thobbesNumbers did seem inflated but couldn’t be bothered trawling the net for more reliable info.
thobbesAs for C-130 fleet:
USAF proposal was to cut 17% of the C-130 fleet (65 out of 383 aircraft or 5 squadrons). That leaves 184 C-130Hs and 134 C-130Js.
32 of the proposed 65 cutback were already a result of a past cutback proposal, which was negated by Congress.
The C-130H Avionics Modernisation Program (AMP) was also cutback. That cuts down on the life of the existing C-130Hs many of which are near 30 years old.
I’ve seen total number of planned C-130Js quoted as 179 for USAF. This is transport models and does not include WC-130, AC-130 and EC-130 derivatives.
The little that is known about C-130 replacement indicates as few as 250 ordered.
Whilst 383 or 318 or 250 C-130s sounds like a lot bear in mind the workload assigned to them in terms of supporting US and allies etc.
thobbesWith regards to airframes providing CAS, it’s not just about airframe capability.
It’s about actual human capabilities.
Anyone reading anything on footslogger experiences with CAS in Afghanistan will see the footslogger often prefer A-10s for CAS than most other platform.
Reasons appear to be several:
1. A-10 squadrons train exclusively for the role, F-15E/-16 pilots do not. Hence A-10 drivers are far better at performing actual CAS mission than F-15E/-16 drivers who are trained in multi-role missions.
2. A-10 squadrons also perform valuable CAS coordination which other fast movers often do not (it’s why some A-10s used to carry OA-10 designation but all the squadrons do it).
3. A-10 squadrons mentality/organisational culture is about ground support unlike other fighter/strike streams. The A-10 pilots pride themselves on that role.
It’s a professional culture of excellence. An F-16 unit has that but it’s probably not directed at CAS.
Take out dedicated CAS and squadrons you’ve lost all that human experience as well as culture of excellence.
Maintaining it is difficult. In fact at a presentation I recently attended, one speaker said: “you don’t change organisational culture, you change the way people do things and organisational change happens subconsciously.”
So you take 355th FW and take it’s A-10s and give them F-16/F-35s. How long before that wing loses CAS expertise as it trains to be a multirole unit and the older personnel move on?
The problem is that the Army tends to regard CAS as the only mission, while for the USAF it is one of many missions.
Problem is pretty much all the missions flown in Afghanistan, Iraq and a lot flown in Libya were CAS.
thobbesWhat’s interesting is that there does not appear to be any great urgency in fighter fleet upgrades except USAF and USMC.
It’s not like the 1950s-1980s when you had even smaller powers replacing aircraft with newer versions very frequently in order to stay up to date.
In some ways predictions of a new Cold War seem a bit misguided. The threat just isn’t there.
In fact if we applied the predicted fleet composition of 2030 to say 1990, you’d get some interesting results:
IDF/AF – 100 F-15/-16, rest is A-4, F-4 and Nesher/Kfir (instead there was a couple of hundred F-16s and 50+ F-15s)
JASDF – a mere 40 F-15 and the rest is F-1, F-104 and F-4.
France – no M2000 in service, only Mirage III/V/F1
Germany – no Tornado or Alpha Jet in service, only F-4, G91 and F-104
thobbesI disagree with you here thobbes, IMO the primary attribute of stealth is time compression, delay re-action till its too late.
Any delay is better than no delay, and coupled with speed it will have significant/decisive effect.
Agree on the concept of time compression.
My comment was more about most likely wars to be fought in future – i.e. more low lying relatively largely defenceless and often rotten fruit that are easily contained by 4th generation.
The one interesting thing about all this discussion on this and other boards is the notion of passive and reactive defenders. The defenders are also always assumed to be sitting in their foxholes waiting for the enemy to come.
I think if anyone is rich and powerful enough to afford an IADS/air defence fleet that requires an all stealth fleet to penetrate it, they will also be able to be rich enough to have some reasonably trained officers capable of making proactive plans and most likely be willing to engage in counter-offensive type activities such as hitting F-35 bases with their own offensive assets.
Seems to be the result of 22 years of American interventionism against 3rd and 4th rate opponents who generally were passive.
thobbesIt’s not a pure stand off jammer role. The aircraft has an attack capability with AGM-88s. This applies to both E/A-6B and E/A-18G.
EF-111 did not have an offensive capability though and was unarmed – but the USAF did have F-4G and then F-16s for SEAD/DEAD role (and apparently the dual seater F-4G did the job better than the single seat F-16 hence Israeli F-16 Wild Weasels are two seaters with extra avionics in dorsal spine.
With SEAD/DEAD, long range isn’t necessarily the right tool against mobile radars and systems. Especially if they’re only turning on for a short period of time which may not be sufficient for long range missile to acquire lock and then get to target on time (mobile radars can move).
Basically SEAD/DEAD against mobile systems is more in your face approach than stand off.
Personally I don’t think a total stealth approach is required – at least from a historical perspective. And USN seems convinced E/A-18G is suitable for up to 2035.
It’s just interesting that the USAF is happy to use “unstealthy” F-35s with pods and AGM-88s hanging of the wings for the one role where a stealth aircraft would be really suited to.
And whatever the case, the Marines seem set to lose dedicated EW capability from 2019 onwards and overall dedicated EW fleet drops by 15% in terms of airframe numbers.
thobbesAnother article on USMC not planning to build EW version of F-35:
http://defensetech.org/2012/08/24/no-plans-to-build-f-35-ew-variant/
It says USMC might just attach NGJ pods to aircraft (so much for stealth).
The other issue is obviously what’s replacing F-16CJ in SEAD/DEAD role as article states USAF has no interest in funding EW version of F-35? Again AGM-88 doesn’t really fit into weapons bay of an F-35. New AGM-88E isn’t integrated yet on F-35 but it’s planned to do so later on (again so much for stealth if you need to load AGM-88s onto pylons for critical SEAD/DEAD role).
thobbesJust looked up NGJ status – enters service on E/A-18 in 2020 and F-35B integration is indefinitely postponed:
Unless this has changed (and it may have) USMC definitely lose capability in 2019.
And that means USAF also takes a hit as well thanks to it fobbing off the role to the USN/USMC and thus losing control over this area.
thobbesMany possible options…Avengers kitted with a LITE_EW capability…F35’s already offer capable EW capability as it is but that would take some years post IOC to fully materialize…NGJ comes online around 2018 or so..The F-35 is kitted out to receive this new pod, so you could begin an integration effort to use some of your F-35’s for that role.
According to article USMC doesn’t get F-35B withEW capabilities for at least a few years after 2019. Is this correct?
As far as the USAF, We are not aware of what the black UAV developments are or have been in the past decade, and what sort of capability they are looking to add to the LRS_B ( IOC is still expected around 2025)…
Though the official line was that EF-111 role was handed over to 4 joint squadrons of EA/6Bs (obviously to be replaced by E/A-18G).
Anything else is speculative.
thobbesE/A-18G wasn’t even in service in 2003. There were numerous E/A-6B units present including USMC VMAQ-1 and VMAQ-2.
Libya didn’t have a functioning IADS either.
Also 114 isn’t a lot.
USN currently has 13 operational squadrons + fleet replacement + 1 reserve unit. USMC has 4 units.
Each unit has about 5 aircraft other than Fleet Replacement which has more (basically OCU).
Each CAW has a squadron of 5 E/A-14G or E/A-6B. That means 10 squadrons assigned to supporting carrier ops. Whatever carriers aren’t deployed doesn’t automatically release a squadron – it means squadrons out of action for training and refit.
Then there’s the Fleet Replacement Unit (not sure how many aircraft are assigned to).
thobbesAgreed. Although I wonder how much stomach the Taiwanese will have for war literally once it reaches their backyards and apartments and cities.
Dunno. We modern types aren’t acustomed to adversity of any form. Same applies to your average Russian and Chinese urbanite.
Agreed. All political an economic trajectories say more integration is more likely than war. But, for PRC, Taiwanese independence would almost definitely be an all in.
I think the most likely outcome will be a Hong Kong handover type agreement. But that’ll be a long way off into the future.
thobbesYou guys actually think they will resort to the military option, ever?
The international economic loss would outweigh any gain. It isn’t happening.
I don’t think it’ll ever come to a military option.
I don’t think there’ll ever be an actual shooting war between PRC and USA just like there was never a shooting war between NATO and Warsaw Pact.
However it’s an interesting scenario.
thobbesI totally agree Blitzo.
I think that Taiwan would be unable to prevent a PLA landing.
Where they have the advantage is the land battle. The longer they can hold out the more likely the US will act.
thobbesThe A-10s are in the process of receiving new wings… if they are cut it will be because of the budget cuts, not USAF planning.
Why not cut F-16 or F-15s? The focus is on A-10 cause the USAF doesn’t like it, has never liked it and has never liked supporting the Army.
…and how many C-130s will that leave the US with relative to the rest of the world?
A. The US is the premier super power in the world.
B. Do you realise how massive US commitments are? Do you realise how many detachments they operate across the world? Do you realise how much logistical support that requires? And a lot of the work is more suited for C-130s than C-17s.
Not sure what your point is. A C-27 or C-130 can’t do what an Osprey can either. The US still has a huge fleet of C-130s with new orders continuing.
The number of planned C-130s is less than operated now. USAF has already been trying to gut C-130 fleets but it’s facing opposition from Congress.
And an A-10 doesn’t do the same thing as an attack helo… or a Strike Eagle… or a B-1… or a Predator…what is your point?
Point is maintaining ability to provide Army with CAS.
And maintaing C-130s and C-27s allows ability to provde US ground forces with effective intratheatre transport.
Problem is USAF despises the Army support mission and has always done so:
1. It gutted it’s CAS ability after WWII and didn’t restore it to until 1960s. Situation was so bad USAR was looking at G-91s.
2. During Vietnam, USAF went out of it’s way to take over US Army C-7s and then never really replaced them properly – the mission was taken over by less capable C-23 Sherpa.
3. When Army started C-27 program, USAF fought again to take it over and then scrapped the program.
4. Numerous attempts since 1980s to get rid of A-10 coupled with opposition to USAR taking over them.
Of course F-35/LRSB crowd doesn’t understand that as it’s obsessed with hypothetical wars with China. And even prominent members from otherv services ala the Marines question this obsession.
The US has an awful lot of UAVs and they aren’t going away. The only real question is exactly what the future mix will be.
Lower ordes means less replacements for attrition/retired airframes which means less operational units.
The bottom line remains unchanged. The US is maintaining a full spectrum of capabilities and that isn’t about to change. No one platform needs to satisfy every possible mission.
The USAF (not US as a whole) is looking at streamlining it’s force to meet the wars it wants to fight (i.e. high end war against China) and not the wars it will be most likely be called in to fight.
thobbes1) Top tier air forces
They all want more ISR, and are all feeling the financial squeeze because of their fast jet fleets’ running costs. One of the solutions is to turn UAVs into dual-use ISR + COIN/CAS assets, but there are limits to what UAVs can do. You still need manned fighters for this role (as gun platforms, for shows-of-force etc). None of them really want a turboprop, because of the low performance. The obvious solution, known since the 1970s, is a small Blitzfighter* to slot in nicely between drones and fast jets as a true dual-use ISR + COIN/CAS asset.
The issue is that most top tier airforces are now reorienting back to the 1950s and pretending that future wars will be WWIII.
COIN/CAS was always an unsexy word with most operators and even more so when they start to feel the budget pinch.
2) Air forces that can’t afford fighters of any kind
If you can’t afford even a light fighter, then you’re pretty much stuck with buying turboprop COIN aircraft. Although cheap, they can’t do much. You don’t need a jet trainer and probably can’t afford to splurge on single-role UAVs either. Except… what if you could get a lot more bang for you buck for just a bit more money? Especially in terms of ISR & CAS capability? Then you might be very interested. [/INDENT]
Problem here is that they generally can’t afford any new aircraft and hence are still flying those free A-37s the US gave them in the 1980s and 1990s.
Anyone that can afford new aircraft has already done so with Super Tucano.
The other issue is that US may not want to sell to some of the potential users for political reasons while the Brazillians don’t have this restraint.
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