No. 🙂
If South Korea selects the F35 i suspect it will be precisely because it is American and importantly; the latest offering from that entity, with all the associated “benefits” that fact brings.
If you want the US cavalry to come riding over the hill when you need assistance it makes good diplomatic and political sense to have “helped” move the F35 program along by purchasing the aircraft.
Purchasing the F15 variant isn’t going to alienate the US as much as purchasing the Typhoon would, but it is going to leave some pretty annoyed folk on the other side of the Pacific, folk who the Koreans will be looking to in the event of something occuring.
The cost currently quoted of i beleive around 10billion USD for the F35 exceeds the program cost for the Korean aquisition. As i understand the aquisition rules, if another offering meets the aquisition cost then all those that do not are eliminated. Thus it will be interesting to see how this plays out.

Well I think the Americans would understand and accept it if Korea goes with the F-15. Going with the F-35 would make the Boeing people unhappy (and also the senators representing states having F-15 production). No matter what they do they cannot keep all Americans happy.

And the F-35 program certainly does not depend on South Korea to succeed.

Also, although fighter jets no doubt are the most important and prestigious equipment one can purchase, other defence deals may also play a role. I don’t think the relationship between the US and South Korea breaks down if they go with the F-15SE.

Didn’t do Dassault any favours holding back on TOT in the submarine deal. Would a deal with Dassault also result in fewer technology transfers than expected?

Not very appealing partners, US and France. The first cannot give cast iron guarantees over TOT. The second’s attitude may be to transfer as little technology as possible.

I think Snecma was involved in a deal with India to help them fix the issues with their Kaveri engine, however it seems it failed. Perhaps the French were not willing to share some key engine technologies with the Indians after all? I don’t blame them though.

It’s funny when somebody is claiming “full tech transfer”; I wonder who they are addressing? Certainly not the professionals, they know that there is no such thing…

A mark against the F-35A is that it is probably the most costly of the three types on offer, yet it is also the one that the air force most wants, officials say.

http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_06_03_2013_p24-583039.xml&p=2

Yet another air force (that is not F-35 partner) expressing a preference for the F-35, in spite of the delays and high price.

I wonder when the naysayers on this forum will accept that the F-35 means a significant jump in capabilities above and beyond current 4.5 gen fighters like the Typhoon, Rafale and SH?

This does not take anything away from the excellent 4.5 gen fighters currently on the market, it simply means that something even better is on it’s way…

Spud, Snafu actually got a point regarding Libya and the French a/c.

AFAIK the Rafale and Mirage did not have any additional support, I think it was said that the French actually turned down an offer for Growler support.

I think that in particular the Rafale is quite survivable, and seems much more survivable than e.g. F-16 bl. 50/52 and similar 4. gen a/c.

Of course that does not change the fact that the F-35 is even more survivable.

5. gen >> 4.5 gen >> 4. gen.

It’s not about being “fair” or not — each country will of course try to get as much as possible.

France was in a unique position because they had an excellent alternative to the Eurofighter — and that was going it alone.

Nobody wants to give up parts of their defence industry unless they really really have to. It seems clear that the other partners could not accept what France demanded to participate, however it seems equally clear that France was in a position to demand as much as they did, since, as already noted, they did have an alternative.

Looking at the end results and in particular at the leaks from the Swiss study, it seems that France can be quite happy with their decision. They kept their industry, and they did get an excellent multirole 4.5 gen fighter, second to none. Had they chosen to go with the Eurofighter they would probably have had a good fighter as well, however they would have given up a large amount of their industry. Also politically clearly they prefer to control their own gear.

Keep in mind countries don’t have friends or enemies, they have interests… 😉

Did GD/LM do that with the F-16?

Since they did not, then why do you think that will happen with the F-35?

I am not saying they will do it but your example is a poor one. There is no (western) alternative to the F-35 on the horizon. Whereas F-16 had some competitors (e.g., F-18, Mirage)

The only “alternative” would be a pimped-up 4.5 gen with further LO treatment, stealth pod, and upgraded avionics. However that would most likely be more expensive than F-35, and less capable in most respects. Thus not an alternative.

Only countries that have a low-threat environment will consider 4.5 gen fighters. Even then, only the Gripen NG has the potential to be affordable, the others (Rafale, Typhoon, SH) although more capable comes with a much higher price tag so you might as well get the F-35. And countries that don’t need (or can’t afford) F-35 may also consider other options like the F-16(!) or FA-50.

With F-35 IOC just a few years away the window for Ra-Ty-SH is closing very rapidly.

So the 2005 F-22 sees an 1985 F-15D before the Eagle can see it and maneuvers accordingly.

Examples like this of operating in bubbles do more harm than good. Where was the GCI feeding the Eagle information? Was the eagle modern enough to take that information and present it coherently to the pilot?

I think one point is that SA is one of the most important things.

Another point is that the F-35 will have SA second to none.

No doubt other a/c will be able to improve their SA in the coming years, but so will also the F-35.

My guess is that 10-15 years from now the F-35 will still be the a/c with the “best” SA of all the fighters out there.

Combine that with a very low RCS and a decent IR signature management, some long-reach missiles, modern directional data link, and it becomes very difficult to beat.

Anyway, until we have F-35 pilots fly in Red Flag and other places I think further discussion is futile. Perhaps we can then dig out some of these old threads and laugh at what we wrote back in 2013.

Air Vice Marshal Osley: The way that the requirements for the F35 were set up is to talk about mission performance. Mission performance specification is the high level. There is no doubt at this time about the F35 meeting that mission performance—that is, the ability to counter certain threats that might be encountered at IOC and into the future. That level of the specification remains as valid; we are not questioning that; it is actually achieving that. Below that you have your key performance parameters. The aeroplane at this point in time is achieving those, as far as the F35A is concerned.
The figures that you are talking about, the specifications down the bottom with the sustained turn and the transonic acceleration, are derived values in order to meet the overall mission performance specification. We have always been focused on the ability of the aeroplane to meet the overall mission performance specification—the ability to do its air-to-air mission and to do its air-to-ground mission. If you take a particular parameter, such as the transonic acceleration, the difference between—in fact, the F35 can reach mach 1.16 in 55 seconds, so it is 0.04 mach short of that target, and in a slight descent it will exceed the limit. The point to make is that we do not necessarily get too focused on those individual derived parameters. We are focused on the overall ability of the platform, trading off everything—all the different capabilities—it has there: the situational awareness, the performance of the radar, the performance of the electronic warfare capability, the performance of stealth, the balance of range mission payload and the weapons.
The situational awareness is really the key—taking that and seeing how it performs against the overall mission specification. For instance, the trade-off that might have been made—the delay in the transonic acceleration—might have been due to giving it increased stealth as they were going through the design of the aeroplane. So you really need to see not the individual parameters but the overall specification. At the highest level, as I said, it is all about mission performance. That is what we do focus on.
[…]
Air Marshal Brown: Let me go through what ‘situational awareness’ is because it is actually the key advantage of fifth-generation fighters. It has been the key advantage in combat for quite a deal of time, even as far back as World War II. Air crew with the most situational awareness will normally win the day. But rarely since World War II has close-in combat been the actual determining factor because situational awareness is really that combination of things—of understanding what has happened, what is happening and the ability to say what will happen into the future. This is where fifth-generation aeroplanes have an unprecedented advantage over fourth-generation types.
[…]
But getting back to the situational awareness, the ability to actually have that data fusion that the aeroplane has makes an incredible difference to how you perform in combat. I saw it first hand on a Red Flag mission in an F15D against a series of fifth-generation F22s. We were actually in the red air. In five engagements we never knew who had hit us and we never even saw the other aeroplane at any one particular time. That is a current fourth-generation aeroplane.
The data fusion in the stealth makes such a difference to your overall situational awareness it is quite incredible. After that particular mission I went back and had a look at the tapes on the F22, and the difference in the situational awareness in our two cockpits was just so fundamentally different. That is the key to fifth-generation. That is where I have trouble with the APA analysis. They tend to go down particular paths in the aeroplane, whether it is turn rate performance or acceleration. These are all important factors, but it is a combination of what you have actually got in the jet and the situational awareness that is resident in the cockpit of a fifth-generation aeroplane that makes the fundamental difference.
[…]
Let me get back to my example again. In all those cases, neither turning performance nor speed were the factors that caused us to die in those five simulated engagements. In any practice engagement I have had in the last 20 years where I have turned with another aeroplane in a bigger picture environment—rather than the static one by ones, two by twos or four by fours—every time I have tried to do that I have ended up being shot by somebody else who actually is not in the fight. As soon as you enter a turning fight, your situational awareness actually shrinks down because the only thing you can be operating with is the aeroplane you are turning with. The person who has the advantage is the person who can stand off, watch the engagement and just pick you off at the time. So you got to be really careful about how you use those KPIs.

http://tinyurl.com/kzz8nsd

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