Well that’s hardly comparable to an F-18SH, or the latest build F-15Es.

The whole point was that the Hornets and Mirage 2000 and F-16 are not really comparable to the SH, Typhoon and Rafale.

So it seems you agree.

Have they tried an SH in the latest state though? What about when the APG-79 gets RF attack capability.
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SH?? I was talking about the old Hornet.

Because of avionics mainly. In the state they were when launched, then yes, there’s a difference. Otherwise it’s quite subtle.

Again, check how much better Rafale scores overall compared to the Hornets in the Swiss leaks. It is more than “subtle”.

Sensor fusion is an important part of it, as is having excellent sensors. And no it is not trivial to implement. Where do you fit the IRST and all the other sensor on an old a/c? How do you reduce the RCS to allow for more effient EW techniques?

Well you can trust a RUSI report instead. Site now back up.

https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/whr_1-15_maximising_european_combat_air_power_0.pdf

Thanks for the link, it works!

Italy has made some progress with PIRATE/CAPTOR sensor fusion, but this is still a work in progress.

So the sensor fusion is still work in progress, as of 2015, fully supporting the Swiss eval.

However, the active electronic countermeasures (ECM) components of the DASS, whilst sophisticated, still lag behind the latest French and US capabilities on platforms such as the Rafale, EA-18G and F-22. This is an area where operators suggested that further priority investment could yield significant increases in survivability, especially against ground-based air defences.

Again supporting the Swiss eval: The ECM capabilities of TYphoon are behind Rafale’s.

THen there is also this:

Whilst the major systems such as the engines are extremely reliable, there are persistent problems with many of the smaller subsystems such as the radios and even the digital altimeter.15 These issues are longstanding and in the past have not been treated as priority investment areas because they are by nature small and unassuming from a programme-management point of view. However, in practice small subsystems which do not function properly act as serious performance bottlenecks for the system as a whole. There are fixes for some issues in upcoming software blocks, and new production aircraft are less prone to many of them already. However, at squadron level – especially in German and Italian service – problems remain and should be fixed as a priority. Currently, pilots are forced to spend mental capacity coping with minor errors and trying to work around them. This limits their ability to use some of the more advanced capabilities of the platform. Furthermore, certain relatively minor deficiencies can seriously constrain the capability of the system as a whole to function as intended.

An obvious example of such a deficiency is the poor long-range non-cooperative threat recognition (NCTR) capabilities using the current CAPTOR-M radar. NCTR in this case refers to the capability to positively identify aircraft which have been detected at long range (more than 40 miles) – where optical means are useless – using either high-definition radar ranging or jet-engine modulation identification. Whilst platforms such as the E-3D Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and some advanced US fighter platforms can use these methods to positively identify potential threats at long range, the Eurofighter currently lags behind in this capability and is likely to do so for some years under current plans.16 This means that without information on target identification being fed to them across Link 16 from other allied assets, Eurofighter pilots cannot use their most powerful BVR capabilities and tactics under most rules of engagement (ROE), since they cannot positively identify potential targets until almost WVR.

The platform will continue to provide the backbone of Europe’s air power until at least 2030 and, as such, essential subsystem fixes, weapon and software integration, FOC for CAPTOR-E and enhanced sensor fusion should be prioritised.

Again, AESA radar and sensor fusion are being mentioned as critical to fix on the Typhoon…

So in other words:

If they can get the AESA radar in place; improve on the PIRATE; improve the ECM; improve the sensor fusion, and improve several minor deficiencies, then the TYphoon will indeed become a formidable a/c. No doubt.

Where did it say that “Radar 2” is GaN?

Gripen has landed on highway five

The exercise Baana 16 began this weekend and road base also has other equipment from the Air Force landed. On Wednesday, the exercise also had Nordic elements when two Swedish Jas Gripen fighters took land in Lusi.

From a pilot’s point of view, it is in many ways different to land on a country road, compared with a conventional airbase: runway is usually a little narrower, worse illuminated, it is not normal markings and barriers at the side of the track is higher.

– It is a significant part of the training that each pilot can act on such a base on the night or day, says Lindstrom.

Swedish Gripen practicing operating from a road, together with Finnish Hornets in Lusi, Finland (https://www.google.no/maps/place/19210+Lusi,+Finland/@61.2982429,23.8328064,7z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x468fd8634682c959:0x2600b5523c1a3351!8m2!3d61.2982333!4d26.0740173)

Google translated from: http://online.vasabladet.fi/Artikel/Visa/116871

ADAS 2016: Saab targets Gripen at Philippines

Saab is to open an office in Manila by the end of 2016 to support the company’s campaign to sell its JAS 39 Gripen fighter aircraft to the Philippine Air Force (PAF), an official from the Swedish company told I HS Jane’s on 28 September.

Speaking on the opening day of the Asian Defence and Security 2016 (ADAS 2016) exhibition in Manila, Carl-Erik Leek, Saab’s executive vice-president in the Asia Pacific, said the new office would be the centre of the company’s marketing activities in the country.

At present, these are undertaken from Saab’s regional headquarters in Thailand, although the company does not currently have a major presence, in terms of previous defence sales, in the Philippine market.

The new office will also be supported by the Swedish government’s intention, announced in December 2015, to open an embassy in Manila to support growth in bilateral trade and investment. Both Saab’s office and the new embassy are expected to be operational by November.

Leek, who will head up the new Manila office, said Saab’s primary target in the Philippines is the PAF’s requirement – outlined in the service’s modernisation programme, Flight Plan 2028 – for 12 multirole combat aircraft.

http://www.janes.com/article/64159/adas-2016-saab-targets-gripen-at-philippines

Yet, the actual SA score of the Rafale came out only 0.25 ahead.

Sigh.. we have discussed this before.

1. We don’t really know what those categories really mean
2. In any case they seem to be related to the “air policing” scenario which is probably less taxing than some of the other scenarios.
3. Sensor fusion was highlighted as one of the strong points of the Rafale and one (amongst several) weak points of the Typhoon.
4. Nobody has said that Typhoon does not have “sensor fusion”; the claim was that it was not quite as good was what is found in the Rafale.
5. Please notice how much better the Rafale (and in some cases the Typhoon) is performing compared to the Swiss Hornet, a very capable 4. gen fighter. Also notice that the difference in capabilities between the Hornet and the Rafale is going to grow as new capabilities are implemented on the Rafale including HMD, updates to SPECTRA, etc. etc. To me it makes sense to put the Hornet and the Rafale in slightly different generations (e.g. gen. 4 and 4.5). Notice that both the Hornet and the Rafale are somewhat large twin-engine fighters, and should therefore be very comparable — still, they are not when you look at their performance.

As said before, the Hornets are underestimated by many. And it seems the same goes for Rafale…?