Re: Re: Part Two

Originally posted by Beckles
This all seems quite confusing. First, like I said, basically it sounds like they are only going to have Apaches in the heavy divisions. Then the “three light divisions” (82nd, 101st, and ???? … I thought there were more than 3, more like 5 …) will have a “light reconnaisance aircraft” … but those units already have Apache I thought so are they going to get rid of their full blown attack helicopters?

You’re correct as things stand right now, Beckles. I assume the third division he’s referring to is the 10th Mountain, which doesn’t have Apaches assigned like the other two. So, yes, it does read as though the AH-64s assigned to the 82nd and 101st may shift and re-flag if that plan goes ahead.

Best regards

Steve Rush ~ Touchdown-News

Originally posted by Beckles
Maybe I’m missing something, but it seems to me the obvious answer is that the USA will just buy more AH-64D’s …

The whole concept of an armed scout seems to make a lot less sense when they start to get expensive like the Comanche did and when the AH-64D’s have capabilities like the Longbow radar and MMW Hellfire missiles which enable them to find and kill their targets more effectively without having to expose themselves.

Some very quick maths has me thinking that would cost around $11 billion for the 368 helos they’re talking about procuring.

It’s certainly possible, but I’m not sure they envisage spending that kind of money. The spec of the RFP when it’s announced will be interesting to see just what the Pentagon has in mind as far as capability and levels of equipment are concerned.

Best regards

Steve Rush ~ Touchdown-News

Interesting list, and I certainly wouldn’t rule AH-1Z out at this stage either: particularly if you remember that it’s built in Texas! 😀

Art, I’ll re-check, but I think only the Huey-inspired designs are built at Mirabel in Canada: I’m pretty sure that the 206L/407 etc are all still made at Hurst Field aren’t they? Also, going back to what Arthur said about the UH-60L/M being too big to run errands reminds me that Bell made much the same observation a couple of years ago and were offering to upgrade as many viable UH-1H/V airframes as were available into Huey II for around $1/1.5 million a piece…..

Some off-list e-mail I had earlier today from another correspondent who’s into helicopters in a big way thinks this could all be good news for the S-92 and, having thought about it, I have to say I agree with him. Would be a way to ease the loss of Comanche jobs in CT to give them the VH-92 the HMX contract for starters…..

I neglected to mention that the Osprey was given yet more funding yesterday to the tune of another $850 million:

Bell Boeing Joint Program Office, Patuxent River, Md., is being awarded a $849,300,000 (estimated value) advanced acquisition contract for long lead materials needed to manufacture eight Lot 9 MV-22 and three CV-22 low rate initial production tilt rotor aircraft. Work will be performed in Ridley Park, Pa. (50 percent); Fort Worth, Texas (35 percent); and Amarillo, Texas (15 percent), and is expected to be completed in October 2007. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity (N00019-04-C-0012).

Best regards

Steve Rush ~ Touchdown-News

Part Two

Cody: Chief, Mr. Secretary. It’s first I’ve been introduced. Just going to clarify something.

What I’d like to do first is introduce who’s also with us: the Honorable Claude Bolton, who is our acquisition executive for the Army; Lieutenant General Steve Blum, who’s the chief of the National Guard; Lieutenant General Ron Helmly, who’s the chief of our Army Reserve; and Brigadier General E.J. Sinclair, who’s the commanding general of Fort Rucker, our aviation training center. And he’s also our aviation branch chief.

What I’d like to do is throw up a couple slides, talk you through in detail what we’re going to do, what our plan is, and then I’ll open it up to questions.

First off, we’ve had seven major studies in the last 25 years on Army aviation. It intensified after Task Force Hawk, and then we did another study just prior to 9/11. And that study drove us to some decisions as to retiring Vietnam-era aircraft: the Cobra, the Huey, the OH-58A and C model aircraft, out of the National Guard. And that study also had us cascading some modern aircraft into the National Guard, at some numbers.

We’ve had a changing operational environment, and we’ve looked at it very carefully since 9/11. War does several things for you, but it also requires you to really focus your efforts and to study exactly what risks you thought you took and what — how those risks actually play out on the battlefield, as you made them without a good crystal ball.

And the operational environment has changed. Comanche was built to go deep. It was built to be a low observable helicopter. It — which it is. It was built to be a highly responsive reconnaissance aircraft with a 4 billion — excuse me — 4 million lines of code, of mission equipment package, so that that it could be the see-first, understand-first and the action agent to act first on the modern battlefield. And we’re sure that it could do that.

But the operational environment has changed. We’re seeing a proliferation of MANPADS, IR missile systems, more sophisticated air defense systems, as well as, in the joint fires arena, we have now new types of capabilities to deal with the radar threat environment that 13 or 14 years ago we did not have in the joint force. And so that has changed.

We’ve also seen, in the war in Afghanistan, in the war in Iraq, a greater preponderance in synergy between our ground maneuver forces and our aviation forces. And that changed our operational dictum.

We also took a good look at the attrition of our aircraft and loss of lives that we’ve had since 9/11 in aircraft that have been shot down. And I won’t get too much into that because of the classification. But we did look very hard, and we sent people down range. And it gets to the question about why just now? It took us quite a while to study every one of these tragic incidents so we fully understood what the real threat was and what we forecast the threat to be.

Reserve component missions. Because we’re retiring their aircraft because they’re not sustainable and they’re 1970 technology aircraft, we were faced with two choices; either not cascade aircraft from the operational force that’s being used more, which has about 44 aircraft we’ve attrited already, or shortening — or making their formations smaller. At the same time, we’re relying more and more on the National Guard and the Reserve component aviation forces. We have in Afghanistan right now, we have them in Iraq. They’re part of our rotation base. Yet we have not adequately equipped them with helicopters and formations and their formations don’t look like ours today. So we took a good look at that.

We looked at our replacement and recap, recapitalization requirements for our fleet. And then we also looked at the emerging unmanned aerial vehicle strategy for manned and unmanned teaming with our helicopter fleet, and what it means as we move to the FCS-equipped force in terms of the requirements for reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition.

And then we looked through the lens again of this, and the task force came back to us and said: here’s the capabilities you need to have for Army aviation. And so it was a capabilities-based study, not targeted towards Comanches in particular.

And what we had in the balance, when it was all said and done, the task force came back to us and said: We’ve got to deal and fix right now our aircraft survivability equipment across our fleet. We need to fully fund the Apache Block III Longbow. The Longbow with full Block III capability gives us all the digital connectivity, the battlefield awareness, the battlefield situational understanding that we would get with Block I Comanche. And oh, by the way, the fire-control radar on Longbow Block III is the same fire-control radar that Block I Comanche would have. So they recommended that.

They also recommended that we needed to continue to pursue retiring the Kiowa Warrior aircraft, which was an interim reconnaissance aircraft, and buy a new reconnaissance aircraft. They recommended buying 303 light utility aircraft to replace the Hueys and OH-58s in the Guard; recommended buying more Black Hawks. We have a Black Hawk buy in the current pres-bud, and that number was about 100, and they recommended buying another 80 Blackhawks, which we could give to the National Guard as well as to replace the ones that we lost; buying more Chinooks — 50 of them; buying 25 fixed-wing cargo; but also invest in common cockpits and fly-by-wire. Common cockpit will bring us closer to where the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment’s aircraft are, so that we’ll have our UH-60 Mikes that are coming and our CH-47 Foxtrots have the same cockpit, the same technology upgrade that we have in our special operations. And that will also proliferate on the battlefield more situational understanding and awareness in our assault and lift aircraft; and then invest in our aviation munitions for our rockets and for our Hellfire and the joint common missile; initiate RDT&E funds in some of the tech base that we have in Comanche for the Joint Multirole Helicopter for 2020, and then resource our new UAV strategy.

So that was in the balance, and then what we had in these years, 121 Comanches coming off the line, a Block I that was designed for low-observable. It would have been a reconnaissance aircraft replacing the Kiowa Warriors. And it has great diagnostics; it has two-level maintenance. But, as the chief already explained to you, based upon the current operational environment we have, we would have to put more money into those aircraft to make them survivable through the full spectrum of what the study told us are the emerging employment of Army helicopters that we had.

So what this enables us to do — and this is why we made the decision — we went here and said we want to buy 800 new aircraft, fully recap 1,400 of our aircraft, fully buy and wire our fleet for aircraft survivability, and double the buy of our aircraft survivability B-kits, the jammers and the chaff and flare systems. It gives us 796 new aircraft; it fully fleshes out our multifunctional brigades that we’re building for the Army, for the active and the Guard; enhances our Reserve components; and it moves us towards modularity, to where we’re going.

I just want to touch on this just for a minute because it’s kind of important to understand. Today we have about seven different formations in Army aviation depending upon what division, what corps or what National Guard division you’re in. And the study came back to us and said if you want to fight Army aviation as part of the joint force in the air-ground regime that we anticipate to fight with the Future Combat System-equipped force, they recommended to us that it needs to be at the brigade level, it needs to be resourced with two attack battalions of 48 aircraft; a lift battalion of 30 aircraft; a general support battalion of eight command and control helicopters, 12 CH-47s, 12 medevac aircraft; a self-sustaining aircraft support battalion, with its own AVIM unit; and then the Class IV UAV unit.

When you lay that out — and that would be for all our heavy divisions, a very similar design for our three light divisions, except here we would have the light reconnaissance aircraft vice the Apache Attack Helicopter — you see that we’ve standardized our formations between the active component and the Guard component. When you lay that bill on the table, with the attrition aircraft we have and the retirement of over 880 Vietnam aircraft, we were short aircraft even with the buys we had in the current budget, not to mention the fact that we have to recap many of these aircraft based upon the operational tempo we have on them.

So we’re moving to these formations. In fact, the 3rd Infantry Division, when it goes back to Operation Iraqi Freedom, it will go back with this aviation brigade. Its original aviation brigade only had 18 Apaches, 16 Black Hawks, did not have this and did not have this, and that was a heavy division design.

So that’s where we’re going. Next slide.

Now this is a complex chart, and I made it that way, because it’s the only way I understand it. But when we looked at the missions areas of attack, reconnaissance, reconnaissance and surveillance with our UAVs, utility and cargo assault aircraft — and I’ll talk about fixed wing here in a second — what’s in green is what we had funded. We only had funded so many Longbows in Block I and II; did not have Block III funded. We were going to divest ourselves of the 605 Kiowa Warriors that we have, and we were going to buy Comanche and go out.

What we can do now is go to Block III and take our 501 Longbows, 284 between now and 2011, to make full up Block III and place up the other residual 237 to bring us up to 501 Block III Longbows; divest ourselves of the Kiowa Warrior and purchase a new armed reconnaissance helicopter with the cast common cockpit, so it’s digital connectivity, about 368 of them, and recap our A model Apaches for the National Guard.

On the UAVs, right now, this is where we would have been: We’ve already got Hunter; we’re working an early buy-out for the Shadow; we just started producing and procuring the Raven, which is the small UAV. And what we’re able to do now is procure more UAVs, accelerate the extended-range and multipurpose UAVs so that we can fully work the manned and unmanned teaming with our helicopter fleet.

By the way, a Block III Longbow will give you level-four control of a UAV. In other words, what the UAV sees, the Longbow will see. If the Longbow pilot wants to take charge of the UAV package that’s 50 miles out in front of him and drive the sensor package, he will be able to do that. And so that’s how we’re working and pulling transformational-type technology forward.

On the utility fleet, if we stayed where we were, we had the UH-60L, and we were going to buy about 101 in our program. This new program continues with the 101, but also buys another 80. It also buys 303 of this light utility helicopters to replace these aircraft, and then it converts — some of our Ls will come to the Mike-model line, will have an A-to-M UH-60 recap, and it gets our program set up out here to 2020.

The CH-47, we had a new buy in here of 20, plus we had six that we’d already had funded, and this also allows us to accelerate that. But also, for both of these aircraft in here we fully funded common cockpit for both of these airframes as well as fly by wire so we can deal with the austere brownout conditions that our pilots have been encountering, so that they can better land the aircraft in brownout conditions.

And then when we looked at our fixed-wing fleet, we’re already set up on our special electronic missions aircraft. We’ll be moving from the RC-12 and RC-7 out to the aerial common sensor aircraft. That’s a joint program. That’s been on track.

What has not been on track is our cargo aircraft. Right now we have about 40 of the C-23A’s and B’s in the Reserves, and we’re looking to replace that with a much more capable aircraft, about 25 of them, that we’ll put in the National Guard to meet intra-theater lift requirements for the new modular formations we have, as well as for the homeland security, homeland defense missions that the Guard has.

So the bottom line is, 70 percent of the current fleet we have we’ll be able to either upgrade, recapitalize and buy new, compared to trading off 121 Comanches. And that’s what this whole program’s about.

Someone’s going to ask me how much money we’re putting in UAVs. It’s about $300 million.

Q: For what period?

Cody: During this period, ’04 to ’11. And I don’t have the exact numbers, but we’ll be putting a sizable amount of money into the joint multi-role helicopter and the Joint Vertical Lift technology.

Q: How does the UAV investment compare to what you were going to do before?

Cody: Much more.

Q: How much?

Cody: I don’t have the figures here, but it’s sizable. And of course, you know started this on emergency funding, the Raven; now we’re going to putting this into our budget.

Q: If I could just clarify.

Cody: Go ahead.

Q: You mentioned 70 percent being upgraded or modernized versus putting that money into Apache — into Comanche. But if you didn’t put that money into Comanche, my understanding is you’d still have upgrade programs on other aircraft. So what would the comparable figure be?

Cody: Okay. Our total upgrades would have been 498, and now we move it to 801. Our current new buys would have been 107; we now move it to 903. And our total modifications will stay the same because those programs are ongoing.

Q: I’m sorry, that’s number of platforms, not dollars?

Cody: That’s platforms.

Q: The armed recon 368, is that a new development? And how is that different from Comanche?

Cody: We have several ideas of how we’re going to approach that. How would I answer that, Mr. Bolton?

Bolton: As soon as you give me the requirement, we’re going to put that on the street and let industry tell us which way to go.

Cody: That’s how we’re going to handle that.

Q: Comanche has had so many critics in the past suggest things like this, what is different now? You have to be missing some sort of capability in the future. Say 10 years from now, when you go ahead with this plan, it will be just as good, comparable to Comanche?

Cody: The chief told us to put this in the total context and come back with the capabilities, but also to be informed as to what we’re going to do with our brigades as we move from a brigade-centric formation in our Army, more modular, more self-sustaining, that leverages joint fires and other joint forces. And as we looked at it, that’s where we came up with the newer formation.

If you remember, Comanche was going to be in the (U of A?) with 12 aircraft. That was prior to 9/11 and prior to everything else that we did. We have since gone back and looked very, very hard at the aviation formation and came up with this new formation based upon how we’re fighting. Also, there has been — the way we’re changing our brigade structure and the way we’re moving to more joint fires, some of the things the Comanche was going to do for us can be done by other joint systems.

And when you lay all this out and you take a look at the health of Army aviation and where it’s going to be, and the synergy between Army aviation and Army ground forces and the propensity for us to fight more joint, but also for our helicopters to be more in the close fight in support of our ground maneuver forces for killing, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition, that’s what changed. And we think we’re going to get as much capability or more capability by going to this larger aviation force.

Q: Are you — are weaponized UAVs and stealthy UAVs part of this plan?

Cody: We will weaponize UAVs.

Q: Yeah, about the recon helicopter, the new one. Did Mr. Bolton say that you would be putting an RFP out, implying this is an entirely new program?

Cody: We will generate a requirements document for him, and then from that he will make a decision on how to go about getting us that helicopter.

Q: Does that imply that this is a new program altogether, a new goal?

Cody: This will be a new start, this will be a new start, this will be a new start.

Q: Where do UAV weaponization efforts stand right now? I mean, you have some kits for the Hunter, but how soon will they be deployed?

Cody: I’ll have to get back to you. I can’t remember where we’re at on it.

Q: Sir, could you explain in lay terms what about the operational environment raised survivability concerns about the Comanche, and what about that aircraft left it susceptible to these issues?

Cody: Okay. What we’re seeing on the battlefield is a proliferation of much more sophisticated missiles. What we’re seeing on the battlefield is triple-A weapons systems, and where they’re being employed is much more sophisticated in terms of target acquisition. If we were to put Comanche on the battlefield today, we would have to do some upgrades to deal with that.

Q: A couple quick factual questions. You mentioned at the beginning that you studied the shoot-downs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Could you tell us, without giving details of each one, how many were shot down? Could you tell us how much you’ve spent on Comanche so far, and could you tell us how short the reserve component is of aircraft?

Cody: Okay. We have spent about $6.9 billion on Comanche, most of that in our RDT&E account. We’ve had nine confirmed helicopters shot down with the loss of 32 lives. And I’ll refer to Steve Blum or Ron Helmly on the Guard and Reserve questions. Steve?

Q: How many are short?

Blum: Well, it really depends. If we’re going to look exactly like the Army, and we move to modularity, so that we have the exact same capability on the battlefield, whether we’re an Army National Guard unit or an Army Reserve unit or an active Army unit. As we move to modularity, which is exactly where we should go, so that all components of your United States Army have the exact same capabilities on the battlefield, so that they’re interchangeable, plug-and-play parts, as we’re using the Reserve component as an operational Reserve today and in the foreseeable future, this is an essential move for us.

So you can see that the organizations now, while they today don’t match, they’re not plug-and-play, they’re not interoperable, and they’re certainly not interchangeable, we insisted — and the Army has come up with an organization that makes us look exactly alike, we’ll be equipped exactly alike, and we’ll be — we will fight exactly like our active-duty counterparts, as soon as the same modules that you see here are resident in the Reserve component as they are in the active duty, and the same numbers apply.

So we will take the current fleet that we have, reapportion it against the new modularity model, and then this new initiative with Comanche will enable us to have modernized aircraft, new aircraft, relevant and ready aircraft for homeland defense and overseas.

Q: How much of an increase in aircraft numbers is that? How many more aircraft —

Blum: Well, we don’t know until we apply what we have currently against this modularity force and then buy what we need and recapitalize what we have to —

Cody: It will not be a one-for-one of the 880 we’re cascading out, because, as you know, a Black Hawk is much more capable than a UH-1. So if you’re looking for a one-to-one, it won’t be that way. I don’t have the absolute numbers. I used to have them. We’ll get that to you. But there is a sizable amount of new acquisitions going to the National Guard.

Q: General, can I just double-check some of the dollar figures? My understanding had been that about $8 billion had been spent. You’re saying it’s 6.9 (billion dollars)?

Cody: I saw that on TV. It’s a bad number.

Q: The 6.9 [billion dollars] is the right number? The total price tag of the program, 39 billion —

Cody: Thirty-nine-point-something billion. And that would have been bought 650 Comanches.

Q: Sir, on the same — following through on the numbers questions there, do you have a ballpark figure of what the cancellation costs might be for Comanche?

Cody: No, we don’t know what the contract cancellations — I’ll ask Secretary Bolton to address that. They’ve got some windows, but we don’t know what it will be. There’s a process that has to go through that I’m not fully up to speed on.

Bolton: For the termination costs, somewhere between 450 to about 680. We won’t know the exact costs until I have a chance to put the proposal out to the two companies that are involved here.

Q: (Off mike.) — asking is much higher than that, but that’s clear, you’re saying that 2 billion is over — is way more than you would expect it to be?

Bolton: Two billion is not, if I look in the contract today, it is way overestimated. So the number between 450 and 680 is a much better number. As I said, we’ll negotiate that with the contractor over the next year.

Q: Bell and Boeing estimate that this would impact about 1,300 jobs, initially anyway, in five states. As the secretary and the chief said, though, can you talk about how this new plan may get those jobs back? For example —

Bolton: I think, as you see with what both the chief and secretary have said and General Cody, on the one hand we have 121 aircraft we could have bought over the next five years using the money that we’re taking from the Comanche. On the other hand, you’re buying almost 800 new vehicles, recapitalizing 1,400, and we’re going right back to the same companies, because that is the aircraft industry industrial base. And so I’ve got to think that the jobs will be there. I have to leave that up to industry. I’ve already talked to industry today, talked to leadership of both Boeing and Sikorsky. I’ll meet face to face with them again tomorrow, and the briefing that you’re getting here today they will get on Thursday. And they will also receive a request for information from me that says how do we make this happen? Because my job is to take all of the boards that you’ve seen up here and what the chief and secretary have said and what the war fighter, the soldier needs, and make that a reality and to do it as quickly as possible. And the only way to do that is to get industry involved right away.

Q: Okay. How fast are you divesting yourself of the Kiowa Warrior and what is the timetable exactly for procuring the new — (Inaudible.) —

Cody: We want to do this as quickly as we can. And again, it will be based upon the requirements, documentation that we send to the acquisition executive and then how quickly industry can react to build these new air frames for us to bridge this gap.

Q: Sir, the dollars — in the ’05 budget there’s roughly about a billion-two for Comanche R&D. Roughly how much will be spent on ’05 under this new plan?

Cody: We don’t know until we work the termination costs, but clearly we’re looking to take those dollars and put it into this plan.

Q: Sir, how much will it cost to — how much is your estimate for the Army reconnaissance program for the ’04-to-’11 timeframe?

Cody: Let’s just say that we’ve got some target values based upon these new starts that I talked to you about — the 368, the 303 and the 25 — and based upon our studies and everything, we have the right balance to be able to buy those aircraft fully up to the capabilities that we know we’re going to write in our requirements documentation.

Q: All within that time period?

Cody: All within that time period.

Q: General, our affiliate in New Haven, Connecticut, wanted me to ask — they were up covering Lieutenant-General Riggs back in September at a ribbon-cutting for the new Sikorsky facility, and the quote they sent along that they wanted someone here to respond to is, “If one ever questions the need for this aircraft, the events of the last two years make it clear we need this system now more than ever.” When did it become apparent to you that the operational requirements changed?

Cody: For me — in fact, I’m surprised you quoted him. I’m sure you could’ve quoted me a year ago. (Laughter.) And I think I’m the only general officer that’s flown the Comanche. And I will tell you up front, and pass on to my friends at Boeing and Sikorsky that are on this team, they built a tremendous aircraft. It is the most flexible, most agile aircraft that we have produced in this country, and the people that built it ought to be very, very proud of it. Tremendous flying characteristics and leap-ahead technology that’s going to help us as we move forward.

But the last six months in particular, as I looked at it, the weight of the requirements to fix Army aviation and the change in the operational environment balanced against the cost of the Comanche and the niche capabilities it brings to the table today as a Block I aircraft, and the niche capabilities it has as we move to the future force and what we can do on the other side to enhance all of Army aviation, I crossed that river about six months ago.

That’s all I have for you. Thank you.

Q: How many Comanches actually exist? Sir, how many exist?

Cody: I think there’s 2 that are operational.

(Participating were Les Brownlee, acting secretary of the Army; Claude M. Bolton, Jr., assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology; Army Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, chief of staff, U.S. Army; Army Lt. Gen. Richard A. Cody, deputy chief of staff, G-3. U.S. Army.; and Army National Guard Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, chief, National Guard Bureau.)

Best regards

Steve Rush ~ Touchdown-News

Here’s the first official word on the deal

By Kathleen T. Rhem American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Feb. 23, 2003 ? Army leaders have recommended canceling a
multibillion-dollar helicopter program, citing an Army study that suggests the
funds would be more effective improving other areas of the service’s aviation
program.

Acting Army Secretary Les Brownlee today announced that he and the service’s
chief of staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, recommended canceling the 11-year-old
Comanche helicopter program after a comprehensive review of Army aviation
technology and structure.

The roughly $14 billion allocated to the program between now and 2011 will go
toward other aviation programs, he said.

The study “reflects lessons learned and experiences gained in the recent 2?
years of combat in the global war on terror as well as the operational
environments envisioned in the foreseeable future,” Brownlee said in a late-
afternoon Pentagon press conference.

He said the study shows that the capabilities the Comanche, an armed
reconnaissance helicopter, would bring to the service are not consistent with
the most vital needs of Army aviation. According to the review, those needs
include upgrading, modernizing and rebuilding the Army’s attack, utility and
cargo helicopter fleets as well as replacing aging aircraft in the reserve
component, Brownlee said.

“Our revised plans for the next several years, out to fiscal year 2011, include
the procurement of almost 800 new aircraft for the active and reserve
components, and the enhancement, upgrade, modernization and recapitalization of
over 1,400 aircraft,” he said.

Brownlee said he and Schoomaker began briefing Congress on their plans this
morning and will submit an amended budget request for fiscal 2005.

Schoomaker also mentioned that Army leaders had assurances from President Bush
and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that the funds previously allocated for
the Comanche will stay within the Army aviation program.

Both Army leaders suggested funds already spent on developing the Comanche
won’t have been wasted, because the service and the aviation industry have
learned a great deal through work on the program.

Brownlee said relevant technologies will be retained in the aviation
technological base and will lead to “research and development more applicable
to future aviation initiatives.” He specifically mentioned the Joint Multirole
Helicopter and the Joint Airlift Aircraft programs.

Schoomaker said it’s important to not see this as “just about terminating
Comanche,” but about “fixing Army aviation for the future — for today and for
tomorrow.”

The Comanche program’s cancellation is going hand in hand with a major plan to
restructure the Army’s aviation brigades, Brownlee said. Officials plan to
standardize aviation brigades throughout the Army and “provide the modularity
and flexibility we must have to achieve the joint and expeditionary
capabilities that are so essential to the Army’s role now and in the future,”
he said.

“It’s a big decision,” Schoomaker said. “We know it’s a big decision, but it’s
the right decision.”

Steve Rush ~ Touchdown-News

Distiller,

besides the UH-60M prog, which is actually a pretty major undertaking, there are still several years of UH-60L/MH-60S orders for the Army/Navy underway as we speak. The MY procurement solicitation for the current contract was for around 600 airframes.

See Scramble 295 for details…or ask Art to fire-up his scanner 😀

Cheers

Steve Rush ~ Touchdown-News

Okay, I know this wasn’t a Polish F-16 thread when it began, but in the wake of the later postings I thought this seemed the best place to post the following item! I’d had this hanging around on my computer as a PDF file for a while and must have overlooked it, but it has some interesting figures in relation to Poland’s recent acquisitions:

The International Perspective

Mr. Boguslaw Winid (Charge d’Affairs Embassy of Poland in Washington) October 29, 2003

Poland’s armed forces can be compared to the Oakland Raiders football team that played in the Super Bowl in February 2003. They have experienced players, a great quarterback in President Kwasniewski, and very good special teams exemplified by their placekicker, Sebastian Janikowski. We have a good offensive coordinator but could use some good wide receivers who can fly. This would take the form of C-130s. We also need a sturdy back-up running back. This is the Hum-Vee vehicle. With this organization and these players, we will be prepared to go to the Super Bowl. Security Cooperation with the United States began in earnest in the early 1990s and was crucial in the planning process for modernization of Poland’s armed forces.

The political goal was to reintegrate with Euro-Atlantic structures (NATO, EU); the military objective was to reform the armed forces in a way to make them compatible with NATO and interoperable with our strategic partner: the U.S. This policy was implemented through comprehensive reforms which included training and education of officers, adaptation of structures along with command and control systems as well as acquisition of new equipment. Based on our “special relationship” with the U.S., historic experiences and the role of the U.S. in the world, we saw the U.S. as our principal partner in the area of security policy. Our Security Cooperation program grew from initial limited training of officers (mainly IMET) to a multi-tier partnership culminating in establishment of our Defense Transformation Initiative and the decision to purchase F-16 fighters.

As a result of a decade of cooperation and assistance from Washington, Poland became an important ally in NATO and a significant player in the global security environment. This transition would have been impossible without security assistance programs managed by the Pentagon.

Links established, thanks to this wide ranging cooperation, made it possible for Poland to take a decision to assume responsibility for one of the sectors in Iraq within the coalition effort to stabilize that country. For Poland programs such as FMF and FMS, among others, are critical in the steady and long term modernization of the Armed Forces. They provide assistance in training, structural reforms, acquisition, and procurement policies and purchases of new equipment, compatible with NATO and the U.S. military. Without them, the Polish army would not be able to undertake the missions it now performs. Well-prepared programs, such as those offered to Poland, are also important to the U.S. They constitute a valuable instrument in U.S. security policy enabling Washington to support the development of capabilities of its allies and partners which in turn leads to the creation of forces that can cooperate and assist the U.S. in its global missions. Poland is a good example of successful implementation of this strategy. Successful bilateral cooperation was made possible in no small part due to understanding and willingness of both sides to be flexible and adjust to different legal systems and government cultures, which was a task that sometimes posed substantial challenges. Thanks to the leadership of General Walters and his predecessors, the necessary compromises were made and creative solutions were found to overcome existing challenges. Poland has the largest security assistance program in Central Europe.

Its SA objectives include:

1. Implement NATO force goals and enhance NATO interoperability
2. Bolster Poland’s role as a regional leader/stabilizer
3. Assist with Poland’s multiyear modernization effort
4. Implement Secretary of Defense “Transformation Initiative”
5. Strengthen U.S.-Polish interoperability/cooperation

It is useful to note the growth in this security assistance program

• Over $4 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants and loans since Fiscal Year 1995 (over $200 million without $3.8 billion FMF loan for fighter aircraft)

• Over $3 billion in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases since Fiscal Year 1996 (over $171 million without $3.5 billion F-16 LOA)

• $48.5 million in FY 03 Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funding for the Polish Multinational Division Central-South in Iraq

• $94 million of Excess Defense Articles (EDA)(current value) transferred since inception of the program. 2 former U.S. Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates, 4 Kaman SH-2G helicopters, a number of SM-1 missiles, and on-board spare parts have been transferred to Poland under the EDA program

• $15 million in International Military and Education Training (IMET) funding since Fiscal Year 1992; over 1300 students trained under IMET and FMS since the program’s inception.

• On 27 December 2002 Poland selected the F-16. On 18 April 2003 official signatures were placed on all three agreements which will acquire for Poland 48 F-16 C/D Block 50/52 aircraft, weapons, spares, training, and support valued at $3.5 billion with the first aircraft to be delivered in late 2006.

• Poland has a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for used C-130 Hercules cargo aircraft and has requested additional FMF funding.

• The U.S. is assisting with streamlining and development of a national acquisition system within the Polish MOD

• An FMF-funded FMS case has been established to finance Professional Military Education (PME) training for members of the Polish military and civilian defense workforce, to include noncommissioned officers.

• Poland is exploring the possibility of equipping its armed forces with the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV).

Key areas of cooperation under FMS/FMF include:
1. C4I
2. Airspace management
3. Navigational aide
4. Airfield upgrades
5. Search and rescue
6. Logistics
7. Simulation and NBC training
8. Frigate and helicopter support

As Poland gets more and more involved in security cooperation it is confronted with a complicated system of rules and regulations concerning military cooperation, sales and transfers of equipment. Based on our limited experience we wish to acknowledge the efforts of the U.S. government to streamline the process, address the issue of technology transfer and open the U.S. defense programs (like JSF) to foreign participants.

In our overall assessment, the security cooperation programs managed by DSCA for Poland have been a great help and success. Some suggestions from a close friend and ally:

• Greater transparency and understanding of procedures, especially for newcomers, would be useful
• Security cooperation programs should be designed that reflect priorities in U.S. security policy and should target within their framework those capabilities that enhance the ability of allies to cooperate with the U.S. (e.g., airlift).
• There should be greater convergence of security cooperation programs with the strategic vision of the U.S. government.

Thank you very much
—

Steve Rush ~ Touchdown-News

Top town

well worth the hike up the steps to the Olympic Stadium (where Barcelona’s “second team” Espanyol play their home matches) and the muesum that’s also on the site.

From there you should be able to catch the really scenic cable car all the way to the “beach” area which has some nice bars and a couple of trashy discos after dark. The harbour tour by boat is a pleasant couple of hours too.

The Nou Camp (Barcelona FC) and the museum, club shop etc. is worth a visit too if you like your football.

Once you’ve been there (mind you, even better on a match night) you will laugh when Man U fans tell you they support the “biggest club in the world” 😀

Saludos

Steve