You keep assuming CAS in a traditional high-intensity war,

Because CAS has been a feature of high intensity war since the Allies finally got in right in France in 1944.

& implicitly assume an enemy with a sufficiently capable air force for CAS-tasked F-16s to need escort.

It’s because the USAF is assuming some sort of future high intensity conflict.

Where is the USAF going to fight that war, during the remaining lifetime of the A-10s? What potential enemy will have both enough T-80s or the like for columns, & be able to fight a couple of F-16s with AMRAAM & AIM-9X?

The answer is NOT IN OUR LIFETIMES. I keep saying that.

You don’t like cab rank? Then what response time do you think is adequate for CAS? Will your ground troops have to rely on aircraft sitting on the ground waiting for a call? Good luck with that. I think the US army will give up & buy more artillery & helicopters, or demand its own fixed-wing aircraft for CAS.

Cab rank is fine. Issue is multirole cab rank.

Remember, we’re not discussing a hypothetical generic army & air force in a hypothetical world. We’re discussing the actual, current USAF, in the actual, current, world. Consider the context.

The USAF is preparing to go down the “hypothetical generic army and airforce in a hypothetical world.” Look at comments by high ranking USAF brass as well as the planning options they’re outlying..

In my opinion, the next war will be against another defenceless third world type

BTW, you correctly point out that the USAF hasn’t shot anything down for many years (due to lack of opposition in the air), but insist that even so, fighter escort is essential, even for fighters. Why?

We’e talking about “execut(ing) full-spectrum operations in highly contested environments.”

As I keep saying:
HIGH INTENSITY CONLICT IS DEAD. NO-ONE CAN AFFORD IT – EITHER POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY OR MILITARILY.

FUTURE OF WAR IS MORE OVERKILL AGAINST LARGELY DEFENCELESS THIRD WORLD.

AND AGAINST THIRD WORLD A-10 IS BETTER OPTION THAN MULTIROLE F-16/-18/-35 WHO WILL PROBABLY NEVER EVER LAUNCH A SINGLE AMRAAM OR AIM-9X OR LASER AGAINST ANY OTHER ENEMY JET FIGHTER, LET ALONE ONE EQUIPPED AT A PEER LEVEL

IMO – keep the A-10s and scrap F-15C/D and some F-16s.

A-10 goes by 2035-ish without replacement by dedicated CAS type cause USA can’t afford new tpe.

But up to 2035 you get maximum return in all those sh!tty little insurgencies the USAF doesn’t want to fight, but will invariably be ordered to do so.

NEW in Wikipédia (19 sept !!) ;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudan_Air_Force

(also in ‘list of air forces’ )

friendly, Etienne

And with 10 Mi-17s and 1 Beechcraft 1900 it’s actually better equipped than a lot of European micro-airforces.

He says some other interesting things that are generally ignored:

1. Training and tactics are critical. He actually stated that in realistic USAF/USN tactics exercises had to be changed daily in order to avoid devastating losses.

2. Sortie generation are going down due to declines in aircraft numbers (no it didn’t start in 1991 or at start of GFC). Current fleet sizes are fine for blowing up defenceless third worlders, but insufficient for high intensity conflict.

3. Emphasis on:
– Attaining surprise – key component of warfare since humans first started beating each other up with sticks. Today it relates very much to modern fighter design (i.e. stealth)
– Outnumbering the enemy – key component of warfare since humans first started beating each other up with sticks.
– Outmaneouvring and outlasting the enemy
– Achieving reliable kills – the age old question of BVR v WVR comes into this.

4. Aircraft to emphasise passive over active sensors – in 2013 networked data links, IRST etc kind of come into this.

I think his analysis raises some good issues and highlights the key problems aircraft designers and tacticians need to solve to win A2A combat.

I don’t necessarily agree with his conclusion of “small = best.” The combat record of US/Israeli F-15 and to a lesser degree Iranian F-14s and Ethiopian Su-27s would appear to counter that theory.

I’ll add one of my own comments as it kind of thing to think about the future of air combat:

“The last A2A combat between jet fighters occured in September 2001 between 2 IDF/AF F-15s and 2 SyAF MiG-29s. Contrary to popular thought it was a WVR combat involving some classy maneouvring by the F-15s and not a BVR combat.”

I wish we had modern analyses such as this.

Problem is A2A combat is near extinct so actual combat data doesn’t exist.

Comparisons based on exercises are pointless due to ROE, lack of fog of war and simulated nature of training.

An interesting thing I’ve noticed in recent years is how few collisions occur or loss of control.

When one trains extensively in ACM or missile avoidance, collisions or loss of control due to spatial disorientation are more likely.

This is usually considered an acceptable risk as per old Roman saying: “the more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war.”

And here’s something to contemplate:

The last A2A combat between jet fighters occured in September 2001 between 2 IDF/AF F-15s and 2 SyAF MiG-29s. Contrary to popular thought it was a WVR combat involving some classy maneouvring by the F-15s and not a BVR combat.

EDIT:

The other key components missing in the too frequent my plane is better than your plane” is covered heavily in this article – training and tactics!

It all comes down to the pilot in the end.

Scooter at the same time you would take the word of a bus boy at a hotel as gospel if it was positive towards the F-35.