JonesySorry, you logic escapes me. Sound like you think the USN would need 2 Carrier Battle Groups to take on the Kuznetsov! Which, is only equipped with a dozen or so Su-33’s. Which, are limited in range and payload because of the Ski Jump. :confused:
As a matter of fact a midsized Carrier around the size of the FNS Foch equipped with both Catupults and Arresting Gear. Is far more capable and flexible than the Kuznetsov in my opinion. Thereby providing far more fire power to any Battle Group.
Thats because you are looking at aircraft as the primary weapons system and not at the Soviet force package. Again, remember, Kuznetsov is not a Fleet Carrier in the western sense. You must shake off this idea that ‘its a big carrier therefore is like, and is used like, an American one’. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Look at the group that would form around an early 90’s, non-USSR collapse, Kuznetsov. Close consort would be a Kirov, perhaps a pair of Slava’s, a couple of Kresta/Kara class cruisers and, say, 6 total Soveremenny/Udaloys.
Inside of the Flanker CAP, in that group, you have north of 350 area SAMs. I stopped counting SHORADS SAM’s at about 600!. You have 64 heavy AShM’s and, owing to them and jet/chopper radar, an ability to keep hostile surface vessels at least a good 200km away from the group. A few years later with Ul’Yanovsk and Yak-44 the Soviets may have finally been able to exploit a bit more of the range of those missiles.
As I said the Soviet group would be a very tough nut to crack without NATO assigning significant resources to the task. The assigning of those resources being, as I said, a victory in itself.
JonesySuch Carriers without a strong Strike Component would be extremely vulnerable and wouldn’t last long. Regardless, my point was Large Carrier like the Kuznetsov and project Ul’Yanovsk were overkill.
Again the plan was to operate in the deep blue sea far away from much in the way of land based interference and be bloody hard to shift. What, from that sort of position, was there to strike at?. Why, therefore, would the lack of a strike capability be any kind of handicap whatsoever?.
As stated the carrier, and its attendent battlegroup, had a support role only. Its job was to cover a set of geographic coordinates and deny that seaspace to NATO ASW forces to assist with friendly sub ops. Its not a hunting group after NATO carrier groups etc its solely intended to sit there and be a hard target.
Sea surveillance was intended to be handled by the Legenda satellites, Uspekh on the group choppers and AV-MF very long range recon assets as well as a function of the, unattached, submarines in the area. Air surveillance, on Kuznetsov, was ship-based with Mars-Passat and, on Ul’Yanovsk, airborne (replacing the failed Mars-Passat and Legenda systems) with Yak-44.
The Soviet carrier group would have been a very tough nut to crack even for the combined strength of a couple of US CVN’s and the mere redirection of USN carrier assets would have been a significant victory for the Soviets as it would weaken US SIOP provision and seaborne intervention abilities elsewhere. NATO SSN’s would have been tasked with engaging the carrier group, but, that again would help Soviet SSN’s have a freer hand to operate against the Atlantic sea-bridge….which was the point of the carrier in the first place.
Gorshkov was no idiot. Had Legenda actually worked the operational concept was a very respectable one. Ul’Yanovsk with her Yak-44’s may well have provided the answer to the blue-water battlespace control problem that the Soviet Navy faced after Legenda flopped. All academic now of course, but, certainly to state that the late Cold War Russian carrier designs were ill thought out is massively inaccurate.
JonesyScot,
Yet, Russia has constructed large Carriers and they’re far more effective when equipped with CATOBAR.
Yes, but, those large carriers were never intended to be multirole fleet carriers as in the US mould. So the question of whether or not they would be more effective is irrelevent.
Soviet naval doctrine had no ‘strike from the sea’ component. Catapults assist with the launching of heavily-laden strike aircraft and support types and, seeings as the Soviets had no intention of doing strike work and (when they were building the only large carrier that was completed) had no fixed wing AEW/Tanker, they were never going to be of any real benefit. Consequently they were scarcely worth the cost of inclusion and operation.
The task of the Kuznetsov, as designed, was to sit in the middle of the Atlantic, astride NATO supply lines, and assist the Red Banner sub fleet in severing those lines. She was intended to steam around in blue water, using a powerful phased array air search radar to control airspace in concert with her Flankers and in order to prevent NATO air and, by virtue of the embarked P-700 battery, surface ASW groups from interfering with friendly subs.
Ul’Yanovsk was an evolutionary development from Kuznetsov that took onboard the lessons of the failure of the Mars-Passat system and the value of Hawkeye-style airborne radar. It got steam cats, but, solely for the operation of the AEW support aircraft. Fighters were still anticipated to use the ski-jump as the Flankers had proven an ability to launch, with light air-air loads, quite adequately without having to incur the stresses of catapult operation. Ul’Yanovsk was still a carrier built to serve the prevailing naval doctrine and was not a multirole fleet carrier in the US model.
CATOBAR Fleet carriers, in the US style, were never part of Soviet Naval doctrine so their absence was of no consequence.
JonesyYou are aware that the X-32’s engine didn’t have nearly the bypass ratio of pegasus, and as for having the hot nozzle as far back as possible, that is just a matter of pipework (3 nozzle pegasus was built and tested).
Yep I’m also aware that the X-32 required a blower in the inlet to attempt to create an air-screen to prevent hot gas re-ingestion.
My point was that a lift fan…..essentially a clutched shaft with a transfer box isnt necessarily a hideously complex piece of equipment and that the direct-lift system had its own mechanical complexities and didn’t work as well at generating lift. If mechanical complexity is the unavoidable price of STOVL flight best have a layout which actually delivers for that complexity.
JonesyIn case they need some air support if the F35B gets canned. A few squadrons of Corsairs would come in very handy in Afghanistan.
The drawback to that of course being the predicted draw down of ops in afghanistan and the absolute uselessness of that type of air capability anywhere an air defence system exists. Flying Leathernecks was a good film but a poor model for designing a force structure!
JonesyWhat is illogical about cancelling LRIP airframes on an aircraft that is still in the development phase and clearly not ready for production?
Why is that a bad thing?. Its poor that the development hasn’t gone to schedule but that is hardly a unique characteristic to the JSF program is it?.
JonesyJohn,
You are aware the the boeing x32 was direct vectored thrust and lost out, quite badly, to the lift fan layout?.
Getting half your lift thrust from a cold stage is massively efficient as you have the rotation in the turbine to tap inherently. Its also far safer having the hot nozzle as far aft as possible to minimise the risks of hot gas ingestion.
The lift fan occupies space in the air frame but its performance figures still equate to those of non stovl legacy types like Hornet and Fulcrum so its hardly a significant issue is it?
JonesyCommon legend is that they couldn’t perfect the steam cat and the early CATOBAR designs were no more than that. Personally i’ve never seen solid proof one way or the other. I do find it slightly odd that stills from the many hours of test footage that would exist from a land based test rig have all disappeared completely!.
One thing is for certain though, Scooter, is that the Soviet Navy had no requirement for CATOBAR fleet carriers. The Soviet Navy’s principle striking arm was always the submarine fleet. Carriers and surface ships were support elements for the submarines and that was it. A fleet carrier had no place in the doctrine even up to the Ul’yanovsk.
JonesyApart from the Marines….. Would a STOBAR naval version of the Gripen NG be the next best option if there’s no pure STOVL aircraft available and a conventional CATOBAR carrier/aircraft combo is unaffordable? Gripen has pretty much the same empty and max. weights as the Harrier II, similar engine thrust also. So it could launch from a ski jump and catch a cable on landing.
Who would want it and for what purpose?. Italy might be desperate enough to order a couple of dozen so that the Cavour could fly something in the event of -35B cancellation, but, those airframes would be fiercely expensive. So much so you couldnt credit it as a realistic option. That is even if Gripen could carry a practical combat load off a 600ft deck.
Other that that Gripen is no use to the USMC as it couldnt deploy off the LHA/LHD’s. India has the MiG-29K and Russia an airframe to offer in direct competition to Sea Gripen with the advantages of being tested and proven and possessing the inherent safety benefit of twin engines. To countries looking at small naval airgroups the appeal of not, necessarily, losing the airframe in event of a single-engine fail would be a considerable one.
Brazil wants a sea control carrier and has CATOBAR already. If it can have CATOBAR and Rafale why would it consider STOBAR and Gripen?. The UK, with its erstwhile Carrier Strike requirement, would seem to be about the only country this would have fit for. CVF could have handled the STOBAR arrangement and the type would have allowed for the maintainance of the austere forward base option. Seeings as we are now going CATOBAR and can have, it seems, full first-day-of-war capability courtesy of F-35C that makes Gripen look very much like a solution in search of a problem.
JonesyPhilip
The message to me is that if you want an F35B to take off with a decent fuel and weapons load you need a CVF sized vessel with a ski jump. If you want your F35B to be able to land back on without having to jettison unused weapons you need a CVF size vessel, to allow for rolling landing.
Then you have read the message incorrectly. See ‘Cavour Class’ and compare and contrast with CVF. CVF’s size was far in excess of what is deemed necessary to launch and recover an F-35B. CVF’s size was about right for the efficient operation of a maximum of 36 F-35B’s.
JonesyWhen there is a report from the japanese, taiwanese, philippines etc about chinese ocean recon uav’s or a single article on a coherent wide area maritime surveillance system THEN i’ll be interested,
Until then this looks more like the chinese missile team have gotten ahead of the targeting team and are declaring a capability based on the ISTAR they do have. Which technically is perfectly legitimate.
The US are taking this currently limited system and blowing it up to monstrous proportion to get their latter day missile gap and secure funding on the back of it. This of course feeding the prides of a multitude of chinese internet warriors and all those who have the ill educated views on the supposed vulnerability of aircraft carriers in the missile age.
JonesyA lot of words saying nothing pla.
You’re continually stating that my requirement for evidence is unrealistic. That the chinese wont arrange a display to satisfy my whim. Fair enough, but, without that kind of evidence you have no foundation for your assertions. You are guessing. You may try logical extrapolation but its still a guess at the end of the day!.
You cant answer the simplest question after 5 years of such confident predictions of the obvious capability of chinese industry. Where are the UAV’s?. A scattering few is not a capability. To service the requirement for ASBN would require dozens actually airborne at any one time. That is noticeable so why hasn’t anyone reported it?. Prototypes sat on obscure airbases are reported but not a dozen operationally deployed monitoring the South China sea?. Lets not be silly PLA.
The comment that there ‘must be’ a targeting system because they’ve built the missile is just self-reinforcing nonsense. The Soviets did just that. The missiles were built independent of the targeting system. The chinese are apparently following the same model. As i’ve said targeting platforms for ASBN exist. They are just not surviveable. Is the ASBM operational? Possibly – is it likely to be effective in its current configuration?. I wouldn’t expect so.
JonesyPla,
You are making two fundamental mistakes here. First is misunderstanding the scale of the ISTAR tasking. Again a few images of a couple of prototype UAV’s doesn’t cut it. I’ve yet to see any image of HALE UAV’s in squadron service or a single report of chinese uav sea surveillance operations. These ops, by definition, would not be concealable even by those with the mastery of secrecy you give the chinese.
Here your comments about the apparent new fighter design are helpful in explaining your second error. Do you think that China now possess an air defence capability based on that new fighter design?. Until there are several hundred built and deployed, with a fully worked up training and logistic infrastructure supporting it the answer is no. For years to come that fighter, if it even gets to operational service, does nothing for china’s air defence potential. Likewise these prototype uav’s do nothing for ASBM targeting until they represent a fully worked up and deployed capability.
Right now the commentry is that ASBM has reached initial operational capability, as an anti access weapon, yet it has no targeting system that the opponent it was designed to counter cannot defeat or exploit. Dumb.
JonesySo no evidence and lots of assumption, supposition and leaps of faith?.
The ASBM is an anti access weapon. The whole point of it is to keep opposing strike groups at sufficient distance that they cannot achieve strategic goals. If it cant do that its a failure before it starts.
Before you go accusing me of china bashing I actually like the implication of what the ASBM says of chinese intentions. Its what makes me laugh so hard about american attempts to demonise it. Its a solely defensive weapon. You dont build such a weapon if you intend to fight someone on their doorstep!.
My problem is with the weapon as a system. Its inherent weakness is huge and China just doesn’t give the appearance of making the effort to sort it.
You have reinforced what i’ve said about the chinese HALE UAV projects. Operationally they dont exist and, as Pinko points out, we’ve been flogging this issue 5 years!. 5 years how much further on are they?. Where is the Chinese globalhawk that was predicted?. Where is Chinese SURTASS?. China is imaging ships in chokepoints and calling that an achievement?. I tell you PLA finding ships at sea is lots easier when only have to scan a ten mile wide strait!. For theatre entry denial you need to be scanning tens of thousands of square-mile’s continuously. Thats the gap that needs to be crossed. I see no evidence that gap has been crossed so i’m wondering where your faith comes from to support your comments?
JonesyOK this is probably a very silly question that has been answered many times in the past, but would it not be possible to try to locate the carrier group by whatever means (perhaps when they are visiting a port) and then simply use a nuclear sub to track them?
Not a silly question. Has been tried plenty of times. Story goes the Soviets had a Victor III on the Hermes group all the way to Ascension in 82. We had the Argentines carrier group tailed back to port. So it can be done if the target is switched off or has no ability to counter detect!.
Problem is that the USN CSG is well provided for in ASW with attached cutting edge SSN’s and SURTASS support. If it is tasked for theatre entry in the chinese sphere of interest the group will be at a high alert state for a long time before engagement range.
Putting a trailer on a Carrier group, surface or otherwise, is a long established tactic. Dealing with unwanted snoopers is also a long practiced task – be it by tasking an escort to ‘shove’ the shadower away while the fleet manoeuvres clear or by sending a chopper to wave bottles of whisky at the snooping crew as a distraction!.
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