not have been much use a few years later.

I can see using a former Japanese warplane/trainer as a base “hack” or test aircraft, but nothing long term.

Also, would they need many with all the WWII suplus aircraft provided by the US and UK?

Yes, they would (to all questions).

All of the US/UK aircraft with Free French forces were in Europe… there were virtually no French forces in Indochina other than the Vichy in Allied POW camps.

The British had to keep General Giap, Ho Chi Minh, etc. from taking Indochina away from the small remaining French administrative bodies… the situation was so bad that Japanese POWs were re-armed and used as “security forces” to keep control over the populace until French forces could come over from Europe (after they had first stabilized France).

So not only was there a need for whatever aircraft could be made airworthy without regard to nationality of build, but there were lots of trained maintenance personnel for them… along with remaining stocks of parts from the IJA/IJN units there.

By 1950 there were no more former Japanese aircraft in service (or very few), and the Japanese forces had all been repatriated to Japan by ~1947/8.

If we assume that each F-15 will cost $100 millions, that’s $8 billions. Another $4 billion for the upgrade of 70 F-15s and we’re still quite short of the $30 billion.
Of course, we also have weapons, training, parts and so.

For some reason, announced Saudi deals seem a lot costlier than the usual one’s we read daily.

That’s because most purchasers provide their own maintenance staff, they just need the parts, equipment, and training.

The Saudis don’t do their own maintenance… so the contract price also includes leasing the actual maintenance personnel as well… who tend to be paid about twice what their civilian (and ~4x their USAF) counterparts are.

Basically, that price includes everything except the pilots (but does include training those pilots).

In 8 years has a single FA2 gone to a good home?

Art Nalls picked up one.

http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/aviation/diy-flying/how-to-restore-a-harrier-jump-jet

It is extremely unfair to compare the 70s airframe designed with 70s avionics and 70s missiles to the 90s airframe with the 00s avionics and 00s missiles. Yet you folks keep on doing. Compare what the F-14 could have been to what the F/A-18 is.

That “70s airframe” (actually a late 1960s airframe) is exactly what every single one of the proposed “Tomcat 21, etc” versions would have still been saddled with!

NONE of them proposed a complete airframe re-design with modern materials and aerodynamics… or even a significant revision!

All any of them included was relatively minor modifications to try to fix the Tomcat’s limitations.

It may be “extremely unfair”, but it is reality!

You could always implement carefree handling on F-14. Just different flight control system and software. The same with engine. Just add some FADEC control to TF-30 and make them carefree.

But, if fighter aerodynamics is flowed, you can’t increase its performance …

Putting FADEC on the TF30 would be like putting a turbocharger on the original engine in a Model T… it wouldn’t change anything about the engine’s limitations. The TF30 was a “dead” engine by 1990 anyway… there was no further development planned, and it was being replaced in the USN’s new-build F-14s as well as its upgraded old F-14s.

The F110 in the F-14B & F-14D DID have FADEC… and it still had restrictions to low-speed AOA etc due to airflow problems with engine performance.

And even with an improved flight-control system the F-14D still had restrictions on its flight envelope related to airframe aerodynamics that negatively affected max airspeed (limited to significantly below the “book” max), maneuvering angles and rates, etc.

Trying to convert to a full “fly-by-wire” system would require re-designing the entire control-surface actuating system, as the existing one couldn’t respond fast enough to matter. This would require redesigning the internal wing & fuselage structure to allow placement of the differing-dimensions & loads of the new actuators, etc… and again, none of the “Future Tomcat” proposals went this far.

You would find that, in order to do the complete redesign required to eliminate the negatives of the legacy airframe design, you would be spending more than the comparatively less-extensive design work needed to enlarge the Hornet airframe into that of the Super Hornet.

The former is again avionics related (and I’m sure there is nothing stopping an F-14 throwing an AMRAAM further than an F-18.

Yes there is… the APG-79 radar is capable of exploiting the full range and maneuverability of all AIM-120 models… so there is no way that carrying them on an F-14super-duper could change the missile’s performance, as the slightly higher real-world speed of the F-14 is not enough to measurably increase the max range of AIM-120.

Forget about the “book max speed” of the F-14, they were restricted from that due to airframe issues (even the new airframes), and this was enforced (in the F-14B/D) via the flight computer restricting engine power when Vmaxauthorized was reached, so the pilot could not over-ride it.

This was one of Wabpilot’s points as to why the F-14 wasn’t as good as many of its supporters believe.

If you guys like, you could go over to the Warships1 board and talk to Wabpilot.

He is a former USN F-4/F-14 pilot who has done Navair consulting work after retirement, as well as keeping up with old friends who now fly the Hornet/Super Hornet.

His flat statement is that, for 95% of current missions, he would rather have an F/A-18E/F than an F-14D (for reasons starting with superior avionics and going on from there).

He hated the Tomcat’s borderline control-ability on carrier landing approaches, as well as other issues.

He rates the Super Hornet/AMRAAM combination as better than the F-14D/Phoenix combo for everything except maximum range, and considers the only advantage the F-14D had as an airframe was range.

The Tomcat could only carry 8 missiles while the Super Hornet can carry 10… and the SH can use all of them against any target in the missile’s range. The Phoenix was a large-target-only missile… it was not maneuverable enough to deal with fighters, sea-skimming missiles, and maneuvering missiles, and any time you carried those you were hampered against fighters.

Face it… despite the well-known factual problems with the Hornet design (lets not mention the fictional problems that keep re-appearing on discussion boards), it is still a better fighter and attack plane than the Tomcat was… it was only the missile that made the F-14 such a good bomber-interceptor.