thobbesActually the only armored reserve in the Far East was outdated BTs and the likes. They received no new, useful armor for the duration of the war (until August Storm) , and even in terms of infantry it was poached as early as 1941.
The German tanks at the time were also obsolete in 1941-early 1942 – Panzer 35(t), Panzer 38(t), Panzer II, Panzer III (37mm and 50mm), Panzer IV’s with short barrels (75mm) and even Panzer Is. All with paper thin armour.
The average BT or T-26 packed a 45mm gun that could generally penetrate the German Panzers and the BT-series were fast. There was also several hundred T-34s and KV-1s which were far superior to any German tank.
A good German tank did not come in until mid-1942 with introduction of long barreled Panzer IVG.
German blitzkreig is a great example of what you can do against technologically superior opponents. The average German tank was inferior to T-34, KV-1 or French SOMUA and under gunned when compared to British Cruisers (Panzer II with 20mm gun compared to Cruisers 40mm).
Yet brilliant tactics stole the day.
Good reminder for the tech obsessed boffins.
thobbesAnd the incessant predictions of the decline of American power echoes as a clarion call to American ears all across the United States.
Not really. Britain was very aware of her own decline as I suspect was the Roman Empire and other empires. Decline and stagnation are hard to reverse.
USA’s decline started in 1960s when industry started to go off shore. They’ve been unable to stem that flow despite being well aware of it (e.g. the Rust Belt).
I suspect the Americans will have overwhelming military superiority for the next 50-odd years.
I don’t think the Chinese will ever catch up. However with economic decline comes military decline (you can’t afford it) and the USA will probably reduce capability to Chinese levels.
Idiotic programs like LCS or badly managed programs like F-35 don’t help either.
thobbesTanks are useless without air cover in the modern warfare. Within its current state, India will quickly achieve air dominance.
Indian airforce is not the US airforce nor is Pakistan Iraq circa 1991.
Indian Airforce is actually shrinking in terms of numbers of combat squadrons.
It has about 28 combat squadrons out of 39.5 sanctioned with an actual requirement of 60. Some of the 28 are still equipped with MiG-21 whilst many others are purely ground attack equipped with MiG-27 and Jaguar.
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/indias-shrinking-military-capabilities/
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/the-incredible-shrinking-air-force/1/119731.html
The articles claim that only 13 squadrons are available against Pakistan as the other 15 are needed to deter China.
Furthermore India lacks a lot of the EW and other support needed for proper massed strikes on a military as large as Pakistan.
Which doesn’t pose much of a threat to the Indian Navy.
Those 5 submarines can cause a lot of headaches to the Indians. They might not sink a single ship but the IAF and IN will need to dedicate considerable resources to neutralise them.
Mostly obsolete types, save for a handful of F-16s.
Whilst India is much more modern, a lot of their squadrons are still MiG-21 or ground attack MiG-27/Jaguar.
To quote Air Chief Marshal (Retd) S. Krishnaswamy:
“One aircraft cannot be in six places simultaneously,”
And how is that a containment?
It means less resources available for other operations.
If I have 20 frigates but need 10 stationed close at hand to contain a neighbour, I only have 10 frigates left for other tasks such as patrolling the rest of my shoreline, long range patrols etc etc as well as training and maintenance.
Same applies to planes etc.
The only reason small countries like France and Britain can do expeditionary warfare easily is because they don’t need to maintain large reserves at home.
Same applies to US. If the Canadians turned to evil, US would use a lot of assets into guarding the border. This means less for expeditionary warfare.
[quote]
India is surrounded by an open ocean, thus not even the US could contain India. China is a different story, because China’s surrounded by an island chain that is pro-US. Hence the US could contain China at a few select critical passages along with its three allies each of which brings in formidable navies of their own.[/.quote]
Totally agree on China.
India is not surrounded by open ocean. It has the Bay of Bengal on the East and Arabian Sea on the West. Both of those are containable.
India is not like USA which looks on to two true oceans.
The problem is that India would have at least 600 top-class fighter jets consisting of Su-30MKI, Rafale, and PAK-FA. Just 200 of these is enough to put Pakistan on the defensive position, while the rest head to Chinese border.
The 600 modern jets is at this stage paper only.
Rafale contract hasn’t even been signed and FGFA hasn’t even flown and won’t enter service until 2022. And even the Indians have cut the requirement from 214 a/c to 144 a/c.
Given Indian procurement issues and probable delays in growth in cost of Pak Fa and continuing issues with LCA Tejas, the Indian AF’s 272 Su-30MKIs (but several already lost) will be the bulk of its teeth for some time to come together with upgraded MiG-27, Jaguar, MiG-29 and Mirage 2000.
thobbesYes, Egypt would be a logical customer, as long as it has a government on good terms with the UAE.
Wherever the M2K-9s go, it’ll be interesting to see what weapons the new owner gets.
Given their capabilities (especially cruise missile), they might be a real game changer in their local region.
thobbesIraqi defence procurement seems to be getting a loopy as it was under Saddam’s time!
thobbesOf course, but it is still interesting and useful to explore those influences, and I find it unfortunate that Australia’s historical circumstances have given rise to a nation that seems unable and unwilling to stand on its own two feet, to be counted for what it is rather than laughed out of the room for trying to be what it is not: a significant actor on the world stage.
The (very) condensed version of my take on the world and Australia’s place in it is that we are entering a period of unprecedented global change manifested most obviously and significantly in the Australian context by the relative decline of American power in the face of a rising China. I do not believe that conflict between these two nations is inevitable, but I do believe that it is possible, and increasingly likely from the mid-2020s to mid-2030s, and further that in the event of such a conflict it is entirely possible that America will lose. Worst-case scenario is the eruption of major conflict between China and the United States, strikes conducted (quite reasonably) against US bases in Australia leading to Australia’s entry into the war, the defeat of the US-led alliance and imposition of terms on a defeated Australian nation.
In this context, I do not believe that Australia’s present relationship with the United States serves its long-term interests. Unlike many other nations in the region we have no obvious source of conflict with China; siding with the Americans, hosting their bases on our soil, etc. actually produces a risk of conflict which need not otherwise arise. This is not to deny that the current order underwritten by American hegemony is amenable to Australian interests, however the benefits that America’s presence in the region provides will be maintained with or without Australia’s participation in a formal alliance — that is to say, we can (and therefore should) freeload on the American commitment to the regional status quo, and the likelihood that such disruptions as may arise to the status quo are far more likely to involve other nations (Korea, Japan, Vietnam, etc.) than they are to involve us.
My prescription for Australian foreign policy, therefore, is a gradual dampening of our relationship with the United States, tending towards the adoption of a Switzerland-esque model of armed strategic neutrality. Military spending would rise gradually under this model, extending to at least 2.5% of GDP by 2025, i.e. the onset of the first ‘high risk’ period identified earlier. And of course there would be no more globetrotting adventures.
Just a bit of context for my perspective on these and related matters. :p
It sounds like you know rather more about it than I do. There’s a course I’ve got my eye on regarding the formation of Australian identity, but I’m not sure if I’ll be able to fit it into my History major. I’m from SA and have German blood so there’s a personal angle too which has fired me in various intriguing directions of late. 🙂
Some very good points.
I totally agree that the current relationship with USA and increasing antagonism with China to be against Australia’s long term interests. Australia also doesn’t have great relationships with South Korea, Japan or the rest of Asia. At best the relationships are mediocre.
Australia is to busy pretending they’re part of NATO or trying to play big guy in UN to focus on developing Asian ties. One senior commentator stated that Australia has a very poorly established diplomatic network especially in Asia.
Australia should be chumming up to both sides and have a neutrality policy. At the same time establish extensive diplomatic military relationships with all parties in Asia Pacific.
As for Australian identity it was always someone elses identity right up to the 1970s.
Problem from the 1970s is multiculturalism has diluted the concept of identity.
So Australia goes from having borrowed identities (English/Irish then British then pseudo-American) to having many different ones.
thobbesPakistan is basically useless for Chinese containment effort of India. The US allies(Japan, Korea, and Australia) on the other hand would gladly join in the US effort to contain China.
The Pakistan Airforce is insignificant next to the Indian Airforce or the PLAAF.
Can Pakistan with its bankrupt economy and depleted military actually take on India which is buying up top grade weapons like crazy? Another war with India could mean a significant territorial loss for Pakistan and they know it.
I’m still not sure how Pakistan with 550,000 troops, 3,000 tanks, 11 frigates, 5 submarines, several hundred combat aircraft and nuclear weapons is no threat to India.
Pakistan might not be able to defeat India, but it’s mere presence ensures that India has to maintain a large presence as a deterrence to Pakistan.
Hence less resources for focusing on China.
Pakistan’s threat is in essence about being a fleet in being i.e. it’s mere existence requires a counter.
If subisdising a few squadrons of JF-17s or some tanks for Pakistan means India has to then deploy air defence and armoured assets to keep in check the Pakistanis then it’s a cheap investment.
A great example of this in the USSR in 1941. Despite the Germans wiping out the majority of USSR’s armoured strength on the European front, the Soviets retained large armoured reserves in Manchuria to deter Japan.
War is not about killing or weapons or even technological superiority. It’s about achieving national goals. Splitting an opponent’s focus is a good way of achieving goals.
A Su-30MKI might thrash a J-10 but if that same Su-30MKI is required to deter some JF-17s a couple of thousand kilometres away, then that’s a problem.
thobbesnor in any other place on earth undergoing upheavals… this is not an “arab” trait at all… can easily happen in european societies (lest we forget the behaviour of citizens during and after WW2)
There was no sectarianism in Europe during and after WW2. There was of course atrocities commited at state level and a lot of it was ideologically motivated.
Only exception is the Balkans where there’s been a history of sectarianism. But then here is crossroads of Roman Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity and Islam.
it was an issue… they nearly lost moscow and suffered disproportionate losses vs germany and her allies.
There was a whole heap of factors influencing this:
1. No mobilisation orders
2. Purges of officer classes
3. Bad logistics and support.
4. Poor training.
However Soviets recovered in 1941-43
And even in 1941 they were giving the Germans bloody noses.
have training and organisational regime in place, but if the population doesn’t “believe” in your government/war/army it won’t get anywhere…
nope. because the soldiers were not interested and the NCOs struggled to just make sure the soldiers were not AWOL…
Very true.
imately the entire discussion is moot. It is a false premise to compare a “developed” country (Israel) with a “developing” country (Iraq). The main difference is that whist Iraq has an “educated elite” there is a massive disconnect between them and the “average” person in the street… whereas in Israel the overall education/social development levels are much higher, so whilst there may not be any qualitative difference between the “officers” the real difference is between the quality of the soldiers and their ability to fight modern wars. Iraq in 1990 had a pretty good military by “developing world” standards… but it was still nothing when going up against the concentration of the US+Allies in a very intensive air combat.
A very good point.
thobbesJust on the future of the M2000-9, I think Egypt is a possible customer for them. They already operate M2000E/Bs and have a few dozen M5s as well as F-4s that need replacing.
And Uncle Sam is starting to get worried about shipping more F-16s to them.
thobbesthe vietnamese were fighting to protect their homeland AND they had support… whilst Iraq was completely isolated internationally AND was facing the entire modern armed force of NATO. Also iraqis were simply not prepared to lose millions of dead for Kuwait… not even saddam.
Gulf War 1991 did not involve NATO. USA could’ve done it on her own. And North Vietnam faced the entire might of the US as well.
these points were not true of Iraq in 1990 (note the kurds were already “autonomous” since 1970 and most did not have to server in the iraqi army, so they didn’t count)… (of course Iraqi society was fractured later on and degenerated into a tribal/sectarian society as a result of the upheavals of the invasion resulting in civil war… but that can happen in the most developed of societies too).
Weren’t there always issues with say the Shi’ite Marsh Arabs as well?
Also in Libya and Syria it did not take long for tribalism/sectarianism to come to the fore.
Also Hussein always gave preferential treatment to his own clan.
This is mostly an issue with the education level of many ordinary soldiers as well as the problem of “conscription” (forcing young men into things they don’t want to get into).
This isn’t necessarily a problem. The Soviets certainly didn’t have these sorts of issues in WWII. The educational requirement for tank crews was experience with a tractor!
Troops need to be trained to operate effectively. It’s not about poor overall education. Troops can be educated.
As for conscripts, most countries had it at one stage or another and in many instances they fought well whilst in others they performed poorly.
It’s all about training and proper organisational culture.
The Iraqi officer corps in 1990 understood systems and doctrines quite well and they had comprehensive doctrine school and annual lessons learned conferences from battalion commanders up to a national conferences where divisional commanders / chiefs of staff compiled and reviewed lessons learned and incorporated into the military doctrine which was taught to officer recruits as well as distributed to the officer corps.
Did they distribute this knowledge to NCOs and the general soldiers?
in Iraq the problem is that officers were selected from the lowest % of high school graduates… the brighter young men all went into medicine and other academic subjects and city folks mostly shunned the military, which left it wide open to villagers and tribesmen as a “social stepping tool”.
This is quite common in a lot of societies.
examples?
There were Israeli reports tahat the Jordanian Army got progressively worse as the decades moved on. Apparently the Arab Legion of 1947 was a far superior fighting force than the Jordanian Army of the 1960s (who were still the best Arab troops engaged against Israel).
Can’t remember where I read it though – it was an online military journal.
thobbesGood luck using railways in most of Africa, most of Latin America, or anywhere between Punjab & central Turkey.
Good luck using roads in some parts of Africa, e.g. Congo. The Rwandans & Congolese rebels who took Kinshasa in 1997 leap-frogged from airfield to airfield, with heavy equipment usually moving by river. There are 2250 km of paved roads in the country, of which half were in ‘poor’ (i.e. take a 4WD or don’t even try it) condition. The second largest city is 1566 km from the capital in a straight line.
Moving freight around the country involves frequent transhipping from river to road or railway & back. There are few bridges. Rivers must be crossed by decrepit ferries. The last recorded road crossing of the country by foreign civilians took 44 days.
There are other parts of the continent which are just as bad.
I was only referring to defence of Australian continental landmass.
Up to recent times the ADF was structured purely on defence of Australia. In recent times it has adopted an expeditionary approach hence need for things like C-27s.
thobbesThe interesting thing on page 218 is that the Iraqi air force focusaed on saving it’s butt.
There’s an old saying: “use it or lose it.”
thobbesmack8, there’s one very insightful comment in note 42 on page 18 by USMC Major General Mike Myatt: “Thank God the North Vietnamese weren’t here.”
I think it’s a great insight into the biggest deficiencies Arab forces tend to have which are cultural:
1. Most Arab countries are artificial constructs and thus don’t enhance loyalty.
2. Most Arabs first loyalty is to tribe/clan, religion and only then country.
3. A study I read showed a highly hierarchical culture. In Arab militaries there is a marked difference between officers and non-officers.
Part of this is officers like to retain knowledge on weapon systems etc without imparting anything but the most basic knowledge to their subordinates. This gives them power.
4. A lack of understanding of the concept of “systems” as opposed to looking at weapons as stand alone items.
5. Officers not often selected on merit but rather family/clan/tribe lines.
Another article I read about the Arab Legion (later Jordanian Army) is that as it the number of British Officers declined, the fighting efficacy of the force also declined.
6. Arab militaries are also often kept at low readiness to prevent coup attempts. They are basically often not trusted by the regimes in power. Hence development of Republican Guard (or Saudi National Guard) which are kind of like the SS – troops designed to keep regime in power.
thobbesI don’t know if anyone told you but India doesn’t have Rafale or PAK-FA and will not have for some years also Pakistan is waiting for J10 so it’s more like JF-17 and F-16 against SU-30 and Mirage 2000 looks a bit different now
Any one who dismisses the Pakistan air force as not a threat is an idiot with 2 and soon 3 highly capable multi-role BVR types in numbers and well trained air craw it’s a top class air force
It’s also not just the Pakistani Airforce (though aviation buffs seldom see this).
It’s also Pakistan’s land, sea and nuclear capabilities.
The enemy doesn’t have to be top of the line. It merely has to be good enough and have sufficient quantity.
thobbesA big statement. Some might be interested in unpacking it a bit in the context of, for example:
– Australian efforts during the late 1940s to support Indonesian independence from the Netherlands
– active participation in the Colombo regional development plan of the 1960s
– creating and leading the RAMSI mission to stabilize the Solomon Islands in the 2000s
– diplomatic efforts thought the mid to late 1990’s that culminated in East Timor’s independence vote, followed up by the INTERFET mission to restore law and order after the UN’s efforts to provide security before and after the vote failed miserably.
All that is extremely small stuff. Also East Timor was tryiung to make up for the fact that Australia actively supported the invasion of E. Timor and turned a blind eye to atrocities there.
It also fitted in with Little Johnny’s vision of Australia as America’s deputy sheriff in Asia.
Australia’s foreign policy to 1941 was Anglo-centric. Australia regarded itself as more British than Britain.
1945-1970 – the economy was stilled Anglo-centric and then the Australians got kicked in the **** when UK joined EU and lost preferential trade treatment.
Since then Asia has become Australia’s most important export market, but Australia still views Asia as hostile. Indeed in the 1980s there was even issues with Japanese investment.
Since 1945 foreign policy has mirrored US foreign policy. If the USA decided to invade or nuke Australia, Australia would gladly support this motion.
After Paul Keating lost power, successive Australian governments (Howard, Rudd, Gillard) have continuously reinforced foreign policy ties with America over that of Asia. Meanwhile Asian ties languish and Australia gets left behind (look how long it took for Australia to be invited to ASEAN talks).
Howard was trying to rebuilds some 1950s vision of Australia’s place in Asia (though I agreed with his economic reforms).
Rudd even had the nerve to tell Chinese students their government was bad in a Chinese school in Mandarin. He was also busted telling Hilary Clinton to prepare for war with China.
But then his foreign policy background is Taiwan.
Gillard is a foreign policy luddite.
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