Jonesy the great, what a dream turns true, after 5 years debate on this board;)

Partly the point though isnt it Pinko?. 5 years down the track and this still looks more like US desperation to find a new ‘missile gap’ and build the Chinese up to be the new ‘Evil Empire’ than it does to be a real operational threat!.

Loke,
The issue is not one of whether China has a platform capable of providing targetting data. Almost any modern warship, modern strikefighter or MPA could do the job.

The question is whether any of those ISR assets would survive contact with a CSG for long enough to develop the track, discriminate the targets and get that data back.

Are you suggesting that CVN’s are to be hidden away in anything but a low-threat environment, but the gators will not?

The amphibs cant hide. They have to be in the other guys littoral in order to put forces ashore. The whole point is that opposing entry-denial forces are attrited to the point that the amphibious assembly area is viable for operations before the amphibs get there. AFTER that point the nature of the action changes and the carrier groups inherent mobility advantage is wasted if it has to be shackled to the beachhead.

– yet the USMC still considers storming beaches (forcible entry) its raison d’etre – and focuses huge sums of money on the technology (V-22, EFV, F-35B, etc.) to keep that option viable. People both inside the naval services and outside (DoD, Congress, think tanks, etc.) have been debating issues surrounding the Marines and amphibious operations for decades – and it will and should continue. No doubt that the USMC (USN) are experts in amphibious ops, but that doesn’t mean that alternative strategies (and equipment) should not be considered.

Who else is there that can effect a forced entry if there is no convenient (and viable) land border to jump across?. How else do you put heavy forces in enemy territory if you cant go overland?.

Which calls into question current USMC amphibious doctrine. Potential adversaries that the US might face have plenty of coastal artillery (tubes, mobile SSM’s, and possibly ballistic missiles) that will function to keep ships far from the beaches until missiles are expended and defenses attritted – by the CAW/USAF. This is not like in WWII where you could (relatively) safely park multiple CVE’s just offshore and generate sorties to support the assault. Breaking the door down was hard then, and much harder to do now.

No it doesnt call it into question. It reinforces the idea of the STOVL F-35B in the group – surviveable, flexible striking power based in/near-to the assembly area for hi-readiness/quick reaction. Once the door has been kicked in by the massed striking power of the CAW striking-power needs to be ready to hand to stomp on emergent threats like the C3 nodes supporting shore artillery, mobile SAM’s denying airspace over the FEBA or the coastal missile vehicles mentioned.

You either do that by tying the whole CAW to the beachhead, limiting it to a radius of a couple of hundred miles from the fixed geographical point…..which is moronic especially when that CAW could be achieving very much more valuable strategic effect elsewhere in support of the beachhead. Or by making the strike jets forward deployable. At this point….now the F-35B is being debugged….that decision is a simple one.

The same mistake is being repeated by so many here the fundamentals of carrier deployment have to be reiterated. A carriers primary weapon is its inherent operational mobility. It carries its own weapons and logisitcs as a single package and its able to generate combat power then disappear and reappear elsewhere to generate effects on a completely different threat axis. THAT is the power an aircraft carrier brings….strike with impunity….as by the time the enemy has marshalled his resources to even FIND the carrier thats just hit him…..the naval force has shifted again.

In a strike-from-the-sea scenario asking the carrier to give up its mobility and independence of action, to nursemaid an assembly area, is akin to the Battle of Britain Luftwaffe telling its fighter squadrons to keep close escort on the bombers – Dumb!. You do not want your carrier aircraft spending their days orbitting over the FEBA on armed-recce…its a waste. You want the carrier relocating 400 miles up the coast to interdict opfor comms and logistics – dropping the rail bridge that was carrying an entrained mechanised division that was racing to reinforce the local forces engaging the beachhead, or, hitting the airbases that could be used by hostile strikefighters to target the amphibs in the assembly area.

a US CVN could have 6 VFA/VMFA squadrons. with 4-6 CVNs,(I believe every Marine division landing should be supported by 2 CVNs), a constant presence can be maintained over the FEBA, and still have fleet air defence. so with CVNs doing this job so well, were does the F-35B fit in.

COULD HAVE 4-6 CVN’s…..what if it doesnt have all those decks available?. What happens if there are only a couple of deck available and the rest of the operational decks are in the other ocean. The USN carrier fleet has been drawn down from where it was. How many are fully operational in the Atlantic and Pacific right now?. Given time a weighted force can be assembled….what if the strategic situation doesnt give you that time?. USMC aviation doctrine incorporating F-35B/LHA gives options to the on-scene commander to maximise the effects possible from a minimum of assets and its already best-part developed. Simple as that.

Phillip,

The America class were designed for purpose. The deletion of the well deck was to allow the use of that space plus additional spaces through the vessel for air-optimised useage. SRL techniques should not be confused with CATOBAR approaches. You are looking at over-the-deck speeds of 30knts or so. Shorter through decks should present no problem for SRL as you are hardly going to get a bolter at 30knts!.

Kilo,

So, by your logic, a handful (not more than 12 per big ship, probably more like 8) of less capable fighters will be able to do what one or two complete CV wings will be unable to do. I see.

I think you will find that is more your misunderstanding about Marine air, and what it does, than anything else. No-one has suggested Marine air will replace carrier airwings. The point of Marine air is to be there to support the Marines ashore. The job of the carrier airwing is to secure the amphib assembly area in the first place – if the threat environment warrants it. F-35B’s from the MATF could assist the carrier airwing of course, but, principally shooting in the amphibs is a job for the CAW.

One the assembly area has been secured by the carrier fleet then the Marine forces, including air, go inshore. THAT is where F-35B comes into play. With the threat level attrited and with F-35B covering the assembly area and beachhead FROM the assembly area the CSG is now free to manoever without being fully tied to a geographic location. An opponent attempting to smash a beachhead may try and concentrate forces and present a strategic target-of-opportunity to a CAW able to manoever and exploit.

Likewise if the scenario is sub-warfighting it could be that attaching an LHA with 18 or so F-35B’s to a couple of LPD’s and an LHD etc provides sufficient combat power to obviate the need for a CVN. How much of a force multiplier is that?.

A) Look up tac-air integration.
B) No it isn’t, that job falls to the Department of the Navy who has the right prioritize which of its assets receive funding. Take a gander which is higher on its priorities list? Carriers with 4 squadrons or STOVL Marine CAS?

Ben,

Its only integrated if its there when its called on. STOVL F-35B, if/when the major kinks get worked out, means there is no need for outside integration and THAT is optimal. One service – one chain of command cant be simpler can it?.

I have gandered. The America class boats seem to suggest that STOVL is high on the agenda.

The fact remains that, despite yours and others views on here, Marine Tacair isnt a USN benefit-in-kind. USMC tacair isnt ‘winged artillery’ and isnt the quaint image of open cockpitted Corsairs making strafing runs against Japanese positions.

The USMC have a requirement for surviveable, flexible, precision strike that is independent of the full-aspect airbases the USAF types demand and the big deck carriers that the USN types demand. The ONLY answer to that, that allows for deployment to their specialised LHA’s, is the F-35B. End of conversation. No rotary-air allows for it, no UAV/UCAV currently allows for it with equal surviveability, no tube or rocket artillery currently available can match the effects and engagement flexibility.

Simple as that. You can talk at length about how the USMC requirement is flawed, but, to be frank its irrelevent. The simple fact is that the service requirement stands and the ONLY system that comes close to meeting it is F-35B.

does anyone think it would be better to, for example, return to operating vessels like the Kiev? I know they intend to purchase “at least one” Mistral…perhaps instead of MiG-29K’s and upgraded Su-33s the Russians should consider an updated Yak-141 design? A capable V/STOL aircraft paired with a Mistral-type vessel may be cheaper and better

The problem with that is that a Kiev-type CVS(G) no longer fits with the services operational doctrine. The Kiev’s were intended to support the Soviet/Russian submarine force in the Atlantic basin by engaging NATO ASW surface groups and MarPat aircraft. This is clearly not the strategic goal of the Russian Navy today or in the near-future. The Russian Navy has been tasked for, last I heard, sea control of the extended Russian EEZ and areas of interest. This sort of tasking does not need heavy missile-carrying aviation cruisers any more than it needs big STOBAR aircraft carriers – themselves optimised to support the legacy of Gorshkov’s doctrine.

India has a similar requirement for a ‘patrol carrier’ and came up with 35k tons, GT propulsion and a modest STOBAR airgroup. Given the same strategic requirement the answer for Russia is, unsuprisingly, similar. They have the MiG-29K for free, so, using that is a no-brainer – if it is uncompetetive in fifteen years it doesnt really matter. There is no way that a Russian carrier force will ever be able to go toe-to-toe with the USN anyway so trying to go from where they are now to multirole supercarriers dominating blue-water is fantasy land and a waste of resource that the Russians just are NOT stupid enough to try for. You build a ship in a few years….you build a capability over a few decades….as the Chinese are well aware.

It is well within Russian capabilities to design a 35-40k ton hull good for 30knts and adaptable for a CATOBAR or STOBAR layout depedent on clients requirement (hint: one eye on the export market!). Peacetime airgroup of a dozen MiG-29K’s and a dozen choppers incorporating a good sized det of Ka-31’s. Combat surge of, perhaps, 24 MiG-29k and half a dozen radar Kamov’s. A modest design like this is practical for a proper build run of maybe 6 hulls putting 3 each in the Northern and Far Eastern fleets giving continuous deployment potential in both regions and a noteworthy 2 carrier ‘surge’ potential in emergencies.

As importantly it also allows for the protracted development of multicarrier deployment capability within the Russian Fleet without the large operational costs associated with monster 60k ton carriers!. The Kuznetsov, today, is like the Kirov’s and the Oscars – impressive-looking but operationally useless. If scrapping any of them gave more resource to allow the Russian Navy to get its new, relevent, and very competent-looking escort programmes advanced I’d say do it in a heartbeat.

Oh boy. Not laughed like that in years…..indeed a good find Ja. Pure comedy!.

Particularly liked this bit where the author quotes:

Professor of Military Studies and Senior Academic Advisor, Knightsbridge University

Worth Googling Knightsbridge University quickly for a bit of a giggle.

LACM’s and, perhaps, VATOL UAV’s or surface launched mini-UAV’s are all feasible concepts for submarines and are either deployed or being researched. Most of the rest of it is simply amusing.